“THE DEAD BECAME UNCOUNTABLE”

Mass Atrocities in Sudan
THE UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM teaches that the Holocaust was preventable and that by heeding warning signs and taking early action, individuals and governments can save lives. With this knowledge, the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide works to do for the victims of genocide today what the world failed to do for the Jews of Europe in the 1930s and 1940s. The mandate of the Simon-Skjodt Center is to alert the United States’ national conscience, influence policy makers, and stimulate worldwide action to prevent and work to halt acts of genocide or related crimes against humanity, and advance justice and accountability. Learn more at ushmm.org/genocide-prevention.

DANICA DAMPLO, Policy Manager at the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide.

COVER: A Sudanese woman who fled the conflict in Geneina, in Sudan’s Darfur region, helps her relative to carry a canister after she filled it at the water point in Adre, Chad July 30, 2023. REUTERS/Zohra Bensem
**List of Acronyms**

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INTRODUCTION

On April 15th, 2023, fighting broke out in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), headed by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and a powerful paramilitary group known as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), headed by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). The conflict has killed more than 13,000 people and displaced more than 7.3 million people.¹ The RSF and its allied militias reignited a campaign of widespread, systematic, and ethnically-motivated violence in the region of Darfur, targeting non-Arab communities. Efforts by the United States (US) and others have failed to secure a durable ceasefire or to protect a new generation in Darfur from the risk of genocide.

The conflict that began in April is a continuation of the cycles of violence that have persisted in Sudan for decades, including a period of mass atrocities in 2003-2005 in Darfur, for which former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir was charged with genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC).² The SAF and RSF had previously joined forces in 2019 to oust al-Bashir following widespread protests in which the Sudanese people called for transitional justice and a transition to democracy. However, in 2021, the SAF and RSF overthrew the transitional government that had replaced al-Bashir. In April 2023, disagreements between al-Burhan and Hemedti exploded into open warfare.³ While earlier conflicts had spared Sudan’s capital, since April civilians in Khartoum and nearby Omdurman have endured violent clashes, aerial bombardment, sexual violence, and a humanitarian crisis. The conflict spread, with the RSF seeking to control the Darfur region and branching out from the west, and the SAF based out of the city of Port Sudan in the east. The RSF is supplied by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), while the SAF is supported by Egypt.⁴

Key Points

- The risk of genocide remains high in Darfur, Sudan, which is experiencing widespread, systematic, and identity-based mass killing and atrocities.
- The risk of mass atrocities is high as the conflict spreads to other regions of Sudan, particularly Kordofan.
- A comprehensive, coordinated approach that centers atrocity prevention and civilian protection is critical to address these risks and ongoing mass atrocities. See policy options below.

¹ The RSF and its allied militias reignited a campaign of widespread, systematic, and ethnically-motivated violence in the region of Darfur, targeting non-Arab communities. Efforts by the United States (US) and others have failed to secure a durable ceasefire or to protect a new generation in Darfur from the risk of genocide.
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In June 2023, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum sounded the alarm about the dire risk of genocide in Darfur. That risk remains high today. None of the conditions referenced in this warning have improved since June, and the numbers of civilians killed or harmed has risen dramatically. Among the communities at greatest risk today are those who survived genocide twenty years ago and who have continued to suffer since. This brief will detail mass atrocities underway in Sudan, highlight present and future risks not only in Darfur but elsewhere, and offer policy options for an effective response.

A BRIEF HISTORY

When the current war began, Sudan was already at high risk of experiencing mass atrocities due to a history of genocide, widespread impunity for atrocities, well-armed and resourced perpetrators, and rampant hate speech and identity-based violence, particularly in Darfur.

Beginning in 2003, the Sudanese government, with support from the Janjaweed (a militia group comprised of Arab tribes), responded to rebel movements in Darfur by launching ethnically targeted attacks on the communities perceived to be supporting them, committing mass killings, rape, looting, systematic destruction of food stores, and the forced displacement of Masalit, Fur, and Zaghawa non-Arab communities. These crimes resulted in the deaths of more than 200,000 people and the forced displacement of more than two million people. In 2004 US Secretary of State Colin Powell determined that the crimes amounted to genocide.

In 2007, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorized a hybrid United Nations-African Union peacekeeping force (UNAMID) to implement a peace agreement and protect civilians; UNAMID formally ceased operations in 2020. While imperfect, UNAMID had increased safety and stability for many during its deployment. Although the ICC had charged al-Bashir with genocide and other crimes, he was never sent to the Hague to face trial. Over time, al-Bashir formed the RSF out of Janjaweed fighters in Darfur. While at a lower scale than in the previous periods, violence against civilians continued; in the 2010s the military indiscriminately bombed civilian areas in South Kordofan, while the RSF committed additional atrocities in Darfur and South Kordofan.

Today, civilians in Sudan are enduring mass atrocities at an alarming scale, particularly in the region of Darfur, where the RSF and its allied Arab militias are reported to have committed widespread, systematic, targeted attacks on non-Arab civilians, notably the Masalit people.
CURRENT MASS ATROCITY CRIMES

Since the conflict began in April 2023 both the SAF and RSF have been documented as having attacked civilians. Both denied wrongdoing, and yet failed to halt attacks. More than 13,000 people have been killed since April. The United Nations (UN) has alleged that the SAF and the RSF have murdered, detained, and tortured civilians, and continue to carry out indiscriminate attacks, including airstrikes and drone attacks in civilian areas, and to target hospitals and schools. In December 2023, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken determined that war crimes had been committed by the SAF and RSF, and that crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing had been committed by the RSF and allied militias in Darfur.

Darfur

When the war broke out, the RSF launched attacks on major urban centers and SAF headquarters in Darfur in an effort to seize control of the region. As a central part of this campaign the RSF and its allies from Arab tribes have targeted non-Arab civilians, principally the Masalit community, for murder, torture, and sexual violence including rape, and looting, as well as buildings in Masalit-populated areas for destruction. Blinken’s atrocity determination brought to the fore the layers of tragedy and trauma inherent in this renewed campaign of ethnically targeted violence: “in haunting echoes of the genocide that began almost 20 years ago in Darfur, we have seen an explosion of targeted violence against some of the same survivors’ communities.” The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) confirmed that killings of the Masalit community have been accompanied by “calls to kill and expel them from Sudan.” Survivors have pointed to the use of rampant hate speech and ethnic slurs before, during, and after attacks, including being referred to as “slaves.” The RSF has also targeted political, traditional, and community leaders who could otherwise mobilize resistance to RSF occupation.

There are horrific accounts of RSF forces and its allied militias using rape, gang rape, and other forms of sexual violence against women and girls in Darfur, including holding women and girls in sexual slavery. UN experts have noted the widespread use of conflict related sexual violence (CRSV) by the RSF, including rapes that are ethnically and racially motivated “to punish and terrorize communities.” The Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa explained that the RSF have used rape for 20 years to humiliate non-Arab communities, and now that the RSF is more powerful, the situation in Darfur is worse than it was two decades ago.

The RSF attacked SAF-aligned Masalit militias in the West Darfur capital of El Geneina on April 15th. On June 15th, the governor of West Darfur, Khamis Abakar, was killed hours after accusing the RSF and their allied fighters of “genocide”; his mutilated body was left on the streets of El Geneina. He was last seen in RSF custody. In the days that followed, the RSF and allied Arab militias massacred hundreds of Masalit civilians in the streets of El Geneina. Families were gunned down as they sought to flee, to the point where, according to a local humanitarian actor, “the dead became uncountable.” According to OHCHR, the RSF and their militias made El Geneina “uninhabitable” through burning and looting. An RSF fighter, standing in a part of the town formerly populated by the Masalit community, declared that they had successfully removed the Masalits from the district.

Some who fled El Geneina found shelter in the nearby Ardamata internally displaced persons (IDP) camp. When the RSF attacked the Ardamata IDP camp in early November, they targeted non-Arab IDPs for torture, rape, and murder, and massacred civilians in the nearby Ardamata Masalit majority neighborhoods. The RSF also selected dozens of Masalit men and boys and executed them, taking hundreds of others to RSF detention camps. Six tribal leaders and their families were killed during the attack on the camp in Ardamata; a local
human rights lawyer said, “They want to kill [our leaders] so they can replace us with their own.” The death toll from Ardamata has been estimated to be between 800 to 2000 people. Human Rights Watch has geolocated a video that shows Abdel Raheem Hamdan Dagalo, RSF deputy commander and Hemedti’s brother, celebrating the takeover of the SAF base in Ardamata. The presence of the RSF deputy commander in Ardamata when these atrocities were reported suggests an awareness and complicity of RSF leadership.

The horrors at El Geneina and Ardamata are just two examples; as the RSF and their militias tore across Darfur, they razed more than 29 cities, towns, and villages to the ground. While the RSF has predominantly targeted the Masalit community, it has also targeted individuals from other non-Arab groups, like the Fur and Zaghawa communities. Some IDPs attacked in 2023 have been displaced since the fighting in the early 2000s. To secure funds to pay combatants and instill fear in the local populations, reports suggest that RSF and allies are looting homes, establishing checkpoints for extortion, and ransoming detainees. According to the UN nearly 4,000 civilians were killed in Darfur between April 15th and the end of August, with the majority believed to “have been targeted mainly due to their ethnicity.”

**FUTURE RISKS TO CIVILIANS**

From the start of the conflict both the RSF and the SAF have targeted civilians in a bid for control and power, with spiraling violence fed by cycles of grievance and impunity. As war spreads and impunity persists, new civilians and regions will be put at escalating risk.

**Darfur**

The risk of genocide remains high in the Darfur region - where there is a risk of the RSF and their allied militias targeting remaining members of the Masalit community as well as other key non-Arab communities, particularly those perceived as being affiliated with armed groups. Survivors of the genocide twenty years ago are among those most vulnerable. The failure to meaningfully address previous cycles of violence has contributed to the persistent use of atrocities as part of the military strategy of the RSF and their allies. Many survivors of previous atrocities have lived in IDP camps for over a decade, their physical concentration together makes them easier targets for attack by RSF. While the RSF has made some efforts to appear credible in territories they now control, advocates stress that non-Arab communities remain at risk. The systematic targeting of non-Arab political leaders and the favoring of Arab groups by the RSF opens up long-term risks for identity-based violence even after the RSF consolidates military control. Darfur civilians are also vulnerable to indiscriminate aerial bombardment from the SAF, who have demonstrated a disregard for the people of Darfur, failing to protect civilians from RSF attacks, and bombing RSF-controlled residential areas.

Civilians currently sheltering in El Fasher in North Darfur are at high risk of targeted ethnic violence - including murder, sexual violence, and forced displacement. El Fasher is the last city in Darfur that has not yet fallen to the RSF, which has surrounded the city. Armed movements representing non-Arab groups have mobilized in El Fasher, but have been described to the Simon-Skjodt Center as fractious and unable to hold off the RSF indefinitely. El Fasher also hosts tens of thousands of IDPs from across the region in huge camps in and around the city. Given prior RSF attacks, an attack on El Fasher would likely result in the kinds of violence reported at El Geneina and Ardamata, but on a larger scale. A battle for El Fasher could also lead to retaliation toward other ethnic groups, in addition to the Masalit, represented among the armed groups in El Fasher, such as the Fur and Zaghawa communities.
Risk of atrocities in other regions in Sudan

While the RSF remains well-supplied, including from external actors such as the UAE, it will continue to extend its reach and violent tactics into new parts of Sudan. In December 2023, the RSF attacked Wad Madani in Al Jazirah state. Wad Madani is Sudan’s second largest city, a lucrative target, SAF stronghold, and humanitarian hub hosting tens of thousands of displaced persons. The RSF may continue to select targets on the basis of communal SAF affiliation and the potential for looting, with associated risks for civilians given the brutality of RSF tactics.51

There is a particular risk of mass atrocities in the Kordofan region, which neighbors Darfur and has experienced fierce battles between the SAF and RSF and their respective allied locally based armed groups, resulting in civilian casualties, displacement, and a humanitarian crisis. Given persistent impunity and a history of violence in the Kordofans, there is a risk that the RSF will replicate its scorched earth tactics, including retaliatory attacks on civilians affiliated ethnically with armed opponents. Widespread sexual violence by the RSF is already being reported in the Kordofan region. Given RSF targeting of local leaders in Darfur, the RSF may replicate this tactic in Kordofan to consolidate broad control and alliances.

Within SAF-controlled areas, advocates report the harassment, arrest, and detention of human rights defenders, journalists and anti-war activists, including on the basis of identity. Ahead of the feared RSF attack on Wad Madani, the SAF reportedly targeted for arrest and detention those who based on their accent or ethnicity were suspected of being from the RSF stronghold of Darfur, and therefore of being RSF supporters.

The humanitarian situation in Sudan remains dire and both exacerbates the suffering of survivors of mass atrocities and heightens their risk. Both sides have been accused of obstructing humanitarian access. There is a risk that obstruction could reach the level of forced starvation and death from preventable disease. In Darfur, during and following the 2003-2005 genocide thousands succumbed to starvation and disease. In conflict-affected regions of Sudan, 70% of hospitals are non-functioning, and food, medicine, and drinkable water are scarce. There is a high risk of famine and the UN’s 2.6 billion dollar humanitarian appeal remains only one-third funded at the time of writing this brief.
RESPONSES TO THE CRISIS

Local non-governmental organizations and community leaders are already taking steps to mitigate atrocity risks, meet humanitarian needs, document crimes, and broker small acts of peace.⁶¹ For example, some tribal leaders in Darfur (representing communities not targeted by the RSF) have successfully negotiated small ceasefires.⁶² Throughout Sudan, youth leaders are combating misinformation, providing humanitarian aid, crowdfunding for food, and arranging transportation for fleeing civilians.⁶³ Amidst a collapsed healthcare system, local women’s organizations are providing survivors of CRSV with shelter, medicine, and mental health and psychosocial (MHPSS) support.⁶⁴ Despite furious recruitment efforts by belligerents, civil society actors – particularly young people – continue to organize anti-war demonstrations.⁶⁵
**Mediation**

Most of the international and regional attention on Sudan has focused on mediation between the two belligerents, even though Al-Burhan and Hemiedi have long appeared more convinced that they can defeat the other on the battlefield than at the negotiating table.⁶⁶ The US and Saudi Arabia established a platform in Jeddah to facilitate a cessation of hostilities and the provision of humanitarian assistance. The Jeddah talks have been largely unsuccessful, as both sides have repeatedly violated an agreement reached in the talks to abide by international humanitarian law and protect civilians, and as conflict continues.⁶⁷ Regionally, both the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have offered roadmaps for peace, and in December 2023 IGAD organized a summit where members agreed to seek to organize a meeting between Hemiedi and al-Burhan.⁶⁸ Political parties and local civil society groups have organized a separate track focused on restoring peace and democracy.⁶⁹ In December 2023 two US Congresspeople sent a letter to Secretary Blinken calling for the US to look into the reported role of the UAE in supporting the RSF.⁷⁰ The US has reportedly raised concerns directly with the UAE, with unclear results.⁷¹ On December 20, 2023, two US Senators introduced a bipartisan resolution calling for the Biden administration to name a high-level special envoy for Sudan.⁷²

**Sanctions**

In July 2004 the UNSC imposed an open ended arms embargo in the Darfur region, which remains in place, but does not appear to be stemming the flow of arms used by the RSF to commit atrocities in Darfur.⁷³ Since April 2023, the US has imposed visa restrictions and targeted sanctions on individuals identified as destabilizing Sudan and committing gross violations of human rights.⁷⁴ However, individual sanctions have failed to discourage violence or to stop arms from getting into the hands of perpetrators. On December 20, 2023, two US Senators introduced a bipartisan resolution calling for the Biden administration to develop a comprehensive strategy for sanctioning belligerents and actors that supply them.⁷⁵

**Documentation of crimes**

Due to a lack of access, most of the documentation of atrocities in Sudan has been done by Sudanese groups, who have shared their findings with the world, often at great personal risk. The US has funded local justice and accountability-focused documentation, and on June 9, 2023, publicly launched the Sudan Conflict Observatory remote digital platform for monitoring and reporting on conflict activity in Sudan.⁷⁶ On July 13, 2023, the Prosecutor of the ICC warned that history was repeating itself in Darfur, and announced that his Office would deploy an investigative team.⁷⁷ A UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) that reported on violations by both parties was operational in Sudan from 2020 until Sudan requested the Mission’s mandate be terminated in December 2023. On October 11, 2023, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) passed a resolution that established a fact-finding mission (FFM) for Sudan.⁷⁸ As of December 2023 the FFM has yet to begin its work. In December, Secretary Blinken issued an atrocity determination that both the SAF and the RSF had committed war crimes, and that the RSF and their allied militias had committed crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing in Darfur.⁷⁹
A WAY FORWARD FOR POLICYMAKERS

There are few populations where expectations for protection and justice have been set so high by the international community as in Darfur – and where people have so often been let down. Across Sudan, both the SAF and the RSF have repeatedly violated international humanitarian and human rights law, in open defiance of efforts to constrain them. The emphasis on fragmented mediation efforts alongside the deployment of piecemeal sanctions has so far failed to collectively carry the credibility and leverage needed to prevent atrocities, protect civilians, deliver aid, and end the war.

A calibrated, sustained, and coordinated response at the local, regional and multilateral level is needed to prevent further mass atrocities. Both al-Burhan and Hemedti remain dependent, at least in part, on foreign benefactors and seek political credibility at domestic and international levels. Atrocity prevention must be integrated across all initiatives; concerned governments must urgently seek a mediated outcome to the conflict while using all available tools to protect civilians and prevent atrocities. In the pursuit of protecting civilians, one option is the deployment of a protection force, building on the experience of UNAMID, which was deployed in Darfur until 2020. Other options for protection will be explored below. In addition, a coordinated effort must be undertaken to invest in documentation and justice mechanisms, and to cut off the external financial and military support that sustains the conflict and enables mass atrocities.

Finding an urgent, diplomatic solution to the conflict

- The US should appoint and fully resource a special presidential envoy for Sudan.
- Ensure a coordinated approach between concerned governments and international and regional bodies toward a mediation process and key messaging toward belligerents.
- Engage bilaterally with influential third parties to reduce support to key belligerents and to persuade RSF and SAF leadership to participate constructively in mediation.
- Allow for flexible funding to support local conflict resolution efforts – including by young people and women's groups.
- Provide resources for diverse representatives from Sudanese civil society, including young people, women’s organizations, and survivors and victims’ groups, to organize efforts to promote a political transition and design a future transitional justice process.

Degrad capacity of perpetrators

- Urgently adopt and enforce an all-of Sudan arms embargo and sanction actors and countries that violate the embargo.
- Enforce the UN Security Council arms embargo on Darfur.
• Place targeted sanctions on belligerents identified as having had a role in the commission of mass atrocities, including CRSV.81

• Press states, including the UAE, that provide financial, technical, or political support to the belligerents, to abide by arms embargoes and sanctions.

Protect vulnerable civilian populations

• Urgently explore the deployment of a regional or sub-regional peace operation for Darfur with a mandate to protect civilians and IDPs, and to prevent atrocities in El Fasher.

• Establish safe routes for the evacuation of civilians. Ensure civilians will be able to return to their homes when they can do so safely and voluntarily.

• Support safe refugee resettlement and pathways for asylum.

Advance accountability efforts

• Support victim-centered accountability efforts including through technical, material, coordination, and financial support to locally led human rights monitoring and documentation efforts and ensuring survivor consultation and access with the ICC investigation and HRC Fact Finding Mission.

• The UNSC should expand the ICC investigation to cover all of Sudan.

• Establish an AU Peace and Security Council commission of inquiry into the situation in Sudan.
ENDNOTES

13 “Sudan conflict brings new atrocities to Darfur as militias kill, rape, burn homes in rampages,” AP News, July 28, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/sudan-darfur-fighting-war-crimes-705bde1ac90f67b2936bf6e6f6663ca/;
18 General Al-Burhan has denied that his forces were targeting civilians - despite the UN saying there is evidence they are launching airstrikes on residential areas. See James Landale, “Sudan war: Army chief Burhan claims he’s ready for peace talks,” BBC, September 22, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world/africa-66890207;


As the ethnic targeting dimensions of the violence in Darfur became apparent, the Troika (Norway, the United Kingdom, and the US), a European Union representative, and African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) acknowledged and explicitly condemned the ethnic targeting of civilians by the RSF and allied militias. See: “Condemning Atrocities in Darfur - United States Department of State,” US State Department, June 15, 2023, https://www.state.gov/condemning-atrocities-in-darfur/.


The RSF has historic ties to the Darfur region, and control over the region enables the RSF to access arms and supplies through neighboring states.


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“Sudan: Tackle Spiraling Violence in West Darfur,” Human Rights Watch, June 21, 2023,


Civil society organization with personnel in Darfur, in conversation with the author, October 2023.

Civil society representative from Darfur, in conversation with the author, November 2023.

Sudan expert, in conversation with the author, December 2023.


In addition, in November reported airstrikes launched by SAF killed at least 40 civilians in RSF controlled El Daein in East Darfur. See: “At least 40 civilians killed in El Daein by Sudanese warplanes,” Sudan Tribune, November 22, 2023, https://sudantribune.com/article/279625/.

“RSF deputy leader: ‘We decided to control all of Darfur, and El Fasher is no exception,’” Sudan War Monitor, November 27, 2023, https://sudanwarmonitor.com/pr/rsf-deputy-leader-we-decided-to-control;
“A joined-up mediation approach will be essential to ensure that ceasefire and civilian political tracks in Sudan are harmonized, tells ASG Pobee,” UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, November 16, 2023, https://dppa.un.org/en/msg-sc-9480-asg-pobee-sudan-16-nov-2023;


Sudan expert, in confidential discussion with the author, December 2023;

Sudanese civil society representative, in confidential discussion with the author, November 2023;

Organization represented in El Fasher, in confidential discussion, January 2024.


Civil society expert, concerns conveyed to the author, December 2023.

“A joined-up mediation approach will be essential to ensure that ceasefire and civilian political tracks in Sudan are harmonized, tells ASG Pobee,” UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, November 16, 2023, https://dppa.un.org/en/msg-sc-9480-asg-pobee-sudan-16-nov-2023;


Sudanese civil society representatives in conversation with the author, November 2023;


“Statement by the Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan on indiscriminate attacks on civilian facilities and infrastructure - Sudan,”


For example, US Vice President Kamala Harris included Sudan in her list of topics in discussion with the President of the UAE on December 2, 2023, “Readout of Vice President Harris’s Meeting with President Mohamed bin Zayed of the United Arab Emirates,” The White House, December 2, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/12/02/readout-of-vice-president-harris-meeting-with-president-mohamed-bin-zayed-of-the-united-arab-emirates/.


In May 2023 the US announced an Executive Order—“Imposing Sanctions on Certain Persons Destabilizing Sudan and Undermining the Goal of a Democratic Transition.” It has issued several rounds of sanctions against Sudanese actors. See several examples here:

“Actions Against Senior Rapid Support Forces Commanders in Sudan - United States Department of State,” US Department of State, September 6, 2023, https://www.state.gov/us-against-senior-rapid-support-forces-commanders-in-sudan/;


The SAF and RSF both have committed serious violations of the Jeddah May Declaration. The Sudan Conflict Observatory found multiple violations of the May Declaration by both parties. See: “Public Launch of Sudan Conflict Observatory Monitoring Platform” US Department of State, June 9, 2023, https://www.state.gov/public-launch-of-sudan-conflict-observatory-monitoring-platform/;

While Al-Burhan spoke to world leaders at the UN General Assembly in September, his forces bombed a residential area in Khartoum. See: “More bombs, more legitimacy - How Burhan is playing diplomat while his forces target civilian areas,” Ayin Network, September 30, 2023, https://3ayin.com/en/safbomb/.

Although RSF commander Abdul Rahman Juma was sanctioned by the US for reported involvement in a crime in El Geneina in June, he was later identified celebrating in Ardamata in November. See:


Sanctions on those disrupting peace processes can be implemented in line with existing Executive Order on Sudan, and sanctions on CRSV in line with the Presidential Memorandum on Promoting Accountability for Conflict Related Sexual Violence. See:

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