



International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide: Rwanda 1990-1993

Briefing Book

Volume 1

Compiled and produced by the National Security Archive, at George Washington University

For the Critical Oral History Conference at The Hague, Netherlands,

June 1-3, 2014.

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International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide: Rwanda 1990-1993

Critical Oral History Conference

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*Please note that the contents of this briefing book are embargoed (for public release) until the start of our conference, Monday, June 2, 2014, 9.30 a.m.



May 2014

Dear Participants,

On behalf of the organizers, the National Security Archive is pleased to present this document reader, intended to facilitate discussions at our conference in June on "International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide: Rwanda 1990-1994," co-sponsored by the Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, and the Hague Institute for Global Justice. The volume consists of declassified documents from the United States, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Czech Republic, French, and Rwandan governments, as well as documentation from the United Nations. The documents were obtained through Freedom of Information requests, and various online and personal archival collections. Many of these documents are being published here for the first time.

The organization and content of the materials is guided by our conference structure. The 3 main sections track thematically with the 3 sessions, along with the conference agenda. For ease of location, all pages have been numbered according to section (e.g. 1-34, 3-12).

To help guide you through the collection, an annotated document list provides brief summaries for each document. The chronology is useful for pinpointing key events and decisions from all sides starting in 1990 through the end of the genocide in July 1994.

A few words about the methodology

Since the late 1980's the National Security Archive has co-sponsored over 60 conferences using the "critical oral history" methodology developed by Jim Blight and Janet Lang ranging from topics such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Iran-Iraq War, and the US war in Vietnam, among others. The critical oral history methodology is one which "involves the simultaneous interaction, in a conference setting, of oral testimony, declassified documents, and scholarly analysis."¹ The methodology can produce startlingly new insights and revelations.

This conference and briefing book would not have been possible without the generous support of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. Special thanks to the document sleuths Michael Dobbs and Emily Willard whose FOIA requests and archival digging produced the enclosed extraordinary primary sources.

Sincerely,

Tom Blanton
Director
National Security Archive

¹ Blight, James G. et al. *Becoming Enemies: U.S.-Iran Relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979-1988*. New York: Rowman & Little Field Publishers, Inc.

International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide

Rwanda 1990-1994

The Hague, June 1-3, 2014

Conference Participants



Major-General (retired) **Henry Anyidoho** served as the Deputy Force commander and Chief of Staff for UNAMIR in Rwanda. He has also served in international peacekeeping operations in Lebanon, Liberia and Cambodia. Following his time in Rwanda, he was posted to the Ministry of Defense in Ghana. He served as the Chairman of the Ghana Telecom Board of Directors and is the author of the book, *Guns over Kigali* (1997).



Michael Barnett served as the political officer at the US Mission to the United Nations assigned to cover Rwanda in 1994. His 2003 book, *Eyewitness to a Genocide: the United Nations and Rwanda*, draws on his experiences from this period. Barnett is currently a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a University Professor of International Affairs and Political Science at The George Washington's Elliott School of International Affairs in Washington, DC.



Ambassador **Jean-Christophe Belliard** served as the French government representative to the Arusha peace negotiations, while posted to the French embassy in Tanzania between 1991 and 1994. He represented the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Goma (DRC) during Operation Turquoise. He has also served as French ambassador to Ethiopia and French Representative to the African Union. He is currently director of African Affairs at the French Foreign Ministry.



Dr. **Jean-Hervé Bradol** was the representative of the humanitarian group Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) in Rwanda during the genocide in 1994, and lobbied western governments for military intervention to stop the killing. He was President of MSF-France from 2000 to 2008. He is currently the Director of Research at MSF and editor of *Medical Innovations in Humanitarian Situations: The work of Médecins sans Frontières*. He recently co-authored a study of MSF work in the Great Lakes region between 1992 and 1997.




Colette Braeckman covered the events leading up to the Rwandan genocide as a prominent Belgian journalist and Africa specialist for the French language newspaper *Le Soir*. She has published numerous articles on Rwanda, both before and after the genocide, and a series of books on Central Africa, including *Rwanda: Histoire d'un Genocide* (1994) and *Rwanda-Burundi: les Racines de la Violence* (1996). She is a member of the editorial board of *Le Soir*.



Ambassador **Prudence Bushnell** served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the US State Department from 1993 to 1996, and was responsible for the day-to-day handling of the Rwandan crisis in 1994. Since then she has served as Ambassador to the Republic of Kenya (1996-1999) and Guatemala (1999-2002), and Dean of the Leadership and Management School at the Foreign Service Institute (2002-2005). Today, she is the CEO of Sage Associates, and consults on a range of international and leadership issues.



Jean-Philippe Ceppi was the first foreign journalist to use the term “genocide” in relation to events in Rwanda in an article published in the French daily *Libération* on April 11, 1994, describing the Gikondo massacre. He has covered Africa since 1989 for French and Swiss news outlets as well as the BBC French service. Ceppi is the founder of the Swiss Investigative Reporters Network and a correspondent for Swiss radio.



Lieutenant-General **Roméo Dallaire** (Retired), was the Force Commander of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 1993 and 1994. His book, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, was awarded the Governor General’s Literary Award for Non-Fiction in 2004. Since his retirement from the military, he has written and spoken extensively about humanitarian assistance and human rights. He is the President of the Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire Foundation, founder of the Child Soldiers Initiative and a member of the Canadian Senate.



Ambassador **Ibrahim Gambari** was the Nigerian representative on the UN Security Council in 1994, and President of the Council in May 1994. He was also coordinator of the non-aligned caucus. He served as Nigerian ambassador to the United Nations from January 1990 to October 1999. He was a senior advisor to the Secretary General from 1999 to 2007, working on both Africa and Iraq, and Joint United Nations-Africa Union Special Representative on Darfur since 2010.



Dr. **James Gasana** was Rwanda's Minister of Defense from 1992 to 1993 when he was forced to flee the country by Hutu hardliners. As Minister of Agriculture and Environment from 1990 to 1992, he drew attention to the political instability caused by environmental and economic factors, including the refugee crisis. He is author of *Rwanda: Du Parti-État à L'État Garnison*. He is now a consultant on environmental issues for leading international organizations, including the Food and Agriculture Organization.



Professor **André Guichaoua** is a French sociologist and specialist in the Great Lakes region who was present in Rwanda at the beginning of the genocide. He served as an expert witness in Arusha for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. His books include a detailed study of the events of April 1994, based on ICTR documents, entitled *Rwanda: De la guerre au genocide (2010)* that will soon appear in English.



David Hannay served as the Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the UN from 1990 to 1995. He was elevated to the House of Lords in June 2001. He has since served as Chair of the Board of the United Nations Association UK from 2006 to 2011 and is now Chair of the All Party Group on Global Security and Non-Proliferation. Lord Hannay is also a member of the Top Level Group of UK Parliamentarians for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation.



Ambassador **Colin Keating** was President of the UN Security Council in April 1994 when the Rwandan genocide started. He served as New Zealand Ambassador to the UN from 1993 to 1996 and a member of the Security Council in 1993 and 1994. He was Council president during the month of April in 1994 when the genocide started. In 2005, Keating became the founding Executive Director of Security Council Report, an independent non-profit organization based in New York.




Ambassador **Karel Kovanda** served as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 1993 and 1994. Ambassador Kovanda was the first UN ambassador to use the term “genocide” to describe events in Rwanda. He has also served as Czech ambassador to NATO and Deputy Director General of External Relations in the European Commission from 2005 to 2010. Kovanda currently works in the private sector.



Ambassador **Joyce Leader** served as the Deputy Chief of Mission at the US Embassy in Kigali. Leader has also served as US Ambassador to the Republic of Guinea and Director of the Office of Refugee Assistance to Asia and the Near East. She wrote *Rwanda's Struggle for Democracy and Peace, 1991-1994*, which was published in 2001 by The Fund for Peace where she was a Senior Fellow.



Ambassador **Patrick Mazimhaka** held the position of Vice-Chairman of the Rwandan Patriotic Front from 1993 to 1998, and was the principal RPF negotiator in Arusha. He served as Minister of Youth, Sports and Cooperatives between 1994 and 1996 when he was made Minister of Rehabilitation and Social Affairs. Other senior positions include Special Envoy of the President of Rwanda. He is now an independent consultant.



Edward Mortimer was the main commentator and columnist on foreign affairs for the Financial Times from 1987 to 1998. He has also written for The Times of London and from 1998 to 2006 and served as chief speechwriter and director of communications to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Mortimer is currently Senior Vice-President and Chief Program Officer at the Salzburg Global Seminar and chair of the Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace and Justice.



Ambassador **Ami Mpungwe** served as Tanzania's facilitator for the Arusha peace negotiations between 1992 and 1993, and Director for Africa and the Middle East in the Tanzanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Other diplomatic posts include High Commissioner to South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Namibia from 1994 to 2000. He currently operates in the private sector and, among others, chairs the boards of TanzaniteOne Mining Ltd, MultiChoice Tanzania, Chamber of Mines and sits on the Council of the University of Dar es Salaam.



Monique Mujawamariya was a prominent Rwandan human rights activist prior to the April 1994 genocide. She met with President Clinton in December 1993, and lobbied the US government on behalf of genocide victims following her escape from Rwanda in April 1994. She founded the Rwandan Association for the Defense of Human Rights and Public Liberties in 1990, and was the target of an assassination attempt in 1992. She now lives in South Africa.



Jean-Marie Vianney Ndagijimana is a lawyer. He served as Rwandan Ambassador to Addis-Ababa from January 1986 to October 1990, and to Paris from October 1990 to April 1994, but broke with the provisional Rwandan government after the start of the genocide. He served as Foreign Affairs Minister in the first post-genocidal government from July 1994 to October 1994. He now is the spokesman of the Committee for Unity, Peace and Reconciliation in Rwanda (Inteko y'ubwiyunge mu Rwanda). He lives in France.



Bacre Ndiaye is a Senegalese lawyer who served as Special UN Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions between 1992 and 1998. In August 1993, he authored a special report on human rights violations in Rwanda. He served as Director of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights at the UN (1998-2006) and Deputy Special Representative in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2007-2008). He is currently a senior aide to the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva.



Venuste Nshimiimana was a UNAMIR press officer in 1993 and 1994, and an eyewitness to the killings at the Ecole Technique Officielle in Kigali, at the start of the genocide. A prominent Rwandan journalist, he now works for the Africa Department and Global News Division of the British Broadcasting Corporation.



Ambassador **Ahmedou Ould Abdallah** was the special representative of the UN Secretary-General in Burundi from 1993 to 1995. He has also served as the special representative of the UN Secretary-General in West Africa based in Dakar and is a member of many international recognized organizations like Transparency international and Search for Common Ground. He is currently the President of the Centre for Strategy and Security in the Sahel-Sahara region.



As an academic and human rights activist, **Filip Reyntjens** publicized the existence of death squads linked to President Habyarimana in October 1992. He is the author of numerous books on Rwanda, including *Rwanda, trois jours qui ont fait basculer l'histoire* (1995) and *The Great African War* (2009). He served as an expert witness to the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda and the International Criminal Court. He is currently Professor of African Law and Politics at the Institute of Development Policy and Management at the University of Antwerp.



Iqbal Riza served as the Assistant Secretary-General in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the UN starting in March 1993 until January 1996 under Kofi Annan. He went on to become the Chief of Staff to Annan while he was the UN Secretary General until he retired in 2005. Since then Riza helped to start the Alliance of Civilizations at the UN and has been a Special Adviser to the current UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.



Ambassador **David Scheffer** served as Senior Adviser during the first Clinton administration and advisor to the US Representative to the UN, Madeleine Albright at the time of the Rwandan genocide. From 1997 to 2001 he was the US Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues and led the US delegation in the UN talks that established the International Criminal Court. Scheffer is currently Director of the Center for International Human Rights at Northwestern University in the United States.



Ambassador **John Shattuck** became Assistant Secretary of the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor in 1993 where he played a large role in the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia. He also served as US Ambassador to the Czech Republic and as CEO of the John F. Kennedy Library Foundation, and Tufts University, where he taught human rights and international relations. He is currently the President of Central European University.



Johan Swinnen was Belgium's Ambassador to Rwanda from 1990 to 1994. Since then he has served as Ambassador to the Netherlands, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Spain. He also served as the Director of the Diplomatic Department in the Belgian Ministry of Defense and Coordinator for External Policies in the Belgian Foreign Ministry since January 2013. He is writing a book on his experiences in Rwanda.



Don Webster served as the Senior Appeals counsel and Senior Trial Attorney at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda from 1999 to 2012. He served as the Senior Trial Attorney and lead prosecution council in the case of Prosecutor v. Karemera et al, where the vice president of the MRND party at the time, Édouard Karemera was found guilty of genocide. Webster now resides in New York City.

Conference Staff



Mike Abramowitz directs the National Institute for Holocaust Education at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC. From 2009 to 2014, Abramowitz directed the Museum's Center for the Prevention of Genocide. Prior to coming to the Museum he worked as a reporter and editor for *The Washington Post*, serving as the Post's White House correspondent (2006-2009) as well as the National Editor (2000-2006).



Tom Blanton is the Director of the National Security Archive at George Washington University in Washington, DC. He first came to the Archive in 1986 as its first Director of Planning and Research. Blanton has published and co-authored many books, and his articles have appeared in notable international publications such as *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *The Wall Street Journal* and *The Boston Globe*.



Michael Dobbs is a senior advisor to the Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, and director of the Rwanda documentation project. He is the author of five books, including a biography of Madeleine Albright and a Cold War trilogy, including *One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War*. He was previously a diplomatic reporter and foreign correspondent for *The Washington Post*, posted in Yugoslavia, Poland, France and the Soviet Union, where he covered the collapse of communism.



Nadia Ficara was recently named director of Donor Travel Programs and the VIP Speakers Bureau at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC, after having served as director of Special Events since 2006. Shortly after starting at the Museum, she developed the International Travel Program. In the past two years, she has worked with the Center for the Prevention of Genocide to develop its Bearing Witness programs. Ficara previously worked for the World Presidents' Organization for ten years as the senior special events manager.



Cameron Hudson is the acting director of the Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC. Prior to that, he served as the Center's policy director, overseeing initiatives on early warning and the responsibility to protect. Hudson has also served as the chief of staff to the President's Special Envoy for Sudan (2009-2011) and as the director for African affairs on the staff of the National Security Council at the White House (2005-2009).



Marie-Laure Poiré is the Manager for Events and Communications at the Hague Institute for Global Justice. She previously spent time at The Center for Transatlantic Relations, at Women in International Security (WIIS) and also at The Alliance for Peacebuilding designing and implementing programs to educate those from the private, public and nonprofit sectors on national and international security issues, as well as on leadership and professional development.



Kristin Scalzo is currently a research assistant at the Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, DC. She previously interned at the National Security Archive for the Genocide Prevention Project. Scalzo has focused her research on genocide prevention and peace and conflict resolution in Africa.



Emily Willard is the Research Associate for the Genocide Prevention Project at the National Security Archive. She is currently researching the international response to the conflicts in Rwanda and Bosnia. Previously, she worked on the Archive's Evidence Project conducting research on Guatemala, Mexico, and El Salvador, and the Colombia Documentation Project. Emily contributed to the publication of the Archive's document collections, *Colombia and the United States*, and *Mexico-United States Counternarcotics Policy*. Willard is also a 2014 Rotary Peace Fellow.



Dr. **Abiodun Williams** was appointed the first President of The Hague Institute for Global Justice on January 1, 2013. He has previously served as Senior Vice President of the Center for Conflict Management at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in Washington, DC (2011-2012). From 2001-2007, Williams served as Director of Strategic Planning in the Executive Office of the UN Secretary-General, where he was a principal advisor to Secretaries-General Ban Ki-moon and Kofi Annan. He has also excelled in academia and has published three books on conflict prevention and multilateral negotiations.

Draft Agenda
International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide
Rwanda 1990-1994

The Hague, June 1-3, 2014

We are planning a mixture of formal and informal activities for our conference, based on the formula previously used by the National Security Archive. There will be four primary working sessions of the conference, divided into two sessions each on Monday, June 2, and Tuesday June 3. Each session will be three hours long, with a coffee break in the middle (precise time to be determined by the moderator.)

During the first day, we will focus predominantly on the lead-up to the genocide, between October 1990 and April 1994, with the theme, “Failure to Prevent.” During these sessions, we will ask whether it was possible for the international community to foresee and prevent the gathering catastrophe in Rwanda. The second day will focus on the international response to the genocide (“Failure to Protect”). We will pay particular attention to the role played by the United Nations Security Council. We will close with a “lessons learned” session, looking at the similarities/differences between Rwanda and contemporary mass atrocities. It is important to note that we are striving for greater historical understanding, not apportionment of blame.

We want to keep the discussion informal and dynamic. In keeping with our desire to create a relaxed atmosphere, we encourage casual or business/casual attire. Participants will be encouraged to intervene multiple times, and pose questions and comments to each other, rather than making prepared speeches. The goal is to expose participants to the views of decision-makers and eyewitnesses representing a wide variety of different vantage points, and learn from each other’s experiences. The working sessions will be closed to the press, but an audio record will be kept for historical purposes. (All participants will have an opportunity to review, and if necessary correct, a transcript of their remarks prior to publication.) The draft agenda below outlines some proposed subjects for discussion, but we welcome further suggestions.

Simultaneous English-French interpretation will be provided.

Sunday, June 1

7 p.m. Dinner

- Welcoming remarks and informal discussion.

Contact:

Monday, June 2: Failure to Prevent**9.30 a.m. - 12.30 p.m. Working Session 1**

“Peacemakers and Peacekeepers: The promise and perils of Arusha, 1990-1993”

We will examine whether international decision-makers and diplomats were aware of the potential for disaster in Rwanda during the pre-genocide period. Were the concerns of diplomats and other observers on the ground in Rwanda adequately communicated to the highest levels of government? Did we have a coherent strategy for dealing with the challenges of democratization in Africa in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War? Was the crisis exacerbated by policy differences between Paris, Brussels, and Washington involving conflicting priorities and national interests?

- Background to Arusha, e.g. Mitterrand’s La Baule speech, June 6, 1990; introduction of multi-party system; RPF invasion of October 1 1990.
- Political negotiations. (July 1992 - January 1993)
- Massacres of Tutsi and RPF offensive of 8 February 1993.
- Military negotiations in Arusha. Signing of Arusha agreements, August 1993
- Conversation between “Peacemakers and “Peacekeepers”

12.45 p.m. – 1.45 p.m. Lunch**2 p.m. - 5 p.m. Working Session 2**

“The Failed Peace: October 1993-April 1994”

We will look at the implementation of the Arusha peace agreement, with a particular focus on the role of UNAMIR. Did UNAMIR have sufficient resources, and a sufficiently broad mandate, to accomplish its mission? Was there a breakdown in communication between Kigali and New York? Was the Arusha agreement poorly designed or poorly implemented? Was there a Plan B in case the peace agreement failed to hold?

- UNSC vote to authorize peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, October 5, 1993
- Assassination of Burundi president Melchior Ndadaye (October 21, 1993) and arrival of UNAMIR in Kigali.
- Jean-Pierre warning, January 10, 1994
- Belgian call for a strengthening of UNAMIR, February 25, 1994
- Shootdown of Habyarimana plane, killing of Belgian peacekeepers, and beginning of the genocide April 6-11. 1994.

7 p.m. Dinner

Tuesday, June 3: Failure to Protect**9.30 a.m. - 12.30 p.m. Working Session 3**

“Inside the UN Security Council, April - July 1994”

We will examine the record of the U.N. Security Council in supervising the deployment of UNAMIR and responding to the upsurge in violence in Rwanda following the April 6 assassination of President Habyarimana? Were UNSC members adequately informed about what was going on in Rwanda? Who took the decision to withdraw UNAMIR, and what were the decision-making processes between the US government? Are there structural weaknesses in the way the Security Council operates, such as lack of an independent intelligence capability?

- What did we know-and when did we know it?
- The UNAMIR withdrawal decision, April 11-21, 1994
- Debating the G-word, April 21-May 5, 1994
- Ending the genocide, May 15-July 18, 1994. Operation Turquoise and the victory of the RPF
- Unresolved mysteries and controversies.

12.45 p.m. – 1.45 p.m. Lunch**2 p.m. - 5 p.m. Working Session 4**

“Lessons from Rwanda”

We will seek to draw broader lessons from the Rwanda tragedy, examining its relevance for modern-day crises. Was the Rwanda genocide *sui generis*, or does it reflect broader challenges facing the international community following the end of the Cold War? What does Rwanda teach us about the mechanics of genocide and mass atrocity? How much influence did the international community have over events in Rwanda? Did it use its influence wisely and/or effectively? What role did domestic politics, and internal political splits (cohabitation in France, divided government in the United States, multi-party coalition in Rwanda) play in the Rwanda tragedy? What were the missed opportunities and lessons for prevention? What progress, if any, have we made over the last two decades?

International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide: Rwanda 1990-1994

Chronology of Key Events

1990

June 19: At a summit of Francophone African leaders at La Baule, in France, French President Mitterrand declares that French government assistance to African nations would be conditioned on their progress toward democratization.

July 5: President Habyarimana announces a package of political reform initiatives including separation of church and state and the preparation of a new charter under which multiple political parties could be recognized.

October 1: Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invades Rwanda from Uganda and attack government forces (FAR) at Katitumbé. Offensive is halted with the help of the Belgian, Zairean and French troops.

1991

Date: Massacre of Tutsi and opponents in the prefectures of Ruhengeri, Gisenyi, Kibuye and Byumba.

February 19: Addressing a key cause of instability in the region, the governments of Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire, along with the OAU and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, initial the Dar es Salaam Declaration, which commits the Government of Rwanda to offer voluntary repatriation of refugees.

March 29: Ceasefire agreement signed at N'Sele, Zaire. OAU to supervise ceasefire with multi-national military observer group, as the ceasefire is violated almost immediately.

June 10: A new constitution is promulgated to allow for democratic reforms.

1992

March 4: massacre in Bugesera, attacks leave 300 dead and 15,000 displaced.

March 6: CDR formation announced

April 16: Habyarimana allows opposition parties to join the GOR, finally creating a coalition government.

July 12: At Arusha, Tanzania, the RPF and GOR agree to the deployment of the NMOG between their forces as peace talks begin. For the rest of this month, pressure from all sides is coming into the country to agree to a cease-fire, while rallies and road blocks occur in Kigali.

August 18: The RPF and the Rwandan government agree to the Protocol on the Agreement of the Rule of Law, the first of five protocols that will be negotiated over the next year culminating in the Arusha Peace Agreement.

November: Escalation of extremist Hutu militia violence - demonstrations by opponents of the regime.

1993

January 9: GOR-RPF sign conclusion of power-sharing accord.

January 20-22: Tutsi and opponents massacred in the prefectures of Ruhengeri, Gisenyi, Kibuye and Byumba.

February 8: RPF breaks cease-fire and advances towards Kigali.

February 22: Government declares cease-fire. Rwanda and Uganda ask UNSC for military observers at the border.

March 7: A new ceasefire accord is negotiated, calling for renewed talks at Arusha.

March 12: UNSCR 872 encouraging the talks in Arusha to continue.

April: UNHCR special rapporteur, Bacre Ndiaye, on illegal, summary or arbitrary executions visits Rwanda.

April 7: President and PM sign a joint declaration on human rights.

May: UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali reports to the Security Council and recommends setting up a UN observation mission on the border between Rwanda and Uganda.

June 9: Protocol on refugee return signed in Arusha.

June 22: UNSC establishes peacekeeping mission at Rwanda-Uganda border, known as UNOMUR.

June 24: Peace talks in Arusha are suspended – breakdown comes over issues related to force integration.

July 16: New government appointed – Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a protégé of MDR President Twagiramungu, becomes prime minister. New Foreign Minister Gasana is from same MDR faction.

August 3: Accord on military integration signed in Arusha.

August 4: Arusha Peace Accords signed in Arusha, Tanzania.

August 10: Report published by Bacre Ndiaye, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights in Rwanda identifying that the massacres fulfill the treaty definition of genocide, that reports of violence are increasing, extremist propaganda is widespread and militias are being organized.

September 16: Joint GOR/RPF delegation goes to NY to lobby UNSC for deployment of UNAMIR.

October 3: Black Hawk Down incident in Mogadishu, Somalia

October 5: UN Security Council Resolution 872 authorizes UNAMIR mission in Rwanda

October 23: Assassination of Melchior Ndadaye, Hutu, the first democratically-elected president of Burundi, by factions of tutsi-dominated army; the various massacres leave 100,000 dead, and cause the exodus of 700,000 people, of whom 500,000 arrive in Rwanda.

October 22: Force Commander Roméo Dallaire arrives in Kigali, Rwanda.

November 16: UN peacekeepers raise UN flag in Rwanda.

November 17-18: massacres in Ruhengeri, in five separate locations.

November 23: Special Representative to the Secretary General Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh arrives in Kigali.

December 3: Dallaire receives letter signed by group of senior RGF and Gendarmerie officers discussing potential sabotage of peace process.

December 20: UNSCR 891 extending UNOMUR.

December 28: RPF battalion moves to the CND Parliament building escorted by Belgian and Tunisian peacekeepers.

1994

January 5: President Habyarimana installed but disagreement between parties blocks formation of the BBTG and National Assembly. Over the next few months, the BBTG will try to be installed multiple times but due to political infighting, party splits and violence, it is unsuccessful.

January 10: Dallaire sends fax to UN Secretariat in New York regarding meeting with informant in Kigali. Annan sends a cable back that same day refusing Dallaire permission for pre-emptive raids on arms caches, and orders him to request meeting with President Habyarimana.

February 14: German, Belgian, French and US Ambassadors meet with President Habyarimana to urge quick establishment of transitional institutions.

February 21: Hutu-supremacist CDR party demonstrates for right to participate in Transitional National Assembly. On the same day opposition political party leader (PSD), Felicien Gatabazi is assassinated. The next day CDR President Martin Bucyana is also assassinated. Violence escalates.

February 23: The parties again try to install the transitional government, but fail to do so.

February 25: Belgian FM Claes calls for a strengthening of UNAMIR after his visit to Rwanda.

March 19: Deputy Assistant Secretary Prudence Bushnell and Director of the Office of Central African Affairs Arlene Render arrive in Kigali to push for the political transition, stay until March 23.

March 22: UNAMIR completes Phase II deployment, troop strength now at 2,539

March 25: Ceremonies for the installation of the transitional institutions scheduled to take place, but cancelled due to a number of outstanding issues.

April 5: UN Security Council passes Resolution 909 extending UNAMIR mandate for six weeks with a review period.

April 6: President Habyarimana of Rwanda, President Ntaryamira of Burundi, and a number of government officials are killed in a plane crash on their approach to the airport in Kigali. President Habyarimana's death sparks violence and widespread massacres in Kigali that soon spread throughout the country.

April 7: Start of massacre of political opponents, Hutu in favor of power-sharing and Tutsi. This includes the kidnaping, torture and murder of ten Belgian peacekeepers while trying to protect the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who is also executed by government forces.

April 9: Former Parliament speaker Theodore Sindikubwabo announces the formation of an interim government and declares himself interim president.

April 9: Evacuation of foreign nationals begins.

April 10: Ambassador David Rawson closes the U.S. Embassy in Kigali as corpses in the streets of Kigali start to be collected.

April 11: Article in French daily *Liberation* written by journalist Jean-Philippe Ceppi uses the word “genocide” for the first time to describe the situation.

April 12: Rwandan Defence Minister speaks on Radio Mille Collines, calling for the Tutsi to be eliminated.

April 14: Evacuation of the last foreign nationals and the withdrawal of Belgian UNAMIR troops is announced.

April 21: The UN Security Council approves the withdrawal of approximately 2,000 UNAMIR peacekeeping troops in Rwanda due to security conditions. Only 450 remain to provide security to humanitarian workers and displaced persons in Kigali and throughout Rwanda.

April 27: At a general audience, Pope John-Paul II calls on ‘those responsible to work generously and effectively to put a stop to this genocide.’

April 28: Oxfam press release refers to the massacres in Rwanda as ‘genocide.’

April 30: Massacres condemned by the UN Security Council, but 4 states, including the US and the UK refuse to include the term ‘genocide’ in the Resolution. Boutros Boutros-Ghali calls in vain for the Security Council to ‘act forcefully’ to ‘put an end to the massacres’ and questions the wisdom of the reduction in UNAMIR manpower.

May 4: French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe calls on the United Nations to give UNAMIR more troops. In an interview on ABC Nightline, Boutros-Ghali affirms that ‘genocide’ is taking place in Rwanda.

May 12: Alison Des Forges of Human Rights Watch Africa publishes an article entitled ‘How governments can stop the genocide in Rwanda’ in the *New York Times*.

May 15: French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe uses the term ‘genocide’ when speaking to the press after a meeting of the Council of Ministers of the European Union.

May 17: The UN Security Council passes a new resolution (918) approving the deployment of 5,500 UNAMIR troops to Rwanda to assist the humanitarian operations.

May 22: Kigali airport taken by the RPF.

May 25: The UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali states that the response to the crisis in Rwanda is a failure for the UN and the international community. He refers to the massacres in Rwanda as genocide, inferring that the killings have explicitly targeted the Tutsi population.

June 7: UN Commission on Human Rights special envoy Rene Degni-Segui begins a week-long mission to investigate human rights abuses in Rwanda.

June 8: UN Security Council Resolution 925 admits that ‘acts of genocide’ have been committed in Rwanda.

June 12: OAU condemns ‘crimes against humanity.’

June 14: Gitarama taken by the RPF, as the ‘interim government’ flees towards Kibuye and Gisenyi.

June 17: France announces its plan to the UN Security Council to deploy 1,000-2,000 troops to Rwanda as an interim peacekeeping force until UNAMIR troops arrive.

June 22: The UN Security Council approves the proposal to dispatch 2,500 French troops to Rwanda, for no more than two months and operating under a Chapter VII UN peacekeeping mandate.

June 24: Forces for the French-led operation are deployed into western Rwanda through Goma and Bukavu in eastern Zaire.

June 28: Back from his mission in Rwanda, UN Human Rights Commission rapporteur René Degni-Ségui confirms that the term genocide can be applied to the Tutsi massacres and calls for the establishment of an international criminal court.

July 1: Security Council adopts Resolution 935 calling for a committee of impartial experts to examine and analyze evidence of 'possible acts of genocide.'

July 3: The UN Secretary-General authorizes France to create a 'secure humanitarian zone', comprising 20% of Rwandan territory in the south-west of the country (Cyangugu, Gikongoro, Kibuye).

July 4: Kigali is taken by the RPF. This is also the start of a massive exodus of Rwandans, fleeing advancing RPF forces, towards the north-west region (Ruhengeri, Gisenyi) occupied by the 'interim government.'

July 15: The Clinton Administration publicly declares that it no longer recognizes the Government of Rwanda (GOR), primarily on the basis of the GOR's support of the acts of genocide. Rwandan officials in Washington, DC, are asked to leave the country within the week, and the GOR's financial assets in the U.S. are frozen.

July 18: Unilateral ceasefire by the RPF. Establishment of Government of National Unity in Rwanda as Pasteur Bizimungu is to be inaugurated as President of Rwanda on July 19.

Session 1

“Peacemakers and Peacekeepers: The promise and perils of Arusha, 1990-1993”

Documents List

Page No.	Date	Author	Title	Source	Notes
1-1	5/22/1990	Nsengiyumva	Dangers of Democratization	ICTR evidence	excerpt of full document, pages 2-19 only
1-19	6/6/1990	Mitterand	Mitterand's La Baule Speech FRENCH	public statement	French language (original)
1-27	6/6/1990	Mitterand	Mitterand's La Baule Speech ENGLISH	public statement	English language (translation)
1-31	10/24/1990	Martres-Galinie	Assessment of Political Situation FRENCH	French Parliamentary Investigation	
1-32	10/24/1990	Martres-Galinie	Assessment of Political Situation ENGLISH	French Parliamentary Investigation	
1-33	12/10/1990	Kangura	10 Commandments of the Hutus	ICTR evidence	excerpt of full document, pages 1-2
1-35	1/23/1991	Mitterrand	"We are at the limit of the Anglophone front" FRENCH	French Parliamentary Investigation	
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1-37	5/13/1992	Flaten	GOR Outlines Strategy to Negotiations to End War	Freedom of Information Act	
1-47	7/27/1992	Nsengiyumva	Mood of the Military and Civilians	ICTR evidence	
1-54	8/21/1992	Leader	Internal Insecurity: an Ongoing Problem	Freedom of Information Act	
1-68	9/23/1992	Ehrenreich	INR/AA'S AFRICAN TRENDS - 9/18/92 (NO. 19)	Freedom of Information Act	the last 7 pages were withheld in full as non-responsive
1-80	10/22/1992	US embassy Brussels	Reyntjens report on pro-Habyarimana death squads	Freedom of Information Act	excerpt of article 21 page only

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1-84	11/16/1992	SecState	Defense minister James Gasana travels to Washington	Freedom of Information Act	
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1-102	2/26/1993	Joxe	"The Rwandan army no longer fights" FRENCH	Mitterrand Archive	French language (original)
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For letterhead [see original]

L0016876

REPUBLIC OF RWANDA
Ministry of National Defence
Rwandan Army
Military Headquarters
G2

KIGALI, 22 May 1990
No. 042 / G2.2.0

To : Chief of Staff
Rwandan Army

Re : Reflections on current situation

1. I have the honour to forward herewith my reflections on the current situation which is part of the on-going changes ushered in by what is customarily called the "Wind from the East" or "Democratisation".
2. I have dealt with various issues, at times expressing a personal opinion with a view to highlighting the factors that can speed up the process of change in our country. I have probably contributed nothing new but I believe my reflections could contain one point or the other that is relevant to the subject.
3. If, in the course of my reflections, I have gone beyond what is allowed (*Gutandukira*) or hurt some people, I crave their indulgence, for I have only one intention : to contribute to the debate.

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4. I have perhaps proposed no solutions to the various problems, the more so as it is difficult for a single person to find solutions to problems that are so daunting. However, I have stated my points of view where appropriate.
5. I hope these reflections will help broaden debate as part of the quest for solutions to some current problems.

(Signed)

NSENGIYUMVA Anatole

Lt. Col. BEMS

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The geo-strategic and political situation in the world, in Africa, in neighbouring countries to Rwanda and in Rwanda itself

An analytical essay

*→ transition
- multipartyism
opposed in
all countries !!*

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The world's attention is riveted on the changes ushered in by what is now known as the "Wind from the East", and its effects. The West prefers to call it "Democratisation", a term that has been adopted by all the media all over the world.

The so-called "Wind from the East" took its rise in the Warsaw Pact countries, beginning with Poland, Hungary, East Germany, etc. Rumania tried to resist but the Ceausescu regime was dramatically swept away, as we know.

2. The wind of Perestroika blew across the great Soviet Union which shattered the status quo hitherto considered a virtually unchanging reality in the socialist and communist system. Events in the Soviet satellites were significantly influenced by changes in the Soviet Union. Such changes are still underway and it is difficult to predict how far they will go.
3. The "Wind from the East" or the wave of democratization swept through, and continues to sweep through the African continent and the rest of the Third World. China, Mongolia, Nepal, Latin America, etc., are undergoing profound changes that will gather momentum. In the case of Africa, one-party systems of government are being called to question. The forces of change are at work everywhere. Even Senegal, which has been a multiparty democracy for some time now, has also felt the jolts of the "Wind from the East".

Protests by students, state employees, trade unionists and even the military (in Côte d'Ivoire) have challenged governments and demanded change.

Changes are unfolding everywhere – in Senegal, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Benin, Gabon, Central African Republic, Zaire, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, etc. Benin, Gabon, Zaire and Côte d'Ivoire have accepted multiparty politics and initiated the process of change.

Governments in some countries such as Tanzania are planning to initiate gradual changes in line with the aspirations of their people. Others like Kenya and Zimbabwe are still clinging to one-party systems.

4. **The situation in neighbouring countries**

- a) In Zaire profound changes are underway. President Mobutu, after holding popular consultations, has opted for multiparty politics, appointing a *Premier Commissaire d'Etat* [First State Commissioner] and forming a new government.

Most of the barons of the Mobutu regime which has been in power for twenty-five years have been left high and dry.

The MPR is no longer the 'Party-State' and President Mobutu has relinquished the office of MPR Chairman. Other very profound measures have been taken as part of the process of change. However, the situation has not improved much. President Mobutu has demanded the recognition of only three political parties in Zaire. Nevertheless, several political parties have applied for recognition. Some are even demanding that Mobutu should step down.

Limited democracy

Opposition to it

University students and others in institutions of higher learning are continually protesting and clashing with the forces of law and order. Such protests have been staged in Kinshasa, Kisangani, Bukavu and Lumumbashi, and several people have been wounded and even killed in the clashes, contrary to official statements. It is therefore apparent that the situation has not at all returned to normal and the changes initiated in Zaire are not likely to be as peaceful as one might expect.

The presence and influence of foreign nationals in Zaire, particularly that of mulattos and Rwandans are already contested by some segments of the Zairian population. This does not augur well for our country.

- b) The situation in Burundi should be viewed as an exception. In fact, Burundi is undergoing changes albeit against another backdrop; here the changes were triggered before the "Wind from the East" swept through the African continent. First, there was the putsch by Major Pierre Buyoya who overthrew the Bagaza regime. Up till then, the change of regime and establishment of the Third Republic in Burundi could be considered as a revolution engineered from within.

President Buyoya announced sweeping changes at all levels. As regards the question whether the ethnic problem was going to be tackled as part of such sweeping changes, Major Buyoya's answer was that "there is no ethnic problem in Burundi and there will never be any under my regime". He was going to be quickly disillusioned. He was indeed taken unawares by the Ntega-Marangara events. He then had to admit that the Hutu-Tutsi problem does exist in Burundi. Supported by his Rwandan and Zairian counterparts, President Buyoya had to initiate profound changes in order to confront and put an end to the Ntega-Marangara events, and cushion their effects. He appealed for national unity. A government of national unity composed of practically the same number of Hutu and Tutsi was

formed. A Hutu was appointed Prime Minister. The Burundian Government is currently working with a view to consolidating national unity, which is the priority.

On the question of multiparty politics, President Buyoya has asserted that the system would not support his efforts to consolidate national unity. In other words, the introduction of multiparty politics in Burundi is for now out of question. In spite of President Buyoya's efforts to consolidate national unity, he is facing fierce opposition, particularly from the Tutsi who see their privileges being encroached upon by the rising Hutu elite. Tracts denouncing Buyoya's betrayal of the Hutu cause are continually being circulated. Our Government is threatened by such detractors who are advocating the end of both the Buyoya regime and the Government in Kigali, accusing the latter of apartheid. Nevertheless, the idea of national unity is gradually gaining ground in Burundi, although the current changes, that is the "Wind from the East", must not jeopardize the process.

Indeed, multiparty politics in Burundi will only recreate conflicts between PALIPEHUTU Hutu and the UPRONA Tutsi and Hutu. The PALIPEHUTU already consider President Buyoya's efforts insufficient and view him as a hypocrite. Rejected by extremist Tutsi and misunderstood by extremist Hutu, the President is caught in a crossfire.

So in spite of the wind of change that is blowing through Burundi, the country is still far from political stability.

- c) In Tanzania, the Government is still clinging to the one-party system. But President Mwinyi has already stated that the idea of multiparty politics will be studied with a view to ascertaining whether it will suit the Tanzanian people.

Some Tanzanian parliamentarians have already called for multiparty politics. Former Tanzanian President Mwalimu Julius Nyerere has already stated that the one-party era is now a thing of the past. However, he is the Chairman of Chama Cha Mapinduzi and was hitherto fiercely opposed to multiparty politics.

University of Dar-es-salaam students have already staged protests demanding changes in the Tanzanian political system. We therefore will soon witness the jolts of the "Wind from the East" now blowing timidly over Tanzania. Let us wait and see how the situation will evolve.

- d) In Uganda, the internal situation is still far from normal. In spite of the NRA's unquestionable but sporadic successes, the rebellion is still strong in the country, particularly in the north, east and west, on the Ruwenzori hills.

Opposition members in Government have started protesting. Several officers have been arrested and accused of corruption, of attempting to overthrow the Museveni regime or of conniving with rebels to betray the country.

President Museveni's regime is supported mainly by people from the south, including the Banyankole, the Banyarwanda, the Baganda and others. Foreigners (Rwandans) still hold privileged offices in the Ugandan public service. Some Ugandans are not happy with this situation. The acronym "RNA" is already construed as "the Nyankole-Rwandese-Army". The coining speaks for itself. Factors of destabilisation are therefore not lacking in Uganda, in spite of the fact that the multiparty system is still in place.

- e) In Kenya, the situation is quite explosive. The opposition is already very active with the MWAKENYA and others. The Church has fallen out with the Government. The discord has been further exacerbated by the recent assassination of Minister Robert Ouko which has been given a political slant and continues to heighten tensions between the Government, the Church and the opposition. The Kenyan Government has, for its part, categorically rejected multiparty politics while the opposition is clamoring for it. Besides, the statements of the US Ambassador in Nairobi are a strong signal. The Kenyan Government has voiced its indignation but the message is clear and has been understood. I believe Kenya is witnessing a very explosive political situation and it will soon be visited by the "Wind from the East", in spite of the Government's stance on multiparty politics.

*This
is
Rwanda
Wagon*

5. The situation in Rwanda

Rwanda is going through a difficult period on account of the economic crisis which has hit all sectors and the food shortage affecting practically the entire country.

The situation is exacerbated by other adverse factors such as the expulsion of illegal Rwandan immigrants from Tanzania, the threat by Rwandan refugees to return home by force of arms, the sleazy internal opposition which is using some press organs as a tool for negatively sensitizing the population, etc. As regards "democratisation", the Rwandan masses are still staunch supporters of the MRND and its Chairman-Founder. But the events that are rocking the world are beginning to sow ideas in the minds of the "liberals". The MRND is being put to question, cheerleading is criticised, the TCD (Travaux communautaires de développement) [Community Development Work] are considered unproductive and a waste of time, the authorities are criticised in some press organs, the Head

of State is not spared, nor are his family and close aides, the security services are being dragged through the mud, etc.

Nevertheless, relations with our neighbours are as good as ever in spite of the current ups and downs (the refugees in Uganda, the expulsion of Rwandans from Tanzania, Tutsi extremism in Burundi, the calling to question of the presence of Rwandans in Zaire). However, I can say that on the whole, there are several factors favourable to a political conflagration in Rwanda. I will return to this issue in subsequent pages.

II. Causes of the "Wind from the East"

1. Some analysts say the "Wind from the East" sprung in Poland with the birth of Lech Valensa's SOLIDARITY trade union movement. Others assert that the "Wind from the East" took its rise in Moscow thanks to Mikhail Gorbachev. Still others are advancing the theory that Pope John Paul II played a major role in the birth of the "Wind from the East". All these analysts are probably right to a certain extent. Lech Valensa, Mikhail Gorbachev and John Paul II all played an obviously decisive role, each in his own way, in bringing about the changes that are now sending shock waves across the global political spectrum.
2. I, personally, find the origins of the "Wind from the East" elsewhere: the "Wind from the East" sprung in the West.

Indeed, it is noteworthy that the cold war between capitalism, and socialism/communism never ended. Each system carried on fighting under different guises, each undermining the work of the other, taking advantage of every chink in each other's armory to infiltrate the ranks of the other with its weapons of intoxication, publicity, espionage, etc. And the "Wind

from the East", to my mind, is nothing but the victory of the capitalist system over the socialist/communist system.

Afterall, have human rights and democratic freedoms not always been the war horse of the West? Are they not the principal demands people from the East have been clamoring for since the beginning of the process of change? Now that the East has joined the ranks of the West, the latter is now winning the cold war.

III. **Why the Wind from the East is raging in the South, particularly over Africa**

1. As I pointed out earlier, the changes that occurred in the East shattered an order hitherto considered as immutable. This entailed many consequences. Thus, the East and West are now coming to terms with one another. But the East is still soul-searching in a period of flux. It is therefore preoccupied with its own problems. As such, the West has a certain latitude to act and to do many things, including especially demanding changes in Africa in order to establish therein Western systems or pro-Western systems.
2. In fact, the Whiteman has always considered Africa as nothing but a reservoir of cheap raw materials that they absolutely need to control. They have never supported the wave of African States' independence which has enabled African peoples to take control of their destinies and to have a say in the management of their immense resources.
3. Furthermore, the existence of the Eastern Block did not make things easy for the West since it offered Africans an alternative whenever the Western Block fell out with one African country or the other. All this now belongs to the past. Africans no longer have a choice, for both the East and the

West, and all States have to reconcile with one another and speak the same language. White people or Westerners, have at last achieved their cherished dream and now the sky is the limit. They are leaving no stone unturned to have absolute control over Africa's raw materials. That is why they are now imposing on Africa a system they can fully control : multiparty politics known by the magic name "Democratisation". This is my explanation of the famous "Wind from the East" raging over Africa.

IV. How far will the Wind go?

1. In my opinion, the wave of "democratisation" should be viewed from the historical standpoint. There was a wave of conquests followed by colonisation; there was the struggle for independence followed by the accession to independence in the 1960s, particularly in the case of African countries; now it is the wave of "democratisation". This wave will therefore go as far as the previous waves. There is no reason why the process will end in mid-course, when conditions are ripe for it to run its full course.

2. The one-party system was inherited from the system in force in the Eastern Block countries. Now the system is obsolete in those countries which are already adopting multiparty systems. African countries too, particularly given Westerners' unflinching determination, as underscored above (and why not the whole world) will be on the same wavelength willy-nilly.

mentzsch

3. Some States will, of course, be defiant, as has always been the case, but they will always end up being pulled along by the wind of time, into the same camp as the others. It is only a matter of time and it all depends on the process adopted by each country to initiate the inevitable changes.

V. What are the foreseeable consequences?

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1. The consequences, are to my mind, diverse, foreseeable and unforeseeable.
 - a. I pointed out earlier that the Eastern Block was an alternative to African countries and others, when the West wanted to impose its law to the detriment of any given African country. This was also the case when a pro-Eastern Block country considered that its interests were no longer what they were supposed to be. The country in question sought refuge in the West.

This situation eased relations between the North and the South. Now all this belongs to the past. The countries of the North (East-West) will henceforth speak the same language. The South has no choice but to yield. A system that I could call "economic and ideological neocolonialism" will come into being, for we now have to act in accordance with the wishes of the North. There is neither West nor East. Everybody is now under the same roof.

- b. There will be new developments in conflicts all over the world. For example, the US supported UNITA in Angola to thwart the Soviet Union's communist influence in that country. The US backed Zaire to prevent socialists/communists from laying claim to that country's immense raw materials.

The Soviet Union supported the ANC and all liberation movements in order to extend socialist/communist influence.

In Mozambique, the West supported RENAMO for the same reasons as it did UNITA in Angola. All this will change drastically as the fears of either block are no longer justified.

2. I can therefore state unequivocally that the profound changes advocated by all and sundry will have very disruptive consequences in several areas, to the benefit of the North and, of course, to the detriment of the South, particularly African countries.

3. A good example, as concerns African countries, is the imposition of the multiparty system. In fact, most African countries were not prepared for the system. Besides, we vividly recall the devastation caused by multiparty politics in Africa less than thirty years ago. The root causes of such destruction have not entirely disappeared. We therefore cannot rule out the risk of a resurgence of the same demons of regional, ethnic, tribal division, etc. Such divisions actually play into the hands of the Whiteman who has always upheld the "divide and rule" doctrine, of course, to the detriment of African countries. Can the latter reject such a doctrine? I believe African countries have very little or no leeway at all. They have no choice but to go with the current and hope for brighter days ahead. I say so because, as I pointed out earlier, the changes in Africa are not the work of chance. Did French Prime Minister Michel Rocard not state that France was supporting African peoples who revolted against their governments since, as he pointed out, they were aspiring to greater democracy and freedom? Need we look too far afield to understand why the unrest first started in countries of French allegiance? It is all a carefully orchestrated plan which the West is, by the way, bent on executing.

*Refer to Casina
Risks of
Multiparty*

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VI. The case of Rwanda

L0016889

1. As concerns Rwanda, I would like to express a personal opinion on the changes ushered in by the "Wind from the East" and their consequences on Rwanda. I will state whether such changes are inevitable in our country, whether simple readjustments can be made in lieu of such changes, or whether our country is simply not affected by the said changes.
2. I will start with the last point. Our country cannot be unaffected by the changes since we are dealing with a powerful wave of such magnitude as I pointed out above; our country cannot establish its own system in isolation when neighbouring countries, African countries and even countries all over the world are being swept by the same wave. Our country will inevitably be affected by this wave which is already at our door.
3. The changes are therefore inevitable in our country. The question is how to effect them. Wherever the "Wind from the East" is blowing and particularly in Africa, it all starts with protests, students demanding scholarship increments, better living conditions, followed by State employees demanding a pay rise. All of this then degenerates into street protests calling for profound changes in the political system in the country, the introduction of multiparty politics, change of political authorities and their replacement by new people "with cleaner hands", promotion of moral rectitude in politics, etc.

In fact, the calls on political authorities to step down lead to demands by the active population, such that those in power cannot remain indifferent, especially since external pressure is increasingly being brought to bear on political leaders to initiate profound changes.

4. To effect the necessary changes, we need factors that act as stimuli of change which the people and particularly those working in the background can use to incite the people to revolt so as to trigger changes. Such factors also exist in our country and are known as:

- Regionalism,
- Ethnic problems,
- Rwandan refugees,
- Relations with neighbours,
- Situation in relation to neighbouring countries,
- Rwandans of the diaspora,
- The press,
- Functioning of institutions,
- Various political problems.

These are only some of the factors I have tried to analyse with a view to ascertaining or depicting the situation in our country in the light of the above factors that are congenial to change as part of the "Wind from the East" or "Democratisation", the term preferred by various users. I will conclude this analysis by identifying foreseeable changes.

a) **Regionalism**

It's a scourge → This scourge has never disappeared from Rwanda. It is currently at its peak.

When it is not "North-South", it is "Gisenyi-Ruhengeri", or "Bugoyi-Bushiru", etc. The "North-South" problem is currently used by some individuals who are always intent on causing disorder. The demands of "Southerners" are not always clear but they consider themselves victims of discrimination in favour of "Northerners". They seize every opportunity to show how unfair the government is to "Southerners".

L0016891

"Northerners", in turn, claim that the government favours "Southerners" who are insatiable and ungrateful, while "Northerners" are at the receiving end. They think they deserve more than what they are getting. There is another strain of regionalism according to which Cyangugu is viewed as one of the most pampered *préfectures* on account of the ministerial post held by Simeon Nteziriyayo. Virtually no region of the country is satisfied with its situation. And this state of affairs is exploited by a certain media...of the South.

The Gisenyi-Ruhengeri problem is also current. People from Ruhengeri (not all, of course) believe that the Government of Second Republic has denied them their fair share of the cake. They say most of the cake has been given mainly to people from Gisenyi. The latter think it is rather Ruhengeri that is pampered, and that being a native of Gisenyi is a disadvantage, since people from Gisenyi do not enjoy certain advantages; they say so to refute the view that natives of Gisenyi enjoy all the advantages. This is a persistent problem. I think this Gisenyi-Ruhengeri problem is a non-issue which has been deliberately fueled by people bent on dividing the people with malicious intent, otherwise there should not be any problem between Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. It is akin to the Bugoyi-Bushiri problem which, fortunately, is not fueled by too many fanatics. But the demons of division want to fan the problem in order to always create hotbeds of tension. They are acting like those who are bent on creating a "Kingogo problem". I know that this problem does not exist. We must do all it takes to make sure it is nipped in the bud. Regionalism in our country is therefore still very much alive and it is very favourable to instability.

b) **Ethnic problems**

The Hutu believe the Second Republic has favoured the Tutsi, and they say so loud and clear. The Tutsi control the country's economy, they attend the best schools in the country and in large numbers, too. Private schools founded by the

Tutsi are the most prosperous, and priority is given to Tutsi children during enrolment. These are some of the grievances of the Hutu. But here they forget that no Hutu has ever been denied the opportunity to engage in business and to prosper, that none has ever been prevented from founding a private school and running it such that it can be prosperous. They also forget that it is actually the Hutu who intervene in favour of Tutsi children to enable them to get enrolled in secondary and high schools.

Discrete

All this is disregarded by the Hutu who accuse the Government of being too supportive of the Tutsi. The latter also claim that they are victims of discrimination and that they are under-represented in governing bodies. Some, if not many, think the problem of their fellow refugees has not been properly resolved and they are always complaining. Some Tutsi are never tired of picking on the Hutu in one way or the other, quickly forgetting the 1972-1973 years and the precious assistance given to them by the Second Republic. Such a haughty and provocative attitude irritates the Hutu who are forever asserting that another purge would be salutary. They are, of course, wrong. Ethnic problems are real problems that risk being exploited for malicious purposes by those seeking the downfall of the Government or untimely changes.

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c) **The refugee problem**

I have, on several occasions, dwelled on the Rwandan refugee problem and the threat they pose. I have amply demonstrated the conditions under which they can return to the country by force, their chances of success and the factors that are favourable or unfavourable to such a return. On each occasion, I have concluded that they will not return by force in the near future but I have said, however, that in the meantime they are capable of causing harm. I will not restate all the arguments I advanced and which seem to prove me right, at least, thus far. But the

refugees continue to demand the right to return, threatening to attack the country in the bargain.

Negotiations between Rwanda and Uganda, on the refugee problem are on course. The said negotiations have not yet come to fruition. Some people are placing their hopes in them but others think these are only delaying tactics.

Some think President Museveni is only distracting Rwanda so as to gain time to put his house in order and then unleash "his refugees" on Rwanda and support them until they regain power. This is the kind of negotiations he had in Nairobi with Tito Okello's Government before he captured Kampala and Uganda.

I have no reason to subscribe to this sort of reasoning but will the current whirlwind that is shattering all forecasts on current problems not adversely affect the refugee problem such that it could take on dimensions not desired by the Government.

I cannot be categorical on this point, but I wish to simply point out that the refugee problem is a very sensitive and complex one which could become a destabilization factor and thus play into the hands of those seeking to destabilize the country.

*Summary
Implications*

d) Relations with neighbours and Rwandans of the diaspora

- 1) Relations with neighbouring countries are very good, if not excellent. But we are aware that these countries are host to Rwandan refugees hostile to our Government, the most virulent being those living in Uganda. Since all the refugees are in permanent contact with one another, it is necessary to keep a watchful eye on all of them because their attitude towards our country and their growing demands could affect relations between the host country and

Le discours de La Baule (1990)

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ALLOCUTION PRONONCEE PAR M. FRANCOIS MITTERRAND PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE A L'OCCASION DE LA SEANCE SOLENNELLE D'OUVERTURE DE LA 16ème CONFERENCE DES CHEFS D'ETAT DE FRANCE ET D'AFRIQUE

Majesté, Laissez-moi vous remercier pour la présidence que vous avez exercée depuis la Conférence de Casablanca. Je salue ceux qui nous rejoignent dans notre Conférence pour la première fois. Je ne ferai pas de distinction. Mais je noterai cependant la présence de la Namibie, ce qui marque bien qu'il y a aussi des évolutions heureuses : l'accession à l'indépendance est l'une des formes essentielles de la liberté et la Namibie en est le meilleur symbole.

Depuis la conférence de Casablanca, beaucoup de choses se sont passées. Vous avez parlé, Majesté, des maux dont souffre l'Afrique. Chacun le sait, ils sont nombreux. Cela repose sur des réalités difficiles et parfois angoissantes. La crise est d'abord économique. Elle s'aggrave sans cesse. Vous savez que la production par tête diminue chaque année, que la part de l'Afrique dans la concurrence mondiale recule, que les investissements se font plus rares, qu'ici ou là la famine resurgit, que la dette s'alourdit. Bref, on est installé cruellement dans le cycle infernal "dette-sous développement", tandis que la population croît. Comment voulez-vous que les systèmes scolaires et sociaux puissent résister à la poussée de la démographie dans de telles circonstances ?

Vous avez eu raison de le dire tout à l'heure, se tourner vers l'Afrique et porter accusation révèle une grande injustice de ceux qui, avec complaisance, parfois même avec satisfaction, dénoncent les mœurs, les traditions, le système politique, la manière de vivre de l'Afrique. Si j'ai moi-même des observations critiques à faire, comme je le ferai à l'égard de mon pays, je refuse de m'engager dans ce procès. Je préfère examiner avec vous la manière dont on pourrait préparer l'avenir immédiat. Car je suis de ceux qui pensent que si responsabilités il y a, on ne peut ignorer celles qui incombent à la société internationale et particulièrement aux pays les plus riches.

Sont-ils sans pitié ou simplement indifférents ? Nous attendons encore, en dépit des efforts répétés de la France et de quelques autres, le plan mondial qui permettrait d'examiner, sur une distance de cinq à dix ans, la manière de parer aux maux successifs qui viennent pour une large part des pays riches pour atteindre les pays en voie de développement, pauvres ou moins pauvres, mais en tout cas très endettés.

Examinons par exemple, l'effondrement des cours des matières premières. Je me répète d'une année sur l'autre. Mais comment ne pas se répéter ? Nous sommes contraints de tenir le même discours puisque les faits n'ont pas changé. Si on se met à la place des responsables africains, on se dit comment faire ? On établit un budget, on tente de

planifier sur deux ans, trois ans, cinq ans et en l'espace d'une semaine, quand ce n'est pas au cours d'une simple séance d'un après-midi dans une ville lointaine, tout s'effondre.

Les monnaies de base ont connu des évolutions qui ont constamment dérangé vos prévisions ; vos productions ont connu des évolutions saisissantes vers la baisse. On s'interroge : comment le financier le plus avisé du monde, pourtant si prêt à se faire donneur de leçons, agirait-il ? Quelle solution trouverait-il pour compenser les pertes, arrêter le désastre ? On s'étonne après cela de la fuite des investissements étrangers... Et que penser de la fermeture des marchés en Occident ? Faut-il s'étendre sur le débat au sein du GATT à propos du maintien du protectionnisme, sur les produits agricoles, les produits textiles et combien d'autres ? Il y a là une spirale qui empêche les pays africains de retrouver un équilibre hors duquel tout leur est interdit. Le développement, bien entendu, la prospérité, l'équilibre politique, le temps et l'espace nécessaires pour procéder aux réformes politiques attendues.

Il est vrai que l'Afrique est l'oubliée de la croissance, la laissée pour compte du progrès ; je dis ceci d'une façon rapide car, dans tel ou tel pays, on observe des efforts récompensés par le succès. Nous n'allons pas nous attarder pour tenter de désigner le coupable. Les responsabilités sont partagées. Dans mon esprit, elles commencent par l'insouciance ou l'irresponsabilité des pays, qui par solidarité internationale et dans leur intérêt, devraient comprendre qu'une large et audacieuse politique Nord-Sud s'impose. Elles continuent par les défaillances de nombreux pays africains qui n'ont pas pu ou qui n'ont pas su prendre à temps les mesures qui pouvaient leur convenir. Prenons-en acte ; posons-nous ces questions.

La première question est sous-jacente dans les campagnes qui se développent, un peu partout dans le monde, contre la politique de la France faut-il que la France renonce afin de ne plus être exposée aux critiques nombreuses qui la frappent ? Faut-il qu'elle rapatrie chez elle tous les moyens et qu'elle les consacre à ses ressortissants nationaux ? Faut-il qu'elle se replie, faut-il qu'elle cherche en elle-même ses seules ambitions. Je vous dirai ce que je pense de la politique de la France et de la manière dont elle est conduite. Mais je répondrai par avance à cette question : la France est décidée à poursuivre sa politique et donc à aider l'Afrique, quoi qu'il en soit et quoi qu'on en dise. Elle ne se retirera pas de l'œuvre engagée depuis si longtemps et qui, sous des formes différentes au travers de l'histoire, l'a associée à un grand nombre de ces pays. La France restera fidèle à son histoire dont, d'une certaine manière vous êtes, et à son avenir dont vous serez, je l'espère aussi.

Permettez-moi quelques rappels simples. La France est toujours le premier des pays industriels avancés dans l'aide aux pays en voie de développement. Le premier, nettement, devant tous les autres. C'est vrai que des pays comme le Canada ou l'Allemagne font un effort tout à fait estimable. Mais, c'est vrai que d'autres grandes puissances restent à quelque distance et même parfois à une longue distance. Notre aide à l'Afrique en 1990 est supérieure à celle de 1989 qui, elle-même, était en accroissement par rapport aux années précédentes.

La quatrième Convention de Lomé, à laquelle nous avons pris une part si évidente, a permis d'augmenter de 45% les engagements financiers de la Communauté. Dans toutes

les enceintes internationales, j'ai plaidé pour le développement que je considère comme un élément indissociable des progrès de la démocratie. Nous sommes allés partout, le ministre des Affaires étrangères, le ministre de l'Economie et des Finances, le ministre de la Coopération, le ministre de la Francophonie notamment, pour plaider le dossier de l'Afrique. Et nous devons répéter, encore une fois, les mêmes choses simples.

A Toronto, nous avons mis au net un plan qui permettrait de réduire ou d'abolir la dette des pays les plus pauvres et nous avons préconisé trois façons de faire en annonçant aussitôt celle que nous avons choisie.

A Dakar, peu de temps après, nous avons annulé nos créances publiques à l'égard de trente-cinq pays d'Afrique. Cet exemple a été suivi par quelques uns. A la tribune des Nations Unies, j'ai demandé qu'un plan fut élaboré et décidé en faveur des pays dits intermédiaires, ceux qui sont peut-être moins pauvres, mais si endettés que le bénéfice de leur travail est absorbé par le service de la dette.

A Toronto, à Dakar, à New York, j'avais déjà indiqué que la France ne s'en tiendrait pas là. Je pense que dès maintenant, il convient de ne plus faire que des dons à 100% aux pays les moins avancés. Une conférence de ces pays se tiendra à Paris, cet automne, j'aurai l'occasion d'y revenir. Je pense qu'il convient de limiter à 5%, ce qui revient à une réduction de 50%, les taux d'intérêt de tous les prêts publics aux pays dits intermédiaires de l'Afrique sub-saharienne.

C'est une décision unilatérale de la France. Elle n'a pas été négociée, ni avec vous, ni avec nos partenaires de ce fameux club des pays les plus riches qui se réunira dans quelques semaines à Houston. Mais j'ai l'intention, à Houston précisément, de demander à nos partenaires, aux six autres pays industrialisés, d'aller plus loin. J'ai l'intention de leur demander d'abord s'il leur est possible de reprendre à leur compte des dispositions du type de celle que je viens d'énoncer ; ensuite, d'allonger de toute façon les délais de remboursement des pays les plus endettés par des moyens divers qu'il conviendra de choisir.

Et j'en reviens à ce projet dix fois traité et dont il faudra bien comprendre qu'il est nécessaire, celui d'un fonds spécial mondial. J'avais proposé qu'il fut financé par des nouveaux droits de tirages spéciaux. Je pense que les pays peuvent renoncer à certains de leurs droits pour alimenter une sorte de fonds mondial de garantie qui servirait à amorcer la pompe pour que, désormais, un nouveau cours des choses préside à la marche des affaires internationales. Mais, rien ne se fait au hasard. Peut-être à certaines époques l'argent se répandait avec prodigalité, sans contrôle. Moi, je n'ai pas connu ce temps-là. Je veux dire que je n'étais pas responsable au temps où ces pratiques ont pu exister.

Vous savez bien, Madame et Messieurs, comment les choses se passent, comment les décisions sont prises. Il peut même arriver que des difficultés naissent à ce propos entre nous. Pas exactement entre vous et moi, mais entre nos hauts fonctionnaires lorsqu'ils discutent âprement de la valeur de tel projet, de son financement, de ses modalités. Il vous arrive même parfois de reprocher à la France, par ses exigences et par sa rigueur, d'exprimer je ne sais quel relent de l'époque coloniale, bien que nous ne prétendions pas, et vous le savez bien, dicter la politique que vous avez à faire. Les crédits du Fonds d'aide

et de coopération qui sont placés sous la tutelle du ministre de la Coopération et qui servent à développer des projets font l'objet d'une instruction interministérielle, avec un luxe de précautions de toutes sortes. Les crédits sont alloués au fur et à mesure des réalisations. On constate, sur place, ce qui se fait, en collaboration avec les responsables de chacun de vos pays. Il en est de même pour les crédits, prêts et dons gérés par la Caisse centrale de coopération économique. Ce sont des institutions sévères ou des organismes parfois rébarbatifs qui accumulent les étages administratifs, mais qui sont quand même bien nécessaires. Ils permettent en tout cas d'avoir la conscience tranquille. Pour vous comme pour nous cette aide est menée avec la rigueur nécessaire, pour qu'elle soit utile à vos peuples.

A tout cela, Madame et Messieurs, vos Etats participent et contribuent. Ils font entendre leurs voix, ils font connaître aussi leurs objections et ils acceptent parfaitement tout ce qui leur permettra de mener leur action sous le contrôle de chefs d'Etat dont je peux dire que j'ai souvent constaté le scrupule sur la manière dont ils devaient gérer les crédits qui doivent servir au développement de leur peuple. Si l'on doit constater un certain nombre de défaillances à travers le temps, je ne vois pas, ayant fait un examen approfondi de cette situation, ce qui pourrait être vraiment remarqué au cours de ces dernières années. Pour la balance des paiements, il arrive qu'une contribution soit consentie par la France aux Etats lorsqu'ils ont constaté que leur programmation se heurte à des décisions souvent spéculatives qui ruinent, en l'espace de quelques heures, la patience et la prévision de plusieurs années.

Là encore, c'est notre ministère des Finances qui intervient. Il a des instructions financières pour chaque pays. Le ministère des Affaires étrangères et celui de la Coopération y prennent part : dans un système aussi précis, par où serait passée cette "évaporation", dont on parle sans arrêt, dans un procès de type cartésien, comme une sorte d'invitation en sourdine à voir la France arrêter, cesser de pratiquer la politique qui nous rassemble aujourd'hui et qui fait de nous des pays amis et solidaires, nous qui représentons ensemble, sur la scène internationale, un front de quelque 30, 35 pays. Mais sur ces 35 pays, presque tous sont sous-développés. Peut-on dire : que c'est de leur faute, et oublierait-on cette indifférence des peuples riches ou plutôt de leurs dirigeants, cet oubli de leur responsabilité et de leur intérêt, car c'est du développement des termes de l'échange qu'eux mêmes tireront les moyens de leur prospérité ?

Je n'ignore pas les interrogations que suscitent chez vous les événements qui ont bouleversé l'Est de l'Europe. Vous craignez que bien des capitaux ne se détournent de l'Afrique. C'est une inquiétude que l'on peut comprendre, car les moyens des pays qui sont vos amis ne sont pas illimités. Eh bien, il dépend de nous qu'il n'en soit pas ainsi. La France fait son devoir. C'est vrai que si l'on ne rétablit un climat de confiance dans la marche en avant des pays de l'Afrique, il est difficile d'espérer la venue d'investissements étrangers, privés. On peut prendre des mesures de toutes sortes, notamment fiscales, mais ne s'agit-il pas aussi d'un problème politique ?

Si l'on veut redonner confiance dans les chances de l'Afrique ce sera par une stabilité retrouvée, avec des administrations en bon état de marche, avec une gestion scrupuleuse et un certain nombre de dispositifs, soit anciens, soit nouveaux qu'il conviendra de déterminer au cours des heures de travail que nous aurons cet après midi et demain.

Prenons un cas : celui de la zone franc. Je crois que l'on peut considérer que cette zone franc est un facteur de stabilité pour l'Afrique noire. Je crois que les pays qui participent y sont très attachés. Eh bien, la France aussi. Périodiquement, l'idée d'une dévaluation du franc CFA est relancée par de grandes institutions internationales.

On dit que vous y êtes hostiles, moi aussi. Cela ne réglerait aucune de vos difficultés. Je crains que cela ne puisse aboutir qu'à alourdir les charges de vos dettes et à renchérir vos importations. Certains d'entre vous se posent la question de savoir si l'Union économique et monétaire européenne ne modifierait pas la relation du franc CFA avec les autres monnaies de l'Europe. Je vous dis dès maintenant que ce qui vaut pour le franc CFA par rapport au franc vaudra demain par rapport à la monnaie européenne si celle-ci, comme nous l'espérons, voit le jour. Je puis m'en porter garant. Ainsi disposerez-vous d'une vaste zone qui vous apportera certaines formes de sécurité dans le trouble général qui s'empare de l'Afrique. Vous savez que l'Europe dispose d'un Marché commun et qu'elle est à la recherche d'une monnaie unique.

Or la zone-franc a une monnaie mais elle n'a pas de Marché commun. Il y a pour l'instant d'un côté un marché commun sans monnaie et de l'autre une monnaie sans marché commun. Il y a là peut-être une situation dont la contradiction pourrait toucher à l'absurde. Ne devriez-vous pas, Madame et Messieurs, rechercher l'unification de vos marchés et l'harmonisation de règles administratives, juridiques, fiscales et douanières dans des ensembles suffisamment vastes ? Il serait peut-être trop ambitieux de considérer l'ensemble de l'Afrique noire. La réalité historique et géographique devrait aboutir à plusieurs ensembles et ce serait déjà un grand progrès.

En tout cas, nous sommes prêts à vous aider pour mettre en œuvre ce mouvement que je crois indispensable si l'on veut pouvoir disposer de l'instrument politique, géographique, économique qui nous permettra d'avancer dans la lutte contre la crise. Mais je tiens à dire ceci : de même qu'il existe un cercle vicieux entre la dette et le sous-développement, il existe un autre cercle vicieux entre la crise économique et la crise politique. L'une nourrit l'autre.

Voilà pourquoi il convient d'examiner en commun de quelle façon on pourrait procéder pour que sur le plan politique un certain nombre d'institutions et de façons d'être permettent de restaurer la confiance, parfois la confiance entre un peuple et ses dirigeants, le plus souvent entre un Etat et les autres Etats, en tout cas la confiance entre l'Afrique et les pays développés. Je reprends à mon compte l'observation, à la fois ironique et sévère, de Sa Majesté le Roi du Maroc lorsqu'il évoquait la manière dont la démocratie s'était installée en France. Cela n'a pas été sans mal, ni sans accidents répétés. Elargissant le propos, je reprendrai les termes de l'un des chefs d'Etat avec lequel nous donnions hier soir : l'Europe dont nous sommes, nous Français, avait à la fois le nazisme, le fascisme, le franquisme, le salazarisme et le stalinisme. Excusez du peu...

Etait-ce les modèles à partir desquels vous aviez à bâtir vos Etats, vous qui n'avez disposé, dans la meilleure hypothèse que d'un quart ?

Il nous a fallu deux siècles pour tenter de mettre de l'ordre, d'abord dans notre pensée et ensuite dans les faits, avec des rechutes successives ; et nous vous ferions la leçon ?

Il nous faut parler de démocratie. C'est un principe universel qui vient d'apparaître aux peuples de l'Europe centrale comme une évidence absolue au point qu'en l'espace de quelques semaines, les régimes, considérés comme les plus forts, ont été bouleversés. Le peuple était dans les rues, sur les places et le pouvoir ancien sentant sa fragilité, cessait toute résistance comme s'il était déjà, et depuis longtemps, vidé de substance et qu'il le savait. Et cette révolution des peuples, la plus importante que l'on eut connue depuis la Révolution française de 1789, va continuer.

Je le disais récemment à propos de l'Union Soviétique cette révolution est partie de là et elle reviendra là. Celui qui la dirige le sait bien, qui conduit avec courage et intelligence une réforme qui, déjà, voit se dresser devant elle toutes les formes d'opposition celles qui s'y refusent, attachées au système ancien et celles qui veulent aller plus vite. Si bien que l'histoire reste encore en jeu. Il faut bien se dire que ce souffle fera le tour de la planète. Désormais on le sait bien : que survienne une glaciation ou un réchauffement sur l'un des deux pôles et voilà que le globe tout entier en ressent les effets. Cette réflexion ne doit pas rester climatique, elle s'applique à la société des hommes !...

Enfin, on respire, enfin on espère, parce que la démocratie est un principe universel. Mais il ne faut pas oublier les différences de structures, de civilisations, de traditions, de mœurs. Il est impossible de proposer un système tout fait. La France n'a pas à dicter je ne sais quelle loi constitutionnelle qui s'imposerait de facto à l'ensemble de peuples qui ont leur propre conscience et leur propre histoire et qui doivent savoir comment se diriger vers le principe universel qu'est la démocratie. Et il n'y a pas trente six chemins vers la démocratie.

Comme le rappelait M. le Président du Sénégal, il faut un Etat, il faut le développement et il faut l'apprentissage des libertés... Comment voulez-vous engendrer la démocratie, un principe de représentation nationale avec la participation de nombreux partis, organiser le choc des idées, les moyens de la presse, tandis que les deux tiers d'un peuple vivraient dans la misère. Je le répète, la France n'entend pas intervenir dans les affaires intérieures des Etats africains amis. Elle dit son mot, elle entend poursuivre son œuvre d'aide, d'amitié et de solidarité. Elle n'entend pas soumettre à la question, elle n'entend pas abandonner quelque pays d'Afrique que ce soit.

Ce plus de liberté, ce ne sont pas simplement les Etats qui peuvent le faire, ce sont les citoyens : il faut donc prendre leur avis et ce ne sont pas simplement les puissances publiques qui peuvent agir, ce sont aussi les organisations non gouvernementales qui souvent connaissent mieux le terrain, qui en épousent les difficultés qui savent comment panser les plaies. Nous ne voulons pas intervenir dans les affaires intérieures. Pour nous, cette forme subtile de colonialisme qui consisterait à faire la leçon en permanence aux Etats africains et à ceux qui les dirigent, c'est une forme de colonialisme aussi perverse que tout autre. Ce serait considérer qu'il y a des peuples supérieurs, qui disposent de la vérité, et d'autres qui n'en seraient pas capables, alors que je connais les efforts de tant de dirigeants qui aiment leur peuple et qui entendent le servir même si ce n'est pas de la même façon que sur les rives de la Seine ou de la Tamise. Voilà pourquoi il faut procéder à une étude méthodique de tout ce qui touche à la vie économique. Il faut mettre en place des dispositifs douaniers qui empêcheront des évasions de capitaux qui viennent souvent justifier les critiques entendues. De ce point de vue encore, la France, si vous le souhaitez,

est prête à vous apporter l'aide humaine et technique, à former des fonctionnaires, à se trouver auprès d'eux. J'ai vu naître la plupart de vos Etats, j'ai connu vos luttes pour en finir avec l'état colonial.

Ces luttes vous opposaient souvent à la France, et seule la sagesse des dirigeants français et africains a évité, en fin de compte, le drame d'une guerre coloniale en Afrique noire. Il fallait bâtir un Etat, une souveraineté, avec des frontières garanties internationalement, telles que les avaient dessinées les compas et les règles des pays coloniaux, dans les salons dorés des chancelleries occidentales, déchirant les ethnies sans tenir compte de la nature du terrain. Et voilà que ces Etats nouveaux, doivent gérer les anciennes contradictions héritées de l'histoire, doivent bâtir une administration centrale, nommer des fonctionnaires après les avoir formé, gérer des finances publiques, entrer dans le grand circuit international, souvent sans avoir reçu des anciens pays coloniaux la formation nécessaire.

Et on aurait à raisonner avec ces Etats, comme on le ferait à l'égard de nations organisées depuis mille ans comme c'est le cas de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne, de l'Espagne ou du Portugal !

Les mœurs, les traditions aussi respectables que les vôtres, l'histoire et la nature de ces peuples, leur propre culture, leur propre façon de penser, tout cela pourrait se réduire à une équation décidée dans une capitale du nord ?

Vraiment, je fais appel à votre raison, et je pense que nous nous connaissons assez pour savoir que rien ne sera fait entre nous en dehors du respect et de la considération que nous nous devons. S'il y a contestation dans tel Etat particulier, eh bien ! que les dirigeants de ces pays en débattent avec leurs citoyens. Lorsque je dis démocratie, lorsque je trace un chemin, lorsque je dis que c'est la seule façon de parvenir à un état d'équilibre au moment où apparaît la nécessité d'une plus grande liberté, j'ai naturellement un schéma tout prêt : système représentatif, élections libres, multipartisme, liberté de la presse, indépendance de la magistrature, refus de la censure : voilà le schéma dont nous disposons.

Nous en avons discuté plusieurs fois et hier soir encore en particulier. Je sais combien certains défendent scrupuleusement leur peuple et cherchent le progrès y compris dans les institutions. Plusieurs d'entre vous disaient : "transposer d'un seul coup le parti unique et décider arbitrairement le multipartisme, certains de nos peuples s'y refuseront ou bien en connaîtront tout aussitôt les effets délétères".

D'autres disaient : "nous l'avons déjà fait et nous en connaissons les inconvénients". Mais les inconvénients sont quand même moins importants que les avantages de se sentir dans une société civiquement organisée.

D'autres disaient : "nous avons commencé, le système n'est pas encore au point, mais nous allons dans ce sens". Je vous écoutais. Et, si je me sentais plus facilement d'accord avec ceux d'entre vous qui définissaient un statut politique proche de celui auquel je suis habitué, je comprenais bien les raisons de ceux qui estimaient que leurs pays ou que leurs peuples n'étaient pas prêts. Alors qui tranchera ? Je crois qu'on pourra trancher en disant que de toute façon, c'est la direction qu'il faut prendre. Certains ont pris des bottes de sept lieues, soit dans la paix civique soit dans le désordre, mais ils ont fait vite.

D'autres marcheront pas à pas. Puis-je me permettre de vous dire que c'est la direction qu'il faut suivre. Je vous parle comme un citoyen du monde à d'autres citoyens du monde : c'est le chemin de la liberté sur lequel vous avancerez en même temps que vous avancerez sur le chemin du développement. On pourrait d'ailleurs inverser la formule : c'est en prenant la route du développement que vous serez engagés sur la route de la démocratie.

A vous peuples libres, à vous Etats souverains que je respecte, de choisir votre voie, d'en déterminer les étapes et l'allure. La France continuera d'être votre amie, et si vous le souhaitez, votre soutien, sur le plan international, comme sur le plan intérieur. Vous lui apportez beaucoup. Quand je constate, par exemple, que le flux de capitaux qui va du Sud pauvre vers le Nord riche est plus important que le flux de capitaux qui va du Nord riche au Sud pauvre, je dis qu'il y a quelque chose qui ne va pas.

Le colonialisme n'est pas mort. Ce n'est plus le colonialisme des Etats, c'est le colonialisme des affaires et des circuits parallèles. Nous parlons entre Etats souverains, égaux en dignité, même si nous ne le sommes pas toujours en moyens. Il existe entre nous des conventions de toutes sortes. Il existe des conventions de caractère militaire. Je répète le principe qui s'impose à la politique française chaque fois qu'une menace extérieure poindra, qui pourrait attenter à votre indépendance, la France sera présente à vos côtés. Elle l'a déjà démontré, plusieurs fois et parfois dans des circonstances très difficiles.

Mais notre rôle à nous, pays étranger, fut-il ami, n'est pas d'intervenir dans des conflits intérieurs. Dans ce cas-là, la France en accord avec les dirigeants, veillera à protéger ses concitoyens, ses ressortissants mais elle n'entend pas arbitrer les conflits. C'est ce que je fais dans le cadre de ma responsabilité depuis neuf ans. De la même manière, j'interdirai toujours une pratique qui a existé parfois dans le passé et qui consistait pour la France à tenter d'organiser des changements politiques intérieurs par le complot ou la conjuration. Vous le savez bien, depuis neuf ans, cela ne s'est pas produit et cela ne se produira pas.

The La Baule Speech (1990)

La Baule, June 20, 1990

...

In any case, we are ready to help you establish this movement, which I believe to be indispensable in order to obtain the political, geographic, and economic instruments that would permit us to continue battling the crisis. But I would like to say the following: just as there is a vicious cycle between debt and under-development, there is another vicious cycle between economic crisis and political crisis. One nourishes the other.

This is why we should examine how to proceed together so that, politically, a certain number of institutions and ways of acting allow trust to be restored, sometimes trust between a people and its leaders, most often between one state and other states, in any case the trust between Africa and the developed countries. I'd like to borrow His Majesty the King of Morocco's observation, both ironic and serious, as he described the way in which democracy was established in France. It was not without evil, or repeated accidents. Expanding my talk, I will borrow the words of one of the Heads of State here this evening: the Europe we come from, we French, had, at the same time, Nazism, fascism, Francoism, Salazarism, and Stalinism, no less...

Were these the models on which you have built your states, you who have taken, in the best case, just a quarter of a century?

It took us two centuries to try to create order, first in our thoughts and then in reality, with successive descents; and we are teaching you about it?

We have to talk about democracy. It's a universal principle which seemed so incontrovertible to the peoples of central Europe that in the space of a few weeks, the regimes considered the strongest were overthrown. The people were in the streets, in the squares, and the ancient power, sensing its fragility, gave up all resistance, as if it had already been void of substance for a long time and it knew it. And this revolution of the peoples, the most important one we have seen since the French Revolution of 1789, will continue.

I said recently about the Soviet Union that this revolution has come from there and it will return there. The one who governs there knows it well, he who is, with courage and intelligence, leading a reform that, already, is facing every kind of opposition, that which, attached to the former system, refuse the reform, and that which wants to go faster. So the story is still unfinished. It must be said that this wind will go around the world. We already know it well: one of the poles freezes or heats up and voilà: the entire globe feels the effects. This thought does not have to remain climate-related, it applies to the society of men!...

Finally, we can breathe, finally we have hope, because democracy is a universal principle. But we cannot forget the differences in structures, in civilizations, in traditions, in customs. It is

impossible to propose a ready-made system. It is not for France to dictate some constitutional law that would then be de facto imposed on people who have their own consciousness and their own history and who must know how to lead towards the universal principle that is democracy. And there are not thirty six paths to democracy.

As Mr. President of Senegal reminded us, development is needed and freedoms must be learned...How can you engender democracy, a principal of national representation with the participation of numerous parties, organize the exchanging of views, the resources for the press, when two thirds of the population would be living in misery. I repeat, France does not intend to intervene in the interior affairs of friendly African nations. It has its say, it intends to pursue its work with aid, friendship, and solidarity. It does not intend to be questioned, it does not intend to abandon any African country.

This also about liberty: it is not only states that can provide it, it is citizens. Therefore, we must ask their opinion. And it is not only public powers that can act, it is also non-governmental agencies who often know the situation on the ground the best, who embrace the inherent difficulties, who know how to heal the wounds. We do not want to intervene in interior affairs. For us, this subtle form of colonialism, which consists of permanently teaching and giving advice to African states and those who lead them, is as perverse as all other forms of colonialism. To do this would be to believe that there are superior peoples, who hold the truth, and others, who would not be capable of it, but I know about the efforts of so many leaders who love their people and intend to serve them, even if not in the same way as on the banks of the Seine or the Thames. That is why we must begin a methodical study of everything to do with economic life. We must put customs arrangements in place that would prevent the tax evasion and other financial crimes that often justify the criticism we hear. Again, from this point of view, France, if you wish, is ready to offer aid in people and technology, to train officials, to be beside them. I have seen the birth of most of your states, I have known your battles to put an end to the colonial condition.

These battles often pit you against France, and only the wisdom of French and African leaders, at the end of the day, prevented the tragedy of a colonial war in Sub-Saharan Africa. It was necessary to build a state, a sovereignty, with internationally-guaranteed borders, the ones that were drawn and regulated by colonial countries, in gilded lounges of western Chancelleries, tearing apart ethnicities without understanding the nature of the terrain. And here we are: the new states have to manage the old contradictions inherited from history, they have to build a central administration, train and appoint civil servants, manage public finances, enter into the grand international circuit, often without having received the necessary training from the old colonial countries.

And we have to deal with these states, as we would with nations that have been organized for a thousand years, as is the case with France, Great Britain, Spain, or Portugal!

Customs and traditions just as deserving of respect as yours, the history and nature of these peoples, their own culture, their own way of thinking, could all this be reduced to a solved equation in a northern capital?

Really, I appeal to your reason, and I think that we know each other well enough to know that nothing will happen between us without respect or disregarding the esteem in which we hold each other. If there is dissent in some particular country, well then the leaders of the country will discuss it with their citizens. When I say democracy, when I chart a course, when I say that this is the only way to get to a state of equality when the need for greater freedom is apparent, of course I have a plan ready: representative system, free elections, multiparty politics, freedom of the press, independent judiciary, rejection of censorship: here is the plan that we have.

We have discussed this many times, and here, tonight, again in particular. I know how much some scrupulously defend their people and seek progress, including in their own institutions. Many of you said, "If you transpose the single party and arbitrarily decide on a multiparty system, some of our populations will refuse it, or else will immediately suffer from its deleterious effects."

Others said, "We have already done this and know about its disadvantages." But the disadvantages are still less important than the advantage of feeling that one is in a civically organized society.

Others said, "We have started, the system is not there yet, but we are going in this direction." I am listening to you. And, as I agreed more easily with those of you who defined a political system close to the one I am used to, I understood the reasons of those who believed that their country or their population was not ready. So who will decide? I believe that we could decide by saying that, in any case, this is the direction in which we all must go. Some have put on the seven league boots, either in civic peace or in disorder, but they have acted quickly.

Others are walking step by step. May I say that the most important thing is to go in the right direction. I am speaking to you as one citizen of the world to other citizens of the world: it is the path of freedom that you are advancing on at the same time as you advance along the path of development. Moreover, the thought can be reversed: by taking the road towards development, you are committed on the road towards democracy.

To you free people, to you sovereign states that I respect: choose your path, determine the steps and the pace. France will continue to be your friend, and if you wish, your support, internationally as well as domestically. You bring a lot to the relationship. When I see, for example, that the flow of capital that goes from the poor South towards the rich North is bigger than the flow of capital that goes from the rich North to the poor South, I say that there is something wrong.

Colonialism is not dead. This is no longer the colonialism of states, it is the colonialism of business and of parallel channels. We are speaking as sovereign states, equal in status, even if not always in means. There are all kinds of conventions between us. There are military conventions. I repeat the principle of the French policy: every time a foreign menace appears, that could attack your independence, France will be by your side. We have already demonstrated this many times, and sometimes in very difficult circumstances.

But our own role, as a foreign country, even though we are friends, is not to intervene in domestic conflicts. In these cases, France, with the country's leaders, will ensure the protection of its citizens, its nationals, but does not intend to arbitrate conflicts. This is what I have been doing as part of my responsibilities for nine years. In the same way, I will always forbid a practice that sometimes existed in the past which consisted of France trying to organize domestic political changes by plot or conspiracy. You know well that, for the last nine years, this has not happened, and this will not happen in the future.

4.A.4. Extrait du message de l'attaché de défense à Kigali,

24 octobre 1990,

Appréciation de la situation politique

Déclassifié

TERTIO : APPRECIATION DE LA SITUATION POLITIQUE.

LA SITUATION EST DOMINEE PAR LA COMBINAISON DE 2 COMPORTEMENTS DESTABILISATEURS.

- LES MEDIAS, LES REPRESENTATIONS DIPLOMATIQUES VOISINES DU RWANDA VOLONTAIREMENT OU INVOLONTAIREMENT SE FONT LES PORTE-PAROLE DES ENVAHISSEURS OU MEME LES SOUTIENNENT OUVERTEMENT.

CECI VIENT D'ETRE ATTESTE PAR LA MANIERE DONT R.F.I. A RENDU COMPTE CE MATIN DE LA MISSION DE LA COMMISSION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME DIRIGEE PAR MAITRE FEDER DE NATIONALITE FRANCAISE. EN EFFET, ALORS QUE CE JURISTE DELIVRE MANIFESTEMENT UN CERTIFICAT DE BONNE CONDUITE AU GOUVERNEMENT RWANDAIS QUI S'EFFORCE DE RESERVER LES MEILLEURS CONDITIONS DE TRAITEMENT AUX SUSPECIS, CETTE STATION NE RETIENT QUE LES ELEMENTS NEGATIFS DE SON RAPPORT.

- LES BELGES CONTINUENT A ENTRETENIR LA CONFUSION EN BRANDISSANT LA MENACE D'UN DEPART RAPIDE DE LEURS RESSORTISSANTS ET DE LEURS PARACHUTISTES SI LE PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA NE SE RESOUT PAS A DES CAPITULATIONS EX ORBITANTES ET INJUSTIFIEES.

CES DEUX COMPORTEMENTS SONT DE NATURE A DECOURAGER LES AUTORITES GOUVERNEMENTALES DISPOSEES A FAIRE D'IMPORTANTES CONCESSIONS. ELLES NE PEUVENT ADMETTRE EN PARTICULIER QUE LEUR SOIT IMPOSE UN ABANDON TERRITORIAL, AU MOTIF D'ETABLIR UN CESSEZ-LE-FEU, AU PROFIT D'ENVAHISSEURS TUTSIS DESIREUX DE REPENDRE LE POUVOIR PERDU EN 1959. ELLES PEUVENT D'AUTANT MOINS L'ADMETTRE QUE CEUX-CI MECONNAISSANT LES REALITES RWANDAISES RETABLIRAIENT PROBABLEMENT AU NORD-EST LE REGIME HONNI DU PREMIER ROYAUME TUTSI QUI S'Y EST JADIS INSTALLE ; CE RETABLISSEMENT AVOUE OU DEGULSE ENTRAINANT ^{selon toute vraisemblance} L'ELIMINATION PHYSIQUE A L'INTERIEUR DU PAYS DES TUTSIS, 500.000 A 700.000 PERSONNES, PAR LES HUTUS 7.000.000 D'INDIVIDUS.

L'INTERVENTION PREVISIBLE DU PRESIDENT ZAIROIS NE DEVRAIT PAS CLARIFIER LA SITUATION. EN EFFET IL N'EST PAS IMPOSSIBLE QUE CE DERNIER, DEVANT LA DEMISSION BELGE, LES HESITATIONS DE L'O.U.A. ENTRETENUE PAR MUSEVENI EN PARTICULIER, DECIDE POUR DES RAISONS DE PRESTIGE LOCAL D'INTERVENIR A NOUVEAU, EN PRENANT SOUS SA TUTELLE LE RWANDA, SANS EN AVOIR REELLEMENT LES MOYENS. LES REVERTONS ACTUELLES AU SEIN DE LA C.E.P.G.L. (COMMUNAUTE ECONOMIQUE DES PAYS DES GRANDS LACS : ZAIRE - BURUNDI - RWANDA) SEMBLENT DEMONTRER SA VOLONTE DE SE MANIFESTER. ELLE POURRAIT SE CONCRETISER PAR LE RETOUR DES TROUPES ZAIROISES.

SIGNE : COL. GALINIE./.

G. MARTRES.

4.A.4. Excerpt from the defense attaché in Kigali's message,
October 24th, 1990,
Assessment of the political situation

Declassified

TERTIO: Assessment of the political situation.

The situation is dominated by the combination of two destabilizing behaviors.

- The media and the diplomatic representatives of Rwanda's neighbors, have become, voluntarily or involuntarily, spokespeople for the invaders, or have even supported them openly.

This has just been attested to by the way in which R.F.I. became aware this morning of the mission of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, led by Mr. FEDER, a French national. In fact, while he obviously issued a certificate of good conduct to the Rwandan government, which strives to maintain the best conditions of treatment for suspects, this station retained only the negative items of his report.

- The Belgians continue to maintain confusion, brandishing the threat of a rapid pull-out of their citizens and their parachutists if President HABYARIMANA does not agree to exorbitant and unjustified capitulations.

These two behaviors are of a nature to discourage the governmental authorities ready to make important concessions. They cannot accept, in particular, abandoning some territory, in order to establish a cease-fire, to the profit of the Tutsi invaders eager to retake the power they lost in 1959. They can even less admit that these invaders, disregarding Rwandan reality, will probably reestablish the Honni regime of the first Tutsi kingdom, once installed in the northeast. This reestablishment, explicit or disguised, would result (in all likelihood) in the physical elimination of Tutsis in the interior of the country, 500,000 to 700,000 people, by the 7,000,000 Hutus.

The foreseeable intervention of the Zairian president will not necessarily solve the situation. Indeed, it is not impossible that Zaire, before the Belgian departure and in particular the hesitation of the O.A.U. [Organization of African Unity], sustained by MUSEVENI, could decide, for reasons of local prestige, to intervene once again, taking RWANDA under its supervision, without really having the means to do so. Current meetings within the C.E.P.G.L. (Economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes: ZAIRE – BURUNDI – RWANDA) seem to demonstrate the probable manifestation of an intervention. It could materialize through the return of Zairian troops.

SIGNED: COL. GALINIE./.

G. MARTRES.

KANGURA.

K0157990

KEY:

The extracts are written in normal print.



1990:

No 6 December 1990:

Page 8: The 10 commandments:

1. Every Hutu must know that any Tutsi woman, wherever she is, is working for her Tutsi ethnic group. In consequence, every Hutu who does the following is a traitor:
 - who espouses a Tutsi woman
 - who takes a Tutsi woman as a concubine.
 - who takes a Tutsi woman as his secretary or his protegee.
2. Every Hutu must know that our Hutu girls are more worthy and more conscientious in their role as women, wives, and mothers. Are they not pretty, good secretaries and more honest!
3. Hutu women, be vigilant and bring your husbands, brothers and sons to their senses.
4. Every Hutu must know that every Tutsi is dishonest in business. He only aims at the supremacy of his ethnic.

"The night will be told by the one who spent it." (Literal translation of a Rwandan proverb.)

Consequently, any Hutu who does the following is a traitor:

- who makes an alliance with Tutsis in his business.
 - who invests his money or the State's money in a company of a Tutsi;
 - who lends or borrows money from a Tutsi;
 - who gives favors to Tutsis in business (granting importing licenses, banking loans, building plots, State markets...)
5. Strategical posts as well as political, administrative, economical, military, and security ones must be put in hands of Hutus.
 6. The education sector (pupils, students, teachers) must be Hutu in the majority.
 7. The Rwandan Armed Forces must be exclusively Hutu. The experience of the October 1990 war teaches us that. A soldier can't take a Tutsi woman as a wife.
 8. Hutus must stop taking pity on Tutsis.
 9. -The Hutus, wherever they are, must be united, interdependent and worried about the condition of their Hutu brothers.
 - The Hutus of the interior and from outside must constantly look for friends and allies for the Hutu cause, starting by their Bantou brothers.
 - They have to constantly counteract Tutsi propaganda.

K0157991

- The Hutus must be firm and vigilant against their common enemy Tutsi.
 10. The 1959 Social Revolution, the 1961 Referendum, and the Hutu Ideology, must be taught to every Hutu and at all the levels.
 Every Hutu must widely diffuse the present ideology.
 Any Hutu who will persecute his Hutu brother for having read, diffused and taught this ideology is a traitor.

[REDACTED]

1991:

No 23 October 1991:

Last page:
 Colonel Rwendeye's photograph:
 Caption: " We will always remember Colonel Rwendeye, who sacrificed himself for the mass, and we will avenge him and his mates."

[REDACTED]

No 25 November 1991:

In the editorial: We Hutus, are now angry.
 It is now evident that if that continues like that, the mass can take part in that war in another way because wars are identical.

[REDACTED]

No 26 November 1991:

The cover:
 Special: Tutsi, God's race.
 Which arms should we use to vanquish Inyenzi forever? (A machete is drawn in front of this title.)
 If the Hutu 1959 Revolution should be brought back, for us to vanquish Inyenzi-Ntutsi.

[REDACTED]

(Réunions quotidiennes pendant la guerre du Golfe) **1 - 35**

- VERBATIM -

de la réunion tenue le mercredi 23 janvier à 18 H 00 au Palais de l'Elysée.

1991

PARTICIPANTS -

M. le Président de la République - Monsieur ROCARD - Monsieur DUMAS - Monsieur JOXE - Monsieur CHEVENEMENT - Général SCHMITT - Général FORRAY - Amiral COATANEA - Monsieur le Préfet FOUGIER - Monsieur BIANCO - Amiral LANXADE - Monsieur VEDRINE - Général MONCHAL - Général MENU -

PARTIE CONSACREE AU RWANDA :

MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE - Situation au RWANDA.

Je constate que certains européens se sont réinstallés à RUHENGERI qui est une ville très dangereuse, parce que nos troupes sont présentes ; les gens prennent des risques et c'est nos troupes qui doivent leur venir en aide; d'où notre présence...

PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE -

C'est un engrenage normal !

La nature du conflit est indiscernable, le rôle de l'OUGANDA est équivoque.

Les Tutsis ougandais se déplacent pour conquérir le RWANDA, c'est inquiétant.

J'aimerais que nous fassions des représentations à l'OUGANDA. On n'a pas intérêt que le front du RWANDA cède. S'il s'agit de luttes tribales on ne dit rien ; s'il s'agit d'une agression il faut s'interposer et délivrer les Français retenus par les Tutsis. J'ai eu un entretien téléphonique avec le Président HABYARIMANA.

CEMP

Les Européens encerclés à RUHENGERI sont pour 40 d'entre eux des coopérants français présents sur ordre de leur administration.

PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE -

On est autorisé à intervenir pour les libérer.

CEMP -

Il y a 100 militaires français engagés dans cette action. On laisse les Rwandais tenter de faire partir les rebelles et on récupère nos ressortissants.

PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE -

On ne peut pas limiter notre présence.

Nous sommes à la limite du front anglophone. Il ne faut pas que l'OUGANDA se permette tout et n'importe quoi. Il faut le dire au Président MUSEVENI ; il n'est pas normal que la minorité Tutsie veuille imposer sa loi à la majorité...

A demain 18 H 00.

– VERBATIM –

from the 6 pm meeting on Wednesday, January 23 at the Elysée Palace

PARTICIPANTS –

President of the Republic – Mr. ROCARD – Mr. DUMAS – Mr. JOXE – Mr. CHEVENEMENT – General SCHMITT – General FORRAY – Admiral COATANEA – Prefect FOUGIER – Mr. BIANCO – Admiral LANXADE – Mr. VEDRINE – General MONCHAL – General MENU –

SECTION ON RWANDA:

DEFENSE MINISTER – Situation in RWANDA

I have found that certain Europeans have moved back to RUHENGERI, a very dangerous city, because our troops are present; people are taking risks and it's our troops that have to come to their aid; whence our presence...

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

These are normal circumstances!

The nature of the conflict is indiscernible, UGANDA's role is ambiguous.

The Ugandan Tutsis are moving to conquer RWANDA, it's worrying.

I would like it if we made contact with UGANDA. It's not in our interest for the Rwandan border to yield. If it's to do with tribal battles we say nothing; if it's an aggression we have to intervene and rescue the French people held by the Tutsis. I had a telephone conversation with President HABYARIMANA.

CEMP

Forty of the surrounded Europeans in RUHENGERI are French aid workers present on the orders of their administration.

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

We are authorized to intervene to liberate them.

CEMP

One hundred French troops are committed to this action. We let the Rwandans try to get the rebels to leave and we retrieve our citizens.

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

We cannot limit our presence.

We are at the edge of the English-speaking front. UGANDA cannot just do as it pleases.

We must tell President MUSEVENI: it's not normal that the Tutsi minority wants to impose its rule over the Hutu majority...

Until tomorrow at 6 pm.

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RELEASED IN PART
1.4(B), 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 KIGALI 01981 01 OF 04 131453Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 AMAD-01 CIAE-00 C-01 DODE-00 EUR-01 HA-09
H-01 INRE-00 INR-01 L-03 ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
PM-01 P-01 RP-10 SNP-01 SP-01 SS-01 TRSE-00
T-01 /034W

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FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0673
INFO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KIGALI 01981

E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, MARR, RW, UG
SUBJECT: GOR OUTLINES STRATEGY TO NEGOTIATIONS TO END WAR

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. IN DISCUSSIONS MAY 10-11 WITH A/S COHEN, RWANDA'S NEW FOREIGN MINISTER OUTLINED A TWO-PRONGED APPROACH TO ENDING RWANDA'S WAR WITH THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF): DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RPF RESULTING IN A PEACE TREATY ON THE ONE HAND AND

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PAGE 02 KIGALI 01981 01 OF 04 131453Z
NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH UGANDA ON THE OTHER. HE SUBSEQUENTLY INCORPORATED INTO HIS STRATEGY COHEN'S SUGGESTION FOR A NON-AGGRESSION TREATY WITH UGANDA. THE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID ALL ISSUES WERE NEGOTIABLE. COHEN SAID IF ALL PARTIES REQUEST US TO, THE U.S. WOULD PARTICIPATE IN FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS AND PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ON DEVELOPINGHS
MOCK MUSEVENI IN" TO FUTURE COMMITMENTS WITHOUT FORCING HIM TO ACKNOWLEDGE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR. RWANDA'S NEW MINISTER OF DEFENSE ASKED FOR U.S. HELP WITH THE DEMOBILIZATION OF THE ARMY, DEMINING THE BORDER AREA,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: WILLIAM E LANDFAIR
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 12 MAY 2012
DATE/CASE ID: 27 APR 2005 200103014

UNCLASSIFIED

OPENING THE NORTHERN CORRIDOR AND HAVING UGANDA WITHDRAW AID FROM THE RPF. END SUMMARY.

TWO-PRONGED APPROACH

3. AMBASSADOR HERMAN J. COHEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICA, DISCUSSED PROSPECTS FOR RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS TO END THE GOR-RPF WAR AND RELATED ISSUES IN A JOINT MEETING MAY 10 WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BONIFACE NGULINZIRA AND DEFENSE MINISTER JAMES GASANA. ALSO PRESENT AT THE MEETING FOR THE U.S. WERE AMBASSADOR FLATEN, DCM LEADER, ECON OFFICER ZORICK. PRESENT FOR THE RWANDAN SIDE WERE AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. ALOYS UWIMANA AND A NOTETAKER FROM EACH OF THE MINISTRIES.

4. THE FOREIGN MINISTER OUTLINED TO AMBASSADOR COHEN THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT'S TWO-PRONGED STRATEGY FOR RESOLVING THE WAR WITH THE RPF. HE SAID THE APPROACH WOULD INVOLVE BOTH POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH THE RPF AND

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PAGE 03 KIGALI 01981 01 OF 04 131453Z
NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH UGANDA. HE TOLD COHEN HE WILL GO TO KAMPALA THE WEEK OF MAY 18 (PROBABLY MAY 18-21) TO MEET AND DISCUSS DATES AND LOCATION FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RPF AND TO BEGIN DISCUSSIONS WITH UGANDA. (NOTE. WE HAVE LEARNED THAT THE INTERIOR MINISTER AND THE MINISTER RESPONSIBLE FOR REFUGEE AFFAIRS WILL ACCOMPANY THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON THIS TRIP. MDR AND PL PARTY LEADERS MAY ALSO PARTICIPATE. END NOTE.)

5. THE MJ WGZLT IN A PEACE TREATY SIGNED BY THE TWO PARTIES. THE FIRST PHASE WILL BE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE, WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS. A MECHANISM FOR MONITORING THE CEASE FIRE WILL BE NECESSARY IF THE CEASEFIRE IS TO BE EFFECTIVE. HE MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF NEUTRAL OBSERVERS OR A TEAM CONSISTING OF THE TWO PARTIES. THE SECOND PHASE WILL BE THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE THAT WILL HAVE TO EXAMINE SIX ELEMENTS: REFUGEES, NATIONAL UNITY, THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS, A NATIONAL CONFERENCE, THE PARTICIPATION OF THE RPF IN THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE INTEGRATION OF THE TWO ARMIES. THE FOREIGN MINISTER STRESSED THAT ALL OF THESE ELEMENTS ARE NEGOTIABLE. THE

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MINISTER SAID THESE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE DIRECT AND WITHOUT MEDIATORS BECAUSE MEDIATORS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO INFLEXIBLE POSITIONS. FACILITATORS TO PROVIDE A NEUTRAL VENUE OR OBSERVATION MIGHT, HOWEVER, BE USEFUL.

6. IN HIS TOAST TO AMBASSADOR COHEN AT A DINNER LATER THAT EVENING, THE MINISTER CLARIFIED HIS CONCEPT OF
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MEDIATION: HENCEFORTH MEDIATORS, INCLUDING THE U.S., WOULD FACILITATE MEETINGS RATHER THAN SERVE AS AN OBLIGATORY CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

7. UGANDA, THE MINISTER SAID, WOULD BE KEY IN THE PROCESS. THE GOAL OF RWANDA'S NORMALIZATION EFFORTS WOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE UGANDA TO ABANDON ITS SUPPORT FOR THE RPF AND TO HAVE UGANDA ENCOURAGE THE RPF TO ACCEPT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 KIGALI 01981

E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, MARR, RW, UG
SUBJECT: GOR OUTLINES STRATEGY TO NEGOTIATIONS TO END WAR

THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. NO RESULTS CAN BE EXPECTED WITHOUT UGANDA'S PARTICIPATION AND COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL NORMS OF SECURITY AND TO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.

COHEN BRIEFS ON TALKS IN UGANDA

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8. [REDACTED] A/S COHEN
RESPONDED FAVORABLY TO THE STRATEGY OUTLINE BY THE
MINISTER. HE AGREED THAT MUSEVENI WAS KEY AND COULD BE
VERY USEFUL.

1.4(B)

1.4(B)

9. RPF READY TO NEGOTIATE. COHEN TOLD THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT THE RPF IS READY TO NEGOTIATE AND THAT IT HAS AGREED TO ACCEPT THE INVITATION OF FRANCE TO THE NEXT NEGOTIATING SESSION IN PARIS. HOWEVER, HE SAID, THE RPF DOUBTS THE FREEDOM OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT TO NEGOTIATE. HE SAID THE RPF CITED THE CONSTITUTION, THE CONTINUING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT, AND THE OBSTACLE OF THE PRESIDENT'S FAMILY AS THE BASIS FOR ITS SKEPTICISM. COHEN SAID HE URGED THE RPF TO FIND OUT AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WHETHER ITS ANALYSIS IS CORRECT.

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10. RPF DEMANDS. COHEN REVIEWED FOR THE RWANDANS THE RPF DEMANDS: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE N'SELE ACCORDS, INCLUDING THE RIGHT OF REFUGEES TO RETURN; INTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES; AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE TO PROTECT RETURNING REFUGEES; A NEUTRAL OBSERVER GROUP FOR A
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CEASEFIRE; THE PRESENCE OF THE U.S. AT NEGOTIATIONS BECAUSE OF DOUBTS OVER THE NEUTRALITY OF THE FRENCH; AND A CEASEFIRE (ONE THAT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY MEAN LAYING DOWN ARMS). THE ONLY NON-NEGOTIABLE DEMAND, HE SAID, WAS THE RIGHT OF REFUGEES TO RETURN.

U.S. ROLE IN TALKS

11. AMBASSADOR COHEN TOLD THE RWANDANS THAT THE U.S. HAS FULL CONFIDENCE IN THE FACILITATING ROLE OF THE FRENCH IN NEGOTIATIONS. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE RPF HAD ASKED FOR A U.S. PRESENCE AND SAID THE U.S. IS READY TO BE PRESENT PROVIDING ALL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE FRENCH, ARE READY FOR THE U.S. TO PARTICIPATE. COHEN SAID THE U.S. CAN FURNISH TECHNICAL EXPERTS TO HELP WITH DEFINING THE TERMS OF A CEASEFIRE AND WITH THE ISSUE OF INTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES.

INTEGRATION OF FORCES AND DEMOBILIZATION

12. COHEN NOTED THAT PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA BELIEVES INTEGRATION OF THE ARMY WILL BE THE MOST DIFFICULT ASPECT OF THE RPF'S DEMANDS. COHEN RECOUNTED HIS SUGGESTION FOR LINKING INTEGRATION WITH DEMOBILIZATION: FIRST INTEGRATE ALL THE FORCES AND THEN DEMOBILIZE AN EQUAL PROPORTION OF BOTH FORCES. THE DETAILS, HE SAID CAN BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE HELP OF EXPERTS. BUT EVERYONE WHO RETURNS, REFUGEES AND SOLDIERS, MUST BE REINTEGRATED INTO RWANDAN SOCIETY. IN RESPONSE TO THE
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MINISTER'S QUESTION, COHEN SAID THE RPF HAD NOT INDICATED HOW IT THOUGHT INTEGRATION MIGHT TAKE PLACE.

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13. RWANDA'S NEW MINISTER OF DEFENSE, JAMES GASANA, NOTED SEVERAL DIFFICULTIES TO REINTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES: MANY RPF FIGHTERS HAVE SERVED IN THE ARMY OF ANOTHER COUNTRY, RAISING THE QUESTION OF LOYALTY; VARIATIONS EXIST IN THE LEVEL AND QUALITY OF TRAINING OF THE TWO FORCES; COHEN'S SUGGESTION RISKED LEAVING MINORITY TUTSI OVERREPRESENTED IN THE ARMY.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 KIGALI 01981

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SUBJECT: GOR OUTLINES STRATEGY TO NEGOTIATIONS TO END WAR


NON-AGGRESSION ACCORD

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14. DEFENSE MINISTER GASANA (WHO IS A MEMBER OF THE
PRESIDENT'S POLITICAL PARTY) ELABORATED ON THE ROLE
UGANDA AND ITS ARMY HAS PLAYED IN THE WAR: THE NRA
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1.4(D)

16. THE LAST ELEMENT, COHEN SAID, WOULD AVOID THE
ARGUMENT OVER WHERE THE TROOPS ARE AND PERMIT THE
CEASEFIRE TO BE IMPLEMENTED. HE SAID THE ENTIRE ACCORD
COULD BE DEPOSITED WITH THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY
COUNCIL WHICH WOULD ENGAGE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
IN PROVIDING GUARANTEES.

17. THE RWANDAN FOREIGN MINISTER EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM
OVER SUCH AN ACCORD. HE ASKED WHETHER SUCH AN ACCORD
COULD BRING CHANGES ON THE GROUND, WHAT THE
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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WOULD DO IF IT WERE BROKEN, AND
WHETHER UGANDA WOULD ACCEPT. HE SAID THERE WOULD BE NO

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WAY RWANDA COULD LET MUSEVENI GET AWAY WITHOUT ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR IF THERE WERE NO IRON-CLAD GUARANTEES OF PEACE.

[REDACTED] HE NOTED THAT SIMILAR ACCORDS WITH COMMITMENTS WERE USED IN ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA AND ARE UNDER DISCUSSION IN MOZAMBIQUE.

1.4(D)

18. LATER THE SAME DAY, HOWEVER, THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD ACCEPTED THE IDEA OF [REDACTED] IN HIS TOAST TO COHEN LATER THAT EVENING, HE STATED THAT RWANDA WOULD NEED POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FROM FRIENDLY COUNTRIES TO ENCOURAGE UGANDA TO SIGN AN ACCORD

1.4(D), 1.4(B)

[REDACTED]

1.4(B)

U.S AID REQUESTED

19. IN SUMMING UP AID RWANDA WILL NEED TO ACCOMPLISH ITS PLAN, THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE TOLD COHEN THAT U.S. HELP WOULD BE NEEDED:

-- TO ENCOURAGE UGANDA TO WITHDRAW SUPPORT FROM THE RPF SO SINCERE NEGOTIATIONS CAN PROCEED;

-- TO ENCOURAGE UGANDA TO OPEN THE NORTHERN CORRIDOR SO RWANDA'S ECONOMY CAN BEGIN TO RECOVER;

-- TO ASSIST IN DEMOBILIZATION BY PROVIDING
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REINTEGRATION TRAINING AND REHABILITATION FOR HANDICAPPED VETERANS; AND,

-- TO HELP WITH DEMINING AREAS NEAR THE FRONTIER SO CIVILIANS CAN RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND BEGIN FARMING AGAIN.

COMMENT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 KIGALI 01981

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SUBJECT: GOR OUTLINES STRATEGY TO NEGOTIATIONS TO END WAR

20. THE FOREIGN MINISTER APPEARS READY TO TAKE
NEGOTIATIONS TO END THE WAR IN A NEW DIRECTION. THE
INTENTION TO SIGN A PEACE TREATY WITH THE RPF AND TO
NEGOTIATE SEPARATELY WITH UGANDA ARE TWO IMPORTANT
DEPARTURES FROM THE POSITION OF THE FORMER GOVERNMENT
THAT SHOULD OPEN NEW AVENUES OF DISCUSSION FOR ALL

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
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PARTIES. AMBASSADOR COHEN MADE IT CLEAR TO RWANDA THAT
THE U.S. IS WILLING TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH ITS
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RPF AND UGANDA AND HE OFFERED SOME

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SUGGESTIONS ON SEVERAL POINTS. HE DID NOT GET INVOLVED WITH NEGOTIATING DETAILS, SUCH AS TERMS OF A CEASEFIRE, BUT DID OFFER U.S. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WHEN THE TIME COMES.

21.



1.4(B)

THIS POSITION CONTRASTS SHARPLY WITH THAT PRESENTED TO AMBASSADOR COHEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND HIS CABINET OFFICIALS. IT MAY SIGNAL DIFFICULT INTERNAL DISCUSSIONS AHEAD, EVEN THOUGH THE NEW STRATEGY FOR NEGOTIATIONS WAS PRESENTED AS A TRANSITION GOVERNMENT POSITION. END COMMENT
FLATEN

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Republic of Rwanda

Kigali, 27 July 1992

**Ministry of Defence
Rwandan Armed Forces
Staff Headquarters**

Intelligence Service (G2)

Memorandum to the Army Chief of Staff

[CONFIDENTIAL]

SUBJECT: MOOD OF THE MILITARY AND CIVILIANS

1. The political situation of our country and the ongoing war have aroused many comments by soldiers and civilians alike.

Coming in the wake of certain political events and pressure from the enemy, the comments have created a certain mood which must be brought to your attention as it is certainly a matter of concern.

You will find below some of the comments, followed by my opinion and views.

2. These comments which are often made by both civilians and soldiers have been generated by various issues.

(A) The Arusha Accords

(1) The comments made by civilians on these Accords are many but I need not mention them since they are made publicly, even over the radio during news programmes broadcast by political parties or the coverage of rallies.

In a nutshell, many people severely criticize the contents of the Accords which only favour the RPF to the detriment of Rwanda. They are therefore calling for their review so that the points which do not favour us should be revisited.

Most of those who criticize the Accords are worried about the possible merger between the Rwandan Armed Forces and RPF elements

The civilian population is opposed to this eventuality and believes that it is a devious way of seizing power in Rwanda from within.

Even members of some opposition political parties, especially the MDR, are not in favour of any merger between the Rwandan Armed Forces and RPF armed elements. In fact, all those who are against the merger believe that our country is being sold to the enemy.

The people are therefore afraid of all this. Some of them are even saying that they are immediately going to get ready to flee before the INKONTANYI arrive, adding that prior to their flight they

will massacre the Tutsi.

(2) As for the military, many soldiers virulently disapprove of any merger between the INKONTANYI and the Rwandan Armed Forces. Officers are among those denouncing this provision of the Arusha Accords opining that they could, eventually, put up with the absorption of a few INKONTANYI elements in the Army, in proportion to the Tutsi population in this country.

If the Tutsi account for 14 percent of Rwandans, the INKONTANYI to be absorbed should represent 14 percent of the future Rwandan Armed Forces. To go beyond that, say the Officers, in fact, the other soldiers as well, would amount to selling this country to the enemy, what the Military would not allow.

In their conversations, some officers go as far as wondering whether things should stay the way they are, in other words whether civilian authorities should continue issuing directives and taking decisions which go against the interests of the Nation, for the sole purpose of protecting the immediate interests of their parties.

They wonder how long this is going to last, while expressing their worries over the interference of politicians in purely military matters. They conclude that it is time this situation changed.

Regarding the merger with the INKONTANYI or their absorption, the officers are of the opinion that the Government, through MINAFET and the Ministry of Defence should, in a meeting to which more military officials should be invited, endeavour to explain this matter and allow an open discussion thereon in order to get the feel of and record the worries and views of soldiers on this issue. Such views should be taken into account in future negotiations. They say that it is right to do so since they, and not civilians, are the ones who will be required to work with the INKONTANYI.

In any case, the military is apprehensive about a possible merger between the INKONTANYI and the Rwandan Armed Forces. They already have a premonition that if the INKONTANYI are absorbed in great numbers they will massacre our soldiers, especially our cadres.

Some of our officers are even saying that before they flee from this country they will first settle old scores with those of our leaders who caused the disaster by naively yielding to all the demands of the enemy fighting us.

(3) Many civilians are now beginning to approach soldiers telling them that the Rwandan Armed Forces are their last hope and that they should therefore right the situation in time by putting an end to the intrigues of irresponsible civilians who are only seeking immediate returns under the umbrella of political parties, instead of taking into account the interests of all the Rwandan people.

Therefore, on the whole, there is widespread anxiety among civilians and soldiers in view of the possible merger between the Rwandan Armed Forces and the INKONTANYI. Many people feel that our leaders do not have the interests of the Nation at heart.

(4) The officers object to the provision in the Arusha Accords that a new a new army is going to

be created, which provision ignores the fact that the Rwandan Armed Forces already exist. They severely criticize the fact that even Radio Rwanda no longer talks of "The Rwandan Armed Forces" but rather of "Government Armed Forces". The officers underscore that this reasoning gives the impression that the Rwandan Armed Forces are a faction on the same footing as the RPF elements, a view they loathe.

They too do not hesitate to say that "this country has been sold out".

(5) Members of all political parties (save, of course, the *Parti Liberal*) do not understand at all the unilateral and unconditional release by Rwanda of prisoners of war and the acolytes of the enemy.

To most people, this is further proof that only the enemy is deriving any benefit from the Arusha Accords and that the Government allows itself to be hoodwinked all the time.

Some people believe that there are some individuals among the negotiators of the Accords who are working for the enemy, offering the enemy everything, to the detriment of the interests of the Nation.

The people are therefore asking the Rwandan Armed Forces to do something to put the situation right before it is too late. Greatly vexed, some even go as far as saying that our troops should withdraw from the war front, for it serves no purpose to be riddled with bullets when so-called political leaders are busy selling out the country to the very enemy whom we are fighting.

The soldiers speak almost the same language. They want to know when and under what conditions their colleagues captured by the enemy will be released, now that the enemy has secured the unconditional release of their own people. This has, of course, increased their demoralization, especially as some of them think that the officers sanctioned the operation during their meeting with the Prime Minister and MINAFFET at the ESM. Some soldiers are saying that before they flee, as the enemy advances in great numbers towards the capital, they will deal with the officers who easily gave in to the wishes of reckless civilian authorities (I am only repeating what is being said).

For their part, the officers feel they have been tricked by MINAFFET and the Prime Minister. Indeed, they do not understand why these two authorities met so many military officials purportedly to explain to them the Arusha Accords and yet forgot, of course knowingly, to speak to them on the unilateral and unconditional release of prisoners of war and the acolytes of the enemy.

The officers say they have thus been misused because both civilians and the military believe that they were aware of the manoeuvre which occurred on the very evening of the meeting with the authorities mentioned above. It is with a lot of bitterness that they refer to this matter.

B. Dismissal of Communal authorities (KUBOHOZA)

(1) Some people think that the "KUBOHOZA" phenomenon which consists, in particular, of dismissing officials who are not well looked upon by opposition political parties, especially pro-MRND bourgmestres, may create disorder in the country, if the Government does not put an end to it in time. This is all the more disquieting as senior political leaders, including the Prime Minister, officially endorse and support these reprehensible acts.

People wonder whether the Prime Minister, for example, still feels he is the Prime Minister of the entire Government when he goes to the extent of practising "KUBOHWOZA" himself by distributing MDR badges to bourgmestres forcibly converted during party rallies.

People also wonder how worse the situation could get, if the Head of State does the same thing for the benefit of his party, the MRND.

The same questions are being asked as people wonder why State civil servants should be relieved of their posts without compensation, simply because they do not belong to the same party as the minister.

Many people are furious about this, especially MRND members who wonder whether MRND ministers are really committed to defending the interests of their party or whether some of them are not there only to defend their own interests.

I also noted the views of some officers who, without necessarily taking sides, are nevertheless saying that "if the President does not defend his people, if he does not stand up in time against the scheming of these pro-enemy parties, in other words if ^{he} is only defending his own interests while ignoring those of the Nation and bluntly abandoning those who have supported him so far; well, if he fails to react in time to these dramatic situations so as to save the Nation and honest people, he is going to find himself alone since no one wants to die for someone who will not recognize him".

"Ahubwo mazabimubwire abimenye", they added.

3 Personal views

(a) The Arusha Accords were one-sided Accords to the benefit of the enemy who therefore feels that they could go further and demand more. The concessions thus made to the enemy may seriously mortgage the interests of the country.

Being aware of this, the people are protesting everywhere. Many members of even opposition political parties are denouncing certain aspects of the accords, especially those provisions relating to the formation of a new national army and the unilateral release of prisoners of war and acolytes of the enemy, which release was made to the detriment of Rwanda.

Soldiers, in general, do not at all approve of the accords, believing that the country has been betrayed to the enemy and that, consequently, it is no longer necessary to continue fighting, since all the war efforts are being negated by political leaders who are only out to defend their own interests.

(b) I think that this situation is serious and should be examined more closely in order to redress the damage done, if that is still possible.

As concerns the military, I think it is still time to organize a broad-based discussion on the Accords, especially with respect to the formation of the "new army". Through such a discussion the feelings and concerns of soldiers, in other words the feelings and concerns of those who will be required to live with the INKONTANYI in the "New Army", will be known.

Inspiration could even be drawn from some of the views that would emanate from the discussion, instead of being subjected to decisions that cater for immediate political interests, whereas the consequences of

such decisions may seriously compromise the future of the Rwandan Armed Forces and that of the country.

The Head of State had promised to hold a second meeting with military leaders. Why not take advantage of that meeting where everyone will speak their mind without fear of being rapped over the knuckles? No longer being sure of their future as transfers seem to be controlled from a distance by circles outside the Rwandan Armed Forces, the officers are indeed beginning to harbour some obsessive fear. So, they fear to speak their minds in the presence of certain persons. This is the truth; it is pointless trying to run away from it. This obsessive fear now hounds some of them.

c. The uneasiness noticed among civilians is also noticed among soldiers. Everyone openly says that this country has been betrayed and that something must be done to save it. Civilians are counting on the Armed Forces and some of them are already approaching soldiers to tell them that the time has come to save the country from chaos. This is a dangerous situation and, under the circumstances, anything may happen, especially as people no longer hesitate to say that if the Head of State is not ready to assume his responsibility to save the country, he should hand over power. This is what people say openly.

d. The soldiers ARE NOT willing to live together with the INKONTANYI and do not at all understand why we are asking them to fight, since we release the INYENZI captured at the front as well as the recruiting agents who supply combatants to the enemy front. All this annoys the troops who are beginning to criticize severely both the civilian and military leaders. Officers are beginning to distrust more and more their superiors and they say so. This situation calls for reflection and a remedy.

e. The Arusha Accords have caused widespread turmoil and vexation. Yet, the war may continue, and if it does, we may face the following problems:

- soldiers becoming tired and demoralized;
- increasing economic hardship;
- the risk of partners abandoning us;
- the risk of politicians causing chaos, which will be to the advantage of the enemy, and so on and so forth.

Under such circumstances, this country may fall into the hands of the INKONTANYI, an eventuality fraught with dire consequences.

In order to prepare ourselves for the continuation of hostilities, which in the final analysis are inevitable, in my opinion the following measures must be taken:

- (1) - recruit and train enough soldiers whose morale would be less affected. They will be better equipped to face the enemy who has been perked up by a series of cheap victories and sustained propaganda.
- (2) - make sure we have enough ammunition because a new lack of ammunition may cause practically irreversible disaster.
- (3) - strive to stay in the good books of our friends and partners, especially France and the United States. In this regard, it is necessary to prepare their minds, making them understand that Rwanda is a unique case, that we are confronted with an enemy who wants to regain the power it lost and that any good intention it may display is only a subterfuge aimed solely at taking over power and thereafter proceeding to avenge

the victims of the 1959 Revolution and of the events that followed that revolution up to 1973. These friends and partners will thereby help us weaken the enemy who is still asking for more. After this, we could easily sell the concept of representation within the Rwandan Armed Forces, representation based on the proportion of each ethnic group in the Rwandan population, in lieu of a complete merger which, if it ever happens, will end up in the disaster of a more deadly civil war. Politicians must understand this;

(4) - Induce our friends and partners to give priority to the democratic process instead of getting bogged down in insidious considerations put forward by the enemy. Clearly, this calls for a national consensus so that we all speak the same language regarding the war;

Parties like the PL and others operating within its fold should listen to reason by giving priority to the interests of the Nation. In any case, if they fail to do so, the masses will react, now that they are becoming aware that they have been duped. Mob action is difficult to control.

(5) - the population and the Rwandan Armed Forces having been vexed by the actions of the Government which only engages in political scheming (I am only repeating what is being said), this Government may be compelled to resign. It would therefore be necessary to persuade our friends not to abandon us under the pretext that we are not showing any sign of goodwill.

To this end, the democratic process must be kept on course and, whenever necessary, shown to the world to prove that, in spite of our current difficulties, we are still committed to democracy or, rather, to the democratic process;

f. In my opinion, it is absolutely absurd that at a time when the enemy is threatening the country and swears to seize power in Kigali (they are about 50 km away from the capital) the people inside the country are tearing one another to pieces under the cover of political parties and with the blessings of the leaders of these parties. It is not in such circumstances that we will be able to unite against the enemy threatening us. These quarrels and the "KUBOHOZA" business that some officials wholeheartedly support must cease.

People, especially the *bourgmestres*, should feel secure, if we are asking them to ensure security inside the country.

Some officials (e.g. bougmestre Gatete and others) should be left alone, instead of being made victims of the zeal they have shown in the interest of the nation.

Government employees should not be victims of injustices stemming from political parties, otherwise they will become dissatisfied and swell the ranks of those who are against authority thereby worsening the climate of uneasiness prevailing in the country.

In passing, I should point out that the employment of many Tutsi and PL members by the government has greatly annoyed Hutu elements who have been laid off. Tension is high.

4. Conclusions

(a) The people are unhappy and have been demoralized by the government's action which favours the enemy. The soldiers are demoralized and apathetic. They are not willing to work together with the

INKONTANYI.

(b) On the whole, the climate is unhealthy and many people are asking for change, going as far as appealing to the military to do something to save the country. The Arusha Accords which are criticized by many people have only added fuel to the flames.

(c) Taking advantage of this situation which is in its favours, the enemy is putting pressure on the ground and politically and we may be overwhelmed.

(d) Something must be done to resolve this imbroglio. However, we must also get ready to continue with the war - if the enemy opts for it - and make sure that our friends and partners are well disposed towards us. Diplomatic action, be it informal, is therefore a matter of absolute necessity.

(signed)

Lt. Col. Nsengiyumva Anatole
G2 Officer at the Staff Headquarters of the Rwandan Army

Copy to:

-H.E. the President of the Republic.

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AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 KIGALI 03478

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, RW
SUBJECT: INTERNAL INSECURITY: AN ONGOING PROBLEM

REFS: (A) KIGALI 3196, (B) KIGALI 3211
(C) KIGALI 3044, (D) KIGALI 2203

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

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2. INTERPARTY VIOLENCE SUBSIDED DURING THE PAST WEEK FOLLOWING TWO WEEKS THAT SAW DEATH AND DESTRUCTION IN WIDELY SEPARATED PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, COINCIDENT TO A CALMER POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE AS A BROAD SPECTRUM OF RWANDANS ACCEPTED THE ARUSHA ACCORD PRINCIPLES FUNDAMENTAL TO POLITICAL TALKS WITH THE REBEL RPF. PARTY YOUTH, THE INTERAHAMWE OF THE PRESIDENT'S MRND PARTY AND HARDLINE CDR YOUTH, APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN THE PRINCIPLE ARCHITECTS OF RECENT ROAD BLOCKS AND ATTACKS, WHILE THE MAIN OPPOSITION PARTY, THE MDR, PROBABLY PROVOKED MOST OF THE RECENT COMMUNE-LEVEL VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH. OBSERVERS CONTEND THAT THE INTERAHAMWE AND

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THE CDR YOUTH ARE BECOMING INTERCHANGEABLE AND ALLEGE THAT MILITARY ARE INVOLVED IN THEIR ACTIVITIES. WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN SOME ARRESTS IN CONNECTION WITH INTERPARTY DISTURBANCES, THE LACK OF RESPONSE FROM THE SECURITY SERVICES, STILL CONTROLLED BY THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY, AND THE LACK OF JUDICIAL FOLLOW-UP ARE TROUBLING. ALTHOUGH THE VIOLENCE SEEMS TO HAVE SUBSIDED FOR NOW, WE CAN ANTICIPATE A NEW WAVE OF INTERNAL INSECURITY, IN SOME FORM OR ANOTHER, AS PEACE TALKS PROCEED, ESPECIALLY IF INTERNAL DIFFERENCES OVER POWERSHARING AND INTEGRATION OF FORCES BECOME ACUTE.
 END SUMMARY.

INTERNAL INSECURITY EBBS AND FLOWS

3. THROUGHOUT THIS YEAR, INTERNAL INSECURITY HAS INCREASED IN PARALLEL WITH EACH SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD IN THE DEMOCRATIZATION AND PEACE PROCESSES AND SUBSIDED AS INTERNAL POLITICAL FORCES REACHED A NEW LEVEL OF
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 COMMON UNDERSTANDING. THE BUGESERA MASSACRES, FOR EXAMPLE, TOOK PLACE JUST AS NEGOTIATIONS OVER FORMATION OF A MULTI-PARTY GOVERNMENT WERE REACHING THEIR CONCLUSION. RANDOM LAND MINE EXPLOSIONS REACHED A PEAK IN EARLY MAY, JUST WEEKS AFTER THE MULTI-PARTY TRANSITION GOVERNMENT WAS SWORN IN AND ANNOUNCED ITS PROGRAM. THE CRAZY WEEKEND IN LATE MAY INVOLVING INTER-PARTY VIOLENCE AND MILITARY MUTINIES, MIXED IN WITH A CAR BOMB EXPLOSION (REF D) OCCURRED AFTER THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S SUCCESSFUL TRIP TO UGANDA WHERE HE AND THE RPF AGREED TO TALK AND JUST PRIOR TO THE INITIAL GOR-RPF TALKS IN PARIS. INTERNAL SECURITY DETERIORATED AGAIN IN JULY WITH AN UPSURGE IN INTERPARTY VIOLENCE, IN THE INTERIM PERIOD AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE ARUSHA CEASEFIRE ACCORD WITH ITS THREE PRINCIPLES AIMED AT GUIDING AUGUST'S POLITICAL-MILITARY NEGOTIATIONS AND BEFORE THE NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN.

TENSIONS HEIGHTENED

4. TENSIONS BETWEEN POLITICAL PARTIES WERE HEIGHTENED IN LATE JULY WITH CALLS FOR THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT TO RESIGN. THE CALLS CAME BOTH FROM SUPPORTERS OF PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA'S MRND PARTY YOUTH, THE INTERAHAMWE, AND FROM THE HARDLINE HUTU SUPREMACY

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COALITION FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC (CDR).
UNAUTHORIZED DEMONSTRATIONS, MAINLY IN THE FORM OF
BLOCKING PRINCIPAL ROADS IN THE COUNTRY, DREW ATTENTION
TO THE CDR'S DENUNCIATION OF THE ARUSHA ACCORD AS WELL
AS TO DEMANDS FROM BOTH GROUPS FOR THE RELEASE OF THEIR
MEMBERS WHO HAVE BEEN ARRESTED AND FOR THE RELEASE OF
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MILITARY ARRESTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE MUTINIES OF
RUHENGERI AND GISENYI.

VIOLENCE BREAKS OUT

5. THE JULY 28 CDR DEMONSTRATION IN KIGALI (REF B)
RESULTED IN A FINAL COUNT OF THREE DEAD, TWO CDR
MEMBERS AND ONE POLICEMAN. INTER-PARTY VIOLENCE THE
WEEKEND OF AUGUST 8-9 NEAR GISENYI (NORTHWEST)
BETWEEN THE MDR AND THE INTERAHAMWE, NEAR KIBUNGO

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P 210525Z AUG 92
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1550
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 06 KIGALI 03478

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SUBJECT: INTERNAL INSECURITY: AN ONGOING PROBLEM

(SOUTHEAST) BETWEEN THE MDR AND THE INTERAHAMWE, AND OUTSIDE CYANGUGU (SOUTHWEST) BETWEEN THE CDR AND THE LIBERAL PARTY (PL) LEFT FOUR DEAD, ALL MDR YOUTH, AND MANY INJURED. COMMUNE-LEVEL VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH CONTINUES, WITH MDR LOYALISTS ATTEMPTING TO RID THEIR COMMUNES OF MRND AUTHORITIES.

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 THE CDR

6. THE CDR IS NORTHERN-BASED PARTY WHICH DRAWS ITS SUPPORT FROM BOTH THE PRESIDENT'S MRND AND THE OPPOSITION MDR AND CLAIMS TO BE THE TRUE SUCCESSOR TO THE OLD PARMEHUTU PARTY, WHICH PREACHED HUTU SUPREMACY AT INDEPENDENCE. IT IS PARTICULARLY FEARED BY MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITION FOR ITS KU KLUX KLAN-LIKE APPROACH TO ETHNIC RELATIONS. ITS REPEATED CALL FOR RECOGNITION OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TUTSI AND HUTU IS WIDELY INTERPRETED AS A CALL FOR EXTERMINATION OF THE TUTSIS. MANY PEOPLE IN DIFFERENT SOCIAL AND POLITICAL POSITIONS HAVE TOLD US THAT THE CDR IS NOTHING MORE THAN THE MOUTH-PIECE OF THE PRESIDENT, SAYING WHAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SAY BUT CANNOT. THIS PARTY, REGISTERED IN MARCH, IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT.

7. CDR LEADER, JEAN BOSCO BARAYAGWIZA INSISTS THAT UNITY BETWEEN HUTU AND TUTSI IS IMPOSSIBLE; THEY CAN ONLY CO-EXIST. HE IS EXTREMELY CRITICAL OF A SPEECH IN WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER CALLED FOR ALL RWANDANS TO SEE THEMSELVES AS BANYARWANDA RATHER AS HUTU, TUTSI OR TWA. BARAYAGWIZA TOLD CHARGE THAT ONLY RECOGNITION OF ETHNIC DIFFERENCES CAN ALLOW RWANDA TO FIND A SOLUTION TO ITS PROBLEMS. HE SAID THAT HIS PARTY WANTS PEACE BUT NOT PEACE AT ANY PRICE, A REFERENCE TO THE CDR'S STRONG OBJECTIONS TO THE ARUSHA ACCORD PRINCIPLES (REF C). HE BELIEVES THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE WORKING FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE MAJORITY. THIS, HE EXPLAINED, MEANS WORKING FOR

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 PEACE WITHOUT YIELDING TO THE RPF AS HE BELIEVES THIS
 GOVERNMENT HAS DONE, AND IT MEANS PREPARING FOR
 ELECTIONS WHICH HE SAYS HAVE BEEN ALL BUT FORGOTTEN.

8. BARAYAGWIZA, TOLD CHARGE JUST BEFORE THE FATAL
 KIGALI DEMONSTRATION THAT THE CDR WAS NOT INTERESTED
 IN CREATING VIOLENCE AND THAT HIS GROUP WAS AGAINST
 DEMONSTRATIONS. RECALLING EARLIER ROADBLOCKS IN THE
 NORTH, BARAYAGWIZA REPLIED THOSE HAD BEEN
 UNAUTHORIZED AND THAT THE CDR MEMBERS INVOLVED HAD
 BEEN REPRIMANDED. APPARENTLY THE REPRIMAND WENT
 UNHEEDED.

THE INTERAHAMWE

9. THE INTERAHAMWE, THE MRND YOUTH, ARE ALSO WIDELY
 FEARED BY OPPOSITION MEMBERS WHO BELIEVE THE GROUP IS
 MORE A MILITIA THAN SIMPLY THE YOUTH WING OF THE
 PARTY. MANY OPPOSITION PARTY MEMBERS CLAIM THEY HAVE
 SEEN GENDARMES AMONG INTERAHAMWE GROUPS AND THAT
 THESE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN PROVIDING MILITARY TRAINING TO
 THE YOUTH.

10. A SOURCE WHO CLAIMS TO HAVE BEEN AN INTERHAMWE
 FOUNDER SUPPORTED THIS ALLEGATION TO CHARGE
 RECENTLY. ENCOURAGED TO TALK TO CHARGE BY A TRUSTED
 COMMON ACQUAINTANCE, THE SOURCE SAID THAT THE
 INTELLECTUAL YOUTH GROUP HE STARTED LAST AUGUST IN
 RESPONSE TO YOUTH GROUPS LAUNCHED BY OPPOSITION
 PARTIES HAD BECOME A MILITIA. HE CLAIMED THE AIMS OF
 THE GROUP HAD BEEN PERVERTED BY MEMBERS OF THE

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 PRESIDENT'S FAMILY WHO HAD INSERTED THEMSELVES INTO
 THE MANAGEMENT OF THE GROUP. HE CONTENDS THAT 50
 MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, WHOSE NAMES HAVE
 BEEN PASSED TO THE DEFENSE MINISTER, ARE ACTIVELY
 PARTICIPATING IN THE GROUP'S ACTIVITIES AND INVOLVED
 IN MILITARY TRAINING FOR SOME MEMBERS OF THE GROUP.
 HE BELIEVES MANY MEMBERS OF THE INTERAHAMWE ARE
 UNAWARE OF THE ORGANIZATION'S CURRENT THRUST. THE
 SOURCE, WHO RESIGNED FROM THE MRND IN JUNE, SAID HE
 BELIEVES HIS LIFE IS IN DANGER FROM PERSONS CLOSE TO

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P 210525Z AUG 92
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1551
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 06 KIGALI 03478

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, RW
SUBJECT: INTERNAL INSECURITY: AN ONGOING PROBLEM

THE PRESIDENT. INDEED, SHORTLY BEFORE HIS
RESIGNATION FROM THE PARTY, A CAR BOMB EXPLODED IN
FRONT OF HIS WORK PLACE WHICH HE LINKS TO PEOPLE WHO
MAY BE INTERESTED IN HIS ELIMINATION.

11. MRND SECRETARY GENERAL, MATHIEU NGIRUMPATSE,
SAID THAT ALLEGATIONS AGAINST THE INTERAHAMWE ARE
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PURE PROPAGANDA. HE SAID A GENDARME COMMANDANT TOLD
HIM THERE WERE 2-3 GENDARMES IN THE GROUP BUT HAD NOT
YET PROVIDED NAMES. NGIRUMPATSE SAID HE WOULD
REPRIMAND ANY GENDARME FOUND AMONG THE MEMBERS.

12. CHARGE ASKED PRESIDENTIAL CABINET DIRECTOR ENOCH
RUHIGIRA ABOUT ALLEGATIONS OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN
THE INTERAHAMWE. HE REPLIED THAT A PARTY
INVESTIGATION HAD TURNED UP INVOLVEMENT OF "MILITARY
RESERVISTS". THESE PEOPLE, HE SAID, WOULD BE

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EXCLUDED FROM INTERAHAMWE ACTIVITIES IN THE FUTURE.
 KIGALI'S PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ALSO TOLD CHARGE THAT
 "MILITARY RESERVISTS" ARE IN THE INTERAHAMWE.
 (NOTE: MILITARY ARE PRECLUDED BY LAW FROM JOINING
 POLITICAL PARTIES. END NOTE).

DIFFERENCES BLURRED?

13. SEVERAL OBSERVERS BELIEVE THAT THERE IS NOW
 LITTLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CDR AND THE
 INTERAHAMWE. THEY CLAIM TO HAVE SEEN MEMBERS OF EACH
 GROUP PARTICIPATING IN DEMONSTRATIONS ORGANIZED BY THE
 OTHER. THE INTERAHAMWE SOURCE TOLD CHARGE THAT, LIKE
 THE INTERAHAMWE, THE CDR IS ALSO AN AFFAIR OF THE
 PRESIDENT AND HIS FAMILY.

14. QUERIED BY CHARGE, HOWEVER, LEADERS OF BOTH THE
 MRND AND THE CDR CONTEND THAT THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS
 ARE COMPLETELY SEPARATE AND THAT THEIR IDEOLOGIES AND
 AIMS ARE TOTALLY DIFFERENT. CDR LEADER BARAYAGWIZA
 IS CRITICAL OF THE MRND FOR FAILING TO PUT HUTU

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 INTERESTS FIRST. HE CLAIMS THAT THE CDR IS COMPOSED
 PRIMARLY OF YOUNG PEOPLE WHO HAVE NOT BEEN "DIRTIED"
 IN MRND POLITICS. MRND LEADER NGIRUMPATSE IS EQUALLY
 CRITICAL OF THE CDR POLICY OF ETHNIC SEPARATISM AND
 CLAIMED TO CHARGE THAT THE CDR IS ACTUALLY A THREAT
 TO THE MRND. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT INTERAHAMWE
 MEMBERS MIGHT BE PARTICIPATING IN CDR DEMONSTRATIONS
 AND VICE-VERSE, BUT HE SAID SUCH PERSONS, IF
 IDENTIFIED, WOULD BE PUNISHED. HE CLAIMED SUCH
 PARTICIPATION WAS TOTALLY SPONTANEOUS AND NOT
 SANCTIONED BY THE MRND.

MDR ACCUSED

15. THE MAJOR OPPOSITION PARTY, THE MDR, IS THE TRUE
 SOURCE OF INSTABILITY, ACCORDING TO MRND LEADER
 NGIRUMPATSE. HE CLAIMS THAT MDR LEADER FAUSTIN
 TWIGIRAMUNGU IS RESPONSIBLE FOR STIRRING UP MDR
 YOUTH, THE JDR, AGAINST MRND MEMBERS. HE HAS WRITTEN
 LETTERS TO THE PRIME MINISTER ACCUSING TWAGIRAMUNGU
 OF URGING MDR MEMBERS AT POLITICAL RALLIES TO TAKE
 STEPS TO REMOVE THE MRND AUTHORITIES IN THEIR
 COMMUNES FROM THE POSITIONS. HE SAID THAT THE PRIME

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MINISTER HIMSELF HAS CONDONED THE PRACTICE OF "LIBERATION" OF COMMUNES IN PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS. HE BLAMED THE MDR PRIME MINISTER FOR TALKING WITH TWO VOICES, ONE TO OFFICIALS AND ANOTHER TO THE POPULATION. HE ALSO ACCUSED THE PRIME MINISTER OF FOSTERING INTERPARTY FRICTION WITH FORKED-TONGUE LANGUAGE IN COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETINGS.

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SECRET PLANS FOR DESTABILIZATION?

16. MANY RWANDANS ARE CONVINCED THAT THE INTERNAL SECURITY RAMPANT IN THE COUNTRY IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS IS NO ACCIDENT, BUT THEY DISAGREE ON THE SOURCE. BOTH SIDES IN RWANDA'S POLITICAL DIALOGUE BELIEVE THE INCIDENTS OF INTERNAL INSECURITY FIT WITH PLANS THE OTHER HAS TO DESTABILIZE THE COUNTRY IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE ITS GOALS.

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	SP-01	SS-01	TRSE-00	T-01	USIE-00	/037W	

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P 210525Z AUG 92
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1552
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
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AMEMBASSY PARIS

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17. A TRUSTED SOURCE WHO ADVOCATES CHANGE TOLD CHARGE OF A "SECRET" GROUP OF 45 PROMINENT RWANDANS WHOSE AIM IS TO CREATE DISTURBANCES THROUGHOUT RWANDA THAT WILL DESTABILIZE THE COUNTRY AND SLOW DOWN IF NOT REVERSE THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS. ALLEGEDLY INCLUDED IN THE GROUP ARE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS,
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 JOURNALISTS, BUSINESSMEN AND PERSONS IN THE SECURITY FORCES. AMONG THE NAMES SHOWN TO CHARGE WERE THOSE OF CDR LEADER BARAYAGWIZA, FOR EXAMPLE, THE WIFE OF THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL SECRETARY, COL. SAGATWA, AND GAUDANCE HABIMANA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL POPULATION PLANNING OFFICE AND CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF THE PRESIDENT.

18. ON THE OTHER SIDE, THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY CHARGED EARLIER THIS YEAR THAT THE OPPOSITION, IN COLLABORATION WITH THE REBELS, WAS ENGAGED IN A DESTABILIZATION CAMPAIGN INVOLVING ETHNIC MASSACRES, STRIKES, PROTESTS, AND SO FORTH, AS THE THIRD PHASE OF THE REBEL PLAN TO OUST THE GOVERNMENT. MRND SECRETARY GENERAL, NGIRUMPATSE, TOLD CHARGE THAT HE ADVISED THE PRIME MINISTER (MDR) IN A LATE JULY LETTER OF A NEW DESTABILIZATION PLAN DESIGNED TO RUN THE MRND OUT OF KIGALI AND REMOVE THE PREFET, WHO HAS THE FULL BACKING OF THE PRESIDENT. (NOTE: THE PRIME MINISTER REPLIED THAT THE PERSONS NAMED BY NGIRUMPATSE HAD BEEN FOUND TO BE INNOCENT OF THE CHARGES. END NOTE.)

SECURITY FORCES ON THE SIDELINES

19. THE ABSENCE OF A STRONG RESPONSE TO THESE MANY INSTANCES OF VIOLENCE FROM RWANDA'S SECURITY FORCES, STILL UNDER THE CONTROL OF LOYALISTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY, IS TROUBLING. KIGALI'S PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SHOWED CHARGE A LETTER HE WROTE TO THE RADIO STATION (WHICH TO OUR KNOWLEDGE WAS NEVER AIRED), IN WHICH HE DEPLORED THE SLOW RESPONSE OF THE
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GENDARMERIE TO THE VIOLENCE THAT RESULTED IN THE
DEATH OF TWO CDR MILITANTS IN KIGALI RECENTLY. HE
NOTED THAT THE GENDARMES OFTEN LEAVE THE RESPONSE TO
THE URBAN POLICE, WHO ARE NOT SPECIALIZED IN RIOT OR
CROWD CONTROL. THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR TOLD CHARGE HE
BELIEVES THE GENDARME BEHAVIOR IS A RESULT OF THE
FACT THAT MANY SYMPATHIZE WITH THE CDR. HE CLAIMS
THEY ALSO DO NOT WANT TO ENGAGE AGAINST THE
"RESERVISTS", THEIR FORMER COLLEAGUES AND SOMETIMES
SUPERIORS, WHEN THEY SEE THEM AMONG THE RANKS OF
DEMONSTRATORS. HE SPECULATES THAT THE HEAD OF THE
GENDARMERIE, AN MDR STALWART, IS MORE COMFORTABLE
SITTING ON THE FENCE THAN RISKING ACTIONS/DECISIONS
THAT MIGHT UPSET HIS "BOSS".

20. THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR TOLD CHARGE THAT HIS
OFFICE, RESPONSIBLE FOR BRINGING CASES TO TRIAL, IS
DEPENDENT ON THE GENDARMERIE'S JUDICIAL POLICE BRANCH
FOR CONDUCTING INVESTIGATIONS INTO THESE KINDS OF
OFFENSES. HE SAID HE HAS NO CONTROL OVER THE PACE OR
THE METHODS OF THEIR WORK, ALTHOUGH THE BRANCH
NOMINALLY WORKS UNDER THE GUIDANCE OF HIS OFFICE AND
TURNS ITS WORK OVER TO HIM FOR PREPARING CASES. HE
CITED AN EXAMPLE OF A RECENT INCIDENT WHERE HE ISSUED
A MANDATE FOR THE ARREST OF SEVERAL PEOPLE. THE
JUDICIAL POLICE RETURNED EMPTY-HANDED SAYING THEY
COULD NOT FIND THEM.

21. AT ITS MEETING AUGUST 12, THE COUNCIL OF
MINISTERS DISCUSSED THE SECURITY SITUATION AND
DECIDED THAT, TO BE MORE EFFECTIVE, SECURITY FORCES

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NEEDED REORGANIZATION, EQUIPMENT, AND TRAINING. THE
COUNCIL ALSO DECIDED THAT MINISTERS SHOULD VISIT
THEIR PREFECTURES OF ORIGIN WITH THE AIM OF DIFFUSING
TENSIONS AND ENCOURAGING COOPERATION AMONG PARTIES.
THREE MINISTERS FROM THREE DIFFERENT PARTIES HAVE
ALREADY MADE SUCH A VISIT IN THE PREFECTURE OF BUTARE
(WHERE THE PREFET IS FROM YET A FOURTH PARTY) TO
ENCOURAGE CALM.

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P 210525Z AUG 92
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1553
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 06 KIGALI 03478

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JUDICIAL SYSTEM INERT

22. THE APPARENT INABILITY OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM TO PROSECUTE PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH RECENT INCIDENTS OF INSECURITY, INCLUDING LAND MINE EXPLOSIONS, BOMBINGS, ROBBERIES, ASSASSINATIONS AND THE MORE RECENT INTER-PARTY VIOLENCE, IS RAISING A LOT OF QUESTIONS

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BY THOSE WHO THOUGHT THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE ABLE TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE. THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT CURRENTLY HEADED BY A MINISTER FROM THE LIBERAL PARTY HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO INCREASE ITS CREDIBILITY IN THESE MATTERS SINCE THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT TOOK OFFICE. BOTH THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR AND MRND LEADER NGIRUMPATSE, WHO WAS MINISTER OF JUSTICE IN THE FIRST TRANSITION GOVERNMENT, ATTRIBUTE JUDICIAL WEAKNESS TO A LACK OF TRAINED JUDGES. INDEED, THE EDUCATION LEVEL OF JUDGES, WHO ARE DEPENDENT UPON THE PRESIDENT FOR THEIR APPOINTMENTS, IS LOW AND FEW ARE TRAINED IN THE LAW, MAKING THEM SUSCEPTIBLE TO POLITICAL

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PRESSURE AND CORRUPTION.

PARTY RESPONSIBILITY

23. MDR LEADER TWAGIRAMUNGU TOLD CHARGE RECENTLY THAT HIS PARTY PLANS TO MODERATE ITS TONE AND ENCOURAGE RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR BY PARTY MEMBERS. AT A PRESS CONFERENCE AT THE ONSET OF RECENT PARTY VIOLENCE HE TOLD MDR PARTY YOUTH TO LET SECURITY FORCES TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESTORING ORDER INSTEAD OF TAKING MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS. KIGALI'S PUBLIC PROSECUTOR NOTED A DISTINCT CHANGE IN OPPOSITION SPEECHES AT POLITICAL RALLIES. HE SAID THAT LIBERAL PARTY LEADER MUGENZI, KNOWN FOR HIS FIRERY RHETORIC, HAD RECENTLY MADE AN UNUSUALLY BALANCED SPEECH. HE CLAIMS THAT THE ONLY PARTY LEADER CURRENTLY MAKING INFLAMMATORY SPEECHES IS MRND LEADER NGIRUMPATSE.

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 24. NGIRUMPATSE BELIEVES THE MRND YOUTH MUST STRIKE BACK IF ATTACKED. NGIRUMPATSE DEMONSTRATED HIS ABILITY TO EXERCISE CONTROL OVER THE INTERAHAMWE WHEN IT BLOCKED ROADS NORTH AND SOUTH FROM KIGALI JULY 28. HE WENT TO THE SCENE AND INSTRUCTED THE YOUTH TO DEPART, AFTER BOTH THE KIGALI PREFET (MRND) AND THE MINISTER OF THE INZERIOR (MDR) HAD FAILED IN SIMILAR EFFORTS. BOTH HE AND CDR LEADER, BARAYAGWISA, HOWEVER, ACKNOWLEDGED TO CHARGE THAT THEIR PARTY YOUTH HAD ENGAGED IN ACTIVITIES NOT ENDORSED BY THE PARTY, SUGGESTING THAT PARTY LEADERS MAY NOT ALWAYS BE IN A POSITION TO CONTROL THE ACTIONS OF THEIR YOUTH.

COMMENT

25. ALTHOUGH THE "INVISIBLE HAND" (OR HANDS) THEORY CANNOT BE RULED OUT, THERE IS NO HARD EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A CONSPIRACY THEORY OF VIOLENCE FROM EITHER THE RIGHT OR THE LEFT. AFTER EIGHT MONTHS OF RIDING THE WAVES OF INTERNAL INSECURITY, HOWEVER, IT DOES APPEAR THAT VIOLENCE OF ONE SORT OR ANOTHER IS MOST LIKELY TO ERUPT WHEN TENSIONS INCREASE AS THE SOCIETY STRUGGLES TO REACH CONSENSUS ON THE DIRECTION OF ITS NEXT STEP IN THE DEMOCRATIZATION OR THE PEACE

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PROCESS. ONCE THE CONSENSUS, OR SEMBLANCE OF GENERAL AGREEMENT, IS REACHED, AS IS THE CASE NOW, WITH ALMOST ALL ELEMENTS OF THE SOCIETY READY TO ACCEPT THE NEARLY REVOLUTIONARY ARUSHA ACCORD PRINCIPLES, CALM IS RESTORED FOR A TIME. WITH MORE TOUGH SOCIAL DECISIONS YET AHEAD, HOWEVER, WE CAN ONLY ANTICIPATE
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FUTURE DISTURBANCES THAT ECHO THIS PATTERN.

26. THE USE OF VIOLENCE BY EITHER SIDE IN THIS POLITICAL DEBATE IS ANTI-THETICAL TO THE USG GOAL OF SUPPORTING THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND PROMOTING DEMOCRATIC VALUES. IT THREATENS THE VERY FABRIC OF THE SOCIETY BY STIRRING HATREDS THAT WILL BE DIFFICULT, IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE, TO CALM. INDEED, NGIRUMPATSE CLAIMS THAT ONE OF RWANDA'S PROBLEMS IS THAT ITS DEMOCRACY IS FOUNDED ON HATE. ON THE ONE

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	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-01	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10	SNP-01
	SP-01	SS-01	TRSE-00	T-01	USIE-00	/037W	

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P 210525Z AUG 92
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1554
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 06 OF 06 KIGALI 03478

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, RW

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SUBJECT: INTERNAL INSECURITY: AN ONGOING PROBLEM

HAND, WE NEED TO CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE PARTY LEADERS TO USE MODERATION AND DEMOCRATIC STRATEGIES TO ACHIEVE THEIR GOALS, SUCH AS THE MDR PLAN TO USE PETITIONS INSTEAD OF VIOLENCE TO EXPRESS DISCONTENT WITH LOCAL LEADERSHIP. AT THE SAME TIME, WE NEED TO EMPHASIZE AGAIN TO THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE GOVERNMENT THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNAL SECURITY TO

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BOTH THE PROCESS OF PEACE AND THE PROCESS OF
DEMOCRATIZATION.

27. AMERICAN NATIONALS ARE NOT/NOT DIRECTLY THREATENED BY THIS RECENT OF INTER-PARTY VIOLENCE, AND WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE BECOMING TARGETS OF ANY FUTURE VIOLENCE. THE RISK EXISTS, THOUGH, THAT WE MIGHT END UP IN THE WRONG PLACE AT THE WRONG TIME.

LEADER

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: XA, PREL, PINR
SUBJECT: INR/AA'S AFRICAN TRENDS - 9/18/92 (NO. 19)

"ROME FOR FOLAN AND ALSO FOR VATICAN, LONDON FOR
MCKINLEY, BRUSSELS FOR DUBROW, MADRID FOR CLARKE, USNATO
FOR HAMILTON, BONN FOR KLEMP, USCINCEUR AND HQ US
CENTRAL COMMAND FOR POLADS, HQ USEUCOM FOR EC J-5,

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COMMANDER USASSETAF FOR G-2"

1. (S) TABLE OF CONTENTS FOR AFRICAN TRENDS 9/18/92

-
- A. ESSAY: RWANDA: THREADING A NEEDLE
 B. NOTE: ZAIRE: MOBUTU MANEUVERS TO MAINTAIN CONTROL
 C. NOTE: SOUTH AFRICA: SMALL STEPS TOWARD PEACE
 D. NOTE: SUDAN: RELIEF CRISIS
 E. NOTE: ANGOLA: THE CABINDA POT KEEPS SIMMERING
-

-
- A. ESSAY: RWANDA: THREADING A NEEDLE
-

2. (C) THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT AND THE TUTSI-DOMINATED REBEL RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) ARE LABORING TOWARD A SETTLEMENT, BUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A GENOCIDAL CIVIL WAR WILL LOOM IF THE ONGOING SERIES OF TALKS IN ARUSHA, TANZANIA, FAILS. WHETHER THE PARTIES REACH AGREEMENT

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 DEPENDS PARTLY ON HOW MUCH POWER PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA IS WILLING TO CEDE TO THE RPF AND DOMESTIC OPPOSITION PARTIES. BUT TO BE ACCEPTED BY KIGALI (AND VIEWED AS LEGITIMATE BY THE RWANDAN PEOPLE). A TRUE SETTLEMENT ALSO DEPENDS ON THE RPF'S WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A POWERSHARING FORMULA MORE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TUTSIS' 10-15 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION THAN WITH THE 50-50 SHARE THE RPF HAS BEEN DEMANDING.

3. (C) HABYARIMANA'S SIDE HAS BEEN PUSHED HARDER AND MORE SUCCESSFULLY TO COMPROMISE. THE GOVERNMENT IS VULNERABLE TO MILITARY PRESSURE FROM THE RPF AND TO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE FROM MAJOR WESTERN DONORS. THE RPF LEADERSHIP BY CONTRAST ENJOYS SANCTUARY IN UGANDA AND IS NOT SO HEAVILY PRESSED BY KIGALI, OUTSIDERS, OR THE COSTS OF A WAR WHICH IS FOUGHT ON RWANDAN SOIL. IT IS LIKELY, THEREFORE, THAT THE RPF WILL MAINTAIN A MORE INTRANSIGENT NEGOTIATING POSITION. THIS WOULD PERPETUATE THE CURRENT INSTABILITY AND STIR PASSIONS THAT COULD LEAD TO THE SORT OF ANTI-TUTSI GENOCIDE THAT GRIPPED RWANDA AND NEIGHBORING BURUNDI IN THE PAST.

BACKGROUND

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4. (C) DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM. THE NEGOTIATIONS
 ----- AND THE CONFLICT
 BEHIND THEM ARE MULTIFACETED: HUTU-TUTSI TENSIONS; THE
 EFFORT TO DECENTRALIZE POWER AND WEALTH NOW CONTROLLED
 BY HABYARIMANA'S INNER CIRCLE; AND THE INTERNATIONAL
 DIMENSION, PARTICULARLY THE ROLE OF WESTERN DONORS AND
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 UGANDA.

5. (C) THE BASIS OF THE CONFLICT LIES IN ETHNIC
 TENSION BETWEEN THE TUTSIS--ABOUT 10 PERCENT OF RWANDA'S
 POPULATION OF 7 MILLION--AND THE HUTUS, WHO MAKE UP
 ALMOST ALL THE REST. THE TUTSIS THE COUNTRY'S RULING
 CLASS BEFORE INDEPENDENCE, WERE DISPLACED FROM THEIR
 DOMINANT POSITION IN 1959 BY A COMBINATION OF ELECTIONS
 AND HUTU UPRISINGS THAT KILLED THOUSANDS OF TUTSIS AND
 CAUSED HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS TO FLEE THE COUNTRY.
 ACCORDING TO THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSION FOR
 REFUGEES (UNHCR), SOME 400,000 LONG-TERM RWANDAN
 REFUGEES--VIRTUALLY ALL OF THEM TUTSIS--LIVE IN
 NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.

6. (C) THE RPF, BASICALLY A TUTSI ORGANIZATION. TRIED
 TO GRAB POWER BY INVADING RWANDA FROM UGANDA ON OCTOBER
 1, 1990. AFTER THE SURPRISE ATTACK WHICH SAW THE RFF
 STRIKE AS FAR AS KIGALI, THE RWANDAN ARMED FORCES (FAR),
 AIDED BY FRANCE, REGROUPED AND FUSHED BACK THE REBELS.
 THE RPF STRUCK AGAIN IN JANUARY 1991 AND BRIEFLY
 CAPTURED RUHENGERI BUT APPEARED TO WEAKEN IN THE
 SUBSEQUENT RAINY SEASON. FOR SIX MONTHS AFTER A MARCH
 CEASEFIRE. THE RPF RETREATED TO NORTHERN BORDER AREAS
 AND CONDUCTED OCCASIONAL AND LARGELY INEFFECTIVE
 HIT-AND-RUN ATTACKS. IN LATE 1991 IT BEGAN PRESSING ITS
 ATTACKS WITH RENEWED VIGOR AND EFFECTIVENESS.

7. (C) THE RPF, WHOSE CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF NEGOTIATOR
 ARE PROMINENT HUTUS, PORTRAYS ITSELF AS A NATIONALIST
 ORGANIZATION OPPOSED TO THE HABYARIMANA REGIME'S

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CORRUPTION, ABUSES OF POWER, AND FAVORITISM TOWARD THE HUTUS OF NORTHERN RWANDA. THE LATTER FORM THE CORE OF REGIME SUPPORT. THE RPF HAS NO SIGNIFICANT HUTU SUPPORT, BUT ITS CRITICISMS OF THE GOVERNMENT RESONATE AMONG THE HUTUS ESPECIALLY IN NEWLY FORMED OPPOSITION PARTIES.

8. (C) NEGOTIATIONS PROGRESS. THE ARUSHA TALKS ARE ----- THE LATEST IN A LONG PROGRESSION OF NEGOTIATIONS DATING BACK TO MID-OCTOBER 1990. THEY FOLLOW A MAY 1992 US OFFER TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN CONCERT WITH NEIGHBORING STATES, FRANCE, AND BELGIUM.

9. (C) EARLIER NEGOTIATIONS FOCUSED UNSUCCESSFULLY ON ACHIEVING A LASTING CEASE-FIRE. THEY FAILED ALSO TO MOVE THE TWO SIDES SIGNIFICANTLY TOWARD A POLITICAL

SETTLEMENT. IN PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE EARLIER ROUNDS, HELD IN DAR ES SALAAM IN FEBRUARY 1991 THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THE TUTSIS' RIGHT OF RETURN PENDING AN END TO HOSTILITIES AND A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. THE TWO SIDES ALSO AGREED TO A CEASE-FIRE, WHICH WAS SHORT-LIVED. NEIGHBORING STATES AGREED TO GRANT SANCTUARY TO THOSE TUTSIS WHO PREFERRED NOT TO RETURN TO RWANDA. AND CITIZENSHIP TO THOSE WHO DESIRED IT. SUBSEQUENTLY, HOWEVER, POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS AND THE CEASE-FIRE BROKE DOWN WHEN THE RPF OBJECTED TO THE PROPOSED TERMS OF SETTLEMENT AND THE IMPARTIALITY OF MEDIATORS WAS QUESTIONED.

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10. (C) THE CURRENT SERIES OF TALKS BEGAN WITH A JULY MEETING IN ARUSHA WHICH RESULTED IN A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT. WITH MINOR EXCEPTIONS, THE CEASE-FIRE HAS HELD. THE PARTIES ALSO SET AN AGENDA CALLING FOR POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS TO BE CONCLUDED BY OCTOBER 10. A FOLLOWUP MEETING IN AUGUST LED TO AGREEMENT ON IMPLEMENTING "THE RULE OF LAW." A FURTHER ARUSHA ROUND THAT BEGAN SEPTEMBER 7 FOCUSED ON POLITICAL INTEGRATION--HOW TO BRING THE RPF INTO GOVERNMENT AND HOW TO MODIFY AND LIBERALIZE THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT.

11. (C) THE NEXT ROUND, TO BE HELD IN ARUSHA AFTER OCTOBER 1, WILL CONTINUE THE EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT

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ON POLITICAL INTEGRATION BEFORE IT MOVES TO THE PROBLEM OF MILITARY INTEGRATION.

HABYARIMANA UNDER PRESSURE

12. (C) DONORS, TUTSIS, AND REFORMS. AN

----- EX-

BELGIAN-TRAINED PARATROOPER WHO TOOK OVER IN A 1973 MILITARY COUP. HABYARIMANA IN THE PAST TWO YEARS HAS FACED UNPRECEDENTED PRESSURE FROM DONORS AND THE RPF TO REFORM HIS GOVERNMENT. INITIALLY HE WAS VIEWED AS A MODERATE ON THE QUESTION OF HUTU-TUTSI RELATIONS BECAUSE HE HAD REPLACED A HUTU-CHAUVINIST GOVERNMENT LED BY THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT-PARMEHUTU (MDR-PARMEHUTU) AND HAD APPOINTED TUTSIS TO HIS CABINET. ALTHOUGH HABYARIMANA'S POLICIES FAVORED NORTHERN HUTUS, MAINLY IN THE PREFECTURES OF RUHENGERI AND GISENYI, HIS MDR-PARMEHUTU PREDECESSORS HAD JUST AS BLATANTLY FAVORED

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THE SOUTH.

13. (C) IN 1975 HABYARIMANA ESTABLISHED THE NATIONAL

REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT (MRND) AND MODIFIED THE CONSTITUTION TO MAKE THE MRND THE SOLE LEGAL PARTY. FOR 15 YEARS, HOWEVER. INTERNATIONAL DONORS VIEWED RWANDA AS ONE OF AFRICA'S MOST STABLE AND ECONOMICALLY SUCCESSFUL COUNTRIES.

14. (C) POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DISCONTENT BECAME MORE EVIDENT AFTER 1988. THE FALL IN INTERNATIONAL COFFEE PRICES IN 1989-90 STRAPPED RWANDA ECONOMICALLY AND HEIGHTENED DONOR PRESSURE FOR SIGNIFICANT STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT REFORMS. INCREASINGLY, HABYARIMANA'S WIFE AND IN-LAWS WERE CRITICIZED FOR CORRUPTION, AND HIS POLICY OF FAVORING THE NORTH AT THE EXPENSE OF OTHER REGIONS WAS NO LONGER SEEN AS ACCEPTABLE. JUST AS IMPORTANTLY, THE COLLAPSE OF EAST EUROPEAN COMMUNISM DISCREDITED RWANDA'S CENTRALIZED, ONE-PARTY RULE.

15. (C) HABYARIMANA ATTEMPTED TO RESPOND TO THE CHANGES: ON JULY 5, 1990, HE ANNOUNCED A TWO-YEAR PROCESS TO MOVE TOWARD MULTIPARTY RULE, AND ON SEPTEMBER 21 HE APPOINTED A COMMISSION OF NATIONAL SYNTHESIS TO SUGGEST WAYS TO MOVE TOWARD GREATER DEMOCRATIZATION.

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LESS THAN TWO WEEKS LATER, THE RPF INVASION BROUGHT NEW ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE REGIME TO SOLVE THE TUTSI PROBLEM.

16. (C) THE WAR IS COSTLY TO RWANDA. IT HAS DISRUPTED
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ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN THE NORTH AND HAS DISPLACED SOME 350,000 RWANDANS, ACCORDING TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC). KIGALI MUST PAY FOR AN ARMY THAT HAS INCREASED IN SIZE FROM 5,000 IN OCTOBER 1990 TO ITS CURRENT AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF 30,000. TO FINANCE THE WAR, KIGALI HAS BEEN FORCED TO SELL VIRTUALLY ITS ENTIRE COFFEE STOCKPILE AT A TIME WHEN WORLD PRICES ARE LOW. IT HAS INCREASED BORROWING FROM INTERNATIONAL DONORS AND FALLEN BEHIND ON ITS PAYMENTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. IN THIS SITUATION, KIGALI IS VULNERABLE TO FOREIGN DONOR PRESSURES FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM.

17. (C) UNDER PRESSURE AS WELL FROM NEIGHBORING STATES INTERESTED IN AMELIORATING THE PROBLEM OF TUTSI REFUGEES IN THEIR TERRITORIES. HABYARIMANA IN LATE 1990 AND EARLY 1991 IMPLEMENTED A SERIES OF REFORMS THAT BEGAN TO LIBERALIZE THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND RESPOND TO TUTSI COMPLAINTS. HE ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THE TUTSI RIGHT OF RETURN; ANNOUNCED ELIMINATION OF THE NOTATION OF ONE'S

ETHNIC BACKGROUND FROM NATIONAL IDENTITY CARDS (WHICH HAD LONG ANGERED THE TUTSIS); AND FORMALLY LIFTED PRESS RESTRICTIONS (THOUGH JOURNALISTS CONTINUED TO BE ARRESTED AND BEATEN).

18. (C) IN JUNE 1991, HABYARIMANA ACCEPTED MANY OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION OF NATIONAL SYNTHESIS AND FORMALLY DECLARED RWANDA A MULTIPARTY STATE. HE RENAMED THE MRND AS THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRACY AND INVITED THE RPF TO ESTABLISH ITSELF AS
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A LEGAL PARTY AND COMPETE WITH OTHER PARTIES
(CALCULATING THAT THE MINORITY TUTSIS COULD NOT WIN A

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SIGNIFICANT SHARE OF THE POPULAR VOTE). TO DATE, 16 PARTIES HAVE REGISTERED, REPRESENTING A BROAD RANGE OF RWANDAN OPINION.

19. (C) AFTER NINE MONTHS OF SOMETIMES-ACRIMONIOUS NEGOTIATIONS. HABYARIMANA IN APRIL 1992 AGREED TO A COALITION GOVERNMENT, GIVING 11 OF 20 CABINET SEATS TO FOUR OPPOSITION PARTIES. HE HAS ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION TO HOLD PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS NEXT APRIL' ALTHOUGH THIS SCHEDULE DEPENDS UPON THE RESULTS OF THE ARUSHA TALKS.

20. (C) DESPITE THE REFORMS, THE PRESIDENT RETAINS ULTIMATE POWER AND APPOINTS THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE CABINET. KEY PORTFOLIOS--DEFENSE, INTERIOR, AND CIVIL SERVICE--ARE HELD BY MRND LOYALISTS. ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT NOW SHARES WITH A SUPERIOR COUNCIL OF MAGISTRATES THE AUTHORITY TO APPOINT AND REMOVE JUDGES, HE CONTINUES TO MANAGE A CENTRALIZED POLITICAL SYSTEM AND APPOINTS LOCAL ADMINISTRATORS DOWN TO THE BURGOMASTER LEVEL.

21. (C) MULTIPARTY COMPLEXITY. ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT
----- RETAINS ULTIMATE
AUTHORITY, THE OPPOSITION PARTIES IN THE GOVERNMENT--
OFTEN WORKING AS A BLOC--DO INFLUENCE DECISIONMAKING.

22. (C) THE LARGEST AND APPARENTLY MOST POPULAR
OPPOSITION PARTY IS THE REFORMED DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN
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MOVEMENT (MDR), WHICH IS BASED ON THE OLD
MDR-PARMEHUTU. LIKE ITS PREDECESSOR, THE MDR APPEALS
MAINLY TO SOUTHERN HUTUS. ALTHOUGH IT INCLUDES A
CONSERVATIVE WING THAT EXUDES MDR-PARMEHUTU'S HUTU
CHAUVINISM, ITS CORE LEADERSHIP IS FAR MORE LIBERAL AND
IS ACTIVELY SEEKING A SOLUTION THAT WOULD END THE WAR

AND ACCOMMODATE THE RPF. PRIME MINISTER DISMAS
NSENGIYAREMYE IS FROM THE MDR, ALONG WITH THREE OTHER
CABINET MEMBERS INCLUDING MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND COOPERATION BONIFACE NGULINZIRA.

23. (C) THE LIBERAL PARTY (PL) AND THE SMALLER SOCIAL
DEMOCRATIC PARTY EACH HOLD THREE CABINET POSITIONS
WHILE THE MINUSCULE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY HAS ONE.

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THE PL HAS A HEAVY TUTSI MEMBERSHIP ALTHOUGH SOME OF ITS LEADERS ARE HUTUS. LIKE THE MDR, IT FAVORS MODIFYING THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS IN ORDER TO ACCOMMODATE THE RPF. LAST DECEMBER-JANUARY, FRUSTRATED WITH THE PL'S INITIAL REFUSALS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE GOVERNMENT, HABYARIMANA LASHED OUT AT IT AS BEING THE INTERNAL WING OF THE RPF. OTHER HUTUS SHARE HIS VIEWS.

24. (C) WHAT THE OPPOSITION PARTIES HAVE IN COMMON WITH THE RPF IS A DESIRE TO LIMIT THE PRESIDENT'S POWERS. THEY ALL FAVOR MODIFYING THE CONSTITUTION TO INCREASE THEIR OWN POWERS. BUT AS PART OF THE APRIL AGREEMENT WITH HABYARIMANA THAT GAVE THEM A CABINET MAJORITY AND THE PREMIERSHIP, THEY AGREED NOT TO TAKE MOVES TO CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION.

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25. (C) THE DEGREE OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES' INFLUENCE IS DEMONSTRATED BY THE FACT THAT THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT DELEGATION TO THE ARUSHA TALKS HAS BEEN LED BY FOREIGN MINISTER NGULINZIRA. HE PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS TO THE RPF IN THE SEPTEMBER TALKS THAT WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT. THE PROPOSALS STATED. INTER ALIA, THAT: ALL PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS WOULD BE TAKEN ONLY WITH THE CONCURRENCE OF THE CABINET; THE CABINET WOULD INCLUDE THE RPF; AND ANY AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RPF WOULD HAVE LEGAL PRECEDENCE OVER THE CURRENT CONSTITUTION AND CURRENT LAWS. THESE PROPOSALS, WHICH APPARENTLY WERE NOT APPROVED IN ADVANCE BY HABYARIMANA. MAY WELL BE REJECTED BY KIGALI.

26. (C) THE HUTU RIGHT AND THE GENOCIDE CARD.

HABYARIMANA ALSO FACES PRESSURE FROM HUTU CHAUVINISTS CONCERNED WITH RETAINING ACCESS TO THE NATIONAL WEALTH. ANTI-TUTSI FEELING, SUBMERGED DURING MOST OF HABYARIMANA'S TENURE IN OFFICE, REEMERGED AFTER THE RPF INVASION.

27. (C) THE MOST OBVIOUS POLITICAL MANIFESTATION OF HUTU SUPREMACISM WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT EARLIER THIS YEAR OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REVOLUTION (CDR) AS A POLITICAL PARTY. THE CDR'S CLEAR MESSAGE IS THAT HUTUS AND TUTSIS ARE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT PEOPLES WHO

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CAN DO NO BETTER THAN UNEASILY COEXIST. THE CDR APPEALS MAINLY TO NORTHERN HUTUS WHO HAVE BENEFITED MOST UNDER THE HABYARIMANA REGIME AND WHO ARE THREATENED BY THE RPF

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 FIGHTING. HABYARIMANA'S WIFE AND SOME OF HER FAMILY ARE THOUGHT TO BE ACTIVE SUPPORTERS OF THE CDR.

28. (C) BECAUSE OF THESE FAMILY TIES, HABYARIMANA SOMETIMES IS DESCRIBED AS A PRISONER OF THE FAR RIGHT. HIS REFORMS SUGGEST THAT THIS VIEW EXAGGERATES THE TRUTH. NONETHELESS, CREDIBLE REPORTS OF OFFICIAL PARTICIPATION IN ANTI-TUTSI COMMUNAL VIOLENCE ARE DISTURBING IN A SMALL COUNTRY WITH SUCH A CENTRALIZED ADMINISTRATIVE AND SECURITY SYSTEM. SINCE THE RPF INVASION. THERE HAVE BEEN AT LEAST FOUR EPISODES IN WHICH 300 OR MORE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN KILLED IN ANTI-TUTSI VIOLENCE, THE MOST RECENT IN KIBUYE PREFECTURE LAST MONTH. THE THREAT OF GENOCIDAL VIOLENCE IS LIKELY TO REMAIN DESPITE FORMAL POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE OPPOSITION AND THE RPF.

RPF PRESSES ITS ADVANTAGE

29. (C) COMPARED WITH KIGALI'S DECISIONMAKERS. THE RPF LEADERSHIP APPEARS TO BE MORE UNIFIED, FOR NOW, AROUND A HARDLINE NEGOTIATING POSITION. SINCE 1990, IT HAS SKILLFULLY COMBINED ITS POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRATEGIES. AFTER BEING PUSHED INTO THE HINTERLANDS OF RUHENGERI AND THE AKAGERA AND VOLCANOES NATIONAL PARKS IN MID-1991, THE RPF CONSISTENTLY REJECTED HABYARIMANA'S REFORMS AND HIS INVITATION TO RETURN TO RWANDA TO PARTICIPATE IN ITS MULTIPARTY SYSTEM. WHEN IT RETURNED IN STRENGTH TO THE BATTLEFIELD LATE IN THE YEAR, THE RPF CONCENTRATED ON BUILDING A GUERRILLA EFFORT RATHER THAN ON STRIKING SUCH MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS AS RUHENGERI

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 AND KIGALI.

30. (C) THE FAR, WHICH HAS BECOME MORE UNDISCIPLINED AND INEFFECTIVE AS IT HAS GROWN LARGER, HAS PROVED

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INCAPABLE OF DISLODGING THE REBELS. EARLIER THIS YEAR IT APPEARED TO BE SAVED FROM COLLAPSE ONLY BY THE PRESENCE OF FRENCH MILITARY ADVISERS.

31. (C) THE RPF HAS SUCCEEDED THROUGH WAR AND DIPLOMACY IN WINNING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT TO NEGOTIATE AN RPF ROLE IN A FUTURE RWANDAN REGIME. EVEN THE FRENCH, WHO HAVE LONG BEEN STAUNCH SUPPORTERS OF HABYARIMANA' SUPPORT THE SEARCH FOR A SETTLEMENT THAT IS AT LEAST MINIMALLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE RPF.

32. (C) THE PROBLEM IS FINDING THAT SETTLEMENT. RPF NEGOTIATING POSITIONS HAVE ALTERNATED BETWEEN VAGUENESS AND OBSTINACY. MUCH OF THE RPF'S ENERGY HAS BEEN DIRECTED TO CRITICIZING THE CORRUPTION AND HYPOCRISY OF THE HABYARIMANA GOVERNMENT, AN EASY TASK. THE RPF ENTERED THE ARUSHA ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS CALLING FOR SCRAPPING THE CONSTITUTION AND REPLACING THE PRESIDENT AND NATIONAL LEGISLATURE WITH AN APPOINTED, ALL-POWERFUL NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF RECONCILIATION THAT WOULD RULE THE COUNTRY DURING A FOUR-YEAR TRANSITION PERIOD.

33. (C) THE RPF REJECTS INVITATIONS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MULTIPARTY SYSTEM, PARTLY BECAUSE HABYARIMANA CONTINUES TO HOLD REAL POWER. IT HAS EVEN REJECTED A FORMULA THAT WOULD REDUCE HABYARIMANA'S POWERS SIGNIFICANTLY.

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34. (C) THE RPF IS RELUCTANT TO COMMIT TO A MORE LIBERAL MULTIPARTY SYSTEM WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT GUARANTEES, BECAUSE IT COULD NOT WIN SIGNIFICANT POWER THROUGH ELECTIONS WITHOUT FORMING A COALITION. EVEN IF ALL THE TUTSIS RETURNED TO RWANDA, THEY WOULD CONSTITUTE NO MORE THAN 14 PERCENT OF RWANDA'S TOTAL POPULATION.

35. (C) WHEN THE TALKS TURN TO MILITARY INTEGRATION, THE RPF IS LIKELY TO TAKE AN EVEN HARDER OPENING LINE. PAUL KAGAME, THE RPF MILITARY COMMANDER AND DE FACTO LEADER OF THE REBELS. IN A JULY STATEMENT SAID: "WE SHALL INSIST ON A 50-PERCENT STAKE IN THE NATIONAL ARMY. THERE WILL BE NO COMPROMISE ON THAT BECAUSE WE ARE NOT A DEFEATED ARMY." ALTHOUGH POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS IN KIGALI HAVE AGREED AMONG THEMSELVES TO THE NECESSITY OF INTEGRATING RPF FIGHTERS INTO THE

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ARMY, THE RPF'S OPENING POSITION IS A NONSTARTER.

36. (C) AT BOTTOM, THE RPF WANTS A SHARE OF POWER AS WELL AS SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR RPF MEMBERS AND TUTSIS IN GENERAL. IT DOES NOT BELIEVE IT CAN ACHIEVE THESE AIMS WITHOUT A NEGOTIATED ARRANGEMENT THAT WOULD GIVE IT PARTICIPATION IN THE KIGALI GOVERNMENT OUT OF PROPORTION

TO TUTSI NUMBERS FOR A LONG (FOUR-YEAR) TRANSITION PERIOD. THE RPF LEADERSHIP APPEARS TO REALIZE THAT ITS POSITION CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED ON THE BASIS OF DEMOCRATIC IDEALS, BUT IT IS ATTEMPTING TO DETERMINE THE GOVERNMENT'S BOTTOM LINE BEFORE DECIDING WHETHER A SETTLEMENT IS ACCEPTABLE.

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PRESSURING THE RPF

37. (C) THE RPF HAS BEEN FAR LESS WILLING THAN THE GOVERNMENT TO COMPROMISE, PARTLY BECAUSE IT HAS HAD LITTLE TO LOSE BY CONTINUING ITS STRUGGLE. ALTHOUGH IT HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO WIN THE WAR OUTRIGHT, IT HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS ABILITY TO INTENSIFY THE REBELLION IF THE POLITICAL TRACK BOGS DOWN. RPF INTRANSIGENCE DEPENDS TO A LARGE DEGREE ON UGANDA. WHICH CONTINUES TO PROVIDE LOW LEVELS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND POLITICAL SUPPORT AND IS THE SITE OF THE RPF'S HEADQUARTERS.

38. (C) ALTHOUGH UGANDAN PRESIDENT MUSEVENI HAS LITTLE BUT CONTEMPT FOR HABYARIMANA AND CLEARLY FAVORS A SOLUTION THAT WOULD LEAVE THE RPF WITH A DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE OF POWER, HIS SUPPORT FOR THE RPF MAY BE SOFTENING. WHILE MUSEVENI DOES NOT YET APPEAR TO HAVE REDUCED MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE REBELS, UGANDA AND RWANDA SIGNED A NONAGGRESSION TREATY IN AUGUST THAT PROVIDES FOR RWANDAN MONITORING TEAMS ON THE UGANDA SIDE OF THE BORDER.

39. (C) MOREOVER, IN THE SEPTEMBER NEGOTIATIONS IN ARUSHA, UGANDAN OBSERVERS JOINED OBSERVERS FROM RWANDA'S OTHER NEIGHBORS TO TRY TO PRESSURE THE RPF TO ACCEPT THE GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS. MUSEVENI EVEN SENT WORD THAT HE DID NOT APPROVE OF THE RPF PROPOSAL TO EXCLUDE HABYARIMANA AND THE MRND FROM THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH THE RPF MIGHT CONTINUE TO RECEIVE

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SUPPORT FROM TUTSI SYMPATHIZERS IN THE UGANDAN ARMY AND
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
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FROM WEALTHY TUTSIS IN THE REGION AND THE DIASPORA, THE
ONLY CLEAR WAY TO PRESSURE THE RPF APPEARS TO BE THROUGH
KAMPALA.

40. (C) BY HOLDING TO A HARD LINE, THE RPF RUNS OTHER
RISKS. FIRST, IT MAY ALIENATE THE INTERNAL PARTIES THAT
SHARE ITS INTEREST IN LIMITING PRESIDENTIAL POWERS. IT
ALSO RISKS OFFENDING THE FOREIGN ACTORS--STATES IN THE
REGION, THE US, FRANCE, AND BELGIUM--WHOSE ATTENTION HAS
GIVEN THE RPF/TUTSI ISSUE A NEW DEGREE OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGITIMACY. IT IS LIKELY THAT, WHILE PROFESSING A
WILLINGNESS TO TALK AND BY BEING TACTICALLY FLEXIBLE.
THE RPF WILL SEEK TO DELAY SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS AS LONG
AS POSSIBLE AND WAIT FOR KIGALI AGAIN TO LOWER ITS
BOTTOM LINE.

41. (C) BUT THE RPF IS IN A CATCH-22 SITUATION: IT
WILL RISK A HUTU BACKLASH IF IT IS GENERALLY SEEN BY THE
HUTU MAJORITY--OR BY HARDLINE HUTUS CLOSE TO
HABYARIMANA--AS MOVING TO REASSERT TUTSI HEGEMONY OVER
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM. ANTI-TUTSI ATTACKS DEMONSTRATE
THAT' NO MATTER WHAT IS AGREED TO IN POWERSHARING TALKS,
THE RPF MUST TREAD A FINE LINE IF IT WISHES TO RETURN
PEACEFULLY TO RWANDA. IN THE END, THE RPF MAY DECIDE
THAT THE RISK OF RETURNING IS TOO GREAT. (EHRENREICH)

B. NOTE: ZAIRE: MOBUTU MANEUVERS TO MAINTAIN CONTROL



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ACTION AF-01

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	HA-09	H-01	INRE-00	INR-01	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OMB-01	PA-02	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	SCT-03
	SNP-00	SP-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-01	USIE-00	/030W

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R 221607Z OCT 92
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6163
INFO AMEMBASSY KIGALI

UNCLAS BRUSSELS 13386

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C CAROL FULLER AND EUR/NE

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, BE, RW
SUBJECT: FALLOUT FROM REYNTJENS/KUYPERS REPORT ON RWANDAN
DEATH SQUADS

REF: BRUSSELS 13324

1. RESPONSE TO THE REYNTJENS/KUYPERS REPORT ON RWANDAN
DEATH SQUADS WITH POSSIBLE LINKS TO PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA
(REFTEL) HAS NOT BEEN LONG IN COMING. CONSERVATIVE
CATHOLIC "LA LIBRE BELGIQUE" REPORTED ON OCTOBER 22 THAT
NINE INDIVIDUALS IMPLICATED IN THE "RESEAU ZERO" DEATH
SQUADRONS HAVE INFORMED THE NEWSPAPER THAT THE STATEMENTS
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PAGE 02 BRUSSE 13386 221605Z
ARE "TOTALLY FALSE" AND THAT THEY WILL BE INITIATING LEGAL
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST KUYPERS, REYNTJENS, AND SCHEERS (THE
THIRD AUTHOR OF THE REPORT) FOR DEFAMATION OF CHARACTER
THROUGH THE BRUSSELS LEGAL FIRM OF CRUYPLANTS ELOY MASSART
AND HUPIN.

2. THE NINE RWANDANS LISTED IN THE REPORT ARE: THREE
BROTHERS-IN-LAW OF PRES. HABYARIMANA PROTEE ZIGIRANYIRAZO,

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SERAPHIN RWABUKUMBA, AND COLONEL ELIE SAGATWA;
PRESIDENTIAL SON-IN-LAW ALPHONSE NTIRIVAMUNDA; HEAD OF
MILITARY TRAINING COLONEL ANATOLE NSENGIYUMVA; DIRECTOR OF
THE CABINET OF THE MFA COLONEL BAGOSORA, FORMER CHIEF OF
STAFF OF THE ARMY COLONEL LAURENT SERUBUGA; COMMANDER OF
THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD MAJOR LEONARD NKUNDIYE, AND CAPTAIN
PASCAL SIMBIKANGWA.

3. POST IS SEEKING TO OBTAIN A COPY OF THE
REYNTJENS/KUYPERS REPORT FOR FORWARDING TO THE DEPARTMENT.
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2. Act as Prime Minister when the post falls vacant, until a new Prime Minister is appointed, following modalities provided for in the Peace Agreement.
3. In addition, hold a Ministerial Portfolio.

Sub-section 4: Mode of Decision-Making within the Government

Article 21

Prior to the deliberations, the Cabinet meeting shall adopt its agenda.

Cabinet decisions shall be taken by consensus. Where consensus is not reached, the issue at hand shall be returned to the relevant Minister for further study.

Consensus on the issue shall once again be required subsequent discussions, and if no consensus is reached, a decision shall be taken on the basis of a partial consensus of a 2/3 of the members of the Government present.

For the following issues, however, consensus shall be mandatory:

- amendment to the Peace Agreement;
- declaration of war;
- exercise of the prerogative of mercy and mitigation of sentence;
- defence and security matters.

Article 22

For each Cabinet Meeting, minutes and a summary of decisions shall be written. The summary shall be approved and signed by members who attended the said meeting.

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- a) The party of the former President of the Republic shall present two candidates to the Bureau of the Transitional National Assembly within three (3) weeks of the declaration of the vacancy.
- b) Within the fourth week, the election of the President of the Republic shall be conducted in a joint session of the Broad-Based Transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly. The respective members of the two institutions shall elect the President of the Republic by secret ballot and by an absolute majority. The election shall be supervised by the Speaker of the Transitional National Assembly.
- c) If the Party of the former President of the Republic, for one reason or another, is not willing to present a candidate or cannot present any candidate, or if the President of the Republic has resigned from his party in the meantime, each political force represented in the Transitional National Assembly may submit one (1) candidate within six (6) weeks after the declaration of the vacancy. The election shall be conducted during the seventh week, at the latest, following the modalities provided for in point (b) above.
- d) If the vacancy is declared three (3) months or less before the expiry of the transitional period, the Speaker of the Transitional National Assembly shall assume the interim Presidency of the Republic until the end of the Transition.


Article 49: The candidate to the Presidency of the Republic should be at least thirty five (35) years of age. Once elected, the President cannot perform any military or other remunerative activity.

Article 50: The new President of the Republic shall be sworn in within eight (8) days after his election, by the Presiding Judge of the Supreme Court, before the National Transitional Assembly.

Sub-Section 2: Appointment of the Prime Minister, Ministers and Secretaries of State

Article 51: The candidate for the post of Prime Minister shall be presented by the political formation designated to that effect. He shall be presented to the

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two parties to the negotiations for approval. He should be known before the signing of the Peace Agreement.

Article 52: The Prime Minister shall, in consultation with each political force called upon to participate in the Government, select candidates for the portfolios distributed among the various political forces. He shall present them to the President of the Republic for appointment as well as to the Transitional National Assembly, in accordance with Article 18, paragraph 3 of the Protocol of Agreement signed on 30th October, 1992.

Sub-Section 3: Replacement of the Prime Minister, Ministers and Secretaries of State

Article 53: The vacancy of the post of Prime Minister shall be declared by the Supreme Court upon request by the Broad-Based Transitional Government. The political force of the former Prime Minister shall submit a candidate within fifteen (15) days of the declaration of the vacancy. Political formations participating in the Broad-Based Transitional Government shall, under the coordination of the Deputy Prime Minister, hold consultations for the approval of the candidate. Once a consensus is reached, the Deputy Prime Minister shall present the candidate to the President of the Republic for appointment within three (3) days.

Article 54: The Prime Minister, in consultation with the political force of the Minister or Secretary of State to be replaced, shall present a candidate to the President of the Republic for appointment.

Sub-Section 4: Distribution of Ministerial Portfolios within the Broad-Based Transitional Government

Article 55: In accordance with the provisions of Article 14 of the Protocol of Agreement signed on 30th October, 1992, the numerical distribution of the portfolios among political forces called upon to participate in the Broad-Based Transitional Government shall be as follows:

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- MRND: 5 portfolios
- RPF: 5 portfolios
- MDR: 4 portfolios (including the post of Prime Minister)

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INFO	LOG-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	PFIP-01	C-01	EUR-01	HA-09
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	SNP-00	SP-00	TRSE-00	T-01	USIE-00	/027R	

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DRAFTED BY: AF/C: CSFULLER (AF)
APPROVED BY: AF/C: RMPRINGLE
AF/RA: AXMARLEY

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TO AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY HARARE
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC// USDP//

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USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 372632

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR RW
SUBJECT: RWANDAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE ON INTEGRATION OF FORCES

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. THE RWANDAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE TOLD US HIS

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DELEGATION HAD NOT FOUND THE NICARAGUAN MODEL FOR MILITARY INTEGRATION VERY APPLICABLE TO THE RWANDAN CASE AND THAT THEY WILL BE LOOKING FOR OTHER MODELS. THE RWANDANS CLEARLY FEAR DESTABILIZATION FROM THE INTEGRATION PROCESS AND ARE CLINGING TO THE UNREALISTIC HOPE THAT THE RPF WILL ACCEPT LATER INTEGRATION INTO THE ARMY ON THE BASIS OF ATTRITION. MOREOVER, THE GOR HASN'T YET COME TO GRIPS WITH THE FACT THAT THE RPF WILL PROBABLY NOT ACCEPT A SMALL PERCENTAGE OF THE ARMY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE RWANDANS RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF INTEGRATING SENIOR RPA OFFICERS INTO THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN LARGER NUMBERS AND THE HELPFUL IMPACT THIS PARTICIPATION COULD HAVE ON SECURITY ISSUES. END SUMMARY.

THE NICARAGUAN TRIP

3. PASSING THROUGH WASHINGTON AFTER A WEEK-LONG VISIT TO NICARAGUA, RWANDAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE JAMES GASANA ASKED TO MEET WITH AF/RA MILITARY ADVISER LTC MARLEY ON NOVEMBER

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14. LTC LAURENT RUTAYISIRE, DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL SECURITY AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, ALSO PARTICIPATED IN THE CONVERSATION, BUT AMBASSADOR UWIMANA, THE THIRD MEMBER OF THE DELEGATION, ONLY SAT IN BRIEFLY. THE DELEGATION DID NOT FIND THE NICARAGUAN DEMOBILIZATION MODEL APPLICABLE TO THE RWANDAN CASE, PRIMARILY BECAUSE THEY FOUND IT "IDEOLOGICAL" RATHER THAN "ETHNIC," FOCUSED ON THE POLICE RATHER THAN THE ARMY, AND AIMED AT ELECTIONS RATHER THAN POWER SHARING. MARLEY SUGGESTED ZIMBABWE'S PLAN MIGHT BE MORE APPLICABLE. WE LATER LEARNED THAT THE GOR MAY AUTHORIZE AMBASSADOR UWIMANA TO VISIT EL SALVADOR SINCE ITS MODEL MIGHT BE MORE RELEVANT TO THAT OF RWANDA. UWIMANA IS AWARE THAT THE ZIMBABWE PLAN INTEGRATES THE ARMY, BUT DOESN'T KNOW IF THE MINISTER WILL TRAVEL THERE OR NOT.

INTEGRATION AND DEMOBILIZATION

4. THE DELEGATION EXPRESSED FEARS THAT THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATING THE RPA INTO THE SECURITY FORCES WOULD LEAD TO DESTABILIZATION. IN THEIR VIEW, A "DISPROPORTIONATELY" HIGH PERCENTAGE OF RPA SOLDIERS WOULD UPSET THE ETHNIC BALANCE AND LEAD TO SECURITY PROBLEMS. SIMILARLY, THEY

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FEAR THAT SIMULTANEOUS INTEGRATION AND DEMOBILIZATION WOULD DESTABILIZE FURTHER THE ECONOMY BY SENDING LARGE NUMBERS OF SOLDIERS INTO UNEMPLOYMENT. THEY BELIEVE THE RPF SHOULD BE REPATRIATED INTO SOCIETY FIRST, WITH DEMOBILIZATION OF THE FAR SECOND, AND INTEGRATION OF THE RPA INTO THE ARMY THIRD AS VACANCIES APPEAR THROUGH ATTRITION. MARLEY POINTED OUT THAT THE RPF COULD NEVER

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ACCEPT SUCH AN UNREALISTIC SOLUTION. THE ORDER OF SOLUTIONS REQUIRES EITHER A) INTEGRATION OF ALL FORCES FOLLOWED BY RATIONAL DEMOBILIZATION OR B) DEMOBILIZATION OF A PART OF BOTH FORCES, INTEGRATION OF THE REMAINDER, FOLLOWED BY ADDITIONAL DEMOBILIZATION OF THE COMBINED FORCES LATER.

5. GASANA AND RUTAYISIRE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT IF SECURITY IS THE REAL ISSUE FOR THE RPF THAT THEY SHOULD LOOK AT THE POLICE AND GENDARMERIE, RATHER THAN THE ARMY WHICH SHOULD BECOME AN APOLITICAL FORCE FOR EXTERNAL DEFENSE. MARLEY RESPONDED THAT EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL SECURITY ISSUES MUST BOTH BE ADDRESSED. (COMMENT. TO ENSURE SOCIAL STABILITY, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO INTEGRATE ALL THREE FORCES, BUT FOR FACILITY OF TRANSITION IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO COMPROMISE IN SEVERAL AREAS. THE RPF COULD, FOR EXAMPLE, FOCUS ON OBTAINING HIGHER PERCENTAGES IN THE THE ARMY AND THE POLICE AND NOT INTEGRATE INTO THE GENDARMERIE. END COMMENT)

6. MARLEY EMPHASIZED THAT WHATEVER MECHANISM IS DEVELOPED FOR THE LONG TERM MUST ENGENDER CONFIDENCE IN THE SHORT TERM. AGREEING ON THE NEED FOR CONFIDENCE, THE RWANDANS ALSO INSISTED THAT THE RPF MUST BE REALISTIC IN ITS DEMANDS. SPEAKING BLUNTLY, THEY NOTED THAT THE RPF, AND TUTSIS IN GENERAL, WOULD BE THE FIRST TO SUFFER IF THE MECHANISM WERE TO BREAK DOWN.

7. TURNING TO PERCENTAGES OF PARTICIPATION IN THE ARMY, THE RWANDANS ACKNOWLEDGED THE NEED FOR HIGHER PERCENTAGE OF RPF PARTICIPATION AT THE DECISION-MAKING LEVELS, BUT

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INSISTED THAT THE PERCENTAGES AT LOWER LEVELS SHOULD BE KEPT SMALLER. MARLEY AGAIN CAUTIONED THAT IT WAS NOT REALISTIC TO EXPECT THE RPF TO INITIALLY ACCEPT 12-15 PERCENT PARTICIPATION IN THE ARMY FOR THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION. HE SUGGESTED THEY CONSIDER THE ZIMBABWE SOLUTION. (COMMENT. THIS WOULD INVOLVE INTEGRATING FORCES ON THE BASIS OF THE RELATIVE NUMBERS EACH GROUP HAS AT THE TIME OF INTEGRATION AND ALLOWING PERCENTAGES TO SLIP DOWNWARDS ON THE BASIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS OVER TIME. END COMMENT.)

8. AT THE END OF THE MEETING, GASANA INVITED MARLEY TO VISIT KIGALI AFTER THE NEXT ROUND OF ARUSHA TALKS, AND PERHAPS THEN TRAVEL TO RPF-HELD TERRITORY TO VISIT RPF COMMANDERS. WHEN ASKED WHETHER DAVE RAWSON OR AMBASSADOR FLATEN WOULD BE THE U.S. NEGOTIATOR AT THE NEXT ROUND, MARLEY NOTED THAT SINCE THE TIMING IS UNCLEAR, NO FINAL DECISION HAS BEEN MADE.

COMMENT

9. THE MINISTER AND DIRECTOR GENERAL SEEMED SERIOUS ABOUT SOLVING THE INTEGRATION QUESTIONS, BUT VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PERCENTAGE OF PARTICIPATION THE RPF MIGHT DEMAND AT ARUSHA. THE RWANDAN MILITARY HAS YET TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE FACT THAT THEY MAY HAVE TO GIVE THE RPF MORE THAN 12-15 PERCENT PARTICIPATION IN THE ARMY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY HAVE CLEARLY THOUGHT ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF INTEGRATING SENIOR RPA OFFICERS INTO THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS (PERHAPS ON A 50/50 BASIS) AND THE HELPFUL IMPACT

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THIS PARTICIPATION COULD HAVE ON SECURITY ISSUES.
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2304
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIGALI 04811

E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, RW
SUBJECT: INTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES AND DEMOBILIZATION

REFS: (A) KIGALI 3251, (B) STATE 372632

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: WE EXPECT THAT THE NOVEMBER 23 SESSION OF THE ARUSHA TALKS WILL BE DEVOTED TO THE INTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES RATHER THAN CONTINUATION OF

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THE POLITICAL TALKS, BUT THIS HAS NOT YET BEEN CONFIRMED BY THE RPF. THE RWANDANS ARE READY WITH A FIRM PROPOSAL FOR INTEGRATION, AND HAVE DONE SOME GOOD THINKING ON SUBSEQUENT DEMOBILIZATION. THE TOUGH PROBLEM WILL BE SECURING AGREEMENT ON THE PROPORTION OF RPF TO BE INTEGRATED INTO THE RWANDAN ARMY. RWANDAN OFFERS WILL RANGE FROM SEVEN TO EIGHTEEN PERCENT, THE LATTER BEING THE OUTSIDE LIMIT, ACCORDING TO THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, BUT SENIOR OFFICERS MAY BE A SOMEWHAT HIGHER PROPORTION. THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE HOPES TO COMPLETE THESE

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NEGOTIATIONS LKLJHCOT YET HAVE
 CONFIRMATION THAT THE TANZANIAN FACILITATORS AND THE
 RPF ACCEPT THE RWANDAN CONCEPT OF REOPENING THE TALKS
 IN ARUSHA ON NOVEMBER 23 WITH THE ISSUE OF
 INTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES AS THE FIRST AGENDA ITEM.
 NEVERTHELESS, SINCE THAT SEEMS TO BE THE DIRECTION IN
 WHICH WE ARE GOING, THIS IS A BRIEF SUMMARY OF WHERE
 RWANDAN THINKING IS ON THIS S:#9/-----

4. THE RWANDANS FINALLY GOT AROUND TO ASKING THE
 TANZANIANS FOR A CHANGE IN THE AGENDA ON NOVEMBER
 19. APPARENTLY THE TANZANIANS TOLD THE GOR THAT THEY
 COULD CONTACT THE RPF THEMSELVES. THE TANZANIANS,
 ACCORDING TO AMBASSADOR MBEZI, ARE MOST UPSET WITH
 PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA FOR THE REMARKS HE MADE
 NOVEMBER 15 AT A POLITICAL RALLY. AMBASSADOR MBEZI
 GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY MIGHT EVEN WITHDRAW
 THEIR INVITATION FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE TALKS.
 IN ANY EVENT, THE TANZANIANS REFUSED TO FACILITATE
 CONTACT WITH THE RPF. IN A MEETING WITH THE FOREIGN
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 MINISTER THIS MORNING, NOVEMBER 20, HE TOLD ME THAT
 HE HOPED TO SPEAK WITH THE RPF IN BRUSSELS DURING THE
 COURSE OF THE DAY AND WOULD BE ABLE TO CONVEY THEIR
 RESPONSE TO US THIS EVENING OR TOMORROW MORNING.

 NEXT STEPS

5. RWANDAN THINKING ON THE INTEGRATION QUESTION HAS
 MADE TREMENDOUS STRIDES FORWARD IN THE PAST SIX
 MONTHS. THE IDEA AND PRINCIPLE IS NOW ACCEPTED BY
 THE MILITARY AND EVEN BY THE THE RIGHT WING CDR
 PARTY. MINISTER OF DEFENSE GASANA TOLD ME PROUDLY
 THIS AFTERNOON THAT THE MILITARY IS SOLIDLY BEHIND
 THE CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION AS A RESULT OF A SERIES OF
 SEMINARS HE HAS SPONSORED.

6. THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE HAS PROPOSED THAT
 INTEGRATION BEGIN BY BRINGING RPF OFFICERS INTO THE
 HIGH COMMAND. THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE ASSEMBLING
 MILITARY UNITS INTO AGREED ASSEMBLY POINTS, STARTING
 TWO WEEKS AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE AGREEMENT. IT IS
 OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY WOULD THEN PROPOSE TO

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MOVE UNIT BY UNIT IN EITHER INTEGRATING INTO THE ARMY OR REJECTING INDIVIDUAL FIGHTERS FROM THE RPF. THOSE REJECTED WOULD BE GIVEN TRAINING OR OTHER ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES. THE KEY PROVISION, ACCORDING TO GASANA, IS TO ASSURE THAT ALL RPT ALL RPF COMBATTANTS ARE REPATRIATED, SO NO CADRE IS LEFT BEHIND IN UGANDA TO RENEW THE WAR.

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7. BUT MINISTER OF DEFENSE GASANA IS ALSO ACUTELY AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTIES, PARTICULARLY AFTER HIS VISIT TO NICARAGUA WHERE HE SAW MANY PROBLEMS IN THE

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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	CIAE-00	C-01	DODE-00	EUR-01	HA-09	H-01
	INRE-00	INR-01	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01
	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-00	SP-00	SS-00
	TRSE-00	T-01	USIE-00	RPE-00	/024W		

-----7CF477 201517Z /38

O 201513Z NOV 92
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2305
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY PARIS

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 KIGALI 04811

E. O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, RW

SUBJECT: INTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES AND DEMOBILIZATION

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NICARAGUAN PROGRAM. GASANA TOLD ME TODAY HE BELIEVES IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO COMPLETE THE NEGOTIATION IN ONE SESSION, POSSIBLY EVEN BY THE END OF THE WEEK. HE MET LAST NIGHT AND AGAIN ZNJQGVALFKL
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HALITY

8. AS SOON AS THEY START TALKING NUMBERS, THE TWO SIDES ARE GOING TO HAVE A PROBLEM. I WOULD SUGGEST, THEREFORE, THAT THE RWANDAN SIDE WILL TALK PRINCIPLES INITIALLY AND TRY TO AVOID THE STICKY QUESTION OF HOW MANY RPF OR WHAT PROPORTION THE RPF MIGHT HAVE IN THE ARMY.

9. FROM WHAT WE UNDERSTAND, THE RWANDAN MILITARY BEGAN WITH AN OFFER OF SEVEN PERCENT. THIS WAS CALCULATED ON THE ASSUMPTION OF THERE BEING 500,000 REFUGEES OUTSIDE OF THE RWANDAN BORDERS WHICH IS ABOUT ONE-FIFTEENTH OF THE RWANDAN POPULATION. GASANA TOLD ME TODAY THEY ARE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE UP TO THE PROPORTION CLAIMED BY THE RPF AS RWANDAN DIASPORA, THAT IS 1.3 MILLION COMPARED TO A POPULATION OF 7.2 MILLION, OR UP TO EIGHTEEN PERCENT. WE HAVE HEARD NO HIGHER NUMBERS CONSIDERED IN THIS GOVERNMENT YET, EXCEPT FOR HINTS THAT THE PROPORTION OF SENIOR OFFICERS INTEGRATED WOULD BE HIGHER. GASANA CONFIRMED THAT SENIOR OFFICERS COULD BE A SOMEWHAT HIGHER PROPORTION.

10. SO FAR IT APPEARS THAT THE RWANDANS WILL INSIST ON INTESRATINPL

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PAGE 03 KIGALI 04811 02 OF 03 201516Z
 PNBFRXTY SIZE. THEY ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT CREATING
 WHAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER A CRITICAL MASS OF EX RPF IN
 ANY GIVEN UNIT. THEY ALSO FEAR THAT IF THEY ACCEPT
 TOO HIGH A PROPORTION OF RPF IN THE ARMY, THERE WILL
 BE SECURITY PROBLEMS AS A RESULT, AND THE EX-RPF WILL
 BE THE MOST THREATENED.

 DEMOBILIZATION

11. THE RWANDAN MILITARY CONTAINS APPROXIMATELY
 30,000 MEN. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE RPF EFFECTIVE
 STRENGTH IS ABOUT 10,000. MINIMUM ESTIMATES WOULD
 REQUIRE REDUCING THAT COMBINED FORCE TO NO MORE THAN
 10,000 TROOPS, THUS REQUIRING DEMOBILIZATION OF
 30,000 MEN.
12. RWANDAN SOLDIERS ARE ALL GRADUATES FROM PRIMARY
 SCHOOL BUT, EXCEPT FOR SOME OF THE NONCOMMISSIONED
 OFFICERS, THEY HAVE NO SECONDARY EDUCATION.
13. THE SIMPLEST WAY OF DEMOBILIZING GOR FORCES WOULD
 BE TO MOVE THEM IMMEDIATELY INTO SECONDARY SCHOOLS.
 WE UNDERSTAND THE CURRENT ANNUAL INTAKE OF NEW
 SECONDARY STUDENTS IS ABOUT 10,000. ADDING 10,000
 DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS TO EACH NEW INCOMING CLASS FOR A
 COUPLE OF YEARS WOULD PRETTY MUCH TAKE CARE OF THE
 PROBLEM. IT WOULD STRAIN THE RESOURCES OF THE
 EXISTING SECONDARY SCHOOLS, BUT OUR EXPERIENCE WITH
 SELF-HELP PROJECTS IS THAT CLASSROOMS CAN BE BUILT

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PAGE 04 KIGALI 04811 02 OF 03 201516Z
 VERY QUICKLY, IN A MATTER OF WEEKS, AND VERY CHEAPLY,
 FOR AROUND USD 2,500 PER CLASSROOM.

14. SPECIAL CARE WILL HAVE TO BE TAKEN FOR RPF
 SOLDIERS. THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEM WILL BE THOSE WHO
 ARE RWANDAN BY BIRTH AND LEFT RECENTLY TO JOIN THE

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RPF. THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RETURN TO THEIR HOME COMMUNES WITH SECURITY. BUT THEY COULD BE ACCOMMODATED IN SECONDARY BOARDING SCHOOLS ALONG WITH OTHER DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS FROM THE GOR AND RPF. RWANDANS ARE WELL AWARE OF THE SPECIAL SENSITIVITY FOR THESE PEOPLE, AND EVEN THE MILITARY IS PREPARED TO WORK OUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THEIR REINTEGRATION.

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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	CIAE-00	C-01	DODE-00	EUR-01	HA-09	H-01
	INRE-00	INR-01	L-03	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OMB-01
	PA-01	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-00	SP-00	SS-00
	TRSE-00	T-01	USIE-00	RPE-00	/024W		

-----7CF49A 201518Z /38

O 201513Z NOV 92
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2306
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 KIGALI 04811

E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PREL, RW
SUBJECT: INTEGRATION OF THE ARMIES AND DEMOBILIZATION

15. THE CONCEPT OF USING SECONDARY SCHOOL AS THE PRIMARY VEHICLE FOR DEMOBILIZATION HAS BEEN KICKED

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AROUND IN CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT, THE
MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND THE LEADERSHIP IN THE
PARLIAMENT. EVERYONE RECOGNIZES THAT THERE WILL BE
SOME PEOPLE WHO WILL BE UNABLE TO BENEFIT FROM A
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PAGE 02 KIGALI 04811 03 OF 03 201517Z
SECONDARY EDUCATION AND THAT ADDITIONAL, PERHAPS
VOCATIONAL, ARRANGEMENTS WILL NEED TO BE MADE FOR
THOSE WHO CAN'T HANDLE ACADEMIC TRAINING.
NEVERTHELESS, THE CONSENSUS IS THAT RWANDAN SOLDIERS
WILL NOT BE WILLING TO RETURN TO THE HILLSIDES, SO
SOME SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS MUST BE MADE FOR THEM.
FURTHERMORE, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE RWANDAN ECONOMY IS
NOT GOING TO CREATE MANY NEW JOBS DURING THE NEXT
YEAR. BUT AFTER THE WAR ENDS AND PEOPLE BEGIN TO
HAVE CONFIDENCE, NEW JOBS WILL BECOME AVAILABLE.
RWANDA'S OUTPUT OF SECONDARY SCHOOL GRADUATES IS
PATHETICALLY LOW, NUMBERING JUST A FEW THOUSAND A
YEAR. A DEVELOPING ECONOMY WILL BE ABLE TO ABSORB AN
EXPANSION OF THE SECONDARY SCHOOL POPULATION.

16. COMMENT: NEITHER WE NOR THE RWANDANS HAVE ANY
IDEA WHERE THE RPF WILL DRAW ITS BOTTOM LINE ON
INTEGRATION. AND WE DO NOT HAVE A CLEAR IDEA OF HOW
MUCH FLEXIBILITY THERE IS IN THE RWANDAN POSITION.
THE STICKY PART MAY BE, AS SUGGESTED ABOVE, THE
PERCENTAGE OF RPF THAT WILL BE PERMITTED IN. AND THE
RPF WILL BE DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF THE GOR GOOD FAITH
IN INTEGRATING RPF INDIVIDUALS. THE MINISTER OF
DEFENSE WELCOMES THE PROPOSED TRAVEL OF COLONEL
MARLEY TO ARUSHA, AND HOPES HE WILL VISIT KIGALI
AGAIN ON HIS WAY HOME. END COMMENT. FLATEN

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CASE NO. SR-98-4-T
 EXHIBIT NO. DB236B
 DATE ADMITTED 1-11-2005
 TENDERED BY D.G. PETA CE
 NAME OF WITNESS BA. G. S. M.

CONFIDENTIAL

Kigali, 15 January 1993

Note to His Excellency the President of the Republic of Rwanda

Kigali

Subject: Negotiations in Arusha from 22 November 1992 to 9 January 1993

1. Atmosphere of the negotiations

The negotiations held in Arusha from 22 November 1992 to 9 January 1993 sought to address the distribution of ministerial portfolios within the Broad-based Transitional Government, the establishment of the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) and procedures for making appointments to the judiciary. The atmosphere of the negotiations was one of dealings and differences of opinion among the Government delegation, a logical consequence of the political situation that reigned in the country. It is worth recalling that in the absence of a consensus on the distribution of ministerial portfolios among the political parties and the Government, the delegation had to leave for Arusha with little hope of reversing the order of the negotiations by first tackling the issue of integration of the RPF combatants into the Rwandan Army and then going on to address the outstanding political issues. The Rwandan Government hoped thereby and in the meantime to achieve a consensus on the sharing of ministerial posts and those of the Transitional National Assembly.

2. The negotiations at a standstill

As could be expected, RPF emphatically refused that any other issue be discussed before the issue of power sharing within the Executive, the Judiciary and the Transitional National Assembly had been fully dealt with. This stalemate aggravated by the disquiet over the protest against certain articles in the previous protocol lasted more than a week.

The atmosphere of the negotiations was further dampened by the differences of opinion among the *Comité de concertation* [Consultation Committee], composed of Catholic and Protestant bishops, over the proposal submitted to the Government for the distribution of ministerial portfolios, and by MRND's strong opposition to the conclusions of the Council of Ministers held on 28 November 1992. Any progress in the negotiations was thus blocked.

3. Resumption and progress of the negotiations

The meeting between the President of the Republic of Rwanda and the President of Tanzania, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, came as a big relief to the Government delegation and the observers. The statement by the President of Rwanda specifying the acceptance of the previous protocol, the nomination of deputies by the political parties and the need to ensure a balance

K0339013

between the political parties got things moving again. As the negotiations progressed, the inclusion of other political parties in the Government emerged as a crucial problem, for several reasons:

(a) The Government had remained silent on the issue of the political parties to be included in the Government, thus giving free rein to all sorts of speculation.

(b) The criteria to be applied to the parties that were outside the Government practically eliminated all of them.

(c) The MDR, PL and PSD parties and RPF formed a strong alliance and refused that CDR, a party deemed by many members of the delegation to have a major political impact, be included in the Government.

Despite the support of this coalition by the head of the delegation, we insisted many times that CDR should be brought into the Government; some important personalities including the American Cohen were prepared to throw their weight behind the pressure being put on RPF to ensure that the proposal was accepted. In that connection, the delegation introduced other considerations, including a political code of ethics and the national reconciliation policy, in a bid to soften RPF's intransigence. PDI and CDR were just about to be accepted into the Government when the negotiators received the statement by MDR, PL and PSD that CDR should not be included in the Government. The head of the delegation leaned towards this new statement. The negotiations again reached an impasse. On 3 January 1993, Ambassador Mpungwe sent a letter to the two delegations setting out the position of the Tanzanian Government. He stated that if the two delegations were still unable to sign the Protocol of Agreement between 3 and 6 January 1993, it would be preferable for them to adjourn the talks in order to reflect further on the issues and continue the consultations. The time factor was of strategic importance. Moreover, it could be difficult for Tanzania, as facilitator, to sustain the current high level of interest, support and assistance of the international community in the Rwandan peace process.

From then on, all the observers, the facilitator and the heads of the two delegations took counsel together on the RPF proposal for one ministerial post to be given to RPF and one post to the Government side. It was decided to give one post to MRND and one to RPF.

There was NOT much difference of opinion on the number of seats to be accorded to each of the political forces in the Transitional National Assembly.

4. Observations

- The political differences that were prevalent in the country made themselves felt in Arusha, seriously clouding the atmosphere of the negotiations. This was a direct consequence of the composition of the delegation that carried with it all the sensitivities of the political parties. The members of the various political parties present in Arusha zealously vied with each other for behind-the scene discussions with RPF on partisan issues so much so that RPF believed itself to be and conducted itself like an arbiter. In

the future, the delegation should comprise a smaller number of delegates and the politics therein kept to the minimum possible.

- The political party leaders gave priority to the immediate interests of their parties at the expense of the national interest.
- The solidarity between MDR-PSD-PL and RPF NO LONGER needs to be proven. Yet, this solidarity is ONLY a very short-sighted view of things.
- The observers accuse the Rwandan Government of NOT BEING resolutely committed to the negotiation process. Tanzania may lose interest in the Rwandan case.

5. Conclusion

The negotiations that are expected to culminate in the conclusion of the Peace Agreement must follow their course, although the previous protocol had serious deficiencies in certain places. Any related implementation difficulties could be corrected through diplomatic channels, if need be, by calling for the intervention of the observers before the Peace Agreement is finally signed.

- Considerations that are aimed PURELY at the immediate interests of the political parties should bow to the superior interests of the Nation.
- The President of the Republic and the Prime Minister, who are primarily responsible for handling the politics of the country, should strive towards reconciliation and pave the way for mutual understanding on the essentials in order NOT TO widen the chasm between the President's Office and the Prime Minister's Office at the risk of dragging the country into ruin.

Col. BEMS Bagosora (signed)
Col. BEMS Muberuka (signed)
Lt.Col. BEM Ndengeyinka (signed)
Lt. Col. BEM Rwabalinda (signed)
Maj. BAM Gakara (signed)

Copy to:
His Excellency the Prime Minister
Kigali

PRÉSIDENCE
DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE

Paris, le 8 février 1993

Le Conseiller à la Présidence

D'accord
Urgent
FM
②

NOTE

à l'attention de Monsieur le Président de la République

(Sous/couvert de Monsieur le Secrétaire Général) *HW*

OBJET : RWANDA - offensive militaire du FPR.

Il est confirmé que le FPR a déclenché une **offensive généralisée sur le Nord Rwanda** à partir de ses bases ougandaises et sans doute aussi via le Zaïre.

Ruhengeri fait l'objet de combats, l'armée rwandaise a engagé toute ses réserves.

Une réunion de crise s'est tenue en fin de matinée au Quai d'Orsay.

Le dispositif suivant est soumis à votre approbation :

1 - Sur le plan diplomatique :

- rappel de notre soutien au processus d'Arusha et condamnation de cette rupture unilatérale du cessez-le-feu (déclaration

du porte-parole du Quai).

- mise en garde de Museveni (Président de l'Ouganda) :
M. Dumas devrait le joindre au téléphone.

Nous alertons également Washington, Londres et Bruxelles.

2 - Sur le plan militaire :

- renforcement de notre soutien à l'armée rwandaise, à l'exclusion de toute participation directe des forces françaises aux affrontements.

- livraisons de munitions et matériels

- assistance technique, notamment dans l'artillerie.

- une compagnie a été mise en alerte à six heures au cas où la sécurité de la communauté française nécessiterait son intervention.

Quesnot

Général Quesnot

Vo d Vi

Bruno DELAYE

PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC

Paris, February 8, 1993

*Advisor to the Presidency***NOTE****to the attention of the President of the Republic****(Care of the Secretary General)****SUBJECT: RWANDA – RPF military offensive.**

It has been confirmed that the RPF has launched a **generalized offensive against northern Rwanda** from its Ugandan bases and no doubt also via Zaïre.

Ruhengeri has seen fighting, the Rwandan army has called up all its reserves.

A crisis meeting was held in late morning at the Quai d'Orsay.

The following plan has been submitted for your approval:

1 – On the diplomatic level:

- reminder of our support of the Arusha process and condemnation of this unilateral breaking of the cease-fire (statement from the Quai spokesperson).

- warning to Museveni (President of Uganda): Mr. Dumas should call him on the phone.

We will also alert Washington, London, and Brussels.

2 – On the military level:

- reinforcement of our support for the Rwandan army, with the exception of any direct participation of French forces in the confrontations.

- delivery of munitions and equipment

- technical assistance, especially with the artillery

- one company was put on alert at six o'clock in case the security of the French community necessitates its intervention.

General Quesnot

Bruno DELAYE

HANDWRITTEN NOTE FROM PRESIDENT MITTERRAND: "AGREED; URGENT. "



RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE

JFA

26 FEV. 1993

Le Ministre de la Défense

006816

NOTE

pour

le Président de la République

O B J E T : RWANDA

Je reste préoccupé par notre position au Rwanda et par le rôle dans lequel nos 690 militaires peuvent se trouver entraînés, car l'armée rwandaise, de fait, ne se bat plus guère.

Il y a en ce moment 900.000 réfugiés dormant pratiquement en plein air entre les lignes du FPR et KIGALI. Leur seule présence est un facteur de troubles sérieux, et, bientôt, de situations incontrôlables.

Je vois mal le FPR renoncer à une victoire si proche et qui n'appelle sans doute même pas une offensive générale de sa part.

Je ne vois pas non plus comment faire revenir MUSEVENI à de meilleurs sentiments car nous n'avons pas sur lui de moyens de pression importants.

Quant à HABYARIMANA, l'envoi de deux compagnies supplémentaires, après beaucoup d'autres démonstrations de soutien, fait qu'il se sent à présent l'un des dirigeants africains les mieux protégés par la FRANCE. Ce n'est pas la meilleure façon de l'amener à faire les concessions nécessaires.

Or, il est, par son intransigeance politique, et par son incapacité à mobiliser sa propre armée, largement responsable du fiasco actuel.

.../...

- 2 -


Si le FPR reprend son avance, nos soldats peuvent, au bout de quelques heures, se retrouver face aux rebelles.

Le seul moyen de pression un peu fort qui nous reste, - l'intervention directe étant exclue - me semble l'éventualité de notre désengagement :

- présentée à HABYARIMANA comme une menace, elle peut l'amener à assouplir ses positions;

- présentée à MUSEVENI et au FPR comme une réponse possible à leurs propres concessions, elle pourrait les faire renoncer à une victoire militaire au profit de la seule victoire politique.

Marcel DEBARGE devrait, à mon avis, pouvoir disposer de cet argument pour faciliter sa mission.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'P. JOXE', with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

Pierre JOXE

FRENCH REPUBLIC

Feb. 26, 1993

Ministry of Defense

006816

NOTE

for

the President of the Republic

S U B J E C T: RWANDA

I am still concerned about our position in Rwanda and by the role into which our 690 soldiers could find themselves drawn, for the Rwandan army no longer fights.

There are now 900,000 refugees, practically sleeping outside, between the RPF lines and KIGALI. Their presence alone contributes to serious unrest and, soon, an uncontrollable situation.

I struggle to see why the RPF would abandon such a close victory, which would, no doubt, not even require a general offensive on its part.

I do not see, either, how to bring MUSEVENI back to our side, since we do not have the means to put significant pressure on him.

As for HABYARIMANA, the dispatch of two supplementary companies, after many other demonstrations of support, has led him to feel he is one of the African leaders best protected by FRANCE. This is not the best way to persuade him to make the necessary concessions.

Furthermore, he is, by his political intransigence, and his incapacity to mobilize his own army, largely responsible for the current fiasco.

.../...

If the RPF retakes the offensive, our soldiers could, in a matter of hours, find themselves face to face with the rebels.

Our only remaining means of exerting strong pressure—excluding direct intervention—seems to me to be the possibility of our disengagement:

- presented to HABYARIMANA as a threat, it could lead him to relax his position;
- presented to MUSEVENI and to the RPF as a possible response to their own concessions, it would make them give up a military victory for a solely political victory.

Marcel DEBARGE should, in my opinion, be able to use this argument to facilitate his mission.

Pierre JOXE

3 mars 1993

Conseil restreint : mercredi 3 mars 1993

(Notes prises par Hubert Védrine)

1. Situation au Rwanda

Le Président : "Il faut nous dégager, mais en passant par les Nations Unies. Nous ne devons pas nous retirer comme cela.

C'est au Quai d'Orsay d'assurer très vite ce relais. Est-ce possible ? Il faut faire la soudure, retarder l'avancée des Ougandais. Il y a urgence d'obtenir une décision de Boutros Ghali.

Nos soldats peuvent se transformer en soldats des Nations Unies, mais pas eux seuls. Il faut agir très rapidement, en deux ou trois jours".

2. Situation dans l'ex-Yougoslavie

Le Président : "Si cela devait tourner à un monopole de l'OTAN, je réexaminerais le principe même de notre participation. Eventuellement je demanderais une réunion d'urgence.

Seules les Nations Unies nous engagent.

Je ne crois pas que les Américains veuillent une vraie guerre (ou alors, ils la feront faire par d'autres)"

March 3rd, 1993

Restricted Council: Wednesday, March 3rd, 1993

(Notes taken by Hubert Védrine)

1. Situation in Rwanda

The President: “We must get out, but by going through the United Nations. We cannot pull back like this.

It’s up to the Quai d’Orsay to ensure this shift very quickly. Is this possible?

We have to bridge the gap, to slow the advance of the Ugandans. It is urgent to obtain a decision from Boutros Ghali.

Our soldiers can become United Nations soldiers, but not them alone. We must act very quickly, in two or three days.”

2. Situation in the former Yugoslavia

The President: “If this were to turn into a NATO monopoly, I would reexamine the very principle of our participation. Eventually I would ask for an emergency meeting.

We are only involved with the United Nations.

I do not believe that the Americans want a real war (or else, they will have it fought by others).”

RELEASED IN FULL

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ACTION AF-01INFO LOG-00 ACDA-17 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00 EUR-01
HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-19 L-03 ADS-00
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-02 PRS-01
P-01 SDEL-00 SNP-00 SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00
USIE-00 RPE-01 /061W
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FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
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INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 KIGALI 01605

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MCAF, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: ARUSHA AND BEYOND

REF: STATE 118029

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
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2. SUMMARY: RWANDA IS REPORTEDLY READY TO ACCEPT
RPF MANNING OF 33 PERCENT OF THE FUTURE ARMY. DEFENSE
MINISTER GASANA IS BEING SENT TO TANZANIA WITH THE
MESSAGE, BUT THE GOR HAS NOT AGREED TO MOVEMENT OF
THE GENDARMERIE TO THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. THE
MINISTER OF PLAN IS REACTIVATING HIS INTERAGENCY TEAM
TO COMPLETE PLANNING FOR DEMOBILIZATION, AND INVITES
U.S. PARTICIPATION. AFTER CONVERSATIONS WITH PARTY
LEADERS HERE, DCM WILL DISCUSS OUR PLANNED DEMOCRACY
PROJECTS WITH RPF IN CORRIDORS OF ARUSHA. RWANDAN
CONSENSUS ON REFUGEE RETURN SEEMS FIRM. END SUMMARY.3. IN PREPARATION FOR THE DEPARTURE OF DCM JOYCE
LEADER TO BE OUR OBSERVER IN ARUSHA, WE MET WITH THE
PRIME MINISTER, THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE, THE HEADS OF
THE MDR AND PL POLITICAL PARTIES, AND A NUMBER OF**REVIEW AUTHORITY: Charles Daris, Senior Reviewer**

OTHERS TO GET A FEEL OF RWANDAN ATTITUDES ON THE ARUSHA PROCESS AS WE APPROACH, HOPEFULLY, THE FINAL STAGES.

MILITARY PROPORTIONS

4. THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD US APRIL 15 THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO GO TO 35 PERCENT RPF PARTICIPATION IN THE JOINT ARMY, BUT THE VISIT OF THE TANZANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAD BEEN A BIG DISAPPOINTMENT, BECAUSE HE BROUGHT NOTHING POSITIVE ON THE RPF POSITION. ACCORDING TO TANZANIAN AMBASSADOR MBEZI, THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO PASS HIS MESSAGE TO THE
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PAGE 03 KIGALI 01605 01 OF 02 191414Z
PRESIDENT, NOT TO THE PRIME MINISTER. BUT THE MESSAGE WASN'T MUCH BETTER. THE TANZANIANS ARE CONVINCED THAT THE RPF WOULD COME DOWN 40 PERCENT. BUT THEY HEARD FROM HABYARIMANA THAT RWANDA WOULD ONLY GO TO 30 PERCENT, AND THAT ONLY AFTER A CABINET DECISION WHICH MIGHT TAKE PLACE APRIL 16. ALSO ON APRIL 15, DEFENSE MINISTER GASANA UNDER PRODDING INDICATED THAT RWANDA WOULD ACCEPT 30 PERCENT FOR THE RPF, BUT SAID THAT ANYTHING OVER 30 PERCENT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT.

5. THERE HAS BEEN NO ANNOUNCEMENT FROM THE APRIL 16 CABINET DEBATE, BUT WE HEAR IT WAS ANOTHER ORDERLY MEETING FROM WHICH A CONSENSUS EMERGED. ONE SOURCE TOLD ME THE CONSENSUS WAS REACHED AT 33 PERCENT, A COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT'S 30 PERCENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER'S 35 PERCENT. THE PRESIDENT HAS NOW ASKED DEFENSE MINISTER GASANA TO VISIT TANZANIAN PRESIDENT MWINYI AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO EXPLAIN THE RWANDAN POSITION AND SEEK AN EARLY RESOLUTION IN ARUSHA. GASANA MAY ALSO GO TO ARUSHA.

GENDARMERIE

6. THE PRIME MINISTER NOTED THAT DISCUSSIONS WERE BEGINNING ON THE GENDARMERIE, AND THE RPF WANTED TO MOVE THE GENDARMERIE INTO THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR WHICH THEY EXPECT TO CONTROL IN THE NEXT TRANSITION GOVERNMENT. BOTH HE AND THE DEFENSE MINISTER SAID THIS WAS UNACCEPTABLE IN PRINCIPLE, BECAUSE THEY HAD ALREADY AGREED THAT THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
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PAGE 04 KIGALI 01605 01 OF 02 191414Z
MINISTRIES WOULD REMAIN THE SAME IN THE NEXT
GOVERNMENT. PRESUMABLY THEY WILL HOLD TO THEIR
PROCEDURAL ARGUMENT, EVEN THOUGH EVERYONE KNOWS IT
MASKS A FAR GREATER CONCERN ON THE PART OF HUTU
RWANDANS WHO WOULD HAVE A TERRIBLE TIME ACCEPTING
RPF/TUTSI CONTROL ON THE GENDERMERIE. (COMMENT:
THIS COULD TURN INTO A PROTRACTED AND BITTER
DEBATE. END COMMENT.)

DEMOBILIZATION

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ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 ACDA-17 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00 EUR-01
HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-19 L-03 ADS-00
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-02 PRS-01
P-01 SDEL-00 SNP-00 SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00
USIE-00 RPE-01 /061W

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P 191358Z APR 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3651
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 KIGALI 01605

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MCAP, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: ARUSHA AND BEYOND

7. THERE IS BROAD RECOGNITION AMONG ALL PARTIES,
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THAT IF SOMETHING IS NOT DONE ON AN URGENT BASIS TO
MANAGE THE DEMOBILIZATION OF 20-30,000 TROOPS, NO
PEACE AGREEMENT CAN SURVIVE. IN ADDITION TO
CONVERSATIONS WITH THE PRIME MINISTER, DEFENSE
MINISTER AND PARTY LEADERS, THE AMBASSADOR,
ACCOMPANIED BY USAID AND PC DIRECTORS, MET WITH
MINISTER OF PLAN AUGUSTIN NGIRABATWARE AND HIS
CABINET DIRECTOR TO DISCUSS THE STATE OF PLAY ON
PLANNING FOR DEMOBILIZATION, AND PRESS FOR FURTHER
ACTION. WE AGREED ALL DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS SHOULD BE
ASSIGNED TO SOME FORM OF FURTHER EDUCATION, EITHER IN
THE SECONDARY SCHOOLS (SINCE ALL RWANDAN SOLDIERS
HAVE ALREADY COMPLETED PRIMARY SCHOOL) OR IN
TECHNICAL SCHOOLS. WE WOULD LIKE TO INVOLVE PEACE
CORPS VOLUNTEERS IN THE PROCESS, AND HAVE, THEREFORE,
ASKED PEACE CORPS DIRECTOR ALAN JOHNSTON TO WORK WITH
THE MINISTER OF PLAN FOR AS LONG AS NECESSARY TO
STAFF OUT A REALISTIC PLAN FOR DEMOBILIZATION.
IT IS OUR HOPE TO HAVE USEFUL INFORMATION TO SHARE
WITH THE RPF IN ARUSHA, EVEN BEFORE THE CONCLUSION OF
THE MILITARY TALKS.

DEMOCRACY

8. IN MEETINGS WITH THE MINISTERS AND THE PARTY
LEADERS, WE NOTED THAT THE DCM'S PARTICIPATION IN THE
ARUSHA PROCESS WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR HER
TO DISCUSS THE DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE PROJECTS THAT
WE HAVE IN RWANDA AND TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF A
SEMINAR SUCH AS PROPOED BY NDI WITH THE RPF AND THE
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PAGE 03 KIGALI 01605 02 OF 02 191413Z
GOVERNMENT PARTIES. ALL OF OUR INTERLOCUTORS WERE
ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT INVOLVING RPF LEADERS IN THIS
DISCUSSION AT THIS STAGE. INFACIT, MOST OF THEM SENT
WARM PERSONAL GREETINGS WITH DCM LEADER TO PEOPLE
THAT THEY HAVE KNOWN OR RECOGNIZED WITHIN THE RPF.

REFUGEES

9. IRONICALLY, SINCE THE PURPOSE OF MS. LEADER'S
PARTICIPATION IN THE ARUSHA TALKS IS FIRST AND

FOREMOST HER EXPERIENCE IN REFUGEE QUESTIONS, THERE WAS VERY LITTLE DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE WITH OUR INTERLOCUTORS. OUR CONCLUSION IS THAT THERE IS SUCH BROAD AGREEMENT WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT ON THE OUTLINES OF THE PLANS FOR REFUGEE RETURN, THAT IT HAS NOT BEEN A SUBJECT OF EITHER DISCUSSION OF DEBATE FOR SOME TIME. THE PRIME MINISTER DID, HOWEVER, NOTE THAT THERE WAS A QUESTION OF NATIONALITY AND HOW TO DEFINE WHO IS A RWANDAN. HE SAID THAT RWANDA WOULD RELY ON "INTERNATIONAL DEFINITIONS" OF NATIONALITY IN WORKING THE ISSUE THROUGH. (NOTE: HE MAY BE TALKING ABOUT INTERNATIONAL DEFINITIONS OF REFUGEES. END NOTE.) THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT RWANDA WAS PREPARED TO OFFER TO ALL RWANDANS THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN THE COMING ELECTIONS. IN THIS RESPECT, HE SAID THAT THE UNHCR, IN THE NORMAL COURSE OF ITS BUSINESS, WOULD BE MAKING A CENSUS OF REFUGEES, AND THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO FIND A WAY TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THOSE WHO WERE IDENTIFIED TO BE ABLE TO VOTE. IN THIS HE SUGGESTED THEY MIGHT HAVE TO ESTABLISH CONSULATES IN

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PAGE 04 KIGALI 01605 02 OF 02 191413Z
KIVU, ZAIRE, MBARARA, UGANDA AND IN TANZANIA. THE MOST DIFFICULT, HE SAID, WOULD BE BURUNDI BUT HE DID ELABORATE. FLATEN

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ORIGIN IO-19

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B6, B1, 1.4(D)

INFO	LOG-00	AF-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	EUR-01	HA-09	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	L-03
	ADS-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01
	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-00	SP-00	SS-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	SA-01	CORE-00	/046R		

DRAFTED BY: IO/UNP:LWEINTRAUB:LXW
 APPROVED BY: IO:GFWARD
 IO/UNP:CNPATTERSON AF/C:CFULLER
 P:EBRIMMER (INFO)

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 INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
 AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
 AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
 AMEMBASSY LAGOS
 AMEMBASSY DHAKA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 153516

PARIS FOR PERLOW; BRUSSELS FOR DUBROW
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, UNSC, RW, OAU, UG
 CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 STATE 153516 200203Z
 SUBJECT: RWANDAN DEFENSE MINISTER LOOKS FOR PEACEKEEPERS

REF: STATE 117028

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: RWANDAN DEFENSE MINISTER GASANA TOLD ACTING IO A/S WARD THAT AN OAU FORCE OF 50 OFFICERS CANNOT EFFECTIVELY MONITOR A BUFFER ZONE OF 3,000 SQUARE MILES, FROM WHICH APPROXIMATELY 1 MILLION PEOPLE HAVE BEEN DISPLACED. THE OAU FORCE NEEDS TO BE EXPANDED TO 500 AND

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER
 CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
 DECLASSIFY AFTER: 20 MAY 2015
 DATE/CASE ID: 04 NOV 2011 201005065

SUPPORTED WITH OUTSIDE (READ UN) EXPERTISE AND DEPLOYED AHEAD OF A PEACE AGREEMENT, FOLLOWING WHICH IT WOULD BE REPLACED BY A UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE NOW UNDER DISCUSSION IN ARUSHA. A UN BORDER MONITORING FORCE OF A SIMILAR SIZE WOULD ALSO BE OF GREAT HELP AND SHOULD BE DEPLOYED IMMEDIATELY. GASANA OPINED THAT THE FORCES WOULD BE NEEDED UNTIL ELECTIONS, MEANING A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR OR LONGER, DEPENDING ON THE OUTCOME OF THE ARUSHA NEGOTIATIONS. WARD SAID THAT THE USG IS CONCERNED ABOUT RWANDA'S NEEDS, ESPECIALLY THE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS OF THE DISPLACED PERSONS, BUT NOTED THAT THE UN IS HAVING

DIFFICULTIES IN STAFFING AND PAYING FOR ITS ALREADY-ESTABLISHED PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS. GIVEN THESE CONSTRAINTS, THE USG WILL TRY TO BE HELPFUL. END SUMMARY.

3. RWANDAN DEFENSE MINISTER JAMES GASANA MET MAY 17 WITH IO ACTING A/S GEORGE F. WARD. AMBASSADOR ALOYS UWIMANA AND A MILITARY AIDE WERE ALSO ON THE GOR SIDE. THE USG SIDE INCLUDED DESK OFFICER CAROL FULLER AND IO/UNP

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OFFICERS LEON WEINTRAUB AND ROBERT PATTERSON.

4. GASANA DESCRIBED A SITUATION IN RWANDA WHERE UP TO ONE MILLION PERSONS, APPROXIMATELY ONE-SEVENTH OF THE COUNTRY'S POPULATION, HAVE BEEN DISPLACED, SOME OF THEM MORE THAN FIVE TIMES. THE OAU NEUTRAL MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP (NMOG), WHICH CONSISTS OF ONLY 40 OFFICERS FROM NIGERIA, SENEGAL, MALI, AND ZIMBABWE, WITH FIVE ADDITIONAL MEMBERS EACH FROM THE GOR AND THE RPF, IS "VERY, VERY WEAK," AND UNABLE TO MONITOR A BUFFER ZONE NOW CLOSE TO 3,000 SQUARE MILES, AN AREA RECENTLY ENLARGED BY A FACTOR OF TEN. IN ADDITION TO SUCH OVERWHELMING OBJECTIVE CIRCUMSTANCES, GASANA ALLEGED THAT THE FIVE RPF MEMBERS IN THE NMOG MISUSED THEIR PRESENCE (FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES). HE ALSO NOTED THE OAU'S LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, CLAIMING THAT MANY OF THE INEXPERIENCED OAU OFFICERS HAVE TAKEN SIDES IN THE CONFLICT. GASANA EXPRESSED FRUSTRATION AS WELL WITH THE OAU'S INABILITY TO PROVIDE SOLUTIONS FOR RWANDA'S PROBLEMS, CITING RWANDA'S OBLIGATION TO PAY FOR THE OAU MONITORING PRESENCE IN HIS COUNTRY. HE IS LOOKING FOR HELP FROM THE UNITED NATIONS, HE STATED.

5. THE RPF MAY SAY THEY HAVE WITHDRAWN FROM THE BUFFER

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ZONE, GASANA SAID, BUT THEY HAVE ONLY CHANGED THEIR UNIFORMS FOR CIVILIAN CLOTHES. THAT IS WHY THE OAU FORCE NEEDS TO BE EXPANDED, ASSISTED WITH UN TECHNICAL EXPERTISE, AND DEPLOYED AHEAD (AND IN ANTICIPATION) OF A PEACE AGREEMENT. ONLY IN THIS MANNER CAN DISPLACED PERSONS BE ENCOURAGED TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES AND FURTHER MASS POPULATION MOVEMENTS PREVENTED, THE DEFENSE MINISTER

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PAGE 04 STATE 153516 200203Z
CONTINUED.

6. A MONITORING FORCE ALONG THE COUNTRY'S 180 KM MOUNTAINOUS BORDER WITH UGANDA WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL FOR THE SAME REASON, GASANA SAID. HE CLAIMED THAT ANOTHER CEASEFIRE VIOLATION LIKE THE RPF ATTACK OF FEBRUARY WOULD THREATEN MANY MORE THAN ONE MILLION PEOPLE. HE ADDED THAT HE IS WAITING FOR A REPORT FROM THE SYG'S TEAM THAT HAD ALREADY BEEN IN UGANDA AND WOULD NEXT DISCUSS THIS ISSUE

WITH THE OAU IN ADDIS ABABA.

7. WARD TOLD GASANA THAT HE HOPES THE UN CAN STRENGTHEN THE OAU PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS IN RWANDA, BUT THE UN IS ALREADY HAVING DIFFICULTIES IN STAFFING AND PAYING FOR ONGOING PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN KUWAIT, SOMALIA, AND CYPRUS. EACH SUCH OPERATION FURTHER BURDENED AN ALREADY OVERSTRETCHED UN SYSTEM, EXPLAINING TO SOME DEGREE THE GREAT RELUCTANCE OF THE UNSYG TO MOVE RAPIDLY TOWARD ESTABLISHING A UN PEACEKEEPING PRESENCE IN RWANDA. WE WILL HAVE TO WATCH THE SITUATION IN RWANDA CLOSELY, WARD SAID, AND FIND THE MOST "MANPOWER EFFICIENT" MEANS FOR ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM. HE THEN ASKED GASANA WHAT SPECIFIC KIND OF HELP HE MIGHT LOOK FOR FROM THE UN.

8. GASANA REPLIED THAT AROUND 500 UN TROOPS ARE NEEDED TO DEPLOY ALONG THE UGANDA-RWANDA BORDER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SIMILARLY, HE SAW A NEED FOR AN ENLARGED UMOG OF AROUND 500 OAU TROOPS IN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE PRIOR TO THE SIGNING OF A PEACE AGREEMENT. THE OAU TROOPS WOULD SERVE IN RELATIVELY SMALL UNITS TO FACILITATE EASE OF

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MOVEMENT WITHIN THEIR AREAS OF OPERATION AND WOULD REMAIN UNTIL A POTENTIAL UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE (SUCH AS IS NOW BEING DISCUSSED BY THE PARTIES IN ARUSHA) IS FORMED AND ARRIVES FOLLOWING THE PEACE AGREEMENT. AT THAT POINT, THE UN BORDER FORCE AND UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE SHOULD BE COMBINED UNDER A JOINT COMMAND AND REMAIN UNTIL TRAINING AND INTEGRATION OF THE ARMY HAVE BEEN COMPLETED AND ELECTIONS HELD. THE GOR WOULD LIKE ELECTIONS TO BE HELD WITHIN A "SHORT TIME" OF ABOUT ONE YEAR, BUT THE RPF HAS SUGGESTED A THREE-TO-FOUR YEAR PERIOD. GASANA SUGGESTED THAT THE TOTAL UN STRENGTH WOULD NEED TO BE 1,800, IMPLYING A NEED FOR 800 SUPPORT PERSONNEL IN ADDITION TO THE TWO 500-PERSON GROUPS (COMMENT: IN HIS ANSWER TO THE SAME QUESTION POSED BY AF IN AN EARLIER MEETING, GASANA CITED A TOTAL FIGURE OF 1,000. END COMMENT).

9. GASANA SAID THAT HE HAD PLANS TO SEE THE SYG AND THE UNSC PRESIDENT IN NEW YORK MAY 18, WHERE HE WOULD FURTHER OUTLINE HIS IDEAS. WARD SAID THE USG WOULD REMAIN ATTENTIVE TO RWANDA'S NEEDS AND WOULD WATCH THE DISPLACED PROBLEM WITH DEEP CONCERN FOR SECURITY. IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO FIELD NEW UN PEACEKEEPING FORCES, HE SAID, UT WE WILL TRY TO BE HELPFUL WITHIN THE RANGE OF THE POSSIBLE.

10. COMMENT:

HE CLARIFIED AFTER THE MEETING THAT HIS SUGGESTIONS OF 500 TROOPS ON THE BORDER AND ANOTHER 500 FOR THE OAU NMOG WERE ONLY EARLY PLANNING FIGURES AND NOT CONFIDENTIAL

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SET IN STONE. HE CONTINUED SOMEWHAT RUEFULLY THAT THE GOR HAS NOT SEEN THE DRAFT REPORT OF THE UN TECHNICAL MISSION ON THE BORDER FORCE WHICH SUGGESTS A FIGURE OF 80 TROOPS, AND THAT THE GOR'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROPOSAL COMES ONLY FROM THE RPF'S FORMAL RESPONSE LETTER OF APRIL 19.

END

COMMENT. CHRISTOPHER

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B1

K0342522

CASE NO. ICR-98-41-C
 EXHIBIT NO. AB 237 B
 DATE ADMITTED 1-11-2005
 TENDERED BY DEFENCE
 NAME OF WITNESS BAGOSOLA

Arusha, 1 June 1993

Mr. Minister of Foreign
 Affairs and Cooperation
 Head of the Rwandan
 Government Delegation

Subject: Negotiation Strategy

Mr. Minister,

We, members of the "Strategy Committee" set up by you at the beginning of the latest round of negotiations, whose points of view thus far have been taken into account so as to ensure a smoother running of the negotiations, would like to send you this letter to explain our point of view on the issue of proportions within the National Army. This follows your statements during the plenary session chaired by the Representative of the Negotiations Facilitator on Monday afternoon, 31 May 1993.

Considering that, once made, your statements during the negotiations are final, and that they engage the responsibility of the entire nation, we had already asked you, during a meeting of the Strategy Committee on 18 May 1993, for which you had an express invitation, to consult the delegation you lead, and above all the "Strategy Group", before making any concessions on pre-agreed positions. That was in reaction to your unnecessary offer of 1,200 posts for the RPF in the *gendarmerie* at a time when the discussions were at the stage of dealing with the principles and modalities of the RPF joining that corps.

Again yesterday, you cannot imagine how astonished we were to hear you express satisfaction with the Facilitator's proposed proportions for the army, namely a range of 35-40/60-65%, to the Representative of the Facilitator and in front of the Observers and especially the RPF delegation. That comes at a time when the RPF staunchly defends its position of 50 %.

It is in that context of harmonizing the points of view of the entire Government delegation that we asked you to shed light on three essential points for us:

1. Which authorities or body decided to change the Government's position, which had been a maximum of 33 % / 67 % with regard to the proportions?
2. Which negotiation strategy should be used now that you have expressed satisfaction with the proposed range, which seemingly no longer offers the delegation the possibility to propose 35 % as the maximum percentage to concede to the RPF? Indeed, the maximum percentage continues to be within the range of more than 40 % in statements made within the same session.

K0342523

3. Which information should be broadcast at a later stage on Radio Rwanda, given the scope of the disparity between the maximum agreed to by the Government (33 %) and the minimum that you have accepted (35 %)?

When you stated that Government officials had agreed on the proposed range, we understood that our Select Cabinet first needed to give approval before you could proceed with negotiations on that point.

According to information which Colonel Bagosora and Prof. Runyinya were entitled to receive, which was requested through the proper channels, it has now become obvious that such is not the case, and that your conviction regarding the proportions does not come from the Government, nor the Select Cabinet which represents it for the purposes of these negotiations.

Given the above, and taking into account standard negotiation procedures, especially when such an important issue is under consideration, we ask you, with utmost urgency, to request authorization from the Select Cabinet to negotiate the range of proportions you determined at 35-40/60-65 %, which attributes to the Rwandan Armed Forces a smaller quota than originally agreed within the Government. In so doing, you will normalize the procedures decided upon for these negotiations.

We will agree to proceed with you in these negotiations only when we become informed of the Government's position on that point as it conforms to your statements.

Otherwise, from the point you no longer seem to take into account the opinions and considerations of the delegation members, including those of us members of the Strategy and Negotiation Group, we will leave you to assume those responsibilities alone.

Sincerely,

For the members of the Strategy Committee,

Colonel Théoneste Bagosora

[Signed]

- cc: - His Excellency the President of the Republic of Rwanda, Kigali
- The President of the National Assembly [CND], Kigali
- His Excellency the Prime Minister, Kigali

- - - - -

A13

Rev
m.c.P.
CAG-118



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

RELEASED IN PART August 4, 1993
B3, CIA

CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM

TO:	NSC	-	Richard Clarke Susan Rice Jennifer Ward
	OSD/PK/PE	-	Sara Sewell Richard Brennan
	OSD/ISA/AFR	-	James Woods Vince Kern LTC Mike Harvin
	JCS/J-5	-	ADM Frank Bowman LTC Piotter LCDR Robert Williams
	OMB	-	Gordon Adams
	IO	-	George Ward
	IO/PHO	-	John Brims David Jensen
	IO/UNP	-	Joseph Snyder Susan Zelle
	PM	-	Steven Simon
	PM/ISO	-	Alex Margulies
	PM/DRSA	-	Joe Bowab
	CIA	-	[Redacted]
	USUN	-	Rick Inderfurth David Shefford
	P	-	Bruce Thomas Esther Brimmer

B3

FROM: AF - Prudence Bushnell *PB*

SUBJECT: Peacekeeping in Rwanda

We invite you to attend a meeting on Friday, August 6 at 2 pm at the State Department, room 3519, to determine whether the USG should support a peacekeeping operation in Rwanda. You have already received an analysis of all the various options in a paper dated July 26 (circulated to all addressee offices and attached for your convenience). It seems increasingly apparent that the least expensive option that will meet our peacekeeping objectives is the one recommended by Ambassador Flaten (option five). Based on the latest developments in the field, we

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DECL: OADR

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- 2 -

believe that this limited approach will provide the necessary level of security at a much lower cost (approximately \$8 million for one year) than the much larger PKO forces (costing approximately \$37.5 million) contemplated in the other principal options.

With today's signing of a peace agreement in Arusha, time is of the essence. The two sides are counting on deployment of a neutral international force to help establish a climate of security and confidence during which they can launch a transition government and start the military integration and demobilization process. A good beginning may make the difference between success and failure. Without it, the risk of renewed war and continuing emergency aid requirements (predicted to cost the USG at least \$35 million this fiscal year) will be greatly increased.

Attachment:

As stated.

Drafted: AF/C: RMP ³ingle
8/3/93, 7-2080
W-SECB 4944

Clearance: AF/C: KA ⁷ston

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necessary conclusions. History now seems to be repeating itself, and the errors of the past should be avoided.

10. Ending arbitrary arrests and detentions

77. Arbitrary arrests and detentions and unacknowledged detentions must be stopped and those responsible for such violations punished. These are the violations that foster and pave the way for summary executions. Despite the assurances he was given by the competent authorities during his mission to Rwanda, the Special Rapporteur has in fact received allegations indicating that civilian are still being held in military camps.

11. The genocide question

78. The question whether the massacres described above may be termed genocide has often been raised. It is not for the Special Rapporteur to pass judgement at this stage, but an initial reply may be put forward. Rwanda acceded to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide on 15 April 1975. Article II of the Convention reads:

"in the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another [page 23] group.

79. The cases of intercommunal violence brought to the Special Rapporteur's attention indicate very clearly that the victims of the attacks, Tutsis in the overwhelming majority of cases, have been targeted solely because of their membership of a certain ethnic group, and for no other objective reason. Article II, paragraphs (a) and (b), might therefore be considered to apply to these cases.

80. The violations of the right to life, as described in this report, could fall within the purview of article III of the convention, which reads:

"The following acts shall be punishable:

- (a) Genocide;
- (b) Conspiracy to commit genocide;
- (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
- (d) Attempt to commit genocide;
- (e) Complicity in genocide.

81. Similarly, article IV states: "Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts ... shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals".

12. Additional measures for protection of the right to life and restoring a lasting peace

(a) Preparations for demobilizing military personnel

82. Once peace has been restored, a large number of military personnel will have to be demobilized, within both the Rwandese Armed Forces and the FPR. Preparations for their reintegration into the socioeconomic life of the country should not be left until that time; many of these men were unemployed youngsters who enlisted because the army gave them the possibility of eating. According to reports, some of the recruits were also delinquents. In view of the fact that all these persons have learned how to handle weapons and

Session 2

“The Failed Peace: August 1993 – April 1994”

Documents List

Page No.	Date	Author	Title	Source	Notes
2-1	7/14/1993	Albright	Possible Peacekeeping Operation in Rwanda	Freedom of Information Act	
2-7	7/19/1993	Flatten	Transition Government Extended MDR Splits	Freedom of Information Act	
2-17	7/26/1993	State-OSD	Peacekeeping in Rwanda and the Criteria of PRD-13	Freedom of Information Act	last page deleted because just clearance notices - drafted by KAiston
2-21	7/26/1993	Marley-Aiston	Preliminary peacekeeping options in Rwanda	Freedom of Information Act	last two pages deleted because just clearance notices - drafted by KAiston
2-29	8/19/1993	Leader	The Rwandan Peace Process Problems and Prospects for Implementing the Peace Accord	Freedom of Information Act	
2-49	8/27/1993	Leader	UN Reconnaissance Mission Head Discusses thoughts on UN Involvement in Rwanda	Freedom of Information Act	
2-58	9/16/1993	GOR-RPF	Joint Memorandum on Neutral International Force	Freedom of Information Act	
2-62	9/18/1993	Albright	Rwanda Joint RPF Government Delegation Asks USG support for quick deployment of an NIF	Freedom of Information Act	
2-67	10/1/1993	Flatten	Washington Visit of President Habyarimana	Freedom of Information Act	
2-73	11/19/1993	Dallaire	Draft rules of engagement for UNAMIR	ICTR evidence	excerpt of first page and article 17
2-75	1/11/1994	Dallaire	Request for Protection for Informant	ICTR evidence	("genocide fax")
2-77	1/11/1994	Annan/Riza	Contacts with Informant	ICTR evidence	reply to "genocide fax" from DPKO
2-79	2/2/1994	Aiston	Official-Informal	Freedom of Information Act	international funding of Rwanda's demobilization program
2-83	2/14/1994	Annan	Letter from Foreign Minister of Belgium	ICTR evidence	includes French language copy of letter from Claes
2-87	2/25/1994	Willems to UN	Risk of genocide in Rwanda and reply from UN FRENCH	Belgian Senate Report	French language (original)
2-90	2/25/1994	Willems to UN	Risk of genocide in Rwanda and reply from UN ENGLISH	Belgian Senate Report	English language (translation)
2-92	3/14/1994	Claes	Call for strengthening of UNAMIR	ICTR evidence	

Page No.	Date	Author	Title	Source	Notes
2-93	3/15/1994		Rwanda Refugee Fact Sheet	Freedom of Information Act	
2-96	4/1/1994	Secstate	Demarche on Rwanda Resolution	Freedom of Information Act	
2-98	4/5/1994	UNSC	UNSC Resolution 909 to Extend UNAMIR	United Nations	
2-100	4/6/1994	Bushnell	Bushnell Personal Notebook - First Days of Genocide	Bushnell Personal Archive	
2-105	4/6/1994	ICTR	General map of Kigali - city center	ICTR evidence	
2-106	4/6/1994	ICTR	Map of Camp Kanombe area showing airport, etc.	ICTR evidence	
2-107	4/7/1994	ICTR	Sketch of PM & Joyce Leader houses (MAP)	ICTR evidence	
2-108	4/7/1994	Dallaire	Significant Incident Report - Reported Death of President of Rwanda	ICTR evidence	
2-114	4/7/1994	Delaye	Attack against the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi FRENCH	French Parlimentary Report	French language (original)
2-117	4/7/1994	Delaye	Attack against the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi ENGLISH	French Parlimentary Report	English language (translation)
2-119	4/7/1994	US Brussels	Belgian MFA on Situation in Rwanda	Freedom of Information Act	
2-123	4/7/1994	(Kagame)	Kagame Message to Dallaire	Dallaire Memoir	
2-124	4/7/1994	Dallaire	UNAMIR response to RPA 6 point message	ICTR evidence	
2-125	4/8/1994	Booh-Booh/Dallaire	An Update on the Current Situation in Rwanda and Military Aspects of the Mission	ICTR evidence	note points 6, 13 and 15
2-132	4/8/1994	US Brussels	Claes asks SYG for change in UNAMIR Mandate, asks for USG views and support	Freedom of Information Act	
2-134	4/8/1994	US DoD	Rwanda Current Situation Next Steps Action Memorandum	Freedom of Information Act	
2-135	4/11/1994	Ceppi	"Kigali Livré à la Fureur des Tueurs Hutus" (Kigali Delivered the Fury of Hutu Killers)	Libération (France) news	warning of possible genocide against the Tutsis; French language, no translation available
2-137	4/11/1994	DoD Harvin	Talking points on Rwanda and Burundi	Freedom of Information Act	
2-140	4/12/1994	Dusaidi	RPF Press Release	ICTR evidence	
2-142	4/12/1994	Leader/Brazeal	Colonel Blames Right Wing Military for Kigalis Nightmare	Freedom of Information Act	
2-145	4/12/1994	Rutasira et al	Communique issues by the Command of the Forces Armees Rwandaises	ICTR evidence	
2-147	4/13/1994	Dusaidi	"A crime of genocide has been committed"	ICTR evidence	

Page No.	Date	Author	Title	Source	Notes
2-149	4/15/1994	US DIA	Ned from Kigali and an Analysis of What Happened Following the President's Death and Why	Freedom of Information Act	
2-162	4/25/1994	French FM	Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 25, 1994, Attack of April 6, 1994 FRENCH	French Parlimentary Report	French language (original)
2-167	4/25/1994	French FM	Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 25, 1994, Attack of April 6, 1994 ENGLISH	French Parlimentary Report	English language (translation)
2-171	4/3/2003	ICTR	[Genevieve - Turatsinze's wife - Testimony before ICTR]	ICTR evidence	

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	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	CORE-00	/043W	

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FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8161
INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003423

STATE FOR AF DAS BUSHNELL AND IO/UNP
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA AND DAS SEWELL
JCS FOR J3, J5
WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS NSC

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, UN, RW
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN RWANDA

REF: A) STATE 210975, B) USUN 2899, C) USUN 3028, D)
USUN 3046, E) KIGALI 2414

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT
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2. (C) SUMMARY: IN ANSWER TO REF A, THERE ARE PROS AND
CONS BEING DISCUSSED WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
REGARDING A UN INTERPOSITIONAL FORCE IN RWANDA, REFERRED
TO IN THE (PENDING) ARUSHA ACCORD AS A NEUTRAL
INTERNATIONAL FORCE (NIF). PROBABLY, THE BEST WAY
FORWARD WILE, BE TO DEVISE AN IMAGINATIVE WAY FOR THE UN
TO HELP THE OAU UNDERTAKE THE MAJOR PART OF THE
PEACEKEEPING TASK, ALLOWING THE OAU TO TAP INTO UN
EXPERTISE, BUT AVOIDING PAYING FOR THE PKO THROUGH
ASSESSMENTS ON UN MEMBER STATES. THIS NIF IS SEPARATE

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FROM, BUT COMPLEMENTARY TO, UNOMUR (THE OBSERVER AND MONITORING GROUP ON THE UGANDAN SIDE OF THE BORDER).
END SUMMARY.

HISTORY

3. (C) THIS CABLE WILL DISCUSS THE SECOND STAGE OF MULTILATERAL ACTION IN RWANDA. AS DOD AND STATE WILL RECALL, THE MANDATE AND OPERATING PRINCIPLES FOR THE FIRST STAGE--A BORDER MONITORING GROUP--WAS NEGOTIATED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF DOD/OSD/ISA, JCS, AND STATE'S AF AND IO BUREAUS WITH A HIGH LEVEL FRENCH DELEGATION IN NEW YORK JUNE 11 (REF B). ONCE THE USG AND FRENCH HAD REACHED A CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS, THE FRENCH PRESENTED A TEXT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, WHICH WAS TAKEN UP IN INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS (REF C) AND ADOPTED (REF D).

4. (C) THE SECOND STAGE OF MULTILATERAL ACTION IN RWANDA CANNOT BE THOROUGHLY ANALYZED UNTIL AN AGREEMENT

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BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT IS FINALIZED AND SIGNED AT ARUSHA, TANZANIA. THE ARUSHA ACCORD MAY BE SIGNED BY THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT AND THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) AS EARLY AS JULY 15. REPORTEDLY, THE ACCORD WILL CALL FOR THE UN TO SEND A NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL FORCE (NIF) TO INTERPOSE ITSELF IN THE 70-MILE WIDE BUFFER ZONE BETWEEN THE TWO FORCES' FRONT LINES. THIS WILL CREATE THE ATMOSPHERE OF STABILITY WHICH WILL ENABLE THE ALMOST ONE MILLION DISPLACED PERSONS TO RETURN SAFELY TO THEIR HOMES. THE OAU IS CURRENTLY IN THE BUFFER ZONE WITH A NEUTRAL MONITORING AND OBSERVING GROUP (NMOG), WHICH BY ALL ACCOUNTS IS NOT/NOT DOING A VERY GOOD JOB.

PRD-13

5. (S) THE PROPOSED NIF (ALTHOUGH NOT FULLY FLESHED OUT) SEEMS TO GO A LONG WAY TOWARDS FULFILLING THE CRITERIA IN PRD-13. A) THE THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL ORDER INCLUDES INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION BY REBEL FORCES LOCATED ACROSS THE BORDER IN UGANDA AND A HUMANITARIAN DISASTER INVOLVING ALMOST ONE MILLION DISPLACED WHO HAVE FLED THEIR HOMES IN THE FACE OF VIOLENCE. B) THE

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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF INTEREST IS DEMONSTRATED BY THE PRESENCE OF OAU FORCES IN RWANDA, SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 846 ESTABLISHING A BORDER MONITORING GROUP, AND THE TANZANIAN-FACILITATED PEACE TALKS IN ARUSHA WHICH ARE OBSERVED BY SEVERAL CONCERNED COUNTRIES INCLUDING THE U.S. C) THE CLEAR OBJECTIVES, WHICH SHOULD BE CLARIFIED BY THE ARUSHA ACCORD, SEEM TO BE
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THOSE OF A CLASSICAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN WHICH A CEASEFIRE EXISTS AND BOTH SIDES ACCEPT THE PKO. THIS PROPOSED FORCE DOES NOT APPEAR TO SPILL OVER INTO PEACE ENFORCEMENT. THE PEACEMAKING HAS ALREADY BEEN (ALMOST) ACCOMPLISHED BY THE TANZANIANS. D) THIS IS THE AREA WHERE SOME QUESTIONS REMAIN. PARTICULARLY, THE QUESTIONS OF FINANCING AND WHETHER THE MANDATE SHOULD BE TAKEN UP BY THE UN OR OAU ARE STILL AT ISSUE.

PRO

6. (U) THE SECRETARIAT, AS WELL AS SOME MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE DONOR COMMUNITY, ARE WILLING TO ACCEDE TO THE ANTICIPATED REQUEST FOR A UN-LED NIF. THEY SAY THERE IS A MORAL OBLIGATION FOR THE UN TO HELP BRING PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO CONFLICTS WHEN ASKED. THIS IS ONE CASE WHERE BOTH PARTIES ACTUALLY SEEM TO BE DISPLAYING THE WILL TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS AND MOVE TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, AS OPPOSED TO OTHER AREAS

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	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	CORE-00	/043W	
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 TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8162
 INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 CJCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003423

STATE FOR AF DAS BUSHNELL AND IO/UNP
 SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA AND DAS SEWELL
 JCS FOR J3, J5
 WHITE HOUSE PLEASE PASS NSC

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MARR, UN, RW
 SUBJECT: POSSIBLE PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN RWANDA

(E.G. ANGOLA, BOSNIA, GEORGIA) WHERE THE GOODWILL OF THE
 PROTAGONISTS IS QUESTIONABLE. THE CEASEFIRE HAS BEEN
 HOLDING FOR QUITE SOME TIME. UN PEACEKEEPERS IN RWANDA
 WOULD HAVE A REASONABLY GOOD CHANCE OF EFFECTIVELY

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 BRINGING PEACE TO MILLIONS OF SUFFERING PEOPLE. TURNING
 AWAY FROM THIS CALL FOR HELP COULD HAVE TRAGIC HUMAN
 CONSEQUENCES.

7. (U) FINANCIALLY, THE SECRETARIAT REALIZES IT WILL
 COST LESS TO PUT A PKO IN PLACE FOR A LIMITED TIME
 ALLOWING THE POPULATION TO RETURN TO ITS VILLAGES, THAN
 TO PAY FOR THE FEEDING AND UPKEEP OF ONE MILLION PEOPLE
 IN REFUGEE CAMPS.

8. (C) SUPPORTING THE NEED FOR A UN ROLE, THIS POINT OF
 VIEW CITES THE POOR JOB THE OAU HAS BEEN DOING TO DATE.
 THE OAU HAS BEEN DRAGGING ITS FEET IN PROPOSING CONCRETE

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WAYS TO SHORE UP ITS OPERATION, DESPITE A VISIT BY A SECONDED OFFICER FROM UN DPKO. THERE ARE COMPLAINTS THAT THE OAU IS INEXPERIENCED, CORRUPT, INCOMPETENT, LACKING IN FUNDS, ETC. THE UN HAS THE EXPERTISE TO BE MORE EFFECTIVE. UN SYG BOUTROS-GHALI EXPRESSED THIS POINT OF VIEW TO THE PERMREPS OF FRANCE, BELGIUM AND THE U.S. IN THE SPRING. OF THE P-5, THE FRENCH ARE MOSTLY STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF HAVING A UN-LED PKO, SINCE THEY ARE STAUNCHLY AGAINST THE OAU, WHICH IS ALSO OUT OF FAVOR WITH THE GOR.

CON

9. (C) ARGUING ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN, RUSSIA AND THE UK ARE LEARY OF UNDERWRITING ANOTHER COSTLY PKO. BOTH HAVE SAID THEY DO NOT HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THE MERITS OF THE FORCE, ONLY WITH THE FINANCING. HOWEVER,
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RUSSIA MIGHT GO SO FAR AS TO VETO A RESOLUTION PUTTING THE BURDEN ON THE UN. ALSO, THE SECRETARIAT FEARS THE ARUSHA ACCORD'S REQUEST MAY BE FOR A BIGGER (READ "MORE EXPENSIVE") PKO THAN IS FEASIBLE. THEY MAY NOT BE ABLE TO RUSTLE UP THE REQUISITE NUMBER OF TROOP CONTRIBUTORS.

10. (S) PRD-13 DISCUSSES THE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION THAT REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS CAN POTENTIALLY MAKE TO PEACEKEEPING ONCE THEY ENHANCE THEIR COMPETENCE AND EXPERIENCE. BY HANDING THE RWANDA NIF TO THE UN, THE OAU LOSES AN OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN ON THE GROUND HOW PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS SHOULD AND SHOULD NOT BE DONE. FAILURE TO LEARN QUICKLY, OF COURSE, RUNS THE RISK OF DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE LIVES AND WELL-BEING OF MILLIONS OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS.

IMAGINATIVE ALTERNATIVES NEEDED

11. (C) IF THE UN AND THE OAU CAN FIND A WAY TO RUN AN OPERATION JOINTLY, MUCH LIKE THE OAS AND UN HAVE DONE IN HAITI, THERE MAY BE THE POSSIBILITY OF FUNDING SUCH AN OPERATION THROUGH VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS, OR THROUGH CONTRIBUTIONS IN KIND. THE FRENCH AND BELGIANS, WHO HAVE THE KEENEST NATIONAL INTERESTS IN RWANDA, HAVE

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EXPRESSED RELUCTANCE TO CONTRIBUTE, BUT SHOULD BE
PRESSED TO DO SO. OTHERS SUCH AS THE SCANDINAVIANS MAY
BE WILING TO CONTRIBUTE. AFRICAN MILITARY CONTINGENTS
WITH PRIOR UN PEACEKEEPING EXPERIENCE COULD BE SOUGHT,
AND PLACED UNDER SOME TYPE OF JOINT COMMAND TO TAKE

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ADVANTAGE OF THE UN'S PRIOR EXPERIENCE. MILITARY
OFFICERS FROM NON-AFRICAN COUNTRIES COULD BE RECRUITED
BY THE UN AND SECONDED TO THE RWANDA OPERATION. ANY OR
ALL OF THE ABOVE WOULD GO AGAINST PRECEDENT FOR UN
PKO'S, AND WOULD REQUIRE IMAGINATIVE INNOVATIONS.

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AMEMBASSY LILONGWE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KIGALI 02652

LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MASS, AORC, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: TRANSITION GOVERNMENT EXTENDED -
- MDR SPLITS

REF: KIGALI 0264B

1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT EXTENDED ITS

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Charles Daris, Senior Reviewer

LIFE ON JULY 16, BUT SUMMARILY DISMISSED PRIME MINISTER DISMAS NSENGIYAREMYE AND REPLACED HIM WITH FORMER MINISTER OF EDUCATION AGATHE UWIRINGIYIMANA. WITH THE DUMPING OF THE PRIME MINISTER, FOREIGN MINISTER NGULINZIRA AND MINISTER OF INFORMATION NDENGEJEHO ALSO LEFT THE COALITION GOVERNMENT. OTHER MINISTRIES REMAINED UNCHANGED EXCEPT FOR PL PRESIDENT MUGENZI MOVING INTO THE MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY VACATED BY AGNES NTAMABYALIRO WHO MOVED TO THE VACANT MINISTRY OF JUSTICE. THE NEW MINISTERS WERE SWORN IN SUNDAY, JULY 18. THE IMPACT OF THESE CHANGES ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RPF FOR A PEACE ACCORD REMAIN CLOUDED. THE GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM CONTINUES TO HOLD PEACE AS ITS MAJOR OBJECTIVE, BUT IT IS NOT YET CLEAR HOW THE RPF WILL REACT TO LOSING

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ITS KEY NEGOTIATING PARTNERS. EQUALLY IMPORTANT IS THE IMPACT OF THE CHANGE ON THE NOW WIDELY SPLIT MDR, AND WHETHER ITS PRESIDENT, FAUSTIN TWAGIRAMUNGU, CAN PULL THE PARTY BACK TOGETHER AGAIN AFTER THIS PARTY DEBACLE. BECAUSE OF TWAGIRAMUNGU'S POLITICAL SKILL, THERE IS A CHANCE OF THIS GOVERNMENT MOVING FORWARD TO PEACE WITH THE RPF WITHIN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE WEEKS. END SUMMARY.

GOVERNMENT EXTENDED WITH NEW PRIME MINISTER

3. A NEW PROTOCOL WAS SIGNED JULY 16 TO EXTEND THE MANDATE OF THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT. THE PARTIES REMAIN THE SAME BUT TWO KEY PLAYERS AND THREE OTHERS HAVE CHANGED.

4. FORMER MINISTER OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION AGATHE UWIRINGIYIMANA REPLACES THE DISCREDITED DISMAS NSENGIYAREMYE. PARTING VOLUNTARILY WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ARE FOREIGN MINISTER BONIFACE NGULINZIRA AND MINISTER OF INFORMATION PASCAL NDENGEJEHO. THEIR DEPARTURE REPRESENTS A SERIOUS SPLIT IN THE MAJOR OPPOSITION PARTY, THE MDR.

5. THE PROTOCOL WAS SIGNED VERY LATE FRIDAY EVENING, AND THE SWEARING IN OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT TOOK PLACE BEFORE THE CND (THE PARLIAMENT) AND THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS SUNDAY AFTERNOON. THE NEW PRIME MINISTER IS A REMARKABLE WOMAN

40 YEARS OLD, M.A. IN CHEMISTRY,
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THE WIFE OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY.
SHE HAS BEEN A STRONG ADVOCATE OF REDUCING THE
CONTROL OF NORTHERNERS IN THE EDUCATION SYSTEM. SHE
STOOD A DRAMATIC TEST IN HER NEW ROLE, HAVING BEEN
BEATEN AND TROMPED ON BY MRMD MILITANTS SHORTLY AFTER
TAKING OFFICE AS EDUCATION MINISTER IN APRIL 1992.
SHE COMES FROM BUTARE, NOT THE MDR HEARTLAND, AND
WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGE TO TRY TO REUNITE
THE PARTY. THE NEW MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AMATASE GASANA IS FORMER DIRECTOR OF CABINET OF THE
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION. HE IS KNOWN TO THE EMBASSY AS
A SELF- STYLED INTELLECTUAL AND A SELF PROMOTER, BUT
HIS ACADEMIC CREDENTIALS FROM THE SORBONNE ARE
EXCELLENT. THE NEW MINISTER OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 KIGALI 02652

LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MASS, AORC, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: TRANSITION GOVERNMENT EXTENDED -

EDUCATION, JEAN MARIE VIANNEY MBONIMPA, HAS BEEN THE DIRECTOR OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S CABINET, AND CLEARLY GAINED HIS PROMINENCE BY DEFECTING FROM THE PRIME MINISTER IN THIS TROUBLED WEEKEND. THE NEW MINISTER OF INFORMATION, FAUSTIN RUCOGOZA, IS A POLITICAL UNKNOWN. THERE IS NO ONE FROM THE MDR HEARTLAND OF GITARAMA: PRIME MINISTER IS FROM BUTARE, FOREIGN MINISTER IS FROM KIGALI, EDUCATION MINISTER IS FROM KIBUYE AND THE INFORMATION MINISTER IS FROM BYUMBA.

6. ACCOMPANYING THE EXTENSION OF THE PROTOCOL OF THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT AND THE CHANGE OF PRIME MINISTERS WAS THE MOVE OF AGNES NTAMABYALIRO FROM THE MINISTRY OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY TO THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, WHICH HAS BEEN VACANT FOR THE LAST SIX MONTHS. MORE INTERESTING WAS THE SWEARING IN OF PL PRESIDENT JUSTIN MUGENZI AS AGNES' REPLACEMENT AT COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, A POST HE HAS SOUGHT FOR THE PAST SIX MONTHS BUT HAS BEEN BLOCKED BY THE PRESIDENT. FASCINATING IN ITS THEATRICAL ASPECTS,
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WAS THE FACT THAT MUGENZI RECEIVED AT LEAST THREE TIMES AS MUCH APPLAUSE AS ANY OTHER NEW MINISTER BY THE SUPPOSEDLY MRND (PRESIDENT'S PARTY) PARLIAMENT.

7. ALL OTHER MINISTERS FROM THE MRND (NINE), PSD (THREE), PL (THREE), AND PDC (ONE) RETAINED THEIR

PORTFOLIOS.

8. FOLLOWING THE SWEARING IN, I SPOKE WITH THE PRESIDENTS OF MOST OF THE PARTIES AND MOST OF THE MINISTERS OF THE NEW CABINET. MY QUESTION WAS WILL THIS WORK. ALMOST ALL THE MRND MINISTERS, AND THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT RESPONDED WITH AN ENTHUSIASTIC YES. ONLY THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR, FAUSTIN MUNYAZESA, EXPRESSED CONCERN. HIS WORRY WAS THAT THE SPLIT IN THE MDR WAS NOT HEALTHY FOR THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY IN RWANDA. ALTHOUGH HE HAS BEEN A LOYAL MRND MINISTER, HE WORRIES THAT A PERMANENT SPLIT IN THE MDR WILL RETURN THE BODY POLITIC TO AN MRND-DOMINATED POLITICAL SCENE. PSD AND PL LEADERS ARE ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE CHANGE AND CONFIDENT THAT THEY NOW HAVE A CABINET TEAM THAT CAN WORK TOGETHER.

IMPACT ON PEACE

9. THROUGHOUT THIS MONTH-LONG POLITICAL SHOUTING MATCH, I HAVE BEEN ASSURED BY LEADERS OF THE MDR, THE PL AND THE PSD THAT THE RPF IS AWARE OF WHAT WAS GOING ON AND NOT UPSET BY THE PROCESS, BUT THE POLITICAL COALITION DECISION WHICH LED TO THIS
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EXTENSION AND CHANGE, LEAVES A COUPLE OF UNCERTAINTIES: FIRST, THE PARTIES DID NOT ANNOUNCE AGATHE AS THE PRIME MINISTER CANDIDATE FOR THE NEW ENLARGED TRANSITION GOVERNMENT AFTER THE PEACE ACCORD. SECOND, THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF TANZANIA ARRIVED ON FRIDAY TO HELP RESOLVE THE LAST-REMAINING TECHNICAL ISSUES IN THE PEACE ACCORD. HE IS NOW FACED WITH A TOTALLY NEW TEAM OF PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER, AND IS BELIEVED TO HAVE STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE CONTINUING PRIME MINISTER ROLE FOR DIBMAS. ONLY TIME WILL TELL WHETHER THE TANZANIANS WILL CONTINUE TO PERSEVERE UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES OR GO BACK A BIT IN LIGHT OF THEIR APPARENT COMMITMENT TO DIBMAS.

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AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 KIGALI 02652

LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MASS, AORC, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: TRANSITION GOVERNMENT EXTENDED -

10. THE MRND VICE PRESIDENT TOLD ME, HOWEVER, THAT IF
THE CURRENT TECHNICAL DIFFERENCES CAN BE RESOLVED

QUICKLY, THE MRND WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO ALONG WITH THE NOMINATION OF AGATHE AS THE CANDIDATE FOR PRIME MINISTER IN THE NEXT ENLARGED TRANSITION GOVERNMENT. MDR MILITANTS TOTALLY REJECT THE IDEA, AND PROBABLY WILL ONLY BRING THE PARTY BACK TOGETHER IF A COMPROMISE CANDIDATE IS FOUND.

THB FUTURE OF THE MDR

11. THE APPOINTMENT OF MADAME UWIRINGIYIMANA AS PRIME MINISTER WAS MANIPULATED BY MDR PRESIDENT FAUSTIN TWAGIRAMUNGU. IN EFFECT, IT WAS A COUP AGAINST HIS OPPONENTS WITHIN THE PARTY. THESE OPPONENTS SUMMONED AN MDR POLITICAL BUREAU MEETING ON JULY 17 AND TOOK THE UNUSUAL MEASURES OF SUSPENDING BOTH THE PRESIDENT, AND MADAME UWIRINGIYIMANA FROM HER POSITION AS PRESIDENT OF THE PARTY IN BUTARE,
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ACCUSING BOTH OF HIGH TREASON TO THE PARTY. THE POLITICAL BUREAU WENT ON TO REJECT THE PROTOCOL OF JULY 16 AND TO WELCOME THE WITHDRAWAL OF NGULINZIRA AND MDENGEJEHO FROM THE GOVERNMENT.

12. THE MDR POLITICAL BUREAU WENT ON TO CONSIDER ITSELF THE PARTY OF PEACE AND TO BLAME PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA FOR ANY DELAY THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE UP UNTIL NOW. IN ANNOUNCING ITS SUSPENSIONS OF TWAGIRAMUNGU, IT ANNOUNCED THAT THESE WOULD BE EFFECTIVE UNTIL THE EXTRAORDINARY NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE PARTY ON AUGUST 14-15.

13. TWAGIRAMUNGU TOLD ME A FEW DAYS AGO THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO HOLD AN EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS WITHIN FIFTEEN DAYS. HE ALSO HAD SAID PUBLICLY THAT THE POLITICAL BUREAU MEETING OF JULY 17 WAS ILLEGAL, AND, THEREFORE, ANY DECISIONS THAT IT MAY HAVE MADE WERE NULL AND VOID.

14. TWAGIRAMUNGU TOLD ME JULY 18 THAT HE IS FULLY CONFIDENT THAT HE CAN REUNITE THE PARTY FOR ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE NEXT TRANSITION GOVERNMENT.

COMMENT

15. IN REFTTEL, WE PREDICTED THAT THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT WOULD BE AGAIN EXTENDED ON JULY 16. WE WERE ACCURATE. WE ALSO PREDICTED THAT THE PARTIES WOULD NOT REACH AGREEMENT ON THEIR PRIME MINISTER FOR THE NEXT GOVERNMENT WHICH WILL INCLUDE THE RPF. THAT
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WAS ALSO ACCURATE. BUT THE WAY THEY WENT ABOUT THESE
DECIF OFS WE ATOTAL SURPRISE. WE DID NOT EXPECT
THE MDR TO SPLIT SO TOTALLY IN PUBLIC. THE MDR
POLITICAL BUREAU CONSIDERS WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO BE
DISMISSAL OF THE CABINET BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE
FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT. TECHNICALLY, THEY ARE
CORRECT, AND THE FINAL ANALYSIS WILL HAVE TO AWAIT
WHETHER THIS SPLIT IN THE MDR UNDERCUTS BASIC
AGREEMENTS OF ARUSHA ON POWER SHARING. IT WAS AGREED
IN ARUSHA THAT THE MDR WOULD NOMINATE THE PRIME
MINISTER TO THE NEW TRANSITION GOVERNMENT. IF THE
MDR REMAINS SPLIT, IT WILL BE HARD TO SATISFY ANYONE
THAT THEY HAVE IN FACT EXERCISED THAT RIGHT.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 KIGALI 02652

LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MASS, AORC, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: TRANSITION GOVERNMENT EXTENDED -

16. TWAGIRAMUNGU IS A CAPABLE POLITICIAN AND MAY YET BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE COUP WHICH HE HAS MASTERED. HE SAID PUBLICLY THAT HE TOOK THE ACTION OF PROPOSING THE NEW PRIME MINISTER ONLY AFTER HIS COALITION PARTNERS THREATENED TO FORM A GOVERNMENT WITHOUT THE MDR, IF THE MDR CONTINUED TO INSIST ON NSENGIYAREMYE. HE THUS PRETENDS TO BE THE CHAMPION OF MAINTAINING MDR AS A MAJOR PARTY IN THE TRANSITION TO PEACE AND DEMOCRACY.

17. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HERE HAS BEEN TRYING TO PERSUADE DISMAS TO HAVE A GREATER SENSE OF DIALOGUE WITH HIS OTHER MINISTERS AND WITH THE PRESIDENT. THE FRENCH WENT SO FAR AS TO FORCE THE TWO, THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE PRESIDENT, TO COME TOGETHER TO SIGN A JOINT COMMUNIQUE IN FEBRUARY. BUT THE CONTINUING ANIMOSITY BETWEEN DISMAS AND THE PRESIDENT AND THE OTHER MINISTERS HAS CREATED MAJOR IMPASSES IN THE GOVERNMENT PROCESS, AND DISMAS' APPARENT PREFERENCE FOR NEGOTIATING BY FAIT ACCOMPLI
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HAS ANNOYED NOT ONLY THE MRND, BUT HIS FORMER COALITION PARTNERS. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT DISMAS WILL RETURN TO THIS COALITION. THUS, THE QUESTION REMAINS WHETHER HE WILL CONTINUE TO DRIVE THE SPLIT IN THE MDR TO FRUSTRATE WHAT APPEARS TO BE A COALITION

CONSENSUS WHICH CAN BRING US TO A PEACE ACCORD AND A NEW GOVERNMENT. I WOULD BET ON TWAGIRAMUNGU BEING ABLE TO BRING MUCH OF THE PARTY BACK INTO THE FOLD IN THE COURSE OF THE NEXT COUPLE OF WEEKS, BUT IT IS NOT A FOREGONE CONCLUSION.

18. BRAZZAVILLE MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. FLATEN

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July 26, 1993

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DECL: OADR

JOINT STATE-OSD MEMORANDUM CONCERNING
PEACEKEEPING IN RWANDA AND THE CRITERIA OF PRD-13

A. THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Criterion Met: Yes

The civil war in Rwanda has displaced one million people from the northern portion of the country, and only massive humanitarian assistance (estimated at \$100 million this year) has prevented widespread famine. The war has produced thousands of military and civilian casualties and has sparked episodes of ethnic violence, with the continuing threat of ethnic massacres -- a recurring problem in the region. These conditions clearly qualify as a humanitarian disaster requiring urgent action, coupled with violence and the threat of future violence.

B. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF INTEREST FOR DEALING
WITH THE PROBLEM ON A MULTILATERAL BASIS

Criterion Met: Yes, but an international consensus does not exist yet on the specific means required to resolve the problem

The UN, the OAU, and several regional and Western powers have displayed a common interest in resolving this problem, through both multilateral diplomatic means and through participation in multinational military observer missions. The OAU and Tanzania have sponsored year-long peace talks, with the UN, U.S., France, Belgium, Germany, and neighboring African countries participating as active observers. The UN recently approved a Rwanda/Uganda border-monitoring force and is studying further action, and the OAU has fielded a Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) to monitor the ceasefire.

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Although an international community of interest exists regarding the need for a positive resolution to the civil war, a consensus still needs to be developed among members of the UN Security Council and the broader international community about the specific means to accomplish that objective. In addition, countries which have been actively involved in the peace process have differing approaches to the problem.

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C. CLEAR OBJECTIVES, UNDERSTANDING OF MISSION'S CHARACTER

Criterion Met: Probably, if the mission and objectives are well-defined in the peace accord and approving resolution.

As currently envisioned, the proposed Neutral International Force (NIF) would fit a traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping model, assuming the force is blue-helmeted.

- o Both sides have requested and consented to the force
- o A ceasefire is in place and has been holding since March
- o Hostilities have been suspended and the parties are already separated by a buffer zone monitored by the NMOG

The primary mandate of the NIF would be to assure implementation of the peace accords. The force would keep the parties apart, supervise cantonment and disarmament of troops, store heavy equipment, and oversee force integration and demobilization.

If the situation deteriorated and peace enforcement became necessary, it is not clear that the UN would have the will or resources to respond adequately.

If the operation were not blue-helmeted, it is not clear that all parties would consent or that peace could be maintained. This could significantly alter the proposed force objectives and the character of the mission.

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D. MEANS AVAILABLE

Criterion Met: No, not at this time

While it might be possible to gain adequate financial and troop support for a Rwandan peacekeeping mission, the means are not clearly available at this point. Generating them from the international community would require a significant investment of U.S. effort.

The two sides have been discussing an international force of about 2,500 men. The estimated cost of such a force, at UN reimbursement rates, would be roughly \$37 million for one year. Assuming an assessed UN operation, no financial resources currently exist to pay the U.S. assessment; our only option would be to increase our arrears. (In addition, goods and services could be made available through the UN Participation Act.)

Russian officials have suggested funding the force through voluntary contributions. If a voluntary fund were established, it is unclear who would contribute and in what amounts.

To provide assistance to a non-assessed operation, we might tap FY-93 fallout FME funds, if available; however, there will be numerous claimants for these scarce funds. In addition, we might be able to move funds into the non-assessed security assistance peacekeeping account utilizing FAA transfer authority. Further, if there are funds available in DoD, it might be possible to provide commitments in kind (goods, services, and personnel).

The availability of funding would directly affect the likelihood of attracting necessary force contributions. The OAU already has a small contingent in Rwanda, which they plan to expand to 240 men. However, African nations may not want to

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contribute additional troops unless they are reimbursed at UN rates, and it would be difficult to raise sufficient voluntary funds to provide more than "at cost" reimbursement. At present, aside from the African countries participating or expected to participate in the NMOG, only Canada has expressed an interest in contributing troops in Rwanda. Other possible sources of troops still need to be examined.

Adequate means might be found if the peacekeeping force were small enough. We are currently examining options for a more modest PKO. The Russians might accept an assessed operation for the UN portion, which would not add significantly to U.S. arrears. Alternatively, it would be easier to raise voluntary funds for such an operation.

Whatever the cost of the peacekeeping mission, it must be weighed against the cost of doing nothing. Estimates for humanitarian assistance to the displaced this year alone exceed \$100 million, with the U.S. having already contributed or pledged over \$34 million. A successful peacekeeping operation would allow the displaced to return home, thereby significantly reducing current humanitarian relief costs and obviating the need for future relief.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 26, 1993

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DECL:OADR

RELEASED IN FULL

TO: AF/FO - DAS Bushnell

FROM: AF/RA - LTC Anthony Marley
AF/C - Kevin Aiston

SUBJECT: Preliminary Peacekeeping Force Options for Rwanda

This memorandum is only a preliminary examination of peacekeeping force options in Rwanda. Its purpose is to serve as a basis for further discussion and analysis. The stated costs for each option are rough estimates only, and assume reimbursement of OAU forces at UN rates.

Background. The Government of Rwanda and the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) are soon expected to sign peace accords ending nearly three years of civil war in that central African country. The proposed peace agreement calls for a "Neutral International Force" (NIF) to act as a peacekeeping force during the transitional period. The actual size of the NIF will be dependent on the outcome of a planning survey; current estimates among Arusha participants range up to 2,500 personnel. The costs of the NIF will largely depend on the ultimate size of the force.

The NIF's mandate will include supervision of the encampment and disarming of combatant forces, supervision of the demobilization of excess military forces, monitoring of the integration of forces into the new national army and gendarmerie, and monitoring of internal security to permit the return of up to 1.5 million displaced persons and refugees. The NIF's geographic span of control will encompass the entirety of Rwanda (10,169 square miles, approximately the size of Maryland). NIF peacekeepers would be required for approximately 10-12 months, while observers could expect to remain in Rwanda for the 22 month transition.

The Rwandan Government, the RPF, and the Organization of African Unity have all indicated that they look to the United Nations to provide the NIF peacekeeping force. The Rwandan Government has also indicated that "the people" need to see non-African participation in the peacekeeping force and has made clear that it does not trust the OAU, which it regards as pro-RPF.

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN L. MILLS
DATE/CASE ID: 12 FEB 2003 200101636

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There are currently 50 OAU Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) monitors in Rwanda acting as an interpositional force in the buffer zone. The NMOG may be expanded to a force of 240 personnel in the near future, but its essential mandate is not expected to change. NMOG is charged with monitoring of military activities by the two sides to ensure that they do not conduct offensive military activities, reinforce forward units, or move additional weapons or munitions in the vicinity of the neutral buffer zone.

Options. Six options are currently being considered for a peacekeeping force for Rwanda:

Option 1 - UN-only Peacekeeping Operation. (OAU personnel could form an important part of a UN force, both numerically and in command positions.)

Force composed of approximately 2500 peacekeepers would cost approximately \$2.5 million per month in reimbursable salaries, plus \$375,000 per month in operating costs, plus an estimated \$3 million in round-trip transport costs, or about \$37.5 million for one year. If a UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda were conducted on an assessed basis, the estimated cost to the U.S. would be roughly \$11 million for one year.

• Advantages:

- The only force trusted by all parties
- The UN is the most experienced international peacekeeping organization
- Has a PKO planning and management directorate within the Secretariat
- Bureaucratic funding mechanisms exist to finance UN peacekeeping operations (both within USG and other countries)
- Could provide an easy, needed success to UN peacekeeping efforts
- Canada, among others, has reportedly informally indicated a willingness to provide troops for an UN operation in Rwanda
- Would satisfy UN SYG Boutros-Ghali's earlier insistence that if the UN were involved in an operation, it must be in command of the entire operation
- Would allow France to withdraw its troops from Kigali (approximately 350 soldiers to ensure the security of the capital) without losing face

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- Might allow training of OAU Secretariat personnel through seconding them to the UN operation as deputies
- A UN PKO is cost effective when compared to the cost of caring for the displaced population. A successful PKO would allow the displaced to return home, thereby significantly reducing current humanitarian relief costs (estimated at \$100 million this year, with the U.S. pledged to contribute over \$34 million) and obviating the need for future relief.
- Supports USG policy (per PRD-13) of emphasizing the UN as the primary body to conduct peacekeeping

- Disadvantages:

- Russia (and possibly UK) may oppose and possibly veto an assessed UN operation due to financial constraints (neither contributes significantly to the humanitarian aid bill)
- Finding enough contributions for a voluntary UN operation would be problematic
- UN peacekeeping management directorate is already stretched exceedingly thin due to the abundance of current UN peacekeeping efforts worldwide
- May prove difficult to find enough states willing to provide military forces to participate in the operation
- UN peacekeepers could not be in place and operational for an estimated 4-6 months
- DoD does not want to risk having to provide its own resources, as might be required by a UN operation
- Ignores USG policy to promote regional peacekeeping institutions

Option 2 - OAU-only Peacekeeping Operation

An OAU force composed of approximately 2500 personnel, operating independently of the UN, could be expected to cost the international community at least the same amount as a UN operation (approximately \$2.5 million per month reimbursed to donating countries plus \$375,000 per month in operating costs), as it is unlikely that African countries will be willing to provide significant numbers of military troops to the OAU on a continuing basis without being reimbursed at UN rates. Cost for a one year operation, including estimated round-trip transport costs of \$3 million, would be \$37.5 million.

- Advantages:

- Avoids adding another peacekeeping operation to the heavily committed United Nations

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- Avoids risking Russian Security Council opposition
- If the operation succeeded, it would provide a confidence building experience to the OAU as an international institution
- Would demonstrate that the OAU and its member states are serious about taking responsibility for solving Africa's problems
- Supports USG policy goal to promote regional peacekeeping institutions (although at perhaps too rapid a pace)

- Disadvantages:

- The Rwandan Government thinks the NMOG is pro-RPF and therefore it opposes an OAU-only force
- The OAU SYG Salim Salim has stated that the OAU will not undertake a peacekeeping mission
- African states will need massive external assistance (materiel, transportation, and possibly training) before they could participate in a Rwandan peacekeeping operation
- The OAU lacks experience in planning large peacekeeping efforts
- The OAU Secretariat is not staffed to supervise/manage major peacekeeping operations
- The OAU lacks the communications equipment required to manage such an operation (Satcom communications, HF radios)
- The OAU is severely resource-constrained and lacks funding mechanisms to support such a major endeavor; funding would be ad hoc, on a bilateral and uncertain basis
- May well lead to a collapse of the peace in Rwanda

Option 3 - Hybrid UN-OAU Peacekeeping Operation (UN Observer Force and OAU Peacekeeping Force)

Estimated costs to the international community of approximately \$3 million per month (70 UN observers at a per diem rate of \$120 per day equals \$252,000; 2400 peacekeepers reimbursed at approximately \$2.4 million per month, plus \$375,000 per month for operating costs), plus estimated round-trip transport of \$3 million. Estimated cost for a one year operation would be \$39 million.

- Advantages:

- Provides UN "blessing" of, and involvement in, the Rwandan peacekeeping operation
- A small number of UN observers could probably be deployed more quickly than a full UN peacekeeping operation, and at least a small OAU force would already be on the ground

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- Would provide UN planning expertise to the OAU
- Might minimize Russian opposition (especially if it is conducted as a voluntary rather than an assessed operation)
 - Provides the OAU a UN-supervised peacekeeping learning experience and possible peacekeeping success
 - Active UN involvement, and participation of non-African observers, would probably make this acceptable to both Rwandan parties
 - UN involvement would provide a face saving way for the French to withdraw their forces from Rwanda
 - Would demonstrate the OAU's acceptance of responsibility for addressing Africa's problems
 - Supports USG policy goal of promoting regional peacekeeping institutions

- Disadvantages:

- Might not be trusted by the Government of Rwanda
- The UN has indicated to the OAU that if the UN were involved in a peacekeeping operation, the UN must be in command of the entire operation
 - OAU SYG Salim Salim has indicated that the OAU does not support the concept of a "dual command," and would defer to the UN for operational command.
 - African states will need massive external assistance (materiel, transportation, and possibly training) before they could participate in a Rwandan peacekeeping operation
 - The OAU is not currently staffed to manage a large peacekeeping operation in Rwanda (no military or peacekeeping directorate)
 - The OAU Headquarters lacks the communications equipment necessary to manage a major peacekeeping operation in Rwanda

Option 4 - Hybrid UN-OAU-Franco-Belgian Force

Combined forces would consist of a 750 man OAU force in the buffer zone augmented by 250 UN troops, paid for through a voluntary fund; retention of the 81 man UN force on the Uganda-Rwanda border which is paid through UN assessments; and an 800 man "International Force" consisting of one Belgian and one French battalion whose costs would be borne directly by the contributors. The costs to the international community would be approximately \$1.1 million per month in reimbursable salaries (for UN and OAU forces), \$225,000 in operating costs per month, and \$1.2 million in UN and OAU round-trip transport, for an estimated total of \$17.1 million for a one year operation. (Note - this option has a total of 1881 personnel rather than 2500, which also has a direct impact on costs.)

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• Advantages:

- Provides UN "blessing" of, and involvement in, the Rwandan peacekeeping operation
- Requires a greatly reduced manpower requirement on the United Nations (331 peacekeepers versus up to 2500 peacekeepers)
- Would provide UN planning expertise to the OAU
- Bureaucratic funding mechanisms exist to support the UN, which could serve as a conduit to provide funding for the operation
- Might minimize Russian opposition
- Provides the OAU a UN-supervised peacekeeping learning experience and a probable peacekeeping success
- Active UN involvement and participation of non-African observers would probably make this acceptable to the Government of Rwanda
- Supports USG policy goal of promoting regional peacekeeping institutions

• Disadvantages:

- Would probably be rejected by the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which considers France an ally of the Government
- France and Belgium might object on fiscal grounds
- France has indicated that it cannot provide voluntary contributions to UN peacekeeping operations
- France has indicated its desire to withdraw its troops from Rwanda
- Belgium has expressed its reluctance to contribute troops to a Rwandan peacekeeping operation due to its colonial association with Rwanda
- African states will need massive external assistance (materiel, transportation, and possibly training) before they could participate in a Rwandan peacekeeping operation
- The OAU is not currently staffed to manage a large peacekeeping operation in Rwanda (no military or peacekeeping directorate)
- The OAU might object to the bilateral aspect of the Franco-Belgian force participating in the operation
- The OAU has been reluctant to accept the peacekeeping role
- OAU SYG Salim Salim has indicated that the OAU does not support the concept of a "dual command"

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Option 5 - Small UN NIF in Kigali/Expanded NMOG in DMZ

Two separate forces: A small UN force of about 300 men to assure security in Kigali for the installation of the joint transitional government and an expanded NMOG of about 240 men with a broader mandate to act as an effective buffer force and provide security in the DMZ. The total cost is estimated at \$620,000 per month, plus round-trip transport of approximately \$725,000, or roughly \$8 million per year.

- Advantages

- Is roughly one-fifth the cost of the other force options actively being considered
- Would allow the post-peace coalition transitional government to begin functioning. If the coalition government works out, the parties' confidence may be high enough to allow force integration without additional deployment of peacekeepers.
- Does not require any command relationship between the UN and OAU, thereby avoiding the bureaucratic resistance of both organizations.
- An expanded NMOG could provide the security necessary for holding of local joint elections in the DMZ and for a gradual return of the displaced to their homes.
- Provides UN "blessing" of, and involvement in, the Rwandan PKO, thereby significantly boosting confidence levels
- Could probably be deployed more quickly than a full-scale UN PKO
- Requires far less manpower from the UN
- The small UN force on the ground could evaluate the need for a larger force for the cantonment/disarmament/force integration/demobilization stage of the PKO
- Would allow the OAU to consult with the UN force and benefit from its PKO expertise
- Would probably minimize Russian opposition (particularly if conducted as a voluntary operation)
- Active UN involvement and participation of non-African forces would make this option more acceptable to the Rwandan government.
- UN involvement would provide a face-saving way for the French to withdraw their forces, as the RPF has demanded.
- Would demonstrate the OAU's acceptance of responsibility for addressing Africa's problems.
- Advances the USG's goal of promoting regional PKOs
- Canada, among others, has informally indicated a willingness to provide troops for a UN PKO in Rwanda
- Despite the OAU's limited PKO experience, they may have the capability to fulfill the modest role required of the NMOG

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- Disadvantages

- Deployment of additional peacekeeping forces sometime in the future might well be required to complete the cantonment/disarmament/force integration/demobilization stage.

- The OAU may not have the funding on hand to expand the NMOG and, if additional funding is required, it would have to be on an ad hoc, bilateral basis.

- Even for an operation this small, funding of the UN portion could prove problematic.

- It may be impractical to include troops from more than one country in a UN force this small, and it could prove difficult to find one country willing to accept the responsibility of contributing all 300 UN troops.

- The UN peacekeeping management directorate is already stretched exceedingly thin due to the abundance of current UN PKOs

Option 6 - Conduct No International Peacekeeping Operation:

There would be no cost to the international community for peacekeepers or observers, but humanitarian aid costs would probably continue at or above current high levels (at least \$100 million this year, with the USG pledged to provide \$34 million in humanitarian aid).

- Advantage:

- Reduces peacekeeping costs to international community

- Disadvantages:

- Will perpetuate massive relief costs, which in Rwanda are approximately 3 times higher than the cost of a 2500-man PKO

- Will most likely lead to the collapse of the peace in Rwanda, which risks regional destabilization

- International inaction would highlight the marginalization of Africa

- Would set a bad precedent; other countries in conflict might prove unwilling to accept a negotiated settlement if the international community is unwilling to provide peacekeeping support

- Ignores USG policy goals of conflict resolution and democratization (in Rwanda, the latter is wholly dependent on a successful end to the civil war)

- Nullifies the US investment in resolution of the Rwandan civil war, including more than one year of diplomatic effort

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 KIGALI 03060

LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RW
 SUBJECT: THE RWANDAN PEACE PROCESS: PROBLEMS AND
 PROSPECTS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PAACE ACCORD

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1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: RWANDA TOOK A GIANT STEP FORWARD IN ITS TRANSITION FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY WITH THE SIGNING AUGUST 4 OF A PEACE ACCORD BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA AND THE RPF REBELS. THIS REVOLUTIONARY DOCUMENT ENDS NEARLY THREE YEARS OF WAR AND TRANSFERS TO A MULTI-PARTY GOVERNMENT HEADED BY AN OPPOSITION PRIME MINISTER POWERS MONOPOLIZED FOR NEARLY TWENTY YEARS BY THE PRESIDENT AND HIS FORMER SINGLE PARTY. THE PEACE ACCORD PROVIDES A BLUEPRINT FOR A COMPLEX, TIGHTLY SCHEDULED 22-MONTH TRANSITION PERIOD INTENDED TO END IN MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS. KEY TO LAUNCHING THIS PROCESS IS THE ARRIVAL IN KIGALI OF A CREDIBLE NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL FORCE (NIF) THAT WILL PERMIT FRENCH FORCES TO LEAVE AS AGREED. THE BROAD-BASED TRANSITION GOVERNMENT WILL INHERIT SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS AND WILL FACE NUMEROUS OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTING THE ACCORD. HOWEVER, RWANDANS HAVE

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 DEMONSTRATED THEIR DETERMINATION TO KEEP THEIR TRANSITION ON COURSE. CONTINUED GOOD WILL ON ALL SIDES SHOULD ENABLE RWANDANS TO SUCCEED IN THE DIFFICULT TASK OF MAKING THE PEACE PLAN WORK. NEVERTHELESS, THEY WILL NEED SUSTAINED BILATERAL AND MULTI-LATERAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONTINUE ITS SUPPORT FOR THE PROCESS DIPLOMATICALLY, MATERIALLY, AND FINANCIALLY. END SUMMARY.

PEACE PROCESS

3. WITH THE SIGNING AUGUST 4 OF A PEACE ACCORD BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA (GOR) AND THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) REBELS, RWANDANS ENDED NEARLY THREE YEARS OF CIVIL WAR AND COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO A TWO-YEAR TRANSITION PROCESS INTENDED TO END IN MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS. THE SIX PROTOCOLS OF THE PEACE ACCORD, METICULOUSLY WORKED OUT DURING A FULL YEAR OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, COMMITS RWANDA TO DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM, RESPECT FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, THE RULE OF LAW, NATIONAL RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE MAJORITY HUTU AND MINORITY TUTSI ETHNIC GROUPS AND THE RIGHT OF REFUGEES TO RETURN.

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4. THE TWO SIDES AGREED ON A POWER-SHARING FORMULA FOR THE GOVERNMENT THAT WILL MANAGE THE TRANSITION PERIOD AND TRANSFERRED TO IT THE POWERS FORMERLY HELD SOLELY BY THE PRESIDENT. THIS GOVERNMENT, TO CONSIST OF THE FIVE PARTIES NOW IN THE GOVERNMENT, AS WELL AS
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THE RPF, IS TO OVERSEE THE DISENGAGEMENT AND DISARMAMENT OF THE TWO ARMIES, EFFECT INTEGRATION AND DEMOBILIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES, ESTABLISH INTERNAL SBCURITY, ASSURE THE REINTEGRATION OF WAR DISPLACED, REVITALIZE LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE CIVIL SERVICE, STRENGTHEN THE JUDICIARY, ORGANIZE THE RETURN AND REINSTALLATION OF LONG-TIME REFUGEES, DRAFT A NEW CONSTITUTION, CONDUCT A CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM, HOLD LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS, AND, FINALLY, HOLD LEGISLATIVE AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.

5. AN APPOINTED MULTI-PARTY PARLIAMENT, THE

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FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
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INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
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AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 004)

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AMEMBASSY DAKAR
 AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
 AMEMBASSY HARARE
 AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
 AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 08 KIGALI 03060

LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RW

SUBJECT: THE RWANDAN PEACE PROCESS: PROBLEMS AND

TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, IS TO WORK SIDE BY SIDE WITH THE BROAD-BASED TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT TO ACCOMPLISH THIS MAMMOTH PROGRAM. AMONG ITS CRITICAL ROLES WILL BE INTERPRETATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE PEACE ACCORD, AND, IF APPROPRIATE, AMENDMENT OF THE PEACE ACCORD IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT AND INITIATION OF JUDICIAL ACTION AGAINST THE PRESIDENT OR MOTIONS OF CENSURE AGAINST THE PRIME MINISTER.

6. THE TIMETABLE IS TIGHT. A NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL FORCE (NIF) IS TO BE IN PLACE IN KIGALI AND TWO COMPANIES OF FRENCH TROOPS WITHDRAWN BEFORE MID SEPTEMBER WHEN TRANSITION INSTITUTIONS -- THE BROAD7BASED TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT (BBTG), THE TRANSITIONAL ASSEMBLY (TNW), KAFDNTHE JOINT HIGH CTMMANDS OF THE ARMY AND GENFARMERIE -- ARE TO BE PUT INPLACE. WITHIN THE FOLLOWING MONHH, DISENGEGEMENTR AND DISARMAMENT OF TZJ ARMED FORCES SHOULD BE COMPLETB. WITHIN THE NEXT NINE MONTHS, INTE4-589, TRAINING FOR THE ARMED FORCES, THEIR REDEPLOYMENT AND

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 DEMOBILIZATION OF THOSE NOT CHOSEN FOR THE ARMED FORCES SHOULD BE COMPLETED. ORGANIZED RETURN OF REFUGEES SHOULD HAVE BEGUN. AS IF THIS WERE NOT ENOUGH, JUDICIAL AND CIVIL SERVICE REFORM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM MUST ALSO TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE 22-MONTH TRANSITION PERIOD ENDS IN LEGISLATIVE AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.

STARTING POINT

-Q7. THE BROAD-BASED TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE OVER AT A TIME WHEN THE RWANDAN ECONOMY IS ON ITS KNEES AS A RESULT OF NEARLY THREE YEARS OF WAR. THE COUNTRY IS NEARLY BANKRUPT. ITS BUDGET IS SERIOUSLY IN DEFICIT AS A RESULT OF ARMS PURCHASES WHICH HAS CAUSED THE WORLD BANK AND THE IMF TO SUSPEND THEIR STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM. IT HAS LITTLE HARD CURRENCY TO PURCHASE IMPORTS. THE JOB MARKET IS SERIOUSLY CONSTRICTED WITH LIMITED OPPORTUNITIES FOR OFF-FARM EMPLOYMENT. THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM IS SADLY UNDERDEVELOPED AND LAND FOR NEW FARM ACTIVITY IS VIRTUALLY NONEXISTENT. WAR-DISPLACED, WHO NUMBERED NEARLY ONE MILLION FOLLOWING A FEBRUARY OFFENSIVE BY THE RPF, WILL NEED FOOD ASSISTANCE AT LEAST THROUGH DECEMBER, SOME THROUGH JUNE, AND HELP IN REESTABLISHING THEMSELVES ON THEIR FARMS. DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS AND GENDARMES AND RETURNING REFUGEES WILL NEED PRODUCTIVE WORK. WEAPONS ARE READILY AVAILABLE MAKING ARMED BANDITRY, POLITICAL CLASHES AND ETHNIC VIOLENCE A CONTINUAL THREAT.

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 8. DESPITE THESE LIABILITIES, HOWEVER, RWANDA WILL BRING SOME IMPORTANT ASSETS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE ACCORD. DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A CIVIL SOCIETY ARE ALREADY UNDERWAY. POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE FLOURISHED FOR TWO YEARS AND ARE REACHING AN IMPORTANT STAGE IN THEIR EVOLUTION WHERE THE PARTY MEMBERS ARE BEGINNING TO HOLD THEIR LEADERS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THEIR ACTIONS AND DECISIONS. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, ONCE A MONOLITH TO THE SINGLE PARTY OF THE PRESIDENT, HAS ALREADY EXPERIENCED

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AOEMBASSY DAKAR UQPQ
RUFHDRJXAMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM 4014
AMEMBASSY HARAJE
RUT
KMXAMEBAYSY KAMPALA 4193
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 C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 08 KIGALI 03060

LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RW
 SUBJECT: THE RWANDAN PEACE PROCESS: PROBLEMS AND

ITS MEMBERS TO OTHER PARTIES. A NUMBER OF HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS EXIST AND HAVE SOUNDED ALARM BELLS AND CONDUCTED INVESTIGATIONS INTO ABUSES BY BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE RPF DURING THE TENSE YEARS OF WAR. WOMEN'S ASSOCIATIONS, ASSOCIATIONS OF ENTREPRENEURS AND COOPERATIVES FLOURISH THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY.

9. IN THE LAST SIX MONTHS, RWANDA HAS EVEN HELD MULTI-PARTY ELECTIONS OF SORTS. IN COMMUNES WHERE LOCAL OFFICIALS WERE DEEMED TO HAVE HAD A ROLE IN ETHNIC OR POLITICAL VIOLENCE, INDIRECT ELECTIONS THAT INVOLVED POLITICAL PARTIES IN HEAVY LOBBYING AND HORSETRADING RESULTED IN NEW LOCAL LEADERSHIP. AN ARRANGEMENT WORKED OUT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE RPF LED TO INDIRECT AND DIRECT ELECTIONS OF LOCAL LEADERS IN THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE BETWEEN THE TWO ARMED FORCES.

10. THE ONE EXCEPTION TO THIS ALREADY LAUNCHED PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IS THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM. SO FAR THIS INSTITUTION REMAINS IN THE HANDS OF
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 INEXPERIENCED MAGISTRATES AND INCOMPETENT PRMSECUOORS WHO, 1?3:-73 9| 5#384)-:(9| :43\$3,5:-), REMAP
 FCBJECTNTO CORRUPTION AFD, IF W
 LEIPART, LOYAG TO
 ORHE O
 OERHRULI G PARTY THAT APPOINTED THEM. THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE A MAMMOTH TASK IN THIS AREA IN ORDER TO INSTILL A RULE OF LAW.

PROBLEMS AHEAD

11. BASIC MISTRUST. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RWANDAN PEACE ACCORD WILL INEVITABLY HAVE ITS UPS AND DOWNS.

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DELAYS WILL, NO DOUBT, SET BACK THE TIMEFRAMA
 ENVISIONED IN THE PEANE ACCORD. U
 EERLYING MOST OF
 THESE ROUGH SPOTS WILL SBE THE FUNDAMENTAL MISTRUST
 AMONG ALL PARTIES. ALT
 UGH THE LEJJRS OF BOTH
 SIDES HAVE SIGNED THE PEACESACCORD, NEITHER SIDE
 TRUSTS THE INTENTIONS OF THE OTHER. HISTORIC
 RIVALRIES BETWEEN THE MAJORITY HUTU, WHO PREDOMINATE
 INSIDE THE COUNTRY, AND THE MINORITY TUTSI, WHO
 PREDOMINATE WITHIN THE RPF, CONTINUE TO FUEL
 ANTAGONISM. ON THE ONE HAND, DOUBTS PERSIST ABOUT
 WHETHER THE RPF IS COMMITTED TO DEMOCRACY OR TO A
 TAKEOVER OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE RESTORATION OF
 TUTSI RULE. ON THE OTHER HAND, DOUBTS ALSO PERSIST
 ABOUT THE COMMITMENT OF THE PRESIDENT AND HIS CLOSE
 ENTOURAGE TO SHARING GOVERNANCE OF THE COUNTRY WITH
 THE RPF. MENTAL AND EMOTIONAL ADJUSTMENTS WON'T BE

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 EASY. AS ONE RWANDAN NOTED RECENTLY, POINTING TO THE
 HEAD TF THE ELITE RWANDAN PARACOMMANDO UNIT: "THIS
 MAN LOST HALF HIS UNIT DURING THE WAR, AND MOW WE AE
 ASU

NG HIM TO INTEGRATE HIS FORCES WITH THOUA OFTOHAV
 EQMDMYJNTJ

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8, :80-):90;& 2,747
 (\$8YJD, #1\$4-73,3\$:63040.3 .8,85"4-DEYPGNATEWJS POLITICAL
 BASE. UNGESS HE PARTY CAN DEVISE A FORMULA FOR
 OVERCOMING ITS DIFFERENCES AND REUNITE, THE BBTG
 RISKS TAKING OFFICE WITH ITS CREDIBILITY AND
 LEGITIMACY COMPROMISED. THE VOLATILE AND COMPLICATED

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 AMEMBASSY CAIRO
 AMEMBASSY DAKAR
 AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
 AMEMBASSY HARARE
 AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
 AMEMBASSY KINSHAA
 AMEMBASSY LA9 039
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 08 KIGALI 03060

LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RW
 SUBJECT: THE RWANDAN PEACE PROCESS: PROBLEMS AND

INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION WILL ONLY BECOME MORE
 COMPLEX WITH THE ADDITION OF THE RPF AS A POLITICAL
 PARTY. WHEN THE POWER'SHARING PROTOCOL WAS CONCLUDED
 LAST JANUARY, THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY RESISTED THE
 POWER-SHARING FORMULA ON GROUNDS THAT IT LEFT THEM IN
 A PERMANENT MINORITY SITUATIONJM RECENTLY THE

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POLITICAL FORCES IN RWANDA SHATTERED THIS IMAGE OF PERMANENT AND STATIC POLITICAL ALLIANCES AS DEMONSTRATED IN THEIR MANEUVERING TO NAME THE PRIME MINISTER FOR THE BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH THE PEACE ACCORD ALLOWS FOR SUCH SHIFTING ALLIANCES AMONG THE PARTIES, ITS SPECIFICITY ABOUT WHICH PARTIES WILL BE IN THE GOVERNMENT AND HOW MANY TNA DEPUTIES EACH WILL APPOINT ALLOWS LITTLE LEAWAY FOR EVOLUTION, REALIGNMENTS OR BREAKAWAYS WITHIN PARTIES. THUS THE PEACE ACCORD IS LIKELY TO EXERCISE SOME CONSTRAINT ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE PARTIES.

13. THE ROLE OF THE RPF. ONE OF THE BIGGEST UNKNOWNNS IN THE INTERNAL POLITICAL EQUATION IS THE IMPACT THE RETURN OF THE RPF WILL HAVE ON THE POLITICAL SCENE.

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 MANY OF ITS LEADERS ARE FAR FROM BEING POLITICAL UNKNOWNNS. MANY HAVE A LONG HISTORY OF ASSOCIATION WITH PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA, WITH HIS MILITARY AND WITH SOME OF THE DARKER INCIDENTS IN RWANDAN HISTORY. MANY PEOPLE QUESTION WHETHER THE RPF IS COMMITTED TO POWER-SHARING AND THE DEMOCRATIC RULES OF THE GAME OR WHETHER THEY WILL RESORT TO VIOLENCE IF THE PROCESS GOES AWRY. WHETHER THEIR SOMEWHAT RIGID IDEOLOGICAL APPROACH TO ISSUES AND TO CONTROL OF PARTY MEMBERS WILL BE COMPATIBLE WITH DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES WILL BE KEY TO THE RPF'S ACCEPTABILITY TO THE RWANDAN PUBLIC.

14. HUTU EXTREMISM. AT THE SAME TIME, HUTU EXTREMISTS WHO OPPOSE RECONCILIATION WITH THE RPF AND OBJECT TO ACCORDING GREATER PARTICIPATION IN RWANDAN SOCIETY TO TUTSIS ARE ALSO AN UNKNOWN QUANTITY. SINCE ITS FORMATION 18 MONTHS AGO, 5#3 :\$4, AN AVOWEDLY ANTIGAOUTSI POLITICAL PARTY, PTAYD AN EXTRAMELY D SRUPTIVE, INDEED VIOLENT/ ROLEM DEMOBILUZED SOLDIERS AND GENDARMES COULD FUEL RENEWED CDR ACTIVITY, LRGELY DORMANT SINCE THE FEBRUARY OFFENSIVE. THE AVAILABILITY OF GUNS AND GRENADES DOES NOTHING TO REDUCE ANXIETY ON THIS POINT.

15. POLITICAL VIOLENCE. TWO GOVERNMENT FFICIALS, FORMER PRIME MINISTER DISMAS NSENGIYAREMYE AND

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DEFENSE MINISTER JAMES GASANA LEFT RWANDA SADDEENLY
AND UNANNOUNCED WITHIN THE PAST MONTH. GASANA SAID
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HE FEARED FOR HIS LIFE AND SPECULATION EXISTS THAT
NSBNGIYAREMYE MAY HAVE BEEN SIMILARLY MOTIVATED. IN
MAY, A WELL-KNOWN POLITICIAN FROM THE PRINCIPAL
OPPOSITION PARTY WAS ASSASSINATED AND THE CRIME
REMAINS UNSOLVED. THESE INCIDENTS, AND OTHERS
INVOLVING LESS PROMINENT INDIVIDUALS, STIR ANXIETIES
ABOUT THE POSSIZLILITY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE AXD
RANDOM TERRORISM CONTINUING DESPITE THE END OF THE
WAR.

16. INTERPRETATION OF THE ACCORD. ALL OF THE
PROBLEMS MENTIONED THUS FAR WILL INEVITABLY MAKE
INTERPRETATION OF THE SOMETIMES CONTRADICTIONARY AND
OFTEN AMBIGUOUS ARTICLES OF THE PROTOCOLS DIFFICULT

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FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
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AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

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AMEMBASSY HARARE

AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
 AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
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 AMEMBASSY LILONGWE
 AMEMBASSY LONDON

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 08 KIGALI 03060

LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 LAGS: REL, PGOV, RW
 SUBJECT: THE RWANDAN PEACE PROCESS: PROBLEMS AND

AT BEST. ALREADY DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ARTICLE OUTLINING THE PROCESS FOR NOMINATING A PRIME MINISTER PRECIPITATED CONSIDERABLE MISUNDERSTANDING, INDEED, ONGOING ACRIMONY. INTERPRETATION OF THE PEACE ACCORD IS VESTED IN THE TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. IF NECESSARY, THE TNA IS TO REFER TO THE POLITICAL-MILITARY COMMISSION SET UP UNDER THE CEASE-FIRE ACCORD OF JULY 1992. THE COMPOSITION OF THIS COMMISSION, CURRENTLY THE "GOVERNMENT" AND THE "RPF", HAS YET TO BE MODIFIED AND ITS ROLE REDEFINED IN A WAY THAT MAKES IT CONSISTENT WITH A POST-PEACE ACCORD MISSION. THIS COMMISSION IS THE ONLY TRANSITION ORGAN WHICH INCORPORATES INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS WHO HELPED BROKER THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

17. RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS. THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH IMPLEMENTING RWANDA'S PEACE ACCORD WILL BE ENORMOUS.

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 DEMOBILIZATION AND INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES,

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REINSTALLATION OF DISPLACED PERSONS, RETURN AND REINTEGRATION OF REFUGEES, WILL ALL HAVE LARGE PRICE TAGS. BOTH THE GOVERNMENT AND THE RPF WILL UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE OUTSTANDING DEBTS. RWANDA CANNOT FINANCE THESE ACTIVITIES WITHOUT HELP FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. ALTHOUGH SOME FAT CAT REBELS, WHO ALLEGEDLY FINANCED THE RPF, MIGHT BE CONVINCED TO INVEST THEIR FUNDS IN PEACE INSTEAD OF WAR, THIS WILL BE INSUFFICIENT. MULTI-LATERAL AND BILATERAL AID, OVER WHICH RWANDANS HAVE NO CONTROL, WILL BE CRUCIAL TO THE PROCESS. FUNDS WILL BE NEEDED FOR BUDGET SUPPORT AS WELL AS FOR THE PROJECTS ASSOCIATED WITH IMPLEMENTING THE PEACE ACCORD. RWANDA'S TRADITIONAL DONORS MUST REMAIN ENGAGED, BUT NEW SOURCES OF FUNDING MUST BE FORTHCOMING AS WELL. WORLD BANK AND IMF PARTICIPATION WILL BE CRITICAL. AN IMPLEMENTATION PROCEEDS, THE RWANDANS WILL IFEVITABLY HAVE TO LOWER THEIR SIGHTS AND ALTER THEIR PROCEDURES NNACCORDANCE W TH RESOURCE AVAILABILITY. EACH NEW SET OF ALTERNATIVES, HOWEVER, &40(4-88, & THE SPECTRE OF MISTRUST AND QUESTIONS ABOUT MOTIVES THAT PLAGUED THE NEGOTIATIONS AT ARUSHA AND RESULTED IN A LONG DRAWN-OUT PROCESS. INORDINATE DELAYS COULD TEMPT ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER TO RESORT TO RENEWED CONFLICT.

18. NIF: THE TIMETABLE KEY. THE PRESENCE OF A NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN KIGALI--AGAIN A FACTOR TOTALLY OUTSIDE RWANDAN CONTROL--IS THE KEY TO
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 UNLOCKING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMPLEX RWANDAN PEACE PLAN. UNTIL A CREDIBLE INTERNATIONAL FORCE IS IN PLACE, THE TWO COMPANIES OF FRENCH TROOPS IN KIGALI WILL NOT DEPART. UNTIL THE NIF ARRIVES AND THE FRENCH DEPART, THE RPF HAS SAID IT WILL NOT COME TO KIGALI. UNTIL THE RPF IS WILLING TO COME TO KIGALI, THE GOVERNMENT HAS SAID NO TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS CAN BE PUT IN PLACE. AS THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD DIPLOMATS RECENTLY: "IN THE ABSENCE OF A NIF, OUR HANDS ARE TIED. WE CANNOT BEGIN TO IMPLEMENT THE PEACE ACCORDS" MEANWHILE, TWO ARMED FORCES CONTINUE TO FACE EACH OTHER ACROSS A NARROW DEMILITARIZED ZONE IN NORTHERN RWANDA.

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19. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. RWANDA HAS SET ITSELF ON
A TWO-YEAR TRANSITION PROGRAM WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY
TURN OUT TO BE EVEN LONGER. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

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	ADS-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01
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P 191143Z AUG 93
 FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4494
 INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
 AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
 AMEMBASSY BONN
 AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
 AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
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 AMEMBASSY CAIRO
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 AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
 AMEMBASSY HARARE
 AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
 AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
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LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RW
 SUBJECT: TTE RWANDAN PEACE PROCESS: PROBLEMS AND

PEACE PLAN DEPENDS ON CONTINUING FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. RETAINING THE INTEREST AND COMMITMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO SUCH A PROTRACTED PROCESS IS UNLIKELY TO BE EASY. RWANDA IS ALREADY COMPETING FOR ATTENTION WITH SOMALIA AND LIBERIA IN AFRICA AND WITH YUGOSLAVIA AND COUNTRIES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD. THE FORMER COLONIAL MASTER, BELGIUM, HAS ALREADY REDUCED ITS INVOLVEMENT AND COMMITMENT TO THIS COUNTRY SIGNIFICANTLY. THE FRENCH APPARENTLY WANT TO REDUCE THEIR COMMITMENT AS WELL, ALTHOUGH THEY SEEM TO WANT TO RETAIN THEIR POLITICAL INFLUENCE. U.S. BUDGET PROBLEMS DO NOT BODE WELL FOR OUR ABILITY TO MAKE COMMITMENTS IN A COUNTRY WHERE OUR DIRECT INTERESTS ARE MINIMAL.

PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

 20. FRAGILE PEACE. THE PEACE IN RWANDA IS FRAGILE.
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 A CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES HELD FOR THE MOST PART OF THE PAST YEAR, WHILE THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE UNDERWAY IN ARUSHA. THE EXCEPTION WAS FROM FEBRUARY 8 TO MARCH 9 THIS YEAR WHEN AN RPF OFFENSIVE BROUGHT RPF FORCES TO WITHIN 20 MILES OF THE CAPITAL AND FORCED THE DISPLACEMENT OF NEARLY ONE MILLION PEOPLE. WHETHER TRUE OR NOT, NO ONE DOUBTS THAT THE RPF HAS THE MILITARY SKILL AND MIGHT RESORT TO DAMAGING VIOLENCE AS LONG AS IT HAS ACCESS TO ITS WEAPONRY. THIS COMMON BELIEF APPEARS TO BE ACTING AS A DETERRENT TO ETHNIC AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE THAT PLAGUED RWANDA DURING THE WAR. POLITICAL YOUTH GROUPS ARE FOR NOW QUIET. THE HUTU EXTREMIST POLITICAL PARTY HAS KEPT A LOW PROFILE SINCE THE RPF'S FEBRUARY OFFENSIVE. BUT GUNS AND GRENADES HAVE PROLIFERATED THROUGHOUT THE SOCIETY AND ARE EASILY ACCESSIBLE TO THOSE WHO SEEK THEM. EVEN AFTER THE FIGHTING FORCES DISARM, AS CALLED FOR IN THE

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DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS, A RESURGENCE OF VIOLENCE CANNOT BE RULED OUT. THE IMMINENT PRESENCE IN KIGALI OF 600 RPF TROOPS TO GUARD RPF PARTICIPANTS IN TRANSITION INSTITUTIONS KEEPS THE FEAR OF RENEWED VIOLENCE ALIVE.

21. THE RWANDAN OPTION. NEVERTHELESS, AGAINST ALL THESE ODDS, RWANDANS HAVE MADE REMARKABLE PROGRESS IN THE LAST 24 MONTHS, PASSING FROM A SINGLE PARTY DICTATORSHIP AT WAR TO A MULTI-PARTY GOVERNMENT LED BY AN OPPOSITION PRIME MINISTER THAT HAS CONCLUDED A PEACE ACCORD. IN THE PROCESS, RWANDANS HAVE CRAFTED A UNIQUE PATH TO DEMOCRACY. IN CONTRAST TO BURUNDI,

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WHERE ELECTIONS ARE TO LEAD THE WAY TO SOCIAL CHANGE, RWANDANS WROPOUE TO TRANSFORM THEIR SOCIETY FIRST. THE RWANDAN WAY, WHERE ELECTIONS ARE TO FOLLOW THE UNLEASHING OF DEMOCRATIC FORCES AND THE TRANSFER OF POWER AWAY FROM THE ALL-POWERFULL PRESIDENCY, MAY WELW PROVE MORS DISFICULT TO MANAGE. FIFTEEN MONTHS OF POWER-SHARING HAS BEEN ANYTHING BUT A SMOOTH RIDE. NEVERTHELESS, THE RWANDAN WAY IS WORKING FOR RWANDA. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND PARTY LEADERS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THEIR STAYING POWER AND THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE TRANSITION PROCESS. THEY HAVE GAINED A WEALTH

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	ADS-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01
	PM-02	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-00	SP-00	SS-00	TRSE-00
	T-00	USIE-00	RPE-01	CORE-00	/049W		

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P 191143Z AUG 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4495
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 07 OF 08 KIGALI 03060

LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RW
 SUBJECT: THE RWANDAN PEACE PROCESS: PROBLEMS AND

OF EXPERIENCE IN POLITICAL MANEUVERING AND COALITION
 BUILDING THAT WILL SERVE THEM WELL WHEN THE RPF JOINS
 THEM IN GOVERNING.

22. GOOD WILL. THE DOGGED PERSISTENCE RWANDANS HAVE
 DEMONSTRATED DURING THEIR YEAR-LONG PEACE
 NEGOTIATIONS AND THEIR 15-MONTH EXPERIMENT WITH
 MULTI-PARTY GOVERNMENT IS TESTIMONY TO THE GOOD WILL
 ON ALL SIDES TO MAKE THE TRANSITION WORK, DESPITE THE
 OBSTACLES THEY WILL INEVITABLY ENCOUNTER ALONG THE
 WAY. WITH THE SIGNING OF THE PEACE ACCORD, RWANDANS,
 INCLUDING THE RPF, COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO PEACE AND
 TO A DEMOCRATIC OUTCOME FOR THE TRANSITION PROCESS.
 RWANDANS ARE TIRED OF WAR, THEY ARE TIRED OF A
 STAGNANT ECONOMY, AND THEY ARE READY FOR A CHANGE

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THAT WILL GIVE THEM A CHANCE AT PEACE AND
 PROSPERITY. RWANDANS KNOW THAT THEY CANNOT AFFORD TO
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 CONTINUE FIGHTING. NO ONE ACQUAINTED WITH RWANDA
 WOULD PREDICT AN UNTRoubLED TRANSITION PERIOD.
 LEADERSHIP WILL PLAY A CRUCIAL ROLE IN KEEPING THE
 PROCESS ON TRACK THROUGH THE DIFFICULTIES THAT LIE
 AHEAD. SUPPORT FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY,
 BOTH BILATERALLY AND THROUGH MULTI-LATERAL
 INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE U.N., ;5#3 294)\$?-, (-, \$ 5#3
 IMF, WILL IMPROVE THE ODDS.

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

23. SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE PLAN IN
 RWANDA WILL EFFECTIVELY END THREE YEARS OF CIVIL WAR,
 OFFER HOPE FOR STABILITY IN THE SUB-REGION, BRING
 RWANDA'S DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS TO THE BRINK OF
 LEGISLATIVE AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, LAY THE
 GROUNDWORK FOR FULL MINORITY PARTICIPATION IN RWANDAN
 POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LIFE, GIVE THE ECONOMY THEO
 CHANCE T

PICK UP, AND MOVE TOWARD RESOLUTION OF A
 LONG-STANDING REFUGEE PROBLEM. RWANDANS HAVE MAPPED
 OUT THE PATH THEY INTEND TO FOLLOW. BUT THEY CANNOT
 COMPLETE THE TRIP WITHOUT THE HELP OF THE
 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

24. THE UNITED STATES HAS PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE
 IN PROMOTING DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO WARRING
 FACTIONS AND, IN ITS ROLE AS OBSERVER AT THE PEACE
 TALKS, SUPPORTED THE TWO SIDES THROUGH THE YEAR-LONG
 NEGOTIATING PROCESS. IN KEEPING WITH OUR POLICY OF
 PROMOTING CONFLICT RESOLUTION, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND
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 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE U.S. SHOULD:

-- CONTINUE TO PROMOTE AND ASSIST THE RWANDAN PEACE
 PROCESS, USING DIPLOMATIC, FINANCIAL, AND MATERIAL
 MEANS;

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- ENCOURAGE CONTINUED COMMITMENT OF ALL SIDES TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE ACCORD DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES THAT WILL INEVITABLY SURFACE;
- ENCOURAGE ALL SIDES TO RULE OUT RECOURSE TO VIOLENCE AS A METHOD OF RESOLVING DIFFERENCES;
- ENSURE TIMELY DEPLOYMENT OF A CREDIBLE NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL FORCE WHOSE SIZE, COMPOSITION, AND COMMAND STRUCTURE ARE COMPATIBLE WITH THE JOB BOTH SIDES EXPECT IT TO ACCOMPLISH;

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	ADS-00	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01
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	T-00	USIE-00	RPE-01	CORE-00	/049W		
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P 191143Z AUG 93
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 08 OF 08 KIGALI 03060

LILONGWE AND YAOUNDE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RW
SUBJECT: THE RWANDAN PEACE PROCESS: PROBLEMS AND

-- ENCOURAGE THE OAU TO ENLARGE ITS MILITARY
OBSERVER GROUP IN RWANDA (NMOG), INCLUDING
PARTICIPATION OF ANGLOPHONE TROOPS, AND EXPAND ITS
MANDATE TO ACCOMMODATE POST-PEACE ACCORD MISSIONS;

-- ENCOURAGE THE U.N., ITS AGENCIES, AND ITS MEMBER
STATES TO BE RESPONSIVE TO RWANDA'S NEED FOR HELP IN
IMPLEMENTING THE PEACE ACCORD;

-- EXERT PRESSURE ON THE WORLD BANK AND THE IMF TO
PARTICIPATE FINANCIALLY IN IMPLEMENTING THE PEACE
ACCORD PROGRAMS;

-- PROVIDE FUNDING FOR DEMOBILIZATION OF ARMED
FORCES AND REINTEGRATION OF RETURNING REFUGEES.

-- WORK CLOSELY WITH OBSERVERS OF THE PEACE
NEGOTIATION PROCESS, ESPECIALLY THE FRENCH, TO HELP
CREATE A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE AMONG THE POLITICAL
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FORCES IN RWANDA THAT WILL PERMIT SUCCESSFUL
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE ACCORDS.

25. KINSHASA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

LEADER

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OMB-01 PA-01 PM-02 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00
SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 DTC-01 RPE-01 CORE-00
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FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4550
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KIGALI 03188

STATE FOR AF/C, AF/RA, AND IO/PEACEKEEPING
YAOUNDE AND LILONGWE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, AORC, MASS, UN, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: UM RECONNAISSANCE MISSION HEAD DISCUSSES
THOUGHTS ON UN INVOLVEMENT IN RWANDA

REFS: (A) KIGALI 3092, (B) STATE 250795,
(C) USUN 3985, (D) ADDIS ABABA 5645

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. UN RECONNAISSANCE MISSION HEAD TOLD

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Charles Daris, Senior Reviewer

CHARGE HIS TEAM'S FINDINGS POINT TOWARD A WHOLLY UN, PHASED PEACEKEEPING OPERATION (PKO) WITH SEVERAL COMPONENTS, PEAKING IN SIZE DURING THE FORCE DISENGAGEMENT/DISARMAMENT/DEMobilIZATION PROCESS, THEN TAPERING OFF SIGNIFICANTLY. HE WORRIES THAT A FORCE SMALLER THAN THE "MINIMUM VIABLE" OR DELAYED IN ARRIVAL COULD JEOPARDIZE A POTENTIALLY SUCCESSFUL PKO. WHAT FORCES CAN BE MOVED IN WHEN TO ASSURE THE PROCESS STAYS ON TRACK IN THE "CRITICAL" WEEKS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD SO A GOVERNMENT CAN BE PUT IN PLACE IS A MAJOR PREOCCUPATION. HE ASKED THAT THE U.S. URGE BOTH SIDES TO REMAIN PATIENT AND CALM PENDING UN START-UP. END SUMMARY.

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3. CHARGE MET 8/26 WITH BRIG. GEN. ROMERO DALLAIRE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON UM INVOLVEMENT IN A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN RWANDA. CHARGE CONVEYED U.S. POSITION AS OUTLINED REF B. THE GENERAL WAS RELUCTANT TO DISCUSS SPECIFICS OF HIS TEAM'S FINDINGS IN ORDER NOT TO PREEMPT HIS REPORT TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL OR COMPROMISE THE UNSYG'S DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY. NEVERTHELESS, HE DISCUSSED BROAD OUTLINES OF HIS THINKING AT THIS STAGE AND EXPRESSED FEARS FOR THE OPERATION'S SUCCESS SHOULD THE UN SKIMP ON RESOURCES. ALSO PRESENT WERE ISEL RIVERO, UN POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, AND FLORENCE BARRILLON-POMES, SPECIAL ASSISTANT.

4. PARAMETERS. THE GENERAL SAID HE WILL RECOMMEND TO THE UNSYG A PKO FOR RWANDA THAT IS "REASONABLE BUT RESPONSIBLE" GIVEN THE CONSTRAINTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE NEEDS ON THE GROUND. HE WILL PRESENT OPTIONS TO THE UN/SYG WITH A CONVINCING ARGUMENT FOR WHAT HE DEEMS THE "MINIMUM VIABLE" OPERATION. BELOW THAT, HE SAID, THE UN WILL BE ON ITS OWN.

5. A WINNER. GEN. DALLAIRE SAID THE RWANDAN PKO COULD BE A WINNER IF IT IS APPROACHED PROPERLY AND AT A PACE THAT KEEPS THE RISK FACTOR LOW. IF FORCE ARRIVAL IS DELAYED, HE SAID, OR IF THE OPERATION IS SHORT-CHANGED ON RESOURCES, FAILURE COULD BE A REAL POSSIBILITY. HE SAID HE FOUND GOOD WILL ON BOTH SIDES TO MAKE THE PEACE PROCESS WORK. THAT THE CEASEFIRE WORKS WITH ONLY 50 NMOG OBSERVERS IS

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EVIDENCE OF THIS GOOD WILL.

6. RISKS EXIST. NEVERTHELESS, HE SAID, RISKS EXIST. HE EXPRESSED PARTICULAR PREOCCUPATION WITH RISKS IN THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE PROCESS WHICH HE CONSIDERS "CRITICAL". WHAT WILL HAPPEN, HE ASKED, WHEN THE UN FORCE FAILS TO ARRIVE BY SEPTEMBER 10, THE LOCALLY AGREED MILESTONE FOR PUTTING THE GOVERNMENT IN PLACE? HOW LONG WILL THE PATIENCE OF THE TWO SIDES LAST BEFORE ONE OR THE OTHER BREAKS THE PEACE? HE SAID HIS TEAM IS DOING A RISK ASSESSMENT TO DETERMINE WHAT RESOURCES ARE NEEDED AND WHEN IN ORDER TO ENSURE AGAINST COLLAPSE OF THE PROCESS

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DOEE-00 EB-01 EUR-01 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00
IO-19 L-03 ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02
OMB-01 PA-01 PM-02 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00
SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 DTC-01 RPE-01 CORE-00
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P 271512Z AUG 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4551
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDP
WMMBA PRIORITY 1366
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA

AMEMBASSY LAGOS
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AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 KIGALI 03188

STATE FOR AF/C, AF/RA, AND IO/PEACEKEEPING
YAOUNDE AND LILONGWE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, AORC, MASS, UN, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: UM RECONNAISSANCE MISSION HEAD DISCUSSES

BEFORE IT EVEN GETS STARTED. HE BELIEVES THAT
FINDING A WAY TO PUT THE GOVERNMENT IN PLACE EARLY
WILL BE CRUCIAL.

7. PHASED OPERATION. THE GENERAL TALKED ABOUT A
THREE-PHASE OPERATION WITH THE NUMBER OF ASSETS
PEAKING DURING THE DISENGAGEMENT/DISARMAMENT PROCESS
OF PHASE II. ALTHOUGH THE GENERAL WAS DELIBERATELY
VAGUE IN DESCRIBING HIS VISION, CHARGE UNDERSTOOD THE
FOLLOWING:

--PHASE I WOULD BEGIN SEPTEMBER 10 AND EXTEND UNTIL
SUFFICIENT UN ASSETS WERE DEPLOYED TO RWANDA TO
PERMIT THE DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS TO BEGIN. ONCE A UN
RESOLUTION AND BUDGET WERE APPROVED, A COMMANDER
COULD BE NAMED AND BE IN COUNTRY WITH AN ADVANCE
PARTY POSSIBLY WITHIN ABOUT TWO WEEKS. FORCES MIGHT
BE ABLE TO BE BORROWED FROM ANOTHER UN OPERATION IN
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ORDER TO MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO BE
PUT IN PLACE. THIS, THE GENERAL BELIEVES IS THE
CRITICAL PHASE.

-- PHASE II WOULD BEGIN WHEN A UN FORCE REASONABLE
ENOUGH TO BEGIN THE DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS ARRIVED IN
COUNTRY. HE SAID THREE MONTHS WOULD BE THE MINIMUM

TIME NEEDED FOLLOWING PASSAGE OF A UN RESOLUTION FOR THE MAIN BODY OF A UN FORCE TO BE DEPLOYED TO RWANDA. THE NUMBER OF FORCES WOULD PEAK DURING THIS PHASE WHICH WOULD LAST UNTIL THE FORCE INTEGRATION WAS COMPLETE, ABOUT NINE MONTHS OUT.

-- PHASE III, BEGINNING ONCE FORCE INTEGRATION WAS COMPLETED, WOULD SEE FORCES REDUCED, POSSIBLY LEAVING ONLY AN OBSERVATION FORCE UNTIL THE END OF THE 22-MONTH TRANSITION PERIOD.

8. BEGINNING AND END. IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY, THE GENERAL SAID THAT THE END OF THE OPERATION WAS CLEAR: 22 MONTHS INTO THE PROCESS WHEN THE PEACE ACCORD CALLS FOR THE TRANSITION PERIOD TO END AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS TO BE HELD. THE GENERAL NOTED THAT HAVING "REASONABLE" ASSETS IN PLACE AT EACH POINT IN THE PROCESS WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE UN--AND DONORS--TO PUSH THE RWANDANS HARD TO STICK TO THEIR PROPOSED TIMETABLE.

9. RELATION TO THE OAU/NMOG. ASKED WHAT THE ROLE OF THE OAU/NMOG WOULD BE, THE GENERAL SAID IT WOULD HOLD THE FORT UNTIL THE UN COULD COME IN. AFTER THE
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ARRIVAL OF THE UN, THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER OAU COMMAND STRUCTURE. THE OAU TROOPS WOULD THEN BE WITHDRAWN OR FOLDED INTO THE UN OPERATION. HE HINTED AN ACCEPTANCE OF THE LONG-STANDING OAU PROPOSAL, FIRST SUGGESTED DURING THE ARUSHA TALKS, FOR OAU PERSONNEL TO BE SECONDED TO KEY POSITIONS OF A UN-LED PKO TO GAIN EXPERIENCE FOR FUTURE OAU PKOS. CHARGE PROBED WHETHER AN NMOG BATTALION (THINKING OF THE EGYPTIAN OFFER) MIGHT BE ABLE TO SERVE AS THE KIGALI FORCE THAT COULD ENABLE THE GOVERNMENT TO BE INSTALLED. HE SAID ANY SUCH FORCE WOULD HAVE TO BE UN-LED.
VA COMPONENTS OF THE OPERATION. CHARGE ASKED ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECT OF A UN

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P 271512Z AUG 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4552
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 KIGALI 03188

STATE FOR AF/C, AF/RA, AND IO/PEACEKEEPING
YAOUNDE AND LILONGWE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, AORC, MASS, UN, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: UM RECONNAISSANCE MISSION HEAD DISCUSSES

OPERATION TO THE MILITARY ASPECT. THE GENERAL SAID
THAT HE WOULD NOT BE PROPOSING AN ALL-SOLDIER
EXERCISE, BUT ONE WITH SEVERAL COMPONENTS. ALTHOUGH
HE DID NOT WANT TO BE SPECIFIC, CHARGE DEDUCED HE
ENVISIONS AT LEAST FOUR COMPONENTS: A FORCE TO

MANAGE THE DISENGAGEMENT/DISARMAMENT ACTIVITIES, MILITARY OBSERVERS FOR THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE TO BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE TWO ASSEMBLY ZONES, A CIVILIAN POLICE COMPONENT, AND A HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANT COMPONENTS (REINSTALLATION OF DISPLACED/DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS/RETURNING REFUGEES). HE STRESSED THAT HIS RECOMMENDATIONS WOULD BE FOR "REASONABLE AND RESPONSIBLE" LEVELS OF PHASED INVOLVEMENT IN ALL COMPONENTS. HE SAID THE HUMANITARIAN COMPONENT MIGHT CONSIST SOLELY OF A COORDINATOR AS THERE IS ALREADY A WELL-DEVELOPED UN-NGO-IGO NETWORK FOR DELIVERING AID TO THE DISPLACED. THE GENDARMERIE AND THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM ARE VIRTUALLY NON-EXISTENT, HE SAID, SO THERE WILL HAVE TO BE SOME ASSISTANCE IN BUILDING THE SECURITY CAPABILITY OF THE NEW GENDARMERIE.

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11. IDENTIFICATION OF SITES. CHARGE ASKED IF HIS TEAM HAD IDENTIFIED SITES FOR CANTONMENT OF WEAPONS AND ASSEMBLY OF TROOPS. HE SAID THEY HAD BUT THEY WOULD BE PRESENTED AS RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UN/SYG. AN ADVANCE PARTY WOULD BE ABLE TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE TWO SIDES ON THE PROPOSALS.

12. PHASE I CRITICAL. THE GENERAL REITERATED THAT, IN HIS VIEW, A RWANDA PEACEKEEPING OPERATION HAD A GOOD CHANCE OF SUCCEEDING. BUT IN ORDER FOR IT TO BE SUCCESSFUL, HE SAID, SOME RESOURCES MUST BE COMMITTED. HIS POLITICAL AIDE OBSERVED THAT THE ANGOLAN OPERATION FAILED BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN SHORT-CHANGED ON RESOURCES. THE GENERAL SAID PHASE I WILL BE ABSOLUTELY CRITICAL. A "MINIMUM VIABLE FORCE" WILL BE NEEDED DURING THIS PERIOD SO THAT THE GOVERNMENT CAN TAKE OFFICE AND SO THAT THE TWO SIDES CAN GET THROUGH THE PERIOD BEFORE A UN FORCE IS PRESENT WITHOUT HAVING THE THE PROCESS "CRASH".

13. APPEAL FOR HELP. THE GENERAL APPEALED TO THE U.S. TO HELP KEEP THE TWO SIDES PATIENT AND CALM AND THE PROCESS ON TRACK PENDING THE ARRIVAL OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE. HE SAID THE UN/SYG IS PULLING OUT ALL THE STOPS TO MOVE QUICKLY ON THE RWANDAN ISSUE. BUT, HE SAID, THE UN JUST CANNOT MEET THE LOCALLY AGREED TIMETABLE. THE UN NEEDS HELP IN CONVINCING THE TWO SIDES OF THE UN'S GOOD FAITH AND IN KEEPING THINGS CALM IN THE INTERIM.

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14. COMMENT. IT IS CLEAR FROM WHAT THE GENERAL SAID THAT THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN HIS REPORT WILL INCLUDE SPECIFIC NUMBERS ATTACHED TO SPECIFIC TIME FRAMES FOR AN OPERATION THAT WILL HAVE A CLEAR BEGINNING AND A CLEAR END. HIS WORRY IS LEGITIMATE: HOW LONG CAN THE TWO RWANDAN FORCES REMAIN DEPLOYED IN BATTLE POSITIONS ON OPPOSITE SIDES OF A NARROW DMZ WITHOUT HAVING SOMETHING GO AWAY? HOW LONG CAN A GOVERNMENT BE POISED TO TAKE OFFICE BEFORE POLITICAL MANIPULATION SETS IN TO DERAIL IT? EVEN THOUGH WE ARE CONVINCED THAT RWANDANS WANT THEIR PEACE PROCESS TO WORK, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THEY CAN REMAIN INDEFINITELY IN ANTICIPATORY LIMBO WITHOUT SOMETHING

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P 271512Z AUG 93
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 KIGALI 03188

STATE FOR AF/C, AF/RA, AND IO/PEACEKEEPING
YAOUNDE AND LILONGWE FOR DATT

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, AORC, MASS, UN, OAU, RW
SUBJECT: UM RECONNAISSANCE MISSION HEAD DISCUSSES

HAPPENING THAT COULD SERIOUSLY TEST THEIR RESOLVE.
TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. THE GENERAL STRIKES US AS A
BRIGHT, NON-NONSENSE SORT OF GUY WHOSE
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HELPING RWANDA HELP ITSELF SHOULD
BE GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. HE STILL INTENDS TO
PRESENT HIS REPORT TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL FOLLOWING
THE LABOR DAY WEEKEND. END COMMENT.

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MEMORANDUM OF THE JOINT MISSION
 "GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA -RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT"
 ON THE ESTABLISHMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF A NEUTRAL
 INTERNATIONAL FORCE TO RWANDA

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NEW YORK SEPTEMBER 16, 1993 RELEASED IN FULL

0. Nature and Mission of the Neutral International Force
(NIF)

On June 11, 1993 the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front submitted a joint request to the Secretary General of the United Nations, asking him to establish and deploy quickly a Neutral International Force (NIF) of which the United Nations would assume responsibility and command.

This request and the Protocol of Agreement between the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front on the Integration of Armed Forces of the two Parties outline the various missions they would wish the NIF to carry out. These missions relate particularly to catering for the overall security of the country and supervising the process of the formation of the National Army and National Gendarmerie (Article 54).

Article 72 of the above-mentioned Protocol of Agreement links the establishment of Transitional Institutions, namely the Broad-Based Transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly as well as the process of disengagement and reintegration of Armed Forces, with a prior deployment of the NIF. The timetable of the implementation of the Peace Agreement, which stipulates that Transitional Institutions must be put in place within thirty-seven (37) days after the signing of the Peace Agreement (Article 7 of the Peace Agreement), has not been so far respected because the NIF is not yet established and deployed.

Considering that the two parties have entrusted the NIF with a key role in the framework of the implementation of the Peace Agreement, they decided to send a joint mission to appeal to the United Nations Secretary General and the Security Council so that a positive reply can be given as quickly as possible, in the shape of a Resolution voted by the Security Council for the establishment and deployment of a Neutral International Force to Rwanda.

A. The deployment of such a Force is necessary and urgent because of the following main reasons:

I- Political reasons:

- 1) The people of Rwanda urge that the delay in the timetable of the implementation of the Peace Agreement be addressed promptly because, if it were to be further extended, that delay, especially in the establishment of Transitional Institutions, would make the whole Peace process collapse.
- 2) The political good will that motivates both parties may be seriously undermined if Political Institutions are not put in place quickly.
- 3) The 50,000 fighters of the two parties still in their respective positions may end up violating the ceasefire because of nervousness due to their difficult living conditions if political decisions are not reached soon.

II- Humanitarian reasons

- 1) The return of the displaced persons in to their property can only take place after the disengagement of the forces currently deployed in war zones. The disengagement and mine clearing operations can only be supervised by the NIF;
- 2) The rainy season is again about to start while the displaced persons are still homeless despite the fact that the two parties have already reached a Peace Agreement;
- 3) Those displaced persons should be resettled as quickly as possible because, if they were to miss the planting season of September-October 1993, there is likely to be famine.
- 4) The repatriation of the Rwandese Refugees who are eager to come back to their motherland can only occur after the establishment of the Broad-Based Transitional Government responsible for planning and carrying out that repatriation. The establishment of that Government is closely linked with the deployment of the NIF as seen above.
- 5) The beginning of the school year in September-October, 1993 must be effective otherwise school children living in the areas affected by the war will miss school for the fourth year in a row with a real risk for them to become illiterate. There is another category of school-age children who have not been able to start school for three consecutive years.

III- Economic reasons

The disengagement of the Armed Forces of the two parties shall allow the reopening and use of the Transit Roads of the Northern Corridor (Mombasa-Kampala-Kigali-Bujumbura), and thus contribute to boosting trade within the region. *JK*

B- Size of the NIF

The size (numbers) of the NIF should be determined in relation with the following factors:

- 1) The importance and complexity of the missions ascribed to the NIF;
- 2) The hilly landscape of Rwanda which makes mobility extremely difficult;
- 3) The big numbers of the armies of the two parties (over 50,000 troops) whose disengagement, demobilization and integration must be supervised;
- 4) The presence of one RPF battalion in Kigali and thus the danger of bringing the soldiers of the two armies together in the Capital City while they are not yet integrated may jeopardize the whole peace process as witnessed in other conflict regions. As a result the presence of a Neutral International Force with sufficient personnel in Kigali is appropriate.

C- Duration of the NIF mission in Rwanda

The Transition period shall last twenty-two (22) months.

However there may be possibilities of considering the deployment modalities and disengagement modalities (end of the mission) in two stages for either case.

1) Deployment

In order to avoid further delay in the establishment of Transitional Institutions, it is suggested to deploy as soon as possible the first elements of the NIF and, if possible, by end of September or early October, 1993.

The other contingents would be deployed a little bit later in order to strengthen the first contingents and thus help them carry out all the missions ascribed to the NIF.

2) Disengagement of the NIF

The end of the mission of the NIF may be viewed in two stages:

- Great reduction of personnel may occur at the end of the integration process of the armed forces of the two parties as well as at the end of the demobilization process.
- The rest of the reduced personnel may be kept in place until general elections to be organized at the end of the Transitional Period.

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D- CONCLUSION


The Joint Mission Government of Rwanda - Rwandese Patriotic Front, considering the insistent request of the people of Rwanda pleading for the establishment of those Transitional Institutions responsible for the implementation of the Peace Agreement, appeals for the understanding of both the UN Secretary General and Security Council, and submits to them the following request:



- 1) The Security Council urgently adopt a resolution favorable to a rapid deployment of the Neutral International Force in Rwanda;
- 2) To envisage a gradual deployment of the personnel of the NIF whose first elements would be expected in Rwanda before October 10, 1993.
- 3) As provided for in Article 53 of the Protocol of Agreement on the Integration of Armed Forces of the two parties, the members of the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) should be incorporated within the first elements of the NIF (the NMOG offers the advantage of having one company currently present in Rwanda).

Done in New York, September 16, 1993.

Dr. Anastase GASANA
Minister for Foreign
Affairs and Cooperation
Chairman of the Joint
Delegation Government of
Rwanda-Rwandese
Patriotic Front (RPF)

Patrick MAZIMHAKA
Commissioner for
External Relations in RPF
Vice-Chairman of the
Joint Delegation
Government of Rwanda-
Rwandese Patriotic Front RPF

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P 180010Z SEP 93
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 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9698
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 AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
 UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
 WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
 AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
 AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
 JOINT STAFF WASHDC
 AMEMBASSY ASMARA
 SECDEF WASHDC
 AMEMBASSY KIGALI
 AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
 USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
 AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
 AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
 AMEMBASSY BONN

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 STATE FOR IO/UNP, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
 WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC;
 JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J5

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: MARR, PREL MOPS, UN, RW, UG
 SUBJECT: RWANDA: JOINT RPF-GOVERNMENT DELEGATION ASKS
 -- USG SUPPORT FOR QUICK DEPLOYMENT OF AN NIF

REF A) STATE 281611 B) KIGALI 3326

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1. SUMMARY. AMB. ALBRIGHT MET WITH THE JOINT RWANDA - RPF DELEGATION ON SEPT 16 TO HEAR THEIR PLEA FOR THE RAPID SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVAL AND DEPLOYMENT OF A NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL FORCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA ACCORDS. INITIALLY SAYING THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA SAW THE NEED FOR A SIX BATTALION FORCE (4200), FM GASANA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WITH TWO BATTALIONS, THE TEMPORARY GOVERNMENT COULD TAKE OVER, AND WITH FOUR BATTALIONS (2800), DISARMAMENT COULD BEGIN. END SUMMARY.

2. ON SEPT 16, AMB. ALBRIGHT RECEIVED A JOINT GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA-RPF DELEGATION LED BY FOREIGN MINISTER GASANA. GASANA WAS ACCOMPANIED BY RWANDA NEW YORK PERMREP, RPF COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN RELATIONS MAZIMHAKA, AND RWANDAN AMBASSADOR TO KAMPALA KANYARUSHOKI. GASANA WAS THE ONLY SPEAKER. AMB HICKS AND NOTE TAKER ALSO SAT IN ON THE MEETING.

3. THE PURPOSE OF THE DELEGATION'S NEW YORK, AND NEXT WEEK WASHINGTON, VISIT WAS TO DRUM UP SUPPORT FROM
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SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE (NIF) TO RWANDA TO ALLOW FOR THE INSTALLATION OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT AND THEN DISARMAMENT OF TROOPS. DURING HIS HALF-HOUR MEETING WITH AMB. ALBRIGHT, GASANA REITERATED THAT RWANDA APPRECIATED THE US BILATERAL AND SECURITY COUNCIL ROLE IN RESOLVING THE CONFLICT IN RWANDA, AND THAT "THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS GOD" IN TERMS OF DECIDING RWANDA'S FATE. NOTING THAT HIS JOINT DELEGATION WAS A RESULT OF PRESSURE FROM THE PEOPLE TO PUT A PERMANENT END TO THE CONFLICT, GASANA ELABORATED THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND HUMANITARIAN REASONS TO ASSURE THE EXPEDITIOUS DISPATCH OF THE NIF.

4. RWANDA'S PROBLEM WAS A POLITICAL ONE, STATED GASANA. BY INSTALLING THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT, THIS POLITICAL PROBLEM COULD BEGIN TO BE ADDRESSED. GASANA HINTED THAT THERE MIGHT BE UNREST AND/OR BREAKING OF THE CEASE-FIRE. ON THE HUMANITARIAN AND ECONOMIC SIDE, THE DISPLACED PERSONS WERE PRESSING TO RETURN HOME. IT MIGHT BE IMPOSSIBLE TO CONTROL AND RESTRAIN THEM. SEPTEMBER WAS THE RAINY/PLANTING SEASON. IF THE REFUGEES DID NOT REACH HOME IN TIME TO PLANT, THERE WAS RISK OF A WIDESPREAD FAMINE BEGINNING IN

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JANUARY/FEBRUARY WHEN HARVEST SHOULD TAKE PLACE. GIVEN ALL OF THESE FACTORS, THE JOINT DELEGATION WAS PLEADING WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITQ TO PROVIDE THE TROOPS FOR THE POLITICAL CHANGES TO BEGIN.

5. AMB. ALBRIGHT PRESSED GASANA ON HIS VIEWS ON HOW MANY TROOPS WOULD BE NEEDED FOR THE NIV. GASANA
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REPLIED, SIX BATTALIONS (4200 PEOPLE AT 700 PER BATTALION): ONE FOR EACH "SECTOR" AND TWO FOR KIGALI. THIS MANQ TROOPS WERE NEEDED DUE TO THE MOUNTAINOUS NATURE OF THE COUNTRYSIDE. GASANA WAS QUICK TO POINT OUT THAT THE BATTALIONS COULD BE DEPLOYED IN "TRANCHES", AND THAT THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT PERIOD COULD BEGIN AS SOON AS TWO BATTALIONS WERE IN KIGALI. GIVEN THAT THERE WERE ENOUGH TO COMPRISE ONE BATTALION ALREADY ON THE GROUND, AND THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD PROMISED A SECOND BATTALION, IT WAS SIMPLY A MATTER OF THE SC AUTHORIZING THE NIF. GASANA ADDED THAT THE PRESENCE OF OTHER BATTALIONS WOULD BE NECESSARQ BEFORE DISARMAMENT COULD BEGIN.

6. AMB ALBRIGHT PROMISED TO RELAY GASANA'S VIEWS AND ESTIMATES TO THE DEPARTMENT, BUT CAUTIONED THAT THE SECURITQ COUNCIL WAS PAYING A GREAT DEAL OF ATTENTION TO BUDGETING PEACEKEEPING FORCES. WE WOULD NEED TO WAIT FOR THE SYG'S SURVEQ TEAM TO FINISH ITS REPORT BEFORE

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P 180010Z SEP 93
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 USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
 AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
 AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
 AMEMBASSY BONN

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 STATE FOR IO/UNP, AF/C, AF/RA, AND L/UNA;
 WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC;
 JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J5

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: MARR, PREL MOPS, UN, RW, UG
 SUBJECT: RWANDA: JOINT RPF-GOVERNMENT DELEGATION ASKS
 -- USG SUPPORT FOR QUICK DEPLOYMENT OF AN NIF

DISCUSSING THE SIZE AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE NIF. IT WAS A
 BUDGET-CONSCIOUS BODY THE RWANDANS WERE DEALING WITH.
 GASANA RECOGNIZED THAT HIS ESTIMATES MIGHT NEED TO BE
 REVISED, "ON PROPOSE, DIEU (LE CONSEIL) DISPOSE," BUT
 REITERATED THAT THE RWANDAN PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT WERE

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SEEKING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION AND NEEDED THE SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITQ, AS CALLED FOR IN THE ARUSHA ACCORDS.

7. ON HIS WAY OUT, GASANA FURTHER SAID TO AMB. HICKS THAT WITH FOUR BATTALIONS (2BOO), HE BELIEVED THE RWANDANS WOULD FEEL SECURE ENOUGH TO BEGIN THE CANTONMENT AND DISARMAMENT OF TROOPS.

8. THE DELEGATION WILL BE IN WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATIONS THE WEEK OF SEPT 20.

ALBRIGHT

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INFO LOG-00 AID-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00 DOEE-00
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P 011010Z OCT 93
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AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIGALI 03586

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, EAID, RW, US
SUBJECT: WASHINGTON VISIT OF PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA

REF: KIGALI 03511

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: HABYARIMANA'S PURPOSE FOR THE VISIT IS TO THANK THE U.S., BELGIUM, FRANCE AND THE U.N. FOR HELP IN BRINGING PEACE TO RWANDA. HE WILL ALSO INTRODUCE RWANDA'S BID FOR A SEAT ON THE SECURITY
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PAGE 02 KIGALI 03586 01 OF 03 011018Z
COUNCIL. IN ADDITION, HE WANTS AID FOR REBUILDING AFTER THREE YEARS OF WAR AND OUR SUPPORT WITH THE IBRD AND IMF. WE SHOULD PRAISE AND ENCOURAGE HIS ROLE IN BRINGING PEACE AND DEMOCRACY TO RWANDA, URGE GREATER ACTIVITY ON FAMILY PLANNING AND DEMOBILIZATION OF THE ARMIES, USE THE OCCASION TO LAUD THE RECENT OAU ROLE IN PROVIDING OBSERVERS, AD LET HIM KNOW WE SUPPORT THE AMERICAN BID TO PRIVATIZE THE RWANDAN TELEPHONE SYSTEM. END SUMMARY.

RWANDAN OBJECTIVES

3. THE PURPOSE OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO BRUSSELS, NEW YORK, WASHINGTON AND PARIS DURING THE NEXT TWO WEEKS IS TO EXPRESS HIS APPRECIATION ON BEHALF OF THE RWANDAN PEOPLE TO THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH HELPED AS OBSERVERS IN THE PEACE ACCORD SIGNED IN ARUSHA IN

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Charles Daris, Senior Reviewer

AUGUST. SIMILAR VISITS TO NEIGHBORS WHO SUPPORTED THE PROCESS RECEIVED A POSITIVE REACTION INTERNALLY AND HAVE HELPED GREATLY IN PERSUADING THE RWANDAN PUBLIC THAT THIS PEACE ACCORD IS FOR REAL.

4. IN HIS UNGA SPEECH, HABYARIMANA WILL ALSO FORMALLY INTRODUCE RWANDA'S BID TO SIT ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL, A BID SUPPORTED BY THE AFRICA GROUP.

5. HOPEFULLY THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL HAVE DEALT WITH THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL FORCE (NIF) BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S ARRIVAL. IF NOT, HIS OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO PRESS FOR A CREDIBLE NIF UNDER UN COMMAND TO HELP
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RWANDANS IMPLEMENT THE PEACE ACCORD. IN THIS REGARD, ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT HAS REQUESTED AS LARGE A FORCE AS POSSIBLE (REFTEL), I BELIEVE HE CAN BE SATISFIED WITH THE FORCE PROPOSED BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL. WE WILL HAVE ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT IF THE ISSUE IS STILL OPEN BY THE TIME OF THE PRESIDENT'S ARRIVAL.

6. HABYARIMANA ALSO WISHES TO RECEIVE PUBLIC RECOGNITION FROM THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES FOR THE STEPS HE HAS TAKEN TOWARD DEMOCRACY AND, OF COURSE, TOWARD PEACE. WE BELIEVE THE PRESIDENT DESERVES CREDIT FOR BRINGING THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS TO THIS POINT, AND WE BELIEVE THAT THE PROCESS IS IRREVERSIBLE. IN THE PEACE ACCORD, THE PRESIDENT YIELDS MOST EXECUTIVE POWER TO THE CABINET, AND HE RETAINS FOR HIS OWN PARTY ONLY ONE-FOURTH OF THE SEATS IN THAT CABINET, LEAVING THE PRIME MINISTERSHIP TO A LEADER OF WHAT WAS FORMERLY AN OPPOSITION PARTY. THIS WAS NOT AN EASY PROCESS FOR THE PRESIDENT. IT HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY TRAUMATIC FOR MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY AND IMMEDIATE ENTOURAGE WHO SEE THEIR POSITION OF PRIVILEGE SLIPPING AWAY. I BELIEVE IT WILL BE HELPFUL TO THE CONTINUING DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS TO PRAISE THE PRESIDENT'S ROLE IN BRINGING IT ABOUT BOTH PRIVATELY AND IN ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAT ARE MADE AT THE TIME OF THE VISIT.

7. WE EXPECT THE PRESIDENT WILL ALSO HAVE MEETINGS AT THE WORLD BANK AND THE IMF. WHEN HE MEETS WITH U.S. OFFICIALS, HE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY ASK FOR U.S.
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SUPPORT WITH THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS. SINCE WE DO NOT YET KNOW THE OUTCOME OF THE MEETINGS OF THE RWANDAN DELEGATION WHICH WENT FOR THE ANNUAL MEETINGS, WE ARE UNABLE TO PREDICT WHAT SPECIFIC REQUESTS THE PRESIDENT WILL HAVE, BUT MOST LIKELY HE WILL ASK US IN A GENERAL WAY TO ENCOURAGE THE WORLD BANK AND THE FUND TO BE UNDERSTANDING OF RWANDA'S DIFFICULTIES AND PATIENT IF SOME REFORMS TAKE LONGER THAN THE BANK WOULD LIKE.

8. HABYARIMANA WILL ALSO MAKE A REQUEST FOR

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ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00 DOEE-00
EUR-01 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-16 L-03
ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-02
PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00 SP-00 SSO-00 SS-00 TRSE-00
T-00 USIE-00 RPE-01 CORE-00 /042W
-----F4800E 011020Z /38

P 011010Z OCT 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4771
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 03 KIGALI 03586

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, EAID, RW, US
SUBJECT: WASHINGTON VISIT OF PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA

ADDITIONAL FUNDING OF AN UNSPECIFIED LEVEL FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN THE WAKE OF THE PEACE ACCORD.

9. THE PRESIDENT EXPECTS TO BE RECEIVED BY PRESIDENT

MITTERAND IN PARIS AND AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS IN BELGIUM.

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U.S. OBJECTIVES

10. OUR OBJECTIVES OF A SETTLEMENT OF THE WAR WITH THE RPF AND OF PROGRESS TOWARDS DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE RWANDAN POLITICAL SYSTEM ARE BEING ACHIEVED. IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THIS PROCESS AND TO USE THE VISIT OF THE PRESIDENT TO THIS END. ON THIS POINT, HIS INTERESTS AND OURS ARE IDENTICAL. IN ADDITION TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENCOURAGEMENT, USAID HAS JUST LAUNCHED A LONG-TERM DEMOCRACY PROJECT WHICH SEEMS TO HAVE THE SUPPORT OF MOST RWANDANS.

PLANNING. SOME OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CURRENT USAID LED PROGRAM HAS BEEN COMPROMISED BY THREE YEARS OF WAR. WE WILL WANT TO ENCOURAGE HABYARIMANA TO PUT HIS FULL WEIGHT BEHIND THE PROGRAM NOW AND IN THE NEXT TRANSITION GOVERNMENT.

12. ONE OF THE MOST SERIOUS THREATS TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND ULTIMATELY, THEREFORE, TO THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN RWANDA IS THE NEED TO DEMOBILIZE SIXTY PERCENT OF THE COMBINED ARMED FORCES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE RPF. THIS WILL PUT ROUGHLY 30,000 MEN ON THE STREETS. IF PROPER PLANS AND PREPARATIONS ARE NOT MADE FOR THEIR RETURN TO CIVILIAN LIFE, CHAOS WILL RESULT. THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO VACANT LAND FOR THEM TO RETURN TO. THEY WILL NOT GO BACK INTO THEIR HILLS AND SIMPLY DISAPPEAR ON THE FAMILY PLOTS,
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BECAUSE THE FAMILY PLOTS ARE NOW LESS THAN TWO ACRES PER FAMILY. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ANSWER TO THE PROBLEM IS TO GIVE DIRECT ASSIGNMENTS TO DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS TO SCHOOLS WHICH FIT WITH THEIR QUALIFICATIONS AND DESIRES. THIS WILL REQUIRE MAJOR EXPANSION OF TECHNICAL AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS. WE HAVE BEEN PUSHING THE MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE AND PLANNING AND THE UNDP AND THE WORLD BANK TO EXPEDITE THE PLANNING FOR THIS PROCESS. WASHINGTON INTERLOCUTORS COULD USEFULLY STRESS THE URGENCY TO

THE PRESIDENT OF MOVING FORWARD WITH THE PLANNING FOR DEMOBILIZATION AND INVOLVING THE RPF AT AN EARLY STAGE. THIS WILL BE A MORE COMPLICATED PROCESS THAN IT WAS IN UGANDA WHERE THE MAJOR CONTRIBUTION WAS TO GIVE PEOPLE MONEY.

13. ALTHOUGH HABYARIMANA HIMSELF HAS NOT BEEN VERY HAPPY WITH THE NEUTRAL MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP PROVIDED BY THE OAU, THE FACT IS THAT THEY HAVE DONE A REASONABLE JOB WITH MINIMAL RESOURCES IN SEPARATING THE WARRING FACTIONS DURING THE COURSE OF THE PAST YEAR. CONSISTENT WITH OUR EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE THE OAU TO MOVE FORWARD ON THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION AGENDA, THE VISIT OF HABYARIMANA CAN BE USED FOR A PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR THE ROLE THAT THE OAU HAS UNDERTAKEN IN RWANDA.

14. WE HAVE BEEN BY FAR THE LARGEST BILATERAL DONOR OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE NEARLY ONE MILLION PERSONS DISPLACED BY THE WAR. AID TO ABOUT 600,000, MOST OF WHOM HAVE RETURNED TO THEIR LAND, WILL BE
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NEEDED AT LEAST THROUGH DECEMBER. THE OTHER 360,000 WILL NEED HELP UNTIL THE SPRING HARVEST IN MAY. OUR CONTINUING ABILITY TO PROVIDE THIS AID IS THREATENED BY SLOPPY GOVERNMENT SUPERVISION AND THEFT OF SUBSTANTIAL QUANTITIES. STATE AND AID INTERLOCUTORS SHOULD REMIND THE PRESIDENT OF HIS RESPONSIBILITY FOR FAIR AND HONEST DISTRIBUTION OF DONATED RESOURCES.

15. FINALLY, DEPARTMENT INTERLOCUTORS SHOULD EXPRESS INTEREST IN THE PROPOSED AMERICAN INVESTMENT TO PRIVATIZE THE EXCELLENT RWANDAN TELEPHONE SYSTEM. I AM SURE THAT PRESIDENT MITTERAND WILL PRESS HABYARIMANA TO ACCEPT THE FRENCH OFFER; WE SHOULD GET

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ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 AID-01 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00 DOEE-00
EUR-01 HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-16 L-03
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T-00 USIE-00 RPE-01 CORE-00 /042W
-----F4801A 011020Z /38

P 011010Z OCT 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
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INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 KIGALI 03586

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, EAID, RW, US
SUBJECT: WASHINGTON VISIT OF PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA

THERE FIRST. NOTE: RWANDATEL ISSUED A TENDER DUE
AUGUST 30. MAJOR BIDDERS ARE ATLANTIC TELE-NETWORK
(ATN), A U.S. FIRM BASED IN THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, AND
FRENCH CABLE AND RADIO (FCR), SUBSIDIARY OF THE
FRENCH NATIONAL SYSTEM. WE ARGUE THAT SINCE RWANDA
WANTS TO PRIVATIZE, IT SHOULD NOT SELL OUT TO A STATE
COMPANY, WHETHER IT BE FRENCH OR ANY OTHER. MOST OF
OUR CONTACTS TELL US THEY DEEPLY WANT AMERICAN
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INVESTMENT FOR ITS SPIRIT OF ENTERPRISE, AND THE
TELEPHONE SYSTEM IS AN EXCELLENT PLACE TO BEGIN (THE
ONLY OTHER U.S. MONEY HERE IS IN JOE WERTHEIM'S TEA
FACTORY, SORWATHE). FLATEN

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(14719 - 14706)

Excerpt: pg. 1 & pg. 7

CASE NO. ICIR-98-04 UN RESTRICTED
 EXHIBIT NO. DN 2209
 DATE ADMITTED. 27/11/2006 UNAMIR
 TENDERED BY DEFENCE File No. 4003.1
 NAME OF WITNESS. FRANK (LACQS) (PW II) 19 November 1993

To: See Distribution List
 From: Force Commander
 Subject: OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE NO. 02: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (INTERIM)

GENERAL:

1. The conduct of military operations in controlled and regulated by the provision of international and national law, conventions and precedence. Within this legal framework, it is for the United Nations (UN) to set the parameter within which UN Forces will operate. Rules of Engagement (ROE) are the means by which the UN can provide political and legal direction and guidance to commanders at all levels governing the use of force. The ROE are drafted by the Force, but are approved by the UN and may only be changed with UN authority.

2. Security Council Resolution, dated October stated:

"UNAMIR is equipped with defensive weapons. The use of weapons is normally authorized for self-defence only. The use of force for deterrence or retaliation is forbidden. Self-defence includes resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the Force from discharging its duties under the mandate of UNAMIR. In applying these rules, the over-riding rule will be the use of minimum force (see Definitions) which will be strictly adhered to by all members of UNAMIR."

3. UNAMIR is a peace-keeping force, without commitment to either party in the Rwandese civil war. Under the terms of the Arusha Peace Agreement and the UN Mandate, UNAMIR has a commitment to all parties in assisting them to achieve peace. Impartiality is the key in this regard and all UNAMIR's actions must be aimed at ensuring the furtherance of this objective. However, circumstances could arise where the use of force by UNAMIR personnel would be justified. When this occurs, the nature of peace-keeping will demand that such actions by UNAMIR will be applied with restraint: use of minimum force.

4. The ROE stated in this directive apply to all personnel from all nations providing personnel to UNAMIR. The ROE are written in the form of prohibitions or permissions. Issued as prohibitions, they are orders not to take specific actions. Issued as

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Excerpt: pg. 1 & pg. 7

UN RESTRICTED

or arrest UN civilians or military personnel using force.

CRIMINAL ACTS

14. The recent history of Rwanda is burdened with civil war, dislocation of large elements of the population, terrorism, ethnic and political violence, armed banditry and virtual economic collapse. The potential for a dramatic rise in armed banditry during the UNAMIR mandate, due to the rapid demobilization of approximately 35,000 military personnel, high unemployment, over-population and mass desertion from the army, is very high.

15. For the most part, the maintenance of law and order, and therefore responding to control criminal activity, is the responsibility of the local police, monitored by the UNAMIR UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) monitors. However, during the period of demobilization, the ability of the local police may be severely taxed. As a very real possibility, UNAMIR military personnel may be required to assist UNCIVPOL and local authorities, in maintaining law and order. In these circumstances, these rules of engagement would be used in support of local authorities and UNCIVPOL. In these circumstances, military personnel or units would be placed in support of UNCIVPOL, who would act to support local police in the maintenance of law and order.

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

17. There may also be ethnically or politically motivated criminal acts committed during this mandate which will morally and legally require UNAMIR to use all available means to halt them. Examples are executions, attacks of displaced persons or refugees, ethnic riots, attacks on demobilized soldiers, etc. During such occasions, UNAMIR military personnel will follow the ROD outlined in this directive, in support of UNCIVPOL and local authorities or in their absence, UNAMIR will take the necessary action to prevent any crime against humanity.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT17. RULE NUMBER ONE: AUTHORITY TO CARRY ARMS.

- a. STATE A: NO AUTHORITY.
- b. STATE B: AUTHORITY GRANTED TO CARRY WEAPONS.

18. RULE NUMBER TWO: STATUS OF WEAPONS.

- a. STATE A: WEAPONS WILL BE CARRIED WITH LOADED MAGAZINES.

23252

BP TGT

CNR 12

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

DATE: 11 JANUARY 1994

HIR 57

TO: BARIL\DPKO\UNATIONS NEW YORK	FROM: DALLAYE UNAMIR\KIGALI
FAX NO: MOST IMMEDIATE-CODE CABLE-212-963-9852 INMARSAT:	FAX NO: 011-250-84273
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR PROTECTION FOR INFORMANT	
ATTN: NGEN BARIL	ROOM NO. 2052
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 2	

1. FORCE COMMANDER PUT IN CONTACT WITH INFORMANT BY VERY VERY IMPORTANT GOVERNMENT POLITICIAN. INFORMANT IS A TOP LEVEL TRAINER IN THE CADRE OF INTERHAMWE-ARMED MILITIA OF MRND.
2. HE INFORMED US HE WAS IN CHARGE OF LAST SATURDAYS DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH AIMS WERE TO TARGET DEPUTIES OF OPPOSITION PARTIES COMING TO CEREMONIES AND BELGIAN SOLDIERS. THEY HOPED TO PROVOKE THE RPF BN TO ENGAGE (BEING FIRED UPON) THE DEMONSTRATORS AND PROVOKE A CIVIL WAR. DEPUTIES WERE TO BE ASSASSINATED UPON ENTRY OR EXIT FROM PARLIAMENT. BELGIAN TROOPS WERE TO BE PROVOKED AND IF BELGIANS SOLDIERS RESORTED TO FORCE A NUMBER OF THEM WERE TO BE KILLED AND THUS GUARANTEE BELGIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM RWANDA.
3. INFORMANT CONFIRMED 48 RGF PARA CDO AND A FEW MEMBERS OF THE GENDARMERIE PARTICIPATED IN DEMONSTRATIONS IN PLAIN CLOTHES. ALSO AT LEAST ONE MINISTER OF THE MRND AND THE SOUS-PREFECT OF KIGALI WERE IN THE DEMONSTRATION. RGF AND INTERHAMWE PROVIDED RADIO COMMUNICATIONS.
4. INFORMANT IS A FORMER SECURITY MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENT. HE ALSO STATED HE IS PAID RF150,000 PER MONTH BY THE MRND PARTY TO TRAIN INTERHAMWE. DIRECT LINK IS TO CHIEF OF STAFF RGF AND PRESIDENT OF THE MRND FOR FINANCIAL AND MATERIAL SUPPORT.
5. INTERHAMWE HAS TRAINED 1700 MEN IN RGF MILITARY CAMPS OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL. THE 1700 ARE SCATTERED IN GROUPS OF 40 THROUGHOUT KIGALI. SINCE UNAMIR DEPLOYED HE HAS TRAINED 300 PERSONNEL IN THREE WEEK TRAINING SESSIONS AT RGF CAMPS. TRAINING

2/2

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FOCUS WAS DISCIPLINE, WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES, CLOSE COMBAT AND TACTICS.

6. PRINCIPAL AIM OF INTERHAMWE IN THE PAST WAS TO PROTECT KIGALI FROM RPF. SINCE UNAMIR MANDATE HE HAS BEEN ORDERED TO REGISTER ALL TUTSI IN KIGALI. HE SUSPECTS IT IS FOR THEIR EXTERMINATION. EXAMPLE HE GAVE WAS THAT IN 20 MINUTES HIS PERSONNEL COULD KILL UP TO 1000 TUTSIS.

7. INFORMANT STATES HE DISAGREES WITH ANTI-TUTSI EXTERMINATION. HE SUPPORTS OPPOSITION TO RPF BUT CANNOT SUPPORT KILLING OF INNOCENT PERSONS. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE BELIEVES THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT HAVE FULL CONTROL OVER ALL ELEMENTS OF HIS OLD PARTY\FACTION.

8. INFORMANT IS PREPARED TO PROVIDE LOCATION OF MAJOR WEAPONS CACHE WITH AT LEAST 135 WEAPONS. HE ALREADY HAS DISTRIBUTED 110 WEAPONS INCLUDING 35 WITH AMMUNITION AND CAN GIVE US DETAILS OF THEIR LOCATION. TYPE OF WEAPONS ARE G3 AND AK47 PROVIDED BY RGF. HE WAS READY TO GO TO THE ARMS CACHE TONIGHT-IF WE GAVE HIM THE FOLLOWING GUARANTEE. HE REQUESTS THAT HE AND HIS FAMILY (HIS WIFE AND FOUR CHILDREN) BE PLACED UNDER OUR PROTECTION.

9. IT IS OUR INTENTION TO TAKE ACTION WITHIN THE NEXT 36 HOURS WITH A POSSIBLE H HR OF WEDNESDAY AT DAWN (LOCAL). INFORMANT STATES THAT HOSTILITIES MAY COMMENCE AGAIN IF POLITICAL DEADLOCK ENDS. VIOLENCE COULD TAKE PLACE DAY OF THE CEREMONIES OR THE DAY AFTER. THEREFORE WEDNESDAY WILL GIVE GREATEST CHANCE OF SUCCESS AND ALSO BE MOST TIMELY TO PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT INPUT TO ON-GOING POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS.

10. IT IS RECOMMENDED THE INFORMANT BE GRANTED PROTECTION AND EVACUATED OUT OF RWANDA. THIS HQ DOES NOT HAVE PREVIOUS UN EXPERIENCE IN SUCH MATTERS AND URGENTLY REQUESTS GUIDANCE. NO CONTACT HAS AS YET BEEN MADE TO ANY EMBASSY IN ORDER TO INQUIRE IF THEY ARE PREPARED TO PROTECT HIM FOR A PERIOD OF TIME BY GRANTING DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY IN THEIR EMBASSY IN KIGALI BEFORE MOVING HIM AND HIS FAMILY OUT OF THE COUNTRY.

11. FORCE COMMANDER WILL BE MEETING WITH THE VERY VERY IMPORTANT POLITICAL PERSON TOMORROW MORNING IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THIS INDIVIDUAL IS CONSCIOUS OF ALL PARAMETERS OF HIS INVOLVEMENT. FORCE COMMANDER DOES HAVE CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ON THE SUDDENNESS OF THE CHANGE OF HEART OF THE INFORMANT TO COME CLEAN WITH THIS INFORMATION. RECCE OF ARMED CACHE AND DETAILED PLANNING OF RAID TO GO ON LATE TOMORROW. POSSIBILITY OF A TRAP NOT FULLY EXCLUDED, AS THIS MAY BE A SET-UP AGAINST THE VERY VERY IMPORTANT POLITICAL PERSON. FORCE COMMANDER TO INFORM SRSG FIRST THING IN MORNING TO ENSURE HIS SUPPORT.

13. PEUX CE QUE VEUX: ALLONS-Y.

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ONLY

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

L0001702 MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI ONLY
NO DISTRIBUTION

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 11 January 1994

NUMBER: UNAMIR: 100

SUBJECT: Contacts with Informant

1. We have carefully reviewed the situation in the light of your MIR-79. We cannot agree to the operation contemplated in paragraph 7 of your cable, as it clearly goes beyond the mandate entrusted to UNAMIR under resolution 872 (1993).

2. However, on the assumption that you are convinced that the information provided by the informant is absolutely reliable, we request you to undertake the initiatives described in the following paragraphs.

3. SRSG and FC should request urgent meeting with the President. At that meeting you should inform the President that you have received apparently reliable information concerning the activities of the Interhamwe militia which represent a clear threat to the peace process. You should inform him that these activities include the training and deployment of subversive groups in Kigali as well as the storage and distribution of weapons to these groups.

4. You should inform him that these activities constitute a clear violation of the provisions of the Arusha peace agreement and of the Kigali weapons-secure area. You should assume that he is not aware of these activities, but insist that he must immediately look into the situation, take the necessary action to

ensure that these subversive activities are immediately discontinued and inform you within 48 hours of the measures taken in this regard, including the recovery of the arms which have been distributed.

L0001703

5. You should advise the President that, if any violence occurs in Kigali, you would have to immediately bring to the attention of the Security Council the information you have received on the activities of the militia, undertake investigations to determine who is responsible and make appropriate recommendations to the Security Council.

6. Before meeting with the President you should inform the Ambassadors of Belgium, France and the United States of your intentions and suggest to them that they may wish to consider making a similar démarche.

7. For security considerations, we leave it to your discretion to decide whether to inform the PM(D) of your plans before or after the meeting with the President. When you meet with the PM(D), you should explain to him the limits of your mandate. You should also assure him that, while the mandate of UNAMIR does not allow you to extend protection to the informant, his identity and your contacts with him will not be repeat not be revealed.

8. If you have major problems with the guidance provided above, you may consult us further. We wish to stress, however, that the overriding consideration is the need to avoid entering into a course of action that might lead to the use of force and unanticipated repercussions. Regards.

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Date Printed:
15-Jun-2004 DOC_NBR: 1994STATE026678

CHANNEL: n/a
HANDLING: ONLY

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CHANNEL = n/a

DATE = 1994/02/02 00:00:00

DOC_NBR = 1994STATE026678

FROM = STATE

LOCATOR = TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM

OFFICE = ORIGIN AF

REFERENCE = n/a

SUBJECT = OFFICIAL - INFORMAL

TAGS = AMGT, RW

TO = KIGALI

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 026678 020002Z
ORIGIN AF-01

INFO LOG-00 OASY-00 ADS-00 ONY-00 SSO-00 /001R

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DRAFTED BY: AF/C: KCAISTON
APPROVED BY: AF/C: AXRENDER
AF/C: RJFENDRICK

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R 020001Z FEB 94
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY KIGALI

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 026678

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM AF/C - K. AISTON

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: AMGT RW
SUBJECT: OFFICIAL - INFORMAL

1. (LOU) DEMOBILIZATION: AFTER WE RECEIVED YOUR AIDAC
CABLE ON UNDP/WORLD BANK TURF BATTLES OVER DEMOBILIZATION
(KIGALI 0159), I SPOKE TO LINDA LLOYD, AF/EPS MARLENE

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

Page: 30

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES L DARIS
DATE/CASE ID: 21 SEP 2004 200402105

UNCLASSIFIED

Date Printed:

CHANNEL: n/a

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15-Jun-2004

DOC_NBR: 1994STATE026678

HANDLING: ONLY

URBINA, AND IO TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT UNDP AND THE BANK SHOULD COORDINATE THEIR EFFORTS AND NOT WORK AT CROSS PURPOSES AND THAT POST HAS A VALID CONCERN ABOUT THE POSSIBLE DELAY IN THE UNDP ROUNDTABLE. AS YOU KNOW, LINDA ATTENDED THE UNDP MEETING IN NEW YORK ON JAN. 24. SHE SAID SHE MADE IT CLEAR THAT,

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PAGE 02 STATE 026678 020002Z
GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF A SUCCESSFUL DEMOBILIZATION, WE DID NOT WANT TO SEE A DELAY IN UNDP ROUNDTABLE. JEROME CHEVALLIER FROM THE BANK WAS THERE, SO HE KNOWS OUR POSITION NOW. AT THE SAME TIME, AF/EPS PASSED YOUR CONCERNS TO DEAN KLINE AT THE USED OFFICE. HE SAID HE WOULD CONSULT WITH TREASURY AND REPORT BACK TO MARLENE BEFORE PASSING OUR CONCERNS TO BANK OFFICIALS. LINDA HAS DRAFTED A FRONT CHANNEL ON THE NEW YORK MEETING, WHICH IS IN THE CLEARANCE PROCESS, AND EPS PLANS A REPORT AFTER THEY HEAR BACK FROM DEAN.

2. (LOU) DEMOBILIZATION (SUITE): WE HEAR THROUGH THE GRAPEVINE THAT YOU ARE THINKING OF ATTENDING THE DEMOBILIZATION ROUNDTABLE IN GENEVA. PLEASE LET US KNOW IF THIS IS SO. (OR MAYBE YOU ALREADY MENTIONED THIS TO ME AND I FORGOT?) AT THIS TIME, WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF SENDING ANYONE FROM AF, SINCE AID IS ALREADY GOING AND THEY'RE THE ONES WHO WILL BE PUTTING UP WHATEVER MONEY WE HAVE TO CONTRIBUTE. (AS FOR A POSSIBLE ESF CONTRIBUTION, WE ARE STILL HOLDING OUR MEMO TO THE SIXTH FLOOR PENDING RECEIPT OF THE INFO ON WHAT OTHER DONORS MIGHT BE DOING.)

3. (C) HOUPHOUET MARGINALIA: WE UNDERSTAND THAT HABYARIMANA WILL PROBABLY ATTEND THE HOUPHOUET FUNERAL IN COTE D'IVOIRE. YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT A/S MOOSE MEET WITH HIM ON THE MARGINS OF THE FUNERAL. WE WOULD USE THE BRIEF MEETING TO REINFORCE OUR MESSAGE THAT THE RWANDANS BETTER GET THEIR ACT TOGETHER AND FORM THE NEW GOVERNMENT ASAP. WE'LL KEEP YOU ADVISED.

4. (U) ENDLESS YEAR-END REPORTS: I JUST WANT TO TAKE
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PAGE 03 STATE 026678 020002Z
TIME OUT TO COMMEND YOU FOR YOUR TIMELY SUBMISSION OF A WHOLE SLEW OF SOMETIMES ONEROUS YEAR-END REPORTS,

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

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Date Printed:

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CHANNEL: n/a

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HANDLING: ONLY

BEGINNING WITH THE HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, THROUGH THE MPP, THE FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS, AND THE DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS PLAN. (I'VE PROBABLY FORGOTTEN ONE OR TWO.) CHURNING THESE THINGS OUT IS HARD ENOUGH WHEN YOU'RE AN SEP POST, BUT IT'S DOUBLY DIFFICULT WHEN YOU'RE SWAMPED WITH POLITICAL WORK, AS YOU ALL HAVE BEEN RECENTLY, AND WHEN ALL THE REPORTS SEEM TO BE DUE AROUND THE SAME TIME. PLEASE PASS MY THANKS TO YOUR STAFF, WITH SPECIAL KUDOS FOR JOYCE FOR HER HUMAN RIGHTS/DEMOCRACY WORK AND LAURA FOR THE ECON TRENDS REPORT. JUST A REMINDER, THOUGH, THAT WE NEED YOUR RESPONSE TO OUR FEEDBACK CABLE ON THE MPP AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AS WELL AS THIS YEAR'S POST REPORTING PLAN

B1

CAME BY TO TALK RWANDA/BURUNDI WITH ME LAST WEEK. HE SAID HE THINKS HABYARIMANA IS TO BLAME FOR THE CURRENT IMPASSE AND IS BEHIND THE PARTY SPLITS. I TOLD HIM THAT WE THINK ALL SIDES SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE IMPASSE. THE GOOD THING ABOUT OUR POSITION IS THAT IT'S NOT ONLY RIGHT, IT ALSO ALLOWS US TO MAINTAIN OUR UNIQUE POSITION AS AN UNBIASED HONEST BROKER WHOSE ADVICE AND ADMONITIONS ARE RESPECTED BY ALL SIDES. AS YOU KNOW, THIS MADE US VERY EFFECTIVE IN ARUSHA AND SHOULD ONCE AGAIN WORK TO OUR ADVANTAGE AS WE PUSH THE VARIOUS PARTIES TO FORM THE NEW GOVERNMENT.

6. (LOU) WERTHEIM CALLS: JOE WERTHEIM CALLED RECENTLY
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 026678 020002Z
TO REPORT THAT HIS WORKERS AT THE TEA FACTORY ARE VERY NERVOUS AND READY TO HIT THE ROAD IN THE EVENT FIGHTING RESUMES. THE TUNISIAN UN (FORMER NMOG) MONITORS APPARENTLY TOLD JOE'S LOCAL MANAGERS THAT BOTH SIDES ARE AT HIGH ALERT. JOE ALSO REPORTS THAT THE LOCALS SAY THEY'RE HEARING MORE GRENADE EXPLOSIONS NOW THAN EVER BEFORE (EXCEPT DURING ACTUAL FIGHTING, I PRESUME). ALL IN ALL, JOE (UNDERSTANDABLY) SOUNDED PRETTY CONCERNED.

7. (U) ARD BRIEFING: JUST THOUGHT YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT I BRIEFED THREE AID CONTRACTORS FROM THE ASSOCIATES IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT (ARD) LAST WEEK, PRIOR TO THEIR DEPARTURE FOR RWANDA TO BEGIN WORK ON THE USAID DIG PROJECT. THE TEAM WAS HEADED BY HARLIN HOBGOOD, WHO IS APPARENTLY AN OLD USAID HAND, AND INCLUDED PASCAL

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

Page: 32

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

2 - 82

Date Printed:

CHANNEL: n/a

8

15-Jun-2004 DOC_NBR: 1994STATE026678

HANDLING: ONLY

BLACQUE-BELAIR AND A THIRD PERSON WHOSE NAME I DIDN'T
GET. ANYWAY, THEY SEEMED WELL-BRIEFED ALREADY AND
GENERALLY VERY KNOWLEDGEABLE.
CHRISTOPHER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNN

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

Page: 33

UNCLASSIFIED

2-75 03:24 5602

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CNR 030 P1/4


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G

RECEIVED
 DIVISION OF SRSS
 15/2/94
 BY RF

RECEIVED IN P.O. 17


TO: BOOH, BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI
 FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
 DATE: 14 FEBRUARY 1994
 NUMBER: 462



SUBJECT: Letter from Foreign Minister of Belgium

1. We have received the attached copy of a letter addressed to the Secretary-General by the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Belgium, Mr. Willy Claes.

2. We would be grateful for your comments on this letter and, in particular, on the suggestion in paragraph 5 that UNAMIR should play a more assertive role in the area of public security. It would also be appreciated if you could send us a draft reply. Regards.

The phrase
 term "discretion"
 means detour: 

FC
 For action of
 the panel
 15/2/94

①
 Dr. Kalia
 In regards to the "public security"
 side → have addressed a proposal.

34-02-1. 03:24 5602

UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

003 P02

FROM: BELGIAN MISSION U N

TO:

2129639222

FEB 14, 1994 10:32AM #319 P.01

CNR 030 P2/4

HA
IRPERMANENT MISSION OF BELGIUMTO THE UNITED NATIONS

809 United Nations Plaza,

New York, N.Y. 10017.

Fax. : (212) 599 - 6843

Tel. : (212) 599 - 5250

DATE: 14 février 1994 No. : 87

FROM: Paul Noterdaeme,
Ambassadeur, Représentant permanent
de la Belgique auprès des Nations Unies,TO: Monsieur Kofi Annan,
Secrétaire général adjoint,
Département des opérations
de maintien de la paix,
PAX No (212) 963-9222

SUBJECT: Rwanda - MINUAR

Monsieur le Secrétaire général adjoint,

J'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre, ci-joint, une lettre reçue ce jour par fax que M. Willy Claes, Vice-Premier Ministre et Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Belgique, adresse à S.E. le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies concernant la situation au Rwanda. L'original de cette lettre sera transmis à sa haute destination dès sa réception.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire général adjoint, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

Paul Noterdaeme

Pages : 2+1

FROM: BELGIAN MISSION U N

TO:

2129639222

FEB 14, 1994 10:33AM #319 P.02

CNR 030 P3/4

P.02

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général,

L'évolution actuelle de la situation au Rwanda n'est pas encourageante et m'amène à vous faire part des préoccupations du gouvernement belge à ce sujet.

Comme vous le savez l'impasse qui s'est créée dans la formation d'un gouvernement de transition à base élargie entraîne une dégradation du climat politique et ce malgré les efforts de votre Représentant Spécial.

L'armée rwandaise semble de plus en plus irritée par les atterroissements des partis, tandis que les informations relatives à la constitution de réserves d'armes par les différentes milices se font chaque jour plus insistantes. De l'aveu même de certains dirigeants, la prolongation du blocage politique actuel pourrait déboucher sur une explosion irréversible de violence.

Je me félicite dès lors des instructions que vous avez données à Monsieur BOON BOON, afin qu'il use au maximum de ses prérogatives en vue de convaincre les partis rwandais de l'urgente nécessité d'aboutir à un accord sur la composition du gouvernement de transition à base élargie.

Il me paraît cependant que cette accentuation du profil de l'ONU au niveau politique devrait aller de pair avec une attitude plus dissuasive de la MINUAR sur le plan de la sécurité.

A Monsieur BOUTROS BOUTROS GHALI
Secrétaire général de l'Organisation
des Nations Unies

NY-1081

194-02-15 03:26 5602

UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

003 P04

FROM BELGIAN MISSION U N

TO:

2129639222

FEB 14. 1994 18:33PM #319 P.03

CNR 030 P4/4=

Je suis conscient de la complexité de la situation comme des contraintes qui vous sont imposées dans le cadre de la résolution 872 du Conseil de Sécurité.

Il est à craindre néanmoins qu'à défaut d'enrayer l'évolution négative à laquelle nous assistons, la NTINDAR pourrait se trouver dans l'impossibilité de poursuivre valablement sa mission fondamentale, à savoir jouer un rôle majeur d'appui à la mise en œuvre de l'Accord de paix d'Arusha.

Je puis vous assurer que le gouvernement belge continue de son côté à exhorter le Président KANYARIMANA et les autres responsables politiques rwandais à accepter les compromis qui s'imposent.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire général, les assurances de ma haute considération.

Willy CLAES

Telex Nr 64, from MINAFET to DELBELONU

(sent by chef de cabinet of foreign ministry, M. Willems, while Claes is still in Kigali) February 25, 1994

Source: <http://www.senate.be/www/webdriver?MIval=/publications/viewPub.html&COLL=S&LEG=1&NR=611&VOLGNR=7&LANG=fr>

« La forte dégradation de la situation sur le plan de la sécurité au Rwanda appelle les réflexions suivantes :

- 1. Les assassinats politiques, les troubles qui s'ensuivent, la détérioration du climat de sécurité, pourraient bien mener à un nouveau bain de sang.*
- 2. Il faudrait accroître la pression diplomatique et politique en vue de parvenir à faire respecter strictement les accords d'Arusha dans un climat serein.*
- 3. Le représentant spécial du secrétaire général au Rwanda, M. Booh Booh, semble avoir perdu de sa crédibilité sur place.*
- 4. Dans le cadre de son mandat actuel, la MINUAR ne peut maintenir fermement l'ordre public. Un sérieux problème de crédibilité se pose.*

Des démarches ont déjà été effectuées à un haut niveau à New York, mais elles sont restées sans résultat. La dernière déclaration du président du Conseil de sécurité concernant le Rwanda (le 17 février 1994) « la MINUAR ne sera assurée d'un appui suivi que si les parties appliquent intégralement et rapidement l'accord de paix d'Arusha » laisse présager une possible inactivité ou un arrêt de l'opération.

5. Quand, à la suite des assassinats et des troubles, la MINUAR a décidé au début de cette semaine de placer l'opération sous alerte rouge, cela a eu pour conséquence que tous les Casques bleus ont reçu l'ordre de se retirer dans leurs campements et d'attendre passivement. Si la situation devait effectivement dégénérer et que les ordres précités de la MINUAR restaient en vigueur, il serait inacceptable pour l'opinion publique que des Casques bleus belges puissent devenir au Rwanda les témoins passifs d'un génocide et que les Nations Unies n'entreprennent rien.

6. Si les conditions se détériorent, les Nations Unies et la Belgique ne peuvent pas, en réalité, se permettre de se retirer du Rwanda. La MINUAR devrait pouvoir jouer un rôle plus énergique et adopter sur place un profil plus marqué

afin de renforcer la crédibilité de la communauté internationale.

7. La question qui se pose est de savoir si cela est possible sans un nouveau mandat du Conseil de sécurité. Si l'on doit tenter de renforcer la MINUAR par un nouveau mandat (une nouvelle résolution du Conseil de sécurité), on peut s'attendre à des difficultés, vu la politique actuelle des États-Unis en la matière. En ce moment, une extension de l'opération (Casques bleus, financement) semble exclue à leurs yeux. Au demeurant, dans les deux résolutions elles-mêmes (872, 893), on met nettement l'accent sur le caractère limité ou récessif de l'opération (sans mettre en péril la capacité de la MINUAR de remplir sa mission).

8. Il devient très important d'examiner comment on pourrait renforcer l'action dans le cadre du mandat actuel (intégration de Casques bleus autrichiens ? Une plus grande marge de décision pour Dallaire ? Déplacement provisoire de Casques bleus venant d'autres opérations dans la région ? ...), et comment augmenter efficacement la pression diplomatique et politique.

9. J'aimerais recevoir vos remarques à propos de tout ceci. J'insiste sur le fait que cela doit servir de base à une décision concernant de nouvelles démarches éventuelles, mais qu'aucune position n'a encore été arrêtée à ce sujet » (523b).

Reply from Ambassador Noterdaeme, Telex 326. February 28, 1994

La réponse sur la question du renforcement de l'action des Nations unies est négative. L'ambassadeur Noterdaeme déclare dans son télex n° 326 du 28 février 1994 qu'il a « sérieusement réfléchi à la manière dont on pourrait infléchir l'action des Nations unies au Rwanda ». Il ajoute : « J'en ai parlé en détail avec les principaux membres du Conseil de sécurité et avec le secrétariat des Nations unies. Il y a en théorie 4 éléments sur lesquels on pourrait jouer :

1) L'élargissement du mandat ou le renforcement des effectifs de la MINUAR : « très improbable »

Non seulement les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni s'y opposent, mais ils auraient même tendance c'est ce que confirment leurs délégations à retirer tout simplement la MINUAR « en cas de difficultés » (telle pourrait même être l'attitude de l'ensemble du Conseil de sécurité). Il y a là-dedans « une logique financière » (les États-Unis n'ont jamais voulu plus de 500 hommes pour la MINUAR).

Il y a également une logique politique : les opérations au Rwanda, au Libéria et au Mozambique relèvent du Chapitre VI; en d'autres termes, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies ne peut pas imposer de solution (en Yougoslavie et en Somalie, cela s'est avéré impossible, même dans le cadre du Chapitre VII).

2) Les règles d'engagement

Le secrétariat des Nations unies « n'est pas enclin à adapter les règles d'engagement » :

militairement, c'est trop dangereux; les Nations unies n'ont jamais autant de moyens que les parties;

politiquement : si les Nations unies recourent à la force, elles prennent parti (ne sont plus neutres) » ([524b](#)).

Telex #64, from MINAFET to DELBELONU

(sent by Foreign Ministry Chief of Staff, M. Willems, while Claes is still in Kigali) February 25, 1994

Source:

<http://www.senate.be/www/webdriver?MIval=/publications/viewPub.html&COLL=S&LEG=1&NR=611&VOLGNR=7&LANG=fr>

“The situation’s significant deterioration, in terms of security in Rwanda, calls for the following reflections:

1. The political assassinations, the ensuing unrest, and the worsening of the climate of safety, could well lead to a new bloodbath.

2. It will be necessary to increase diplomatic and political pressure in order to achieve strict enforcement of the Arusha Accords in a calm environment.

3. The Special Representative of the General Secretary in Rwanda, Mr. Booh Booh, seems to have lost his local credibility.

4. Under its current mandate, UNAMIR cannot firmly maintain public order. There is a serious credibility problem.

Steps have already been taken at a high level in New York, but they have remained without result. The Security Council president’s last declaration concerning Rwanda (February 7th, 1994), “UNAMIR will be assured of consistent support only if the parties implement the Arusha Peace Agreement fully and rapidly,” suggests possible inactivity or stoppages of the operation.

5. Amidst assassinations and unrest, UNAMIR decided at the beginning of this week to put the operation on red alert, and consequently all the Blue Berets received the order to withdraw to their encampments and wait passively. If the situation had indeed degenerated and the aforementioned orders had stayed in effect, it would have been unacceptable, in the public opinion, for Belgian Blue Berets to be passive witnesses to genocide in Rwanda and for the United Nations to do nothing.

6. If conditions deteriorate, the United Nations and Belgium cannot really afford to withdraw from Rwanda. UNAMIR should be able to play a more active role and adopt a more marked profile in order to reinforce the international community’s credibility.

7. The question is to know whether this is possible without a new mandate from the Security Council. If attempting to strengthen UNAMIR requires a new mandate (a new Security Council

resolution), we can expect difficulties, given the current policy in the United States on the matter. At this time, an extension of the operation (Blue Berets, financing) seems impossible in their view. Moreover, in the two resolutions themselves (872, 893), emphasis is clearly placed on the limited or recessive character of the operation (without putting UNAMIR's capability of fulfilling its mission at stake).

8. It has become very important to examine how we could strengthen the action within the framework of the current mandate (integration of Austrian Blue Berets? A larger margin of decision for Dallaire? Provisional deplacement of Blue Berets from other operations in the region? ...), and how to effectively augment diplomatic and political pressure.

9. I would appreciate your remarks about all this. I insist that this must serve as a base for any decision concerning eventual future steps, but as of yet no stance has been reached on this subject.” (532b).

Reply from Ambassador Noterdaema, Telex 326. February 28, 1994

The response is negative on the question of strengthening the United Nations action. Ambassador Noterdaeme, in his telex #326 on February 28th, 1994, declares that he has “*thought seriously about the way we could influence the United Nations' action in Rwanda.*” He adds, “*I talked about it in detail with the principal members of the Security Council and with the Secretary of the United Nations. In theory, there are four elements on which we could draw:*

1) The expansion of UNAMIR's mandate or the strengthening of its numbers: 'very improbable'

Not only are the United States and the United Kingdom against it, they may even, according to their delegations, withdraw UNAMIR altogether 'in case of difficulties' (this could even be the attitude of the entire Security Council.) There is a 'financial logic' behind this (the United States never wanted more than 500 men for UNAMIR).

There is also a political logic: the operations in Rwanda, Liberia, and Mozambique are covered under Chapter VI; in other words, the United Nations Security Council cannot impose a solution (in Yugoslavia and Somalia, this proved to be impossible even under Chapter VII).

2) The rules of engagement

The United Nations Secretary “is not inclined to adjust the rules of engagement.”

Militarily, it is too dangerous; the United Nations never has as much power as the parties;

Politically: if the United Nations uses force, it takes a side (is no longer neutral)” (524b).

Document 34

Letter dated 14 March 1994 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium to the Secretary-General expressing concern that the worsening situation in Rwanda may impede UNAMIR's capacity to fulfil its mandate

Not issued as a United Nations document; translated from French

Current developments in the situation in Rwanda are not encouraging, and lead me to share with you the concerns of the Belgian Government in this regard.

As you are aware, the deadlock in the formation of a broad-based transitional government is leading, despite the efforts of your Special Representative, to a deterioration of the political climate.

The Rwandese army appears to be increasingly annoyed by the parties' procrastinations, while information on the stockpiling of weapons by the various militias is becoming ever more compelling. Even some of the leaders admit that a prolongation of the current political deadlock could result in an irreversible explosion of violence.

Accordingly, I welcome the instructions you have given to Mr. Booh-Booh to make the fullest use of his powers in order to convince the parties in Rwanda of the urgent need to reach agreement on the composition of the broad-based transitional government.

It seems to me, however, that this higher profile of the United Nations on the political level should be accom-

panied by a firmer stance on the part of UNAMIR with respect to security.

I am aware of the complexity of the situation, and of the constraints imposed on you under Security Council resolution 87/2.

Nevertheless, unless the negative developments we are witnessing are halted, UNAMIR might find itself unable to continue effectively its basic mission of playing a major supporting role in the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

I can assure you that the Belgian Government, for its part, is continuing to urge President Habyarimana and the other Rwandese political leaders to accept the necessary compromises.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Willy CLAES

Prosecutor v. Akayesu
Prosecutor's Exhibit #18

Alison des Forges
Entered: 18.2.97

94
P357

RWANDA

RELEASED IN FULL

REFUGEE FACT SHEET

I. NUMBERS: REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

- * **Burundi Refugees in Rwanda:** There are currently about 287,000 Burundi Refugees in Rwanda. More than 300,000 arrived following the October 1993 coup attempt and inter-ethnic conflict in Burundi; after repatriation in early 1994, some 260,000 remain. An additional 25,000 remain from an influx in 1972.
- * **Rwandan Refugees:** There are an estimated 550,000 Rwandan refugees in Central Africa, most of whom fled Rwanda during the 1959 - 1964 period. Countries of asylum are as follows:

Uganda:	200,000
Burundi:	245,000
Tanzania:	50,000
Zaire:	50,000
- * **Rwandan Displaced Persons:** Approximately 350,000 Rwandans, down from 900,000 in 1993, remain displaced in northern Rwanda due to the conflict between the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front. Many are currently returning home.

II. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

- * **Burundi Refugees:** UNHCR is coordinating assistance to the new Burundi refugees in cooperation with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The UN World Food Program (WFP) is supplying food aid. The International Federation of Red Cross/Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the Rwandan Red Cross are distributing food and non-food relief. Medecins sans Frontieres/Belgium and Holland (MSF), Medecins du Monde (MDM), and CARITAS are providing health care. CARE and OXFAM have set up water systems.
- * **Rwandan Refugees:** The bulk of Rwanda's 550,000 refugees are considered self-sufficient and are no longer assisted by the international community. UNHCR provides minimal assistance to 80,000 refugees in Uganda and 77,000 in Burundi.
- * **Rwandan Displaced:** Displaced persons in northern Rwanda are assisted primarily by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and IFRC in conjunction with the Rwandan Red Cross Society. Food aid is provided by WFP.

III. USG ASSISTANCE

- * State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs (RP) earmarked \$250,000 in FY91 for UNHCR Preparatory Activities for a Comprehensive Plan of Action for Rwandan Refugees. Additional contributions to UNHCR are anticipated once Rwandan refugee repatriation appears imminent.
- * RP has also responded in FY94 to appeals for funds to assist new Burundi refugees in Rwanda, Tanzania and Zaire. Contributions are as follows:

UNHCR:	\$4,250,000
IFRC:	\$ 750,000
WFP:	\$ 502,700

RP has also made unearmarked contributions to UNHCR and ICRC 1993 and 1994 programs in Africa which include Rwanda. RP contributed \$43 million for 1993 and \$41.7 million to date for 1994 to UNHCR's General Program for Africa. RP also contributed \$41.5 million to ICRC's 1993 Emergency Appeal for Africa and \$35 million to date for ICRC's 1994 appeal.

- * In December 1994, the U.S. Department of Defense's Office of Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs airlifted over 9,000 blankets to Rwanda for UNHCR to distribute to Burundi refugees.
- * USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has provided \$3.87 million in assistance to internally displaced Rwandans since FY91. In FY93, USAID's Office of Food for Peace (FFP) provided food contributions valued at over \$30 million for internally displaced Rwandans. In FY94 to date, FFP has authorized \$9 million in commodities for WFP in response to the Burundi crisis, a portion of which will go towards refugees in Rwanda.

IV. BACKGROUND

- * **Rwandan Refugees:** Between 1959 and 1964, approximately 150,000 Rwandans fled to Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire following the overthrow of the Tutsi monarchy in Rwanda. During the past thirty years, the refugee population has more than tripled due to high birth rates.
- * **RPF/GOR Conflict:** On October 1, 1990, Rwanda was invaded by the Rwandan Patriotic Front, a force of about 7,000 Rwandan exiles from Uganda. The RPF was not able to take the country (due largely to French and Belgian intervention) but became entrenched in northern Rwanda fighting a guerrilla war with the GOR. About 350,000 persons remain displaced (down from 900,000 in 1993) from the RPF-held zone. The war generated 9,000 new refugees who fled to Uganda.

- 3 -

- * **Arusha Peace Accords:** On August 4, 1993, the RPF and GOR signed peace accords in Arusha, Tanzania signifying the official end to the conflict. Under the Arusha Accords, refugee return is to be addressed sequentially following (1) the formation of a new government, (2) the completion of a humanitarian plan of action to address resettlement of displaced and refugees, and (3) the resettlement of displaced persons.
- * **Burundi Refugees:** Beginning in October 1993, Rwanda received a new influx of over 300,000 Burundi refugees following the attempted coup and subsequent inter-ethnic violence that broke out in Burundi. Due to repatriation which began in early 1994, the current number of new refugees in Rwanda has decreased to about 262,000.

V. CURRENT ISSUES

- * **Stalemate on Formation of a New Government:** Under the Arusha Accords, the return of displaced persons and refugees will be addressed only after the new government is formed. The current stalemate on formation of a new government in Rwanda has delayed large-scale repatriation and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons.
- * **Spontaneous Repatriation:** In early 1994, some 8-9,000 Rwandan refugees returned from Uganda and settled in northern Rwanda in the RPF-held demilitarized zone. UNHCR is providing assistance to this group. Should additional Rwandan refugees return, conflict may occur between returnees and displaced persons competing for land.
- * **Landmines:** The RPF-held zone is heavily mined (50,000 uncleared landmines). A UN peacekeeping force is currently developing a landmine-clearing strategy with the GOR and RPF. Until the mines are cleared, however, the area is considered unsafe for resettlement. Casualties may result should refugees and displaced return prior to demining.
- * **Conditions of Burundi Refugees in Rwanda:** UNHCR has reported initially high death rates among Burundi refugees in Rwanda as a result of disease and malnutrition attributed to extremely poor sanitation, over-crowding, and shortages of both potable water and food. Some 50% to 75% of the deaths are attributed to dysentery. Malnutrition is also a serious concern; nutritional surveys indicate that between 13% to 20% of children under five are malnourished.

Drafted: RP/AAA - MLange, 3/15/94

SEAFR 2274

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 086165 012359Z
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B1, 1.4(D)

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 EUR/WE:ACARSON
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CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 STATE 086165 012359Z
 C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 086165

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RW
 SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON RWANDA RESOLUTION

REF A) USUN 1187; B) STATE 83633

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS AN ACTION REQUEST.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER
 CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(D)
 DECLASSIFY AFTER: 12 APR 2016
 DATE/CASE ID: 06 MAY 2011 201005065


3. EMBASSY IS INSTRUCTED TO MAKE A DEMARCHE TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT EARLY TUESDAY MORNING TO ENLIST FRENCH SUPPORT FOR EXTENDING THE MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR) FOR A SHORTER LENGTH OF TIME

B1



THE VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION WILL BE HELD ON TUESDAY AFTERNOON IN NEW YORK. TALKING POINTS FOR THE DEMARCHE FOLLOW BELOW.

TALKING POINTS:



B1

--DESPITE THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S RECOMMENDATION FOR A 6 MONTH EXTENSION, WE FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT A 2 OR POSSIBLY 3 MONTH EXTENSION WOULD PROVIDE AN INCENTIVE TO THE PARTIES TO RESOLVE THE FINAL ISSUE, INSTALL THE TRANSITION INSTITUTIONS, AND GET ON WITH THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING THE ARUSHA PEACE ACCORDS AND REBUILDING THEIR COUNTRY.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 086165 012359Z
--WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS NOW ADVOCATING A 6 MONTH EXTENSION OF ALL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS WHICH COME UP FOR RENEWAL IN ORDER TO FACILITATE LOGISTICAL ARRANGEMENTS; WHILE WE AGREE IN PRINCIPLE, WE FEEL THAT IN THE CASE OF UNAMIR, A SHORTER TIME FRAME WOULD PUT MORE PRESSURE ON THE PARTIES TO REACH AGREEMENT.

--THE UNITED NATIONS HAS BEEN A FIRM SUPPORTER OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA, AND WE NOTE THAT THE PARTIES ARE CLOSE TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON THE COMPOSITION OF A TRANSITION GOVERNMENT; NEVERTHELESS, THERE HAVE BEEN LONG DELAYS AND WE MUST SEND A STRONG POLITICAL SIGNAL THAT FURTHER DELAYS ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE. TALBOTT

CONFIDENTIAL



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/RES/909 (1994)
5 April 1994

RESOLUTION 909 (1994)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 3358th meeting,
on 5 April 1994

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 establishing the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), as well as its resolution 893 (1994) of 6 January 1994,

Recalling its resolutions 812 (1993) of 12 March 1993, 846 (1993) of 22 June 1993 and 891 (1993) of 20 December 1993,

Recalling also its statement dated 17 February 1994 (S/PRST/1994/8),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 30 March 1994 (S/1994/360),

Welcoming the valuable contribution to peace being made in Rwanda by UNAMIR,

Expressing its deep concern at the delay in the establishment of the broad-based transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly,

Emphasizing that the Security Council, in resolution 893 (1994) of 6 January 1994, authorized the deployment of a second battalion to the demilitarized zone as recommended by the Secretary-General in his report of 30 December 1993 (S/26927), and that the international community has thus done its part in ensuring that conditions exist for implementing the Agreement,

Considering that the fact that the transitional institutions have not been established constitutes a major obstacle to the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement,

Concerned at the deterioration in security in the country, particularly in Kigali,

Concerned also at the deterioration of the humanitarian and health situation,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General on Rwanda dated 30 March 1994;
2. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until 29 July 1994, on the understanding that the Security Council will, within the next six weeks, review the situation in Rwanda, including the role played in that country by the United Nations, if the Secretary-General informs it in a report that the transitional institutions provided for under the Arusha Peace Agreement have not been established and that insufficient progress has been made for the implementation of phase II of the Secretary-General's plan contained in his report of 24 September 1993 (S/26488);
3. Regrets the delay in the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement, and urges the parties to resolve their latest differences without delay with a view to the immediate establishment of those transitional institutions still required for the continuation of the process, and particularly the implementation of phase II;
4. Welcomes the fact that, despite the difficulties encountered in implementing the Arusha Peace Agreement, the cease-fire has been respected, and commends in this respect the essential contribution made by UNAMIR;
5. Recalls nevertheless that continued support for UNAMIR, including the provision of an additional 45 civilian police monitors as described in paragraph 38 of the Secretary-General's report, will depend upon full and prompt implementation by the parties of the Arusha Peace Agreement;
6. Welcomes the continued efforts by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to help promote and facilitate dialogue between all parties concerned;
7. Commends the efforts of Member States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations which have provided humanitarian and other assistance, encourages them to continue and increase such assistance, and again urges others to provide such assistance;
8. Commends in particular the efforts of the Organization of African Unity and its agencies, as well as those of the Tanzanian facilitator, in providing diplomatic, political, humanitarian and other support for the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the Council;
9. Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the size and cost of UNAMIR to seek economies;
10. Decides to remain actively seized of the question.

- Rwanda

Dead

Missing

Alive

- Pm

social Aff

Pm designate

- Agr

- Constituent

- Communications

- Pol. party leader

on plane Min of State for Plan. Dev

Rw. Chief of Staff of mil. \rightarrow French crew members

- BEM's phone call:

Rejection of violence -

Unité - Presidential guard

\rightarrow Not gens d'armes \rightarrow Chief de lab

4 Americans in Bimba in

kidnapping project, communal violence, UNAMIR

- No. of Americans

Burundi - 177

Rwanda - 205

- Buj: Calm all night - Sabena

No gun fire

- Emb opened

Traffic lights

- Ntibantunganya

Nat'l Crisis Committee, incl. mil.

From B's perspective, emphasizing accident

4/6 - R/B

- Yeltsin's statement re Latvia
- Galucchi new position - Korea

Grossman:

- See concerned re status of Amcits
- Do memo & consider task force

- Talk to French & Belges

- Sit
Evaluation

- UN Mission

Is it possible to modify mandate
for protection of foreigners & evacuation

- Bombard w. statements for peace

- Presidential statement

- Mtg. at 2:00 for work. types

- DoA interview

- See if someone can get to her house

Tanel Fleischman 371-6582

- hire Alfred -

- France

UNAMIR - ask for modification of
mandate - 5-10 soldiers taken into
custody. Army controls airport

5 platoons caught betw. gen d'armes
& army. Thinking of sending Belges
to

UNAMIR has released RPF &

haura haur

RPF left installation

openly fighting

UNAMIR not answering phone calls ~ may have been hit

Shooting / cannon

Deteriorating in countryside
communal violence

Has been in contact w. all Americans

Firefight at airport

Belgian troop fought for
in touch

pm Belges are considering contingency plans

Eucorn

Tarell Seames

Belges /

2 executed.

2 Belgian executed

Considering reinforced

UN
US auspices

5 platoons surrounded at airport
Have

told them to protect themselves.

French no intention to send in troops.

Eric Schwartz

Monique

- What did Joyce leader say / do re Monique

- Rita Benish -

- Cem at hotel 1108 - 1120
2 hrs.

- log on

Buy - EAC meeting today
~ seriously consider authorized war
~ is it safe

Convo. w. David
1:14

- eval. = close coordination w.
Fr. & Belg

- wants small presence of 3 people
facilitate human-work
~ dialog





CRN 103

1/6

UNAMIR

194 APR - 8 12 42

(3)

3 pp [unclear] for

916 V 8 1111

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA

DATE: 7 APRIL 1994

NUMBER: 001-~~212~~ 212-963-6460

SUBJECT: SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT REPORT - REPORTED DEATH OF PRESIDENT OF RWANDA

REFERENCE: MIR - 722

- IT HAS BEEN REPORTED AND CONFIRMED BY RGF AND GENDARMERIE THAT THE PRESIDENT OF RWANDA AND THE PRESIDENT OF BURUNDI WERE KILLED IN AN AIRPLANE CRASH AT KIGALI AIRPORT AT APPROXIMATELY 2040 HOURS - 6 APRIL 1994. THE DEATHS HAVE NOT BEEN CONFIRMED BY UNAMIR PERSONNEL BUT DUE TO THE STATEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES OF LEADING RGF AND GENDARMERIE LEADERS THIS REPORT IS CONSIDERED TRUE. THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE RGF WAS ALSO IN THE AIRCRAFT. WE BELIEVE 9 PERSONS WERE KILLED IN THE CRASH.
- AT APPROXIMATELY 2040 HOURS UNMOs AT KANOMBE (KIGALI INTERNATIONAL) AIRPORT REPORTED A LARGE EXPLOSION FROM THE AREA OF CAMP KANOMBE WHICH IS A MILITARY CAMP NEAR THE AIRPORT. INITIAL REPORTS STATED IT WAS AN EXPLOSION OF MUNITIONS. HOWEVER, WITHIN MINUTES GENDARMERIE AND RGF PERSONNEL AT THE AIRPORT BEGAN TO PANIC IN THE AREA OF THE AIRPORT. THE UNMOs REQUESTED AN ARMED ESCORT INVESTIGATE THE EXPLOSION.
- AT 2118 HOURS A PLATOON OF PRESIDENTIAL GUARD ESTABLISHED A ROADBLOCK AT THE MERIDIEN TRAFFIC CIRCLE AND BLOCKED TRAFFIC. SEVERAL SHOTS WERE FIRED. NO REPORTED CASUALTIES. THE GUARDS APPEARED BY UNAMIR OBSERVATION TO BE NERVOUS AND DANGEROUS.
- AT 2130 HOURS A REPORT FROM UNMOs AT THE AIRPORT STATED THE TOWER HAD DECLARED THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL AIRPLANE HAD CRASHED. IT WAS NOT AT THIS TIME CONFIRMED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS ON THE AIRCRAFT. A TELEPHONE CALL TO THE RPF LOS LIVING WITH UNAMIR STAFF AT THE MERIDIEN HOTEL DISCOVERED ALL THE LOS HAD DEPARTED THE MERIDIEN HOTEL APPROXIMATELY 20 MINUTES EARLIER. THE FC DISPATCHED THE DCOO TO THE RPF\CND COMPOUND TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THEM AND ORDERED THE DFC\COS TO THE HEADQUARTERS.
- AT 2135 HOURS KIGALI SECTOR HQ REPORTED THAT THE ARMED

PATROL SENT TO INVESTIGATE THE CRASH HAD BEEN STOPPED, DISARMED AND WERE BEING HELD AT THE AIRPORT. IN ADDITION THE UNMOs AT THE AIRPORT WERE CONFINED TO A ROOM AT THE AIRPORT. THE FC PLACED UNAMIR ON RED ALERT AND PLACED THE FORCE RESERVE ON 30 MINUTES NOTICE TO MOVE.

6. CONSTANT TELEPHONE CALLS WERE RECEIVED DURING THIS PERIOD BY THE FC AND FORCE HQ FROM MINISTERS REQUESTING ARMED UN PROTECTION. IN ADDITION AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT WAS RECEIVED THAT THE PRESIDENT OF BURUNDI WAS ALSO IN THE AIRCRAFT. THE RGF LO WAS IN CONSTANT TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION FROM ARMY HQ WITH THE FC AND REPORTED THE CRASH HAD OCCURRED AND SUBSEQUENTLY REQUESTED FC PRESENCE AT THE RGF ARMY HQ.

7. A CALL FROM MR RIZA IN NEW YORK WAS RECEIVED AND THE UNCONFIRMED INFORMATION AS KNOWN AT THAT TIME WAS PASSED TO HIM AT 2210 HOURS. THE FC MOVED TO RGF ARMY HQ AT 2230 HOURS.

8. TRANSITING THE CITY IT WAS VOID OF INHABITANTS OR TRAFFIC. ROADBLOCKS MANNED BY RGF SOLDIERS WERE LOCATED NEAR THE RGF HQ. FC ARRIVED AT 2250 HOURS AND WAS MET BY THE CHEF DE CABINET OF THE MND OF RWANDA (THE MND IS IN CAMEROON AT A CONFERENCE), THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE GENDARMERIE AND THE KEY STAFF APPOINTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND GENDARMERIE. THE CHEF DE CABINET SPOKE FOR THE GROUP.

9. HE STATED THAT THE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY WERE ON THE PLANE AND THAT THERE WERE NO SURVIVORS FROM THE AIRPLANE CRASH. HE COULD NOT AT THIS POINT CONFIRM THE OTHER PASSENGERS. THE FC OFFERED NO INFORMATION (IE PRESIDENT OF BURUNDI). HE STATED APPARENTLY THE AIRCRAFT EXPLODED IN THE AIR AND CRASHED ON THE GROUND IN THE PRESIDENTS GARDEN NEAR THE AIRPORT. IT WAS SUSPECTED BUT NOT CONFIRMED THAT THE PLANE HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN.

10. DURING HIS DISCOURSE REPORTS CONTINUED TO ARRIVE BY PHONE WHICH UPDATED THE SITUATION. THE CHEF STATED THE ARMY AND GENDARMERIE WERE PREPARED TO KEEP THEIR POSITION FOR THE COUNTRY AND FOR PEACE. WITHOUT THE PRESIDENT HE STATED THEIR WAS NO GOVERNMENT AND THAT THE POPULATION HAD TO BE REASSURED TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN THE NATION. HE REQUESTED UNAMIR SUPPORT IN THEIR ACTIONS. THE FC STATED EVEN WITH THE DEATH OF THE PRESIDENT THERE WAS STILL A GOVERNMENT UNDER PM AGATHE. THE OFFICERS SCOFFED AND STATED SHE AND HER GROUP WERE NOT A GOVERNMENT. THE FC DID NOT PURSUE THAT CONVERSATION BUT ASKED WHAT TYPE OF SUPPORT THEY WERE REQUESTING. THE CHEF STATED JOINT UNAMIR GENDARMERIE AND RGF PATROLS AND A STATEMENT TO THE POPULATION. THE FC STATED THAT THE RGF MUST REMAIN IN ITS BARRACKS AND THAT THE GENDARMERIE MUST DO ITS JOB OF MAINTAINING ORDER. THE FC STATED THE RPF WERE CALM AND UNAMIR WOULD MONITOR THEM CLOSELY AND THAT IT WAS CRITICAL THAT UNAMIR BE ALLOWED TO INVESTIGATE THE CRASH SITE AND THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD RETURN TO THEIR GARRISON. NO COMMITMENT WAS MADE AT THIS POINT.

11. AT 1107 HOURS THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE GENDARMERIE REPORTED THE PRESIDENT OF BURUNDI HAD BEEN ON THE AIRCRAFT.

HE STATED THIS GROUP DID NOT WANT POWER BUT ONLY WANTED TO REASSURE THE POPULATION AS THE POPULATION WAS TIRED OF THIS DANCING AROUND. THE FC ASKED WHO WOULD SPEAK TO THE POPULATION AND SUGGESTED THE PM AGATHE. HE ALSO ASKED IF ANYONE HAD SPOKEN TO THE PM AND THE CABINET. THE CHEF AVOIDED THE QUESTION BY STATING THE NATION NEEDED A TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY TO HANDOVER TO THE POLITICIANS AT ANYTIME THEY WERE PREPARED TO GOVERN. HOWEVER, HE REITERATED ORDER HAD TO BE MAINTAINED TONIGHT AND THAT UNAMIR ASSISTANCE WAS CRITICAL.

12. THE FC STATED THESE DISCUSSIONS HAD POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS AND HE MUST CONSULT WITH THE SRSG. HOWEVER HE STATED ANY ACTION HE WOULD TAKE WOULD ONLY BE WITH HIS PERMISSION. A JOINT COORDINATED PLAN WAS ESSENTIAL. IT MUST BE TRANSPARENT AND CONTROLLED. THE FC ASKED WHAT WAS THE THREAT AT THIS MOMENT.

13. THE CHEF STATED WHAT DID UNAMIR WANT THEM TO DO.

14. THE FC STATED RGF TROOPS MUST BE CONFINED TO THEIR BARRACKS AND ONLY THE GENDARMERIE MUST MAINTAIN ORDER.

15. THE CHEF ASKED TO PLACE TROOPS ON ALERT FOR POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT BUT THEY WOULD REMAIN IN THEIR BARRACKS.

16. AT 2330 HOURS THE FC CONSULTED WITH THE SRSG BY TELEPHONE. HE RETURNED TO THE MEETING AND LISTENED TO THE COS GENDARMERIE ENHANCED SECURITY PLAN TO CONSIST OF ONE ARMORED CAR AND EXTRA GENDARMES AT THE RADIO STATION, ONE ARMORED CAR AND EXTRA GENDARMES AT THE TELCON AND EXTRA GENDARMES AT THE ELECTROGAZ AND THE CITY FUEL TANKS IN CASE OF SABOTAGE. IN ADDITION HE REQUESTED SATURATED PATROLLING WITH JOINT GENDARME AND UNAMIR PATROLS. THE FC AGREED TO THE ABOVE REQUESTS AND STATED THE GROUP MUST REASSURE THE POLITICAL LEADERS OF THE COUNTRY, KEEP THE RGF IN ITS BARRACKS AND ORDER THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD BACK TO ITS BARRACKS. THE CHEF ADDED THAT THEY WOULD SPEAK TO THE RPF THE NEXT DAY WHEN THE POLITICAL SITUATION IS CLEARER. THE FC OFFERED TO STAY AT THE HEADQUARTERS TO COORDINATE ACTIVITIES UNTIL KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER COULD ARRIVE TO COORDINATE DETAILS.

17. AT 2400 HOURS THE FC WAS CONSULTING WITH THE SRSG BY TELEPHONE WHEN THE CHEF STATED HE WANTED TO SEE THE SRSG WITH THE FC. THE FC, AFTER ACCEPTANCE BY THE SRSG, ESCORTED THE CHEF TO THE SRSG HOME WHILE KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER COORDINATED THE ENHANCED JOINT SECURITY MEASURES WITH THE COS OF THE GENDARMERIE AND THE STAFF OF THE RGF AND GENDARMERIE. BEFORE LEAVING, THE FC ASKED THEM TO RECONSIDER AGAIN SPEAKING TO PM AGATHE.

19. AT 0200 THE FC RETURNED TO RGF HQ WITH THE CHEF FROM HIS MEETING WITH THE SRSG AND CONFIRMED THE SECURITY DETAILS WITH THE KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER. THE FC REITERATED THE NECESSITY OF GETTING A UNAMIR PRESENCE TO THE CRASH SITE TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION. THE COS GENDARMERIE AND RGF LO TO UNAMIR COORDINATED THIS MATTER WITH THE KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER AS ROAD BLOCKS STILL BLOCKED ACCESS OF UNAMIR FORCES TO THE CRASH SITE. THE CHEF STATED THE GROUP WOULD PREPARE A COMMUNIQUE FOR THE RADIO AND PRESS. THE FC INSISTED ON SEEING THE COMMUNIQUE BEFORE IT WAS RELEASED. AT 0230 HOURS KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER STATED THE FOLLOWING PERSONS WERE SUPPOSEDLY ON THE AIRCRAFT:

- A. PRESIDENT OF RWANDA.
- B. PRESIDENT OF BURUNDI.
- C. TWO BURUNDIAN MINISTERS.
- D. THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE RGF (MGEN NSABIMANA).
- E. COL SAGATWA (STAFF OFFICER).
- F. DR AKINGENEYE (PERSONAL PHYSICIAN OF THE PRESIDENT).

20. AT 0245 HOURS THE HEAD OF THE FRENCH MILITARY MISSION AND ANOTHER FRENCH OFFICER ARRIVED AT THE RGF HQ AND STATED THEY HAD DIRECTION PARIS TO ENSURE A QUALIFIED CRASH INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED OF THE CRASH. FC ASSURED THEM IT WOULD BE. THEY OFFERED THEIR MILITARY TECHNICAL TEAM CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING 6 HOURS AWAY AT BANGUI.

21. AT 0300 THE FC MOVED TO FORCE HQ AND CONSULTED WITH HIS PRIMARY STAFF OFFICERS. AT 0530 THE SOUND OF SPORADIC MACHINE GUNS, ROCKET AND GRENADE FIRE WAS HEARD IN VARIOUS AREAS OF THE CITY. ON AT LEAST ONE OCCASION THE RPF RETURNED FIRE AIMED AT THEM.

22. AT 0600 INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED THAT THE FM HAD CANCELLED HER RADIO ADDRESS AT 0530 AND WAS REMAINING AT HER HOME. THE GUARD ON HER HOME WAS INCREASED. IN ADDITION THE FM REPORTED THAT THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND AGRICULTURE HAD BEEN KIDNAPPED WITH THEIR FAMILIES BY THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD.

23. ATTEMPTS BY FC TO GET THE RADIO STATIONS TO CARRY AN ADDRESS BY THE FM OR BY UNAMIR OVER THE PHONES WERE REFUSED. RADIO RWANDA TECHNICIANS WERE WARNED NOT TO BROADCAST ANY ADDRESS AND ARE PLAYING CLASSICAL MUSIC. RTLM SUPPOSEDLY BROADCASTED A MESSAGE FROM THE MND (WHO IS OUT OF COUNTRY) BUT DETAILS COULD NOT BE OBTAINED AS IT WAS IN KINYARWANDA. IN ADDITION RTLM WOULD NOT ALLOW FC TO BROADCAST. THEY ACCUSED UNAMIR OF KILLING RWANDESE WHICH IS TOTALLY UNTRUE AS UP TO THAT POINT UNAMIR HAD NOT FIRED A SHOT.

24. SRSG, FC AND VARIOUS AMBASSADORS HAVE MAINTAINED CLOSE COMMUNICATION AND ATTEMPTED TO ORGANIZE A MEETING AT THE US

AMBASSADORS HOME AT 0900. AT 0730 HOURS IT WAS REPORTED BUT NOT CONFIRMED THAT THE HOME OF MINISTER LANDO (LIBERAL PARTY) HAD BEEN ATTACKED AND UN (GHANA) SOLDIERS HAD BEEN KILLED. A RESERVE PATROL WAS SENT TO HIS HOME.

25. RPF REMAINED CALM AND PASSED INFORMATION TO UNAMIR THROUGH THE UNAMIR LO. UNAMIR HAS CONSISTENTLY BEEN DENIED ACCESS TO THE CRASH SITE. IN ADDITION COMMENCING AT 0730 RGF (POSSIBLY PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS).

26. AT 0830 MORE REPORTS CONTINUED TO ARRIVE OF MINISTERS HOMES BEING ATTACKED BY PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS. AT 0845 THE PM FLED HER HOME AND HER UN GUARD WHICH BOUGHT HER TIME WAS DISARMED AND HELD BUT LATER RELEASED. THE PM TOOK REFUGE IN THE UNDP. AT 0920 IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT MINISTER LANDO AND HIS FAMILY HAD BEEN TAKEN FROM THEIR HOME. THE UN GUARD WAS OVERPOWERED AND ONE GHANIAN SOLDIER WAS REPORTED MISSING.

27. AT 0920 HOURS FC CALLED MR RIZA AT UNNY TO INFORM HIM OF THE ESCALATION OF THE SITUATION AND TO INFORM HIM UNAMIR MIGHT HAVE TO USE FORCE TO SAVE THE PRIME MINISTER. THE ARMED ESCORT ATTEMPTING TO GET TO UNDP TO RESCUE THE PM WAS BLOCKED AND THREATENED WITH FIRE IF THEY ATTEMPTED TO GO TO UNDP. THE FC DISCUSSED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WITH MR RIZA AND THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WERE CONFIRMED THAT UNAMIR WAS NOT TO FIRE UNTIL FIRED UPON. OUR PERSONNEL WHO WERE OVERPOWERED WITHOUT FIRE.

28. THE AMBASSADORS MEETING AT THE US AMBASSADORS HOUSE WAS CANCELLED BECAUSE THE AMBASSADORS COULD NOT BE SAFELY ESCORTED TO THE MEETING. THE ARMY AND GENDARMERIE GROUP DID APPEAR. FC DISCUSSED MR RIZA'S DIRECTION WITH SRSG.

29. FC CONVENED A STAFF MEETING AT 1000 HOURS. FC TO GO TO ARMY HQ TO MEET ARMY AND GENDARMERIE GROUP TO EMPHASIZE PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS MUST GO TO THEIR BARRACKS, MINISTERS MUST BE RELEASED AND PM RECOGNIZED AS HEAD OF STATE. DFC\COS TO CONTINUE TO ATTEMPT ACCESS TO CRASH SITE. DCOO TO REMAIN WITH RPF AND KEEP THEM CALM. CMO TO REMAIN AT FORCE HQ AND MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH OTHER SECTORS. SOUTHERN SECTOR ALL QUIET EXCEPT FIRING IN CYANGUGU. RPF SECTOR ALL QUIET. UNMOS DEPLOYED TO RPF FRONT LINES. SECTOR COMMANDER WITH MGEN KAGAME. RGF SECTOR QUIET.

30. DCOO CONVEYED AT 1005 RPF CALM BUT INSISTING ON INSTALLATION OF BBTG, PM AS HEAD OF GOVERNMENT, CONSTITUTION, END TO VIOLENCE.

31. 1015 REPORT FROM RGF LO THAT 3 UNAMIR PERSONNEL KILLED AT CAMP KAMI. CMO TOOK DECISION TO CALL IN ALL MILOBS FROM MILOB GP HQ TO FORCE HQ. CMO CHECKED AND MILOBS WERE NOT KILLED AND ALL WERE ACCOUNTED FOR.

32. 1030 HOURS UNDP REPORTED PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS ATTEMPTING TO BREAK INTO COMPOUND AND ASKED FOR IMMEDIATE SUPPORT. PATROL BLOCKED BY ROADBLOCK AND UNABLE TO GET THROUGH.

33. 1215 HOURS KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER DISPATCHED APCs TO GET PM DESIGNATE WHO HAD BEEN LOCATED AT THE HOME OF A US NATIONAL

6/6

BY THE US AMBASSADOR. A TOGOLESE CAPTAIN UNMO REPORTED TO THE FORCE HQ AND STATED HE AND 13 BELGIAN SOLDIERS HAD BEEN CAPTURED AND TAKEN TO CAMP KIGALI WHERE HE REPORTS THAT 13 BELGIAN SOLDIERS WERE EXECUTED. BELGIAN CONTINGENT COMMANDER INFORMED AND INVESTIGATION COMMENCED.

34. FC CALLED AT 1300 TO STATE HE FELT HE HAD NEGOTIATED THE RELEASE OF THE UNDP PERSONNEL. WHETHER OR NOT THE PM AGATHE WAS IN THIS GROUP COULD NOT BE CONFIRMED. COL MARCHAL CALLED TO STATE HE HAD SECURED THE PM DESIGNATE FAUSTIN. CONTINUOUS CALLS FOR HELP FROM THE LOCAL, UN AND EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY BUT DUE TO ROADBLOCKS VERY FEW ACTIONED. TERRIFIED REFUGEES SWAMP THE HQ AND ARE MOVED UNDER ESCORT TO AMAHORO STADIUM UNDER PROTECTION OF RUTBAT. FC CALLED FOR TWO MORE APC'S TO HELP HIS APC EXTRACT UNDP HOSTAGES. DISPATCHED. DFC\COS ORDERED ALL STAFF OFFICERS TO THE FORCE HQ IN CONVOY. ESSENTIAL CIVILIAN STAFF MOVED INTO THE HQ.

35. AT 1315 HOURS MGEN KAGAME MADE A STATEMENT BY RADIO THAT THE RPF UNDERSTOOD THAT MANY OF THE ATTACKS IN KIGALI WERE AIMED AT THEIR SUPPORTERS AND THAT IF THIS CONTINUED HIS SOLDIERS WOULD REACT TO DEFEND THEIR PEOPLE. REPORTED TO FC WHO DIRECTED DCOO WITH RPF AND CND AND RPF SECTOR COMMANDER TO ATTEMPT TO CALM DOWN RPF.

PRÉSIDENCE
DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE

PARIS le 7 avril 1994

Le Conseiller à la Présidence

(m)

TIV

NOTE

à l'attention de
Monsieur le Président de la République

(s/c. de Monsieur le Secrétaire Général)

Aghali, hr

OBJET : Attentat contre les Président du Rwanda et du Burundi.

1) Hier soir, l'avion du Président rwandais, Juvénal Habyarimana, qui avait à son bord également le Président du Burundi Cyprien Ntaryamira, s'est écrasé à Kigali dans les environs de l'aéroport. L'avion qui revenait de Dar es Salam, où s'était tenue une réunion des chefs d'Etat de la région consacrée précisément au Rwanda et au Burundi, a dans son approche finale essuyé des tirs. Selon les Belges, il s'agirait de tirs de roquettes ou de missiles.

Les deux présidents sont morts ainsi que tous les passagers (une dizaine) dont le chef d'Etat major rwandais et deux ministres burundais. Les trois membres de l'équipage -tous français- ont également été tués

L'attentat est attribué au Front patriotique rwandais (FPR).

2) A Kigali, la garde présidentielle s'est lancée dans la chasse aux opposants. Des informations non encore confirmées font état d'arrestations de ministres et de personnalités, hutues ou tutsies, adversaires politiques du président Habyarimana. Un affrontement entre l'armée rwandaise et le FPR dans la capitale paraît inévitable. L'intérieur du pays serait pour l'instant calme.

Les institutions de la transition n'ayant pas encore pu être mises en place, la mort du président laisse le pays sans aucune autorité reconnue (le gouvernement et le parlement n'ont pas été installés). On craint un coup d'Etat militaire.

A Bujumbura le président de l'Assemblée a pris, selon la constitution, la direction du pays. La situation au Burundi est calme et les autorités développent, dans leurs déclarations publiques, la thèse de l'accident en ce qui concerne le président burundais. Il n'était pas prévu semble-t-il qu'il soit à bord de l'avion du Président Habyarimana au retour de Dar-es-Salam.

3) Une réunion interministérielle s'est tenue ce matin au Quai d'Orsay. Les points suivants ont été abordés :

- Position française : Matignon et le Quai d'Orsay souhaitent, dans cette nouvelle crise rwandaise qui risque d'être très meurtrière, que la France ne soit pas en première ligne et limiter notre action à des interventions à l'ONU pour que la Mission des Nations Unies au Rwanda (MINUAR) remplisse sa mission de sécurité à Kigali (ce qu'elle n'a pas réellement fait jusqu'ici).

- Sécurité de la communauté française : Pour l'instant nos ressortissants ne sont pas menacés et aucune évacuation n'est envisagée. Si ce devait être le cas nous agirions en collaboration avec la Belgique et la MINUAR (1500 hommes sur place dont 450 Belges).

Le ministère de la Défense a cependant déjà mis en alerte deux compagnies et une unité de santé (Bangui, Libreville et Ndjaména).

- Famille du président Habyarimana. Elle est pour l'instant sous la protection de la garde présidentielle. Si elle le souhaite, elle sera accueillie à la résidence de notre ambassadeur, conformément à vos

instructions.


Bruno DELAYE

PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC

PARIS April 7, 1994

*Advisor to the Presidency***NOTE**

**to the attention of
the President of the Republic
(c/o the Secretary General)**

SUBJECT: Attack against the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi

1) Yesterday evening, the airplane of the Rwandan president, Juvénal Habyarimana, with the President of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira, also on board, crashed in Kigali near the airport. The plane was returning from Dar es Salaam, where a meeting had taken place of regional heads of state, dedicated specifically to Rwanda and Burundi, and, in its final approach, came under fire. According to the Belgians, it was either rocket or missile fire.

The two presidents are dead, as well as all other passengers (a dozen) including the Rwandan Chief of Staff and two Burundian ministers. The three crew members—all French—were also killed.

The attack is attributed to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

2) In Kigali, the presidential guard threw itself into the hunt for the opposition. We have received information, not yet confirmed, of arrests of ministers and figures, Hutu or Tutsi, who are political adversaries of President Habyarimana. A clash between the Rwandan army and the RPF in the capital seems inevitable. For the time being, the interior of the country is calm.

Transitional institutions have not yet been able to be put in place, and the president's death leaves the country without any recognized authority (the government and parliament had not been installed). **We fear a military coup d'etat.**

In Bujumbura the president of the Assembly has taken charge of the country, in accordance with the constitution. The situation in Burundi is calm and authorities are developing, in their public declarations, the view that what happened to the Burundian president was an accident. It seems that it was not planned for him to be on board President Habyarimana's plane on the return from Dar-es-Salaam.

3) An interministerial meeting took place this morning in the Quai d'Orsay. The following points were addressed:

- The French position: Matignon and the Quai d'Orsay would like France, in this new Rwandan crisis that risks being extremely deadly, to not be on the front line, and to limit our actions to UN interventions, so that the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) can perform its security mission in Kigali (which, until now, it has not really done).

- Security of the French community: For the time being, our nationals are not threatened and no evacuation is envisaged. If that were to be the case, we would act in collaboration with Belgium and UNAMIR (1500 men on the ground, including 450 Belgians).

The Defense Ministry has, however, already sent out two companies and one health unit (Bangui, Libreville and Ndjaména).

- Family of President Habyarimana. They are, for the time being, under the protection of the presidential guard. If they wish, they will be welcomed at our ambassador's residence, subject to your instructions.

Bruno DELAYE

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ACTION EUR-01

INFO	LOG-00	AF-01	AID-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	DOEE-00
	EB-01	OIGO-01	HA-09	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16
	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01
	PA-01	PM-00	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10	SCT-03	SNP-00
	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	RPE-01	PMB-00	/055W				

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O 071519Z APR 94
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6325
INFO AMEMBASSY KIGALI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE
JCS WASHDC//J4//J5//IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC//OASD/ISP//IMMEDIATE
USEUCOM VAHINGEN GE//J3/J4/BATTLE STAFF//IMMEDIATE
CINTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J3/J4//IMMEDIATE
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//CC/DC/IN// IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHDC//IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 03919

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PREF, KDEM, RW, BY, BE
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 BRUSSE 03919 01 OF 02 071530Z
SUBJECT: BELGIAN MFA ON SITUATION IN RWANDA

REF: A) BRUSSELS 3880; B) FENDRICK-JOHNSON TELCON OF 4/7

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. BELGIAN MFA CONFIRMED DEATHS OF RWANDESE
MINISTERS OF PUBLIC WORKS AND INFORMATION, SAID THEIR
MISSION IN RWANDA REPORTED THAT THE MINISTERS OF FINANCE
AND AGRICULTURE HAD DISAPPEARED, AND THAT 5 BELGIAN UNAMIR
SOLDIERS PROTECTING THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN TAKEN BY

THE RWANDESE MILITARY. THE BELGIANS ONLY KNEW THE PRIME MINISTER HAD FLED. POLCOUNS PASSED TO THEM OUR INFORMATION THAT SHE HAD BEEN KILLED. THE BELGIAN MFA HAD SENT MESSAGES THROUGH THEIR MISSIONS TO THE UN AND TO WASHINGTON TO ASK ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF MODIFYING UN MANDATE TO PROTECT OR EVACUATE EXPATRIATES. BELGIAN MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLANNERS TELL US THE RWANDAN MILITARY CONTROLS THE AIRPORT BUT THE BELGIANS CONTROL A PART OF THE AIRPORT AROUND THEIR C-130. CONTINGENCY PLANNERS ARE LOOKING INTO USING ADDITIONAL TROOPS TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION LOCALLY OR USING SUCH TROOPS IN ORDER TO ASSIST IN A COMPLETE EVACUATION OF ALL UNAMIR FORCES AND OF ALL FOREIGN CIVILIANS WHO WISH TO LEAVE. THEY ARE CONSIDERING THREE APPROACHES: A) USE OF UNAMIR; B) SENDING IN A REINFORCED BATTALION OF 800 BELGIANS DIRECTLY TO RWANDA OR C) STAGING THE BATTALION IN BURUNDI TO BE AVAILABLE FOR USE IN RWANDA IF REQUIRED. NO DECISIONS HAVE AS YET BEEN TAKEN, BUT IF THE BELGIANS DECIDE IT IS NECESSARY TO SEND IN A REINFORCED BATTALION, THEY WILL LIKELY COME TO US FOR AIRLIFT. END SUMMARY.

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2. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS FROM REF B, POLCOUNS SPOKE TO WIL JAENEN, DIRECTOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS AT BELGIAN MFA. JAENEN SAID SITUATION WAS VERY SERIOUS IN RWANDA, WITH MILITARY KILLING MINISTERS AND OTHER TUTSI POLITICIANS. THE BELGIAN MISSION COULD CONFIRM THAT THE MINISTERS OF INFORMATION AND PUBLIC WORKS HAD BEEN KILLED. THE LATTER WAS TALKING TO UNAMIR WHEN HE WAS KILLED. THE MINISTERS OF FINANCE AND AGRICULTURE HAVE DISAPPEARED. FIVE BELGIAN MEMBERS OF THE UNAMIR MISSION PROTECTING THE PRIME MINISTER AT HER RESIDENCE HAD BEEN TAKEN BY THE RWANDAN MILITARY. THEIR FATE WAS UNKNOWN. THE BELGIANS UNDERSTOOD THE PRIME MINISTER HAD FLED. POLCOUNS TOLD JAENEN THAT OUR INFORMATION WAS THAT UNDP EXPATRIATES HAD WITNESSED THE KILLING OF THE PRIME MINISTER.

3. JAENEN SAID THAT THE BELGIAN MILITARY HAD BEEN ASKED TO DO CONTINGENCY/CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR AN EVACUATION OF EXPATRIATES BUT NO DECISIONS HAD BEEN MADE. HE SAID THE BELGIAN MFA HAD SENT MESSAGES TO THEIR MISSIONS IN NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON ASKING IF WE SHOULD NOT CONSIDER CONVERTING THE UNAMIR MANDATE TO ALLOW UNAMIR TO PROTECT/EVACUATE EXPATRIATES AS NEEDED.

UNCLASSIFIED

4. JAENEN SAID THE BELGIANS IN UNAMIR DID NOT/NOT CONTROL THE AIRPORT BUT DID CONTROL A PORTION OF IT AROUND A C-130 THEY HAD ON THE GROUND.

5. SEPARATELY, A JOINT STAFF OPERATIONS OFFICER AT THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE TOLD EMBASSY DAO THAT THE MILITARY WAS DEVELOPING CONTINGENCY PLANS. HE CONFIRMED THAT 5
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BELGIANS WITH UNAMIR HAD DISAPPEARED. HE ALSO SAID 5
PLATOONS WERE CUT OFF AT THE AIRPORT BETWEEN THE ARMY AND
THE GENDARMERIE. THEY WERE NOT IN IMMEDIATE DANGER.

6. AMONG THE OPTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE MILITARY ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS ARE THE USE OF UNAMIR TROOPS TO EVACUATE CIVILIANS IN RWANDA OR TO SEND UP TO A REINFORCED BATTALION (EITHER DIRECTLY TO RWANDA OR TO BURUNDI TO BE ON STAND-BY IF NEEDED) TO SUPPORT TROOPS ALREADY IN PLACE

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ACTION EUR-01

INFO	LOG-00	AF-01	AID-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	DOEE-00
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	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00	STR-01	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	RPE-01	PMB-00	/055W				

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O 071519Z APR 94

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JCS WASHDC//J4//J5//IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC//OASD/ISP//IMMEDIATE
USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//J3/J4/BATTLE STAFF//IMMEDIATE
CINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J3/J4//IMMEDIATE
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//CC/DC/IN// IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHDC//IMMEDIATE

UNCLASSIFIED

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 BRUSSELS 03919

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PREF, KDEM, RW, BY, BE
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PAGE 02 BRUSSE 03919 02 OF 02 071530Z
SUBJECT: BELGIAN MFA ON SITUATION IN RWANDA

IN RWANDA. THE MISSION WOULD BE EITHER TO RESTORE ORDER
OR TO FACILITATE A COMPLETE EVACUATION OF UNAMIR MILITARY
AND EXPATRIATE CIVILIANS WHO WISH TO LEAVE. IF THE OPTION
TO SEND A BATTALION IS CHOSEN, THE BELGIANS WOULD LIKELY
COME TO US FOR AIRLIFT SUPPORT.

BLINKEN

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APRIL 7, 1994

(Message delivered around 1315)

...There was a third message from Kagame, a straightforward ultimatum. The killings throughout the city had to cease immediately or he would order his troops to intervene. The message had six brief lines:

- A. RPF is prepared to secure Kigali;
- B. Force Commander should not rely on his Belgian Staff;
- C. UNAMIR should pull its forces out of the DMZ to reinforce Kigali;
- D. RPF prepared to assist UNAMIR;
- E. If CND is attacked RPF will move on Kigali; and
- F. If situation is not secured by last light 7 April, definite RPF attack.

Source: Dallaire, Roméo Lt. Gen. *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*. New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003, p 247.

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

DATE: 7 APRIL 1994

TO: KAGAME\RPA\MULINDI	FROM: DALLAIRE\UNAMIR\KIGALI
FAX NO: BY TELEPHONE AND BY LETTER INMARSAT:	FAX NO: 250-84273 <i>J. Mulindi</i>
SUBJECT: UNAMIR RESPONSE TO RPA 6 POINT MESSAGE	
ATTN: MGEN KAGAME	ROOM NO. 2052
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 1	

1. MAJOR-GENERAL DALLAIRE FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIPT OF YOUR 8 POINT MESSAGE AND RESPONDS AS FOLLOWS:

- A. NOTED BUT NOT UNDERSTOOD.
- B. NO COMMENT.
- C. UNAMIR WILL NOT CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AS IT IS MANDATED FOR DEFENSIVE PEACEKEEPING TASKS ONLY.
- D. UNAMIR WILL NOT CONDUCT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AS IT IS MANDATED FOR DEFENSIVE PEACEKEEPING TASKS ONLY.
- E. NOTED.
- F. UNAMIR WITH THE GENDARMERIE AND ELEMENTS OF THE ARMY LOYAL TO RWANDA ARE ATTEMPTING TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION. UNAMIR IS NOT IN OFFENSIVE POSTURE AND THROUGH RPF ACTION AT THE CND AND RPA OFFENSIVE TONIGHT THIS WILL BE DEEMED TO BE A SERIOUS CEASEFIRE VIOLATION. UNAMIR'S PEACEKEEPING MANDATE WILL BE TOTALLY VIOLATED. REQUEST YOU RECONSIDER THESE ACTIONS AS LOYAL FORCES AND UNAMIR ARE ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH ORDER AND CONTROL ON AGGRESSION IN KIGALI.
- I. ACKNOWLEDGE.

2. REGARDS

CRN-04-125
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UNAMIR
1/7 F
40 (4)

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING, UNATIONS,
NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI

FROM: BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR,
KIGALI

SUBJECT: AN UPDATE ON THE
CURRENT SITUATION IN
RWANDA AND MILITARY
ASPECTS OF THE MISSION

DATE: 8 APRIL 1994 MIR-723

1. The security situation in Kigali is worsening as the fighting between the Presidential Guards and the RPF intensifies. However, the rest of the country remains calm, although tense.
2. Following the deaths of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi in the night of the 6th of April, elements of the Presidential Guards attacked the residences of several political figures and abducted the Prime Minister, the Presiding Judge of the Constitutional Court, the Ministers of Information, Labour and Social Affairs and Agriculture. We have subsequently received unconfirmed reports that these leaders have been killed by their abductors. The Presidential Guards are also reported to have attacked several other residences and murdered several persons suspected to be RPF sympathisers.
3. A company-size of RPF military personnel left the CND complex on 7 April at 16hours local time and moved into areas where Presidential Guards are located and engaged the Guards in a fierce exchange of fire. UNAMIR observed several armed RPF foot-patrols in areas dominated by government supporters adjacent to UNAMIR headquarters and the Bangladesh Battalion.
4. Meanwhile, a group of Senior Officers of the Rwandese Armed Forces have constituted themselves into a "crisis committee" in an attempt to stabilise the security situation. They have requested UNAMIR to arrange a cease-fire between the RPF and the Presidential Guards. They have also called on the political parties which constitute the current transitional government to meet and establish legal authority as well as accelerate the establishment of the transitional institutions called for in the Arusha Peace Agreement. UNAMIR is actively supporting these efforts and participates as an observer in the "crisis committee". Please find attached a copy issued by the said "crisis committee".

. 2 .

5. We have arranged a meeting between members of the "crisis committee" and the RPF scheduled at 14.00 hours local time today at UNAMIR HQ. We have also established contacts with the RPF and the Presidential Guards in an effort to arrange a cease-fire. The negotiations with the parties are continuing.
6. The death of the President of the Republic, and the still unconfirmed death of the Prime Minister and the Presiding Judge of the Constitutional Court as well as a number of ministers have created a power-vacuum which could pose new problems to the peace process. The Prime Minister-Designate was evacuated by UNAMIR to our Headquarters where he has sought refuge and we are providing him protection within UNAMIR premises.
7. At twelve (12) noon today local time, we received the following message from General KAGAME which he directed must be delivered to the "crisis committee":
 - 1.- that he was ready to attend a meeting in Kigali to further the peace process;
 - 2.- he was dispatching a battalion to Kigali to assist government forces in keeping renegade forces from killing innocent people;
 - 3.- the "crisis committee" could prove its seriousness by not firing at its advancing RPF battalion.
 - 4.- effective immediately, RPF will not allow landing of any aircraft at Kayibanda International Airport, Kigali.
8. Our immediate reaction to the message was to advise General KAGAME that the introduction of new forces in Kigali at this time will be counter-productive and may impede ongoing efforts to arrange a cease-fire between the Presidential Guards and the RPF. We expressed our appreciation to him for his willingness to attend a meeting in Kigali to further the peace process and transmitted his message to the "crisis committee" in accordance with his request.
8. I am continuing my efforts with all the political forces to establish security in Kigali so as to create the necessary environment for the resumption of efforts to set up the transitional institutions. In this connection, I have received and exchanged views with the leadership of the newly-formed "crisis committee".
8. In the name of the Secretary-General and all members of UNAMIR, I have made a national appeal for the restoration of law and order and peaceful coexistence amongst all the forces in the country. I have also circulated the statement

made by the President of the Security Council condemning the deaths and appealing for calm.

9. I regret to confirm the death of ten (10) military personnel from the Belgian contingent who were seized and detained by elements of the Presidential Guard.

10. Following is a military assessment of the current situation and an update on the military aspects of the Mission.

11. MANDATE AND TASKS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 872 OF 5 OCT 93 AND THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON RWANDA DATED 24 SEP 93 WE REVIEWED OUR CURRENT SITUATION AND PROVIDE YOU WITH THE FOLLOWING ASSESSMENT.

12. OUTSIDE KWSA. REPORTS FROM OUR UNMO TEAMS IN THE RGF, SOUTHERN AND DMZ SECTORS ALL REPORT A GENERAL CALM SITUATION EXCEPT SOME STRONG NEGATIVE REACTIONS TO THE PRESIDENT'S DEATH IN GISENYI. IN THE RPF SECTOR EXTENSIVE PREPARATIONS ARE BEING MADE FOR AN IMMINENT OFFENSIVE OPERATION. OUR UNDP CONTACTS ALSO CONFIRM THIS GENERAL SITUATION.

13. INSIDE THE KWSA. THE APPEARANCE OF A VERY WELL PLANNED, ORGANIZED, DELIBERATE AND CONDUCTED CAMPAIGN OF TERROR INITIATED PRINCIPALLY BY THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD SINCE THE MORNING AFTER THE DEATH OF THE HEAD OF STATE HAS COMPLETELY REORIENTED THE SITUATION IN KIGALI. AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN NOT ONLY AGAINST THE OPPOSITION LEADERSHIP BUT AGAINST THE RPF (BY FIRING AT THE CND), AGAINST PARTICULAR ETHNIC GROUPS (MASSACRE OF TUTSI IN REMERA), AGAINST THE GENERAL CIVILIAN POPULATION (BANDITRY) AND AGAINST UNAMIR (DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE ON UN INSTALLATIONS, VEHICLES, PERSONNEL AND AFFILIATED AGENCIES (IE UNDP) WHICH HAS RESULTED IN FATAL AND NON-FATAL CASUALTIES. THE PARTICULARLY BARBAROUS MURDER OF THE 10 CAPTURED BELGIAN SOLDIERS EMPHASIZES THIS SITUATION. IS THE MANDATE OF UNAMIR STILL VALID?

14. THE TASKS OF THE KWSA AND THE PRESENT SITUATION AND HOW IT RELATES TO THE MANDATE ARE REVIEWED BELOW:

A. SECURE THE WEAPONS OF THE PARTIES. THIS OBVIOUSLY IS NOT BEING DONE AS THE PARTIES HAVE REMOVED THEIR WEAPONS AND HAVE OPENED FULL HOSTILITIES. OUR MONITORS HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN AND THIS TASK CANNOT BE DONE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION.

B. SECURE KIGALI. KIGALI WAS SECURED BY TWO SMALL INFANTRY BATTALION BUT NOW THIS BATTALION IS SEPARATED INTO CONFINED CAMPS WHICH ARE ISOLATED BY FIGHTING, FIRING AND ROADBLOCKS AND THE BATTALIONS ELEMENTS ARE FOCUSED ON SELF-DEFENCE. IN ADDITION THESE ELEMENTS ARE SEPARATED FROM THEIR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT IE WATER AND FOOD SOURCE (EXCEPT EMERGENCY RATIONS) AND NO RESUPPLY OF POWER, WASHING WATER, GASOLINE, SANITATION, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, GIVEN THE THREAT OF THE PRESENT SITUATION THEIR SUPPORTING FIELD HOSPITAL. KIGALI IS NOT BEING MONITORED, PATROLLED OR SECURED

GIVEN THIS PRESENT SITUATION. THIS IS A DEFENSIVE SURVIVAL EXERCISE FOR UNAMIR.

- C. SECURE THE RPF BN AREA IN THE CND. THIS IS NOT BEING DONE SINCE THE RPF HAS BROKEN OUT OF THEIR COMPOUND AND ARE CONDUCTING OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KIGALI. THE UNAMIR RPF BN AREA GD HAS WITHDRAWN TO ITS CAMP AND HAS ADOPTED A DEFENSIVE POSTURE. THEREFORE THE RPF ARE NOT BEING MONITORED OR SECURED IN KIGALI.
- D. ARMS RECOVERY. OBVIOUSLY NOT POSSIBLE AS THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS AND RPF ARE ENGAGED IN FULL AND OPEN HOSTILITIES AGAINST EACH OTHER AND THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD FREQUENTLY AGAINST UNAMIR. THIS TASK IS NOT BEING CONDUCTED NOR IS IT POSSIBLE OR VIABLE GIVEN THE PRESENT SITUATION.
- E. APCs EMPLOYMENT. THE APCs ARE BEING USED FOR EMERGENCY OPERATIONS LIKE RESCUE AND CASEVAC INSTEAD OF THEIR ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF DETERRENT.
- F. SURVEILLANCE AND VERIFICATION. GIVEN THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE EVENTS OF THE LAST 48 HOURS IT IS UNACCEPTABLY RISKY TO CONDUCT THESE OPERATIONS WITH UNARMED UNMOs OR EVEN LIGHTLY ARMED TROOPS. IN ADDITION THERE IS A NEW ARMY IN THE COUNTRY. ELEMENTS OF THE OLD ARMY HAVE VOICED A LOYALTY TO THE YET TO BE FORMED TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT AGAINST THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD AND THE OLD GUARD ARMY. WHERE THIS ARMY WILL STAND IN RELATION TO THE RPF INITIATING HOSTILITIES HAS YET TO BE CONFIRMED. THEREFORE KIGALI IS NOT BEING OBSERVED (EXCEPT IN AND NEAR OUR BASE CAMP AREAS), MONITORED OR VERIFIED.
- G. SECURITY OF INDIVIDUALS. THIS HAS BECOME THE MAJOR TASK OF UNAMIR. UNFORTUNATELY DUE TO THE SITUATION IT MAY NOT HAVE SAVED THE PM AGATHE AND OTHER ABDUCTED MINISTERS, BUT IT IS WORKING WITH OTHER CRITICAL VIPs. THIS TASK, AS UNAMIR ATTEMPTS TO ORGANIZE A CEASE-FIRE WILL INVOLVE ESCORTS, GUARDS AND GENERAL PROTECTION. IT WILL BE BASED ON THE EVENTS OF THE LAST 24 HOURS INVOLVE RISKING THE LIVES OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL. THIS MUST BE BALANCED WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF SAVING THE LAST MEANS OF INSTITUTING THE BBTG AND SAVING THE PEACE PROCESS. THIS RISK WILL BE ACCEPTED.
- H. SECURITY OF THE AIRPORT. A SUB-UNIT OF COMPANY STRENGTH IS AT THE AIRPORT BUT SO ALSO IS A FORCE OF PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS AND ANOTHER LARGER FORCE OF UNCERTAIN GOVERNMENT TROOPS. THE AIRPORT CAN BE MONITORED BUT IS NOT SECURED. GIVEN THE SIZE OF THE AREA OF INTEREST OF THE AIRPORT THE PRESENT FORCE

CANNOT ACCOMPLISH THIS TASK IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. INDEED THE RUNWAY IS BLOCKED BY PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS.

- I. PROTECTION OF UN AND EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY. THE COMMUNITY UNTIL NOW HAS BEEN SAFE IN ITS HOMES OR LOCATIONS (EXCEPT FOR UNDP). HOWEVER AS WATER AND FOOD RUN OUT UNAMIR MAY HAVE TO EVACUATE THESE PERSONS TO A CENTRAL OR SEVERAL LOCATIONS. GIVEN THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE STREETS THIS MAY NOT BE POSSIBLE OR MAY BE RETARDED AND VERY DANGEROUS. AN EVACUATION PLAN HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND COORDINATED, BUT IT IS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION OF UNAMIR BEING PERMITTED BY THE PARTIES TO EXECUTE THE PLAN WITH A SECURE AND FUNCTIONAL AIRPORT AND IMMUNITY FROM ATTACK. THIS TASK MAY BE POSSIBLE GIVEN CERTAIN PRECONDITIONS.

15. SUPPORT. THE MISSION IS DESPERATELY SHORT OF LIFE AND OPERATIONAL SUSTAINING SUPPORT. THE RESERVES REQUIRED BY THE UN FOR THIS MISSION WERE EITHER NOT BROUGHT BY TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES OR HAVE NOT BEEN PROVIDED TO THIS MISSION. IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE CITY OF KIGALI IS IN A STATE OF WAR. THE LOCAL ECONOMY IS NOT FUNCTIONING. STORES, GAS STATIONS, SUPPLIERS, ETC ARE CLOSED AND THEIR OWNERS AND WORKERS ARE IN HIDING. AT PRESENT THE MISSION IS EVALUATING ITS LOGISTICS RESERVES. UNFORTUNATELY THE LOGISTICS COMPANY AND MAJOR RESERVE SUPPLY DEPOT ARE ISOLATED AND THE LOGISTICS STAFF AT THE FORCE HQ ARE ISOLATED AT THE MERIDIEN HOTEL EVEN THOUGH ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO BRING THEM TO FORCE HQ TO ASSIST IN THIS PROCESS AS THE MAJORITY OF THE FIGHTING IS ALONG THE ROUTE. IT IS LIBERALLY ESTIMATED THAT UNAMIR HAS THE FOLLOWING RESERVES:

- A. DRINKING WATER. 20 LITRES PER MAN. THIS WATER UNFORTUNATELY IS IN A RESERVE LOCATION WHICH IS NOT ACCESSIBLE TO MOST OF THE FORCE. MOST UNIT LOCATIONS HAVE BETWEEN 1 OR 2 DAYS OF DRINKING WATER. WATER RATIONING HAS BEEN INITIATED.
- B. GENERAL PURPOSE WATER. TOILETS AND SHOWERS IN MOST LOCATIONS HAVE CEASED TO FUNCTION. GENERAL PURPOSE WATER WILL BE BOILED FOR DRINKING PURPOSES WITH A MINIMAL AMOUNT FOR SANITATION. FOR THE SHORT TERM THIS IS ACCEPTABLE BUT OVER THE LONG TERM WILL RESULT IN HEALTH HAZARDS.
- C. RATIONS. UNITS VARY FROM NIL AT THE FORCE HQ TO 2 DAYS AT RUTBAT. RATIONING HAS BEEN INITIATED. A FORCE RESERVE OF 3 DAYS PER MAN AND A RESERVE AT KIBAT LOGISTICS COMPANY OF 10 DAYS PER MAN. UNFORTUNATELY THESE RESERVES ARE AT ISOLATED LOCATIONS FOR MOST UNITS. GIVEN ACCESS TO THESE LOCATIONS UNAMIR CAN SURVIVE ON FOOD FOR LESS THAN TWO WEEKS.
- D. FUEL. FUEL WILL BE OUR BIGGEST DIFFICULTY. A FORCE RESERVE OF 20,000 L OF GASOLINE AND 40,000 L OF DIESEL IS LOCATED AT THE LOGISTICS COMPANY. THIS LOCATION IS ISOLATED FOR MOST UNITS. MOST UNITS FEEL THEY HAVE A TWO TO THREE DAY RESERVE. GIVEN THAT LOCAL HYDRO IS OUT, GENERATORS CONSUMING FUELED ARE CRITICAL TO POWER LIMITED LIGHTING, RADIOS, PUMPS. EVEN WITH RATIONING

FUEL WILL BE DEPLETED IN UNDER ONE WEEK.

- E. AMMUNITION. THIS CRITICAL ITEM GIVEN OUR PRESENT SITUATION AND UNCERTAIN FUTURE IS OUR LARGEST SINGLE DEFICIENCY. A COMPLETE STOCKTAKING IS BEING CONDUCTED AND FIGURES ARE NOT YET AVAILABLE. AS THIS WAS ESTABLISHED AS A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION ONLY SMALL ARMS AND VERY LIMITED AMOUNTS OF SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION ARE AVAILABLE. UNAMIR CAN DEFEND ITSELF FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME.
- F. DEFENSIVE STORES. THESE STORES HAVE NOT YET BEEN PROVIDED BY THE UN SUPPORT SYSTEM. UNIT RESERVES HAVE BEEN DEPLETED. UNAMIR CAN USE ADHOC AND TEMPORARY MEASURES BUT CANNOT SUSTAIN A LONG TERM DEFENCE.
- G. MEDICAL SUPPLIES. ALREADY DEPLETED BY HEARTS AND MINDS SUPPORT PROGRAM TO THE CIVIL POPULATION, THE USE OF UNIT RESERVES FOR THE PRE-6 APRIL TREATMENT OF OUR OWN PERSONNEL AND THE NON-COMMENCEMENT OF UN MEDICAL RESUPPLY THESE ITEMS ARE IN CRITICAL CONDITION, IF WE TAKE HEAVY CASUALTIES. AS A CONSERVATION METHOD WE HAVE CEASED PROVIDING EMERGENCY TREATMENT TO THE CIVIL POPULATION AND ARE TRANSFERRING THEM TO KIGALI HOSPITAL.
- H. COMMUNICATIONS. THE LOCAL TELEPHONE SYSTEM IS NOT FUNCTIONING. UNAMIR HAS AN INMARSAT WITH FAX AT FORCE HQ AND KIBAT ALSO HAS ONE. THESE ARE OUR ONLY LINKS WITH THE OUTSIDE WORLD AND THEY ARE BEING PROTECTED AND SUSTAINED AS CRITICAL MISSION STORES.
- I. TRANSPORT. PRIOR TO HOSTILITIES UNAMIR SUFFERED FROM A SHORTAGE OF VEHICLES. THIS SITUATION HAS BEEN AGGRAVATED BY VEHICLE CASUALTIES, ANTICIPATED FUEL SHORTAGES AND THE NON-AVAILABILITY DUE TO THE CONFLICT OF LOCAL SOURCES. UNAMIR CANNOT LIFT ITSELF, LET ALONE ANY ADDITIONAL PERSONS IN ONE LIFT. WE DO HAVE SUFFICIENT RESOURCES TO SHUTTLE MOVEMENT IF FUEL SUPPLIES ARE AVAILABLE.

16. UNAMIR WAS DESIGNED, ESTABLISHED AND DEVELOPED LOGISTICALLY AS A PEACEKEEPING FORCE. IT THEREFORE DOES NOT HAVE THE RESERVES OF CRITICAL ITEMS FOR A LONG CONFLICT SCENARIO. IN ADDITION, MUCH OF THE RESERVES ARE ISOLATED FROM OUTER UNIT LOCATIONS BECAUSE OF THE ACCOMODATION DIFFICULTIES IN KIGALI. THE POSITIVE SIDE OF THE LOGISTICS SITUATION IS THAT APPROXIMATELY ONE HALF THE FORCE IS OUTSIDE KIGALI AND CAN IF NECESSARY SUPPORT THEMSELVES FROM THE LOCAL ECONOMY WHICH IS STILL FUNCTIONING IN RELATIVE CALM. UNAMIR WILL DEVOTE MUCH STAFF EFFORT AND RESOURCES TO IMPROVING OUR SUSTAINMENT CAPABILITY BUT IT MUST BE EMPHASIZED THAT WE FACE CRITICAL SHORTAGES THAT WILL REDUCE THE ABILITIES OF AND ENDANGER THE FORCE WITHIN A MATTER OF DAYS.

17. THE RGF LEADERS HAVE ASKED THE RPF (THROUGH UNAMIR) TO CEASIFIRE AND WITHDRAW (DISENGAGE) TO THE CND AS THEY STATE THEY ARE TRYING TO DO THE SAME WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD. WE HAVE PASSED THIS MESSAGE TO THE RPF AND THEY STATED THAT THEY ARE

READY TO DO THE SAME IF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS CEASE-FIRES. NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN HAMPERED BY THE COLLAPSE OF THE LOCAL TELEPHONE SYSTEM. CONSIDERABLE FIREFIGHTS ARE ON-GOING THUS BLOCKING ROUTES FOR COMMUNICATIONS, ROADBLOCKS DENY ACCESS AND MOVEMENT WITHIN THE CITY, STRAY BULLETS AND SHELLS, RICOCHETS AND OCCASIONALLY DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE FORCES DEFENSIVE MEASURES AND RETARDS ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY MOVEMENT BY FOOT OR UNPROTECTED VEHICLE. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO SECURE THE FORCE HQ AND AMAHORO STADIUM AREA AS A SECURE CORE FOR OUR OPERATIONS, BUT ON-GOING BATTLES BETWEEN THE RPF AND PRESIDENTIAL GUARD IN THIS AREA HAVE PREVENTED THE CONCLUSION OF THIS OPERATION. THIS OPERATION WILL CONTINUE AS IT IS THE KEY TO ANY EVACUATION PLAN OR FOR ANY EXPANSION PLAN. OTHER LOCATIONS IN KIGALI ARE IN A CAMP SELF-DEFENCE MODE WITH MINIMUM AND ONLY CRITICAL LIFE SAVING OR PEACE SAVING ACTIVITIES TAKING PLACE.

18. THE FC OF UNAMIR NEEDS TO KNOW WHAT THE MAJOR COUNTRIES ARE PLANNING TO DO IN THE AREA OF POSSIBLE EVACUATION, ESPECIALLY OF THE EXPATRIATES AND UN OR UNAMIR. WE HAVE A LIGHT COMPANY (-) AT THE AIRPORT BUT WE DO NOT CONTROL OR HAVE SECURED THE ROUTES TO THE AIRPORT. NEITHER IS THE AIRPORT SECURE FOR LANDING AS WE ARE NOT SURE OF THE OPPOSING FORCES INSTRUCTIONS OR LOYALTIES.

19. FC UNAMIR ATTENDED A MEETING OF THE MILITARY "CRISIS COMMITTEE" LAST NIGHT AND THEY GAVE DIRECTION, TO THEIR OPERATIONS OFFICERS, TO CONSOLIDATE THE PLAN AND ISSUE ORDERS TO STYMIE THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD OPPOSING FORCES. WE DO NOT HAVE THE DETAILS OF THAT PLAN NOR ITS PRESENT IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE.

20. UNAMIR REMAINS COMMITTED TO ITS MANDATE EVEN THOUGH THE PRESENT SITUATION IS NOT ENABLING THIS MISSION TO FULFIL OUR ASSIGNED AND DESIGNED FOR TASKS. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT KIGALI WOULD HAVE BEEN IN A WORSE SITUATION WITHOUT UNAMIR. ALL PRESENT EFFORTS ARE AIMED AT SELF-PROTECTION, SUSTAINMENT, SECURITY OF KEY PEACE PROCESS INDIVIDUALS, LIMITED HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT AND EMPLOYING EVERY SKILL WE POSSESS TO GET THE PARTIES TO A CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATE BACK TO THE POLITICAL PROCESS.

21. We shall keep you apprised of the situation as it evolves.

22. Best regards..

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Archie Bolster, Senior Reviewer

RELEASED IN FULL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BRUSSE 03953 081041Z
ACTION EUR-01

INFO LOG-00 AF-01 AID-01 CCO-00 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00
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IO-16 L-01 ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01
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AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
JCS WASHDC//J4//J5//IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC//OASD/ISP//IMMEDIATE
USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//J3/J4/BATTLE STAFF//IMMEDIATE
CINCTRANS SCOTT AFB IL//J3/J4//IMMEDIATE
HQUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//DC// IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 03953

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PAGE 02 BRUSSE 03953 081041Z
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PREF, KDEM, RW, BY, BE
SUBJECT: CLAES ASKS SYG FOR CHANGE IN UNAMIR MANDATE; ASKS
FOR USG VIEWS AND SUPPORT

REF: A) JOHNSON MCCULLEY TELCON OF 4/8

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE. URGENT ACTION REQUESTED IN
PARA 4 BELOW.
3. OFFICIAL IN CABINET OF BELGIAN FONMIN CLAES CALLED
EMBASSY MORNING APRIL 8 TO SAY THAT CLAES HAD SPOKEN TO
UNSYG BOUTROS-GHALI MORNING APRIL 8 TO URGE THAT UN
CONSIDER CHANGING/EXTENDING MANDATE OF UNAMIR: A) TO
PROTECT PEOPLE WHO WOULD BE IN DANGER SUCH AS REMAINING
RWANDAN POLITICIANS; AND B) TO ASSIST FOREIGN RESIDENTS

WHO NEED PROTECTION OR WISH TO LEAVE RWANDA IN AN EVACUATION.

3. CLAES IS PRESSING FOR THIS CHANGE IN UNAMIR MANDATE BECAUSE HE IS CONSCIOUS OF THE PERNICIOUS PRECEDENT BELGIUM COULD SET IF IT WERE TO NATIONALIZE ITS TROOPS IN RWANDA AND TURN THEM TO PERFORMING A NATIONAL MISSION OF PROTECTION AND EVACUATION. THE BELGIAN MFA OFFICIAL HINTED AT THE PRECEDENT THAT COULD BE USED BY COUNTRIES WITH TROOPS IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA OR ELSEWHERE.

4. ACTION REQUESTED: THE BELGIAN MFA ASKED FOR A RESPONSE ASAP ON WHAT THE U.S. POSITION WOULD BE ON CLAES' REQUEST. IF POSSIBLE, THE BELGIANS WOULD LIKE US TO
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BRUSSE 03953 081041Z
SUPPORT THIS REQUEST ASAP WITH THE SYG AND AT THE UN. THE BELGIANS HOPE FOR A RESPONSE FROM THE USG BEFORE THEIR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETS AT 3 PM APRIL 7 LOCAL TIME.

5. BUJUMBURA AND KIGALI MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

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SPECIAL OPERATIONS/
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SECDEF HAS SEEN
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2500

APR 09 1994

In reply refer to:
I-94/23905

April 8, 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY *PN*

FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL
OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
Prepared by Colonel Gene Ronsick, x54133

SUBJECT: Rwanda: Current Situation; Next Steps (U)
ACTION MEMORANDUM

PURPOSE: To apprise you of the present state of crisis in Kigali and recommend next steps.

DISCUSSION: ~~(C)~~ Current situation: The RPF (Tutsi) rebel force commander met this morning with the Government general who is now in control of the military (Hutu) and with the UN PKO commander (Canadian). Although there are still fire fights between the RPF forces and the Presidential Guard (Hutu extremists who probably shot down the President's airplane), including around the Ambassador's residence, these discussions are trying to install a cease fire, return the forces to their respective camps, and return the city to civilian governmental control. The Government general has promised to provide military escort for AmEmbassy personnel who are planning to depart tomorrow by road convoy to Bujumbura, Burundi (awaiting State approval of this plan). State has drafted a paper for NSC approval that says the US would support the Belgian informal request for airlift support for a reinforced battalion. The French may ask for airlift also. The Belgian and French military authorities are discussing evacuation of their citizens and want EUCOM planners to join them.

RECOMMENDATION: That you authorize General Joulwan to send a EUCOM planning team to join the combined Belgian/French planning group in Brussels. Based on their analysis and developments on the ground, consider providing airlift for their operation. US ground forces should be considered only as a last resort.

SECDEF APPROVAL

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Other _____


DECLASSIFIED MAY 12 2008
Authority: EO 12958 as amended
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Classified by: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: OADR

05-11-013 #68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Samedi, des combats opposaient les troupes du Front patriotique rwandais (FPR) à l'armée gouvernementale à Mukaranye, à 80 km au nord de Kigali. Les rebelles, qui se sont rapprochés de la capitale, sont désormais le seul espoir des civils tutsis.

RWANDA

KIGALI LIVRÉ À LA FUREUR DES TUEURS HUTUS

Dès l'annonce de la mort du président Habyarimana, mercredi, la garde présidentielle, rejointe par des fanatiques hutus, a commencé la chasse aux Tutsis et aux membres de l'opposition. Alors que les cadavres s'entassent dans les rues, la Croix-Rouge estime que le bilan dépasserait les 10000 victimes.

Kigali, envoyé spécial

Les grilles de la paroisse de Gikondo sont encore entrouvertes et des taches de sang maculent le gravier, devant le parvis de l'église catholique. Deux cadavres en barrent l'entrée. Le crâne béant, la gorge ouverte d'un coup de machette, les yeux qui disent encore l'épouvante des derniers instants. Au bas des escaliers, une lourde porte de métal, fermée à clé. Des faibles appels au secours. Derrière la porte, un tas de cadavres gisant dans les débris, les bris de verre, que les pillards ont laissés derrière eux. De la masse des corps lacérés s'extirpe avec douleur une main qui se tend: Pierre, jeune Tutsi, le visage criblé d'éclats. Il faut le hisser au-dessus de la porte pour tenter de l'évacuer avec l'une des rares Jeeps que le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (CICR), seul dé-

sormais à travailler encore à Kigali, a transformée en ambulance.

Samedi matin, à l'heure de la messe, quatre militaires ont pénétré dans l'église et ont jeté deux grenades. Puis les jeunes fanatiques extrémistes hutus du parti du Président, qu'on appelle les *Intérahamé*, sont entrés, armés de machettes, de couteaux, de sagaies, de tournevis. «*Nous avons entendu des cris d'horreur, des rafales*», raconte un coopérant français, dont la maison se trouve à proximité. «*C'était insoutenable*.» Les corps des hommes qu'on évacue n'ont plus de pénis, les femmes les seins coupés, les enfants égorgés. Pour échapper au massacre, quelques paroissiens ont tenté de s'enfuir par une rue transversale, à la sortie de l'église. Ils ont été bloqués par d'autres fanatiques, et leurs corps mutilés s'amoncellent sur la route. Au total, 70 personnes ont péri, et

seule une douzaine respirent encore.

Les rues de Gikondo, comme tous les quartiers populaires de Kigali, appartiennent depuis quatre jours aux pillards et aux assassins. De tous côtés éclatent des rafales, à peine couvertes par les hurlements de terreur. Courts, secs. Des exécutions sommaires. A côté de l'église, une horde d'une centaine de jeunes, parfois des gosses, tenant en main leur machette ou leur couteau, ont trouvé un accès à un atelier de vélos et repartent chacun avec une machine. Un peu plus loin, ce sont les magasins de vivres et de fuel du CICR et de MSF qui sont pillés, et où retentissent les clameurs d'allégresse.

L'armée rwandaise boucle les quartiers, assiste et participe aux meurtres et aux pillages. Le soir, les cadavres qui jonchent les rues, jusque devant les portes de l'ambassade de France, sont laissés aux chiens affamés. Les prison-

niers ont été sortis des cellules pour ramasser les corps, les empiler dans les camions à ordures du ministère des Transports et tenter de les enterrer quelque part. Partout, sur les collines qui forment la capitale rwandaise, c'est le même spectacle. Depuis que les massacres ont commencé mercredi, les équipes de médecins du CICR doivent quitter l'hôpital à 15 heures pour se réfugier dans leur maison. A cette heure, les soldats et les miliciens extrémistes hutus du parti de l'ex-président sont déjà ivres et harcèlent les rares véhicules. Au détour d'une rue, nous assistons à l'une de ces chasses. Un jeune gamin armé d'une barre de fer maculée de sang pourchasse un Tutsi qui hurle de terreur. Lorsqu'une sœur belge tente de s'interposer, le gamin siffle ses copains. Le courage et la fermeté de la religieuse sauveront, pour quelques heures, le malheureux fuyard.

La chasse aux Tutsis et aux membres de l'opposition a commencé dès l'annonce de la mort de l'ex-président, Juvénal Habyarimana, le 6 avril. Munis de listes, les hommes de la garde présidentielle ont été les premiers à lancer la traque sanglante, rapidement rejoints par les *Intérahamé*. Maison par maison. Les Tutsis, dénoncés par les voisins ou par la police, sont massacrés par familles entières. En cas de doute, les assassins demandent la carte d'identité où est mentionnée l'origine. Parfois, les seuls signes extérieurs de richesse, un visage un peu fin et le nez moins épaté, caractéristiques des Tutsis, suffisent à liquider les malheureux. Les meurtriers ne prennent pas la peine de donner des explications. La mort du Président a déclenché la curée. Pris de court, personne n'a pu s'enfuir. «*Je suis chez ma mère avec les enfants*», raconte Jean-Claude, un Tutsi joint au téléphone vendredi

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Les étrangers évacués

525 Français et des centaines de ressortissants étrangers ont été évacués vers le

Centre-afrique et le Burundi. Des combats à l'arme lourde ont éclaté hier après-midi à la périphérie de Kigali, derrière l'hôtel Méridien, a rapporté le CICR installé dans la capitale. De colline en colline, des combats au mortier, à la grenade et aux armes automatiques continuaient hier soir d'opposer les rebelles du Front patriotique rwandais (FPR, la rébellion de la minorité tutsi) à l'armée. Dans l'après-midi, le chef des Casques bleus belges déployés à Kigali avait pourtant fait état d'un cessez-le-feu «pour l'instant respecté». Une accalmie très relative, qui a permis l'évacuation de 525 Français et de centaines d'autres ressortissants étrangers du Rwanda.

Rassemblés à l'ambassade de France, l'école ou le centre culturel français, les candidats au départ ont été conduits par camions à l'aéroport, sous protection de militaires français. Cinq avions Transall les ont ensuite évacués vers Bangui (Centre-afrique) ou Bujumbura, la capitale du Burundi voisin, d'où ils devaient gagner la France. Hier, le ministre de la Coopération, Michel Roussin, espérait que l'essentiel des quelque 600 Français établis au Rwanda aurait quitté le pays, s'ils le souhaitent. Les militaires français se sont aussi chargés d'évacuer une douzaine de parents du président rwandais dont la mort mercredi a marqué le début des massacres.

Les quelque 1 500 Belges, 350 Allemands, 255 Américains ou 198 Italiens recensés au Rwanda ont également quitté en masse le pays ce week-end, par la route ou par avion. Après avoir autorisés dès samedi les avions français à utiliser l'aéroport de Kigali, les membres de la garde présidentielle, qui contrôlent les pistes, ont accepté dimanche après-midi que des avions belges s'y posent aussi pour accélérer le rapatriement de leurs ressortissants.

Les 460 militaires français dépêchés au Rwanda, de même que les troupes de l'ancienne puissance coloniale belge, ne sont tolérés que le temps des opérations d'évacuation de leurs ressortissants, a insisté ce week-end le Front patriotique rwandais. Ces évacuations ne devraient pas durer «plus de dix ou douze heures» a estimé un représentant à New York du FPR, prévenant qu'au-delà de ce «temps raisonnable» la présence militaire occidentale serait considérée comme «hostile». «Il ne faut pas se retrouver dans la situation de 1990 (après un assaut du FPR, parti de l'Ouganda voisin, ndr), lorsque la France avait aussi engagé une opération d'évacuation de ses ressortissants puis était restée trois ans au Rwanda», ajoutait hier le représentant du FPR à Bruxelles, James Rwego.

«Nous ne sommes pas là pour faire la guerre à quiconque», a répondu hier le ministre de la Défense, François Léotard, assurant, comme le FPR le demande, que l'envoi ce week-end de renforts français au Rwanda n'est qu'une «opération ponctuelle», en attendant que les «opérations d'évacuation puissent être terminées». Une fois achevée l'évacuation des Français, les militaires tricolores pourraient aussi se charger du rapatriement de ressortissants belges et d'autres pays européens, ajoutait-on toutefois de source militaire française.

S. Etr (avec AFP et Reuter)

Quatre questions autour d'un massacre

La rivalité entre les Hutus, l'ethnie majoritaire, et les Tutsis, amplifiée par la colonisation, n'a pas eu les mêmes effets au Rwanda et au Burundi.

Peu près tous les deux, à peu près dans les mêmes proportions, de Hutus largement majoritaires et d'une minorité tutsi (10 à 20% de la population), le Rwanda et le Burundi ont été le théâtre d'effroyables tueries depuis des décennies. Explications:

Est-ce un conflit ethnique ancien?

Il s'agit, à la fois, d'un conflit historique et d'une mystique raciale plaquée sur des réalités concrètes du temps de la colonisation. Si, en effet, les Tutsis ont historiquement envahi et conquis ces deux pays montagneux aux rives des grands lacs, la soumission des Hutus n'a pas empêché l'éclatement d'une culture nationale. Les membres des deux ethnies parlent la même langue et partagent, peu ou prou, les mêmes coutumes. Cependant, la colonisation a amplifié leurs différences raciales, interprétant dans le langage de l'époque — la «haute stature fière du guerrier tutsi» comme l'attribut d'un «surhomme», tandis que le paysan hutu «trapu et lent» serait, pour ainsi dire phylogéniquement, condamné au mome travail de la terre au profit de son suzerain. Cette polarisation ethnique, qui constitue en fait une «histoire réinventée» par l'homme blanc, a été léguée aux deux pays à leur accession à l'indépendance en 1962. Avec une différence: par une révolte quatre ans plus tôt, la majorité hutu au Rwanda s'était affranchie du «joug féodal» de la minorité tutsi, alors qu'au Burundi voisin, par la force des armes, les Tutsis sont restés au pouvoir jusqu'aux premières élections démocratiques, l'an dernier.

Est-ce un conflit ethnique ou politique?

L'opposition entre les deux termes cache davantage la réalité qu'elle ne la révèle car, en Afrique, l'appartenance ethnique constitue une «solidarité primaire» qui, souvent, se confond avec des affiliations partisanes. Pour autant, il est erroné de ramener tout affrontement entre Hutus et Tutsis à une «tuerie tribale», énième manifestation d'une haine atavique dont les raisons se perdraient dans la nuit des temps. De fait, les trois journées sanglantes que vient de vivre le Rwanda démontrent qu'au milieu de pillages et de toutes sortes de règlements de comptes, la violence est ciblée — sans égard pour leur appartenance «tribale» — contre les partisans d'un partage du pouvoir avec la minorité tutsi. C'est ainsi que plusieurs ministres et dignitaires hutus, favorables à l'intégration des Tutsis au sein d'un gouvernement national, ont été recherchés et abattus dans leurs maisons. Ces assassinats politiques ont été perpétrés par la garde présidentielle rwandaise, à 100% hutu, l'un des principaux bénéficiaires du régime d'exclusion. Craignant de perdre ses privilèges après la mort du président rwandais, Habyarimana, et d'être poursuivie pour les massacres de civils commis à son instigation, la garde présidentielle a cédé à une rage d'extermination envers des Tutsis minoritaires autant que vis-à-

vis de l'élite hutu, favorable à l'ouverture démocratique du régime.

Que représente, sur le plan politique et militaire, le Front patriotique rwandais (FPR)?

Il y a deux ans, à partir de l'Ouganda voisin où est installée une partie de la diaspora tutsi forte, au total, de plusieurs centaines de milliers de personnes, le FPR a porté la guerre au Rwanda. Très bien organisé, financé par la communauté tutsi en exil, le FPR dispose d'environ 20 000 combattants. Ceux-ci, tout comme son état-major, se recrutent pour l'essentiel parmi les Tutsis, même si certains dignitaires écartés du régime à Kigali ont rejoint le front. Stoppé aux abords de la capitale rwandaise par une intervention militaire française en 1990, le FPR a par la suite accepté de négocier, avant la tenue d'élections générales, son association au pouvoir pendant une période de transition. De laborieuses tractations ont abouti, en août dernier, à la signature de l'accord d'Arusha. Censé être mis en application sous le contrôle d'un contingent des Nations unies, cet échéancier avait pris beaucoup de retard, dû à l'obstruction du président défunt. Pour sa part, le FPR s'était conformé au plan de transition, en cantonnant toutes ses troupes au nord du pays, à l'exception d'un bataillon de 600 hommes stationnés dans la capitale.


Pourquoi la mort des présidents rwandais et burundais a-t-elle mis au bord de la guerre civile le Rwanda et non le Burundi voisin?

Sans préjuger d'éventuelles retombées violentes au Burundi, ce sont les situations politiques respectives qui expliquent cette différence. Au Rwanda, dix-sept années de dictature militaire, ponctuées de massacres commandités par des proches du Président, ont semé la violence tout en fragilisant la majorité supposée «naturelle»: celle des Hutus. Car, en définitive, la rivalité factionnelle, par exemple entre Hutus du Sud et ceux du Nord, a miné le régime, l'emportant sur l'antagonisme tribal. La preuve: selon tous les indices disponibles à présent, c'est une faction de l'armée rwandaise qui, jeudi, aurait abattu en plein vol l'avion présidentiel.

Au Burundi, la dictature de la minorité tutsi s'est, au contraire, achevée par une transition pacifique sous forme de démocratisation: l'adoption du multipartisme par référendum, en mars 1992, puis l'élection d'un président hutu, Melchior Ndadaye, en juillet dernier. C'est seulement par la suite que les militaires tutsis ont tenté d'arrêter le processus historique par la violence: par un putsch sanglant, en octobre dernier, qui a coûté la vie au Président et à une demi-douzaine de ses collaborateurs, s'accompagnant dans l'ensemble du pays de règlements de comptes qui auraient fait 25 000 morts. Non sans difficultés, au début de l'année, un successeur hutu, Cyprien Ntaryamira, a été désigné comme nouveau Président. Sa mort, jeudi, a de nouveau ouvert à Bujumbura la lutte pour le pouvoir.

Stephen SMITH (à Johannesburg)

REPERES



LE RWANDA

Pays enclavé de 26 336 km² en Afrique centrale.

● **Population.** 7,1 millions d'habitants (234 500 à Kigali, la capitale), dont plus de 90% de l'ethnie hutu.

● **Religion.** Chrétiens (65%), animistes (20%), musulmans (9%).

● **Histoire.** Ancien Etat monarchique colonisé par l'Allemagne en 1898, sous mandat belge avec le Burundi à partir de 1922. Indépendant depuis le 1^{er} juillet 1962. Grégoire Kayibanda, le premier président de la République, sera renversé le 5 juillet 1973 par le général Juvénal Habyarimana. Après dix-sept ans de régime de parti unique, le multipartisme a été instauré le 10 juin 1991. Fin décembre 1991, neuf partis politiques ont été reconnus.

● **Chronologie.** Le Rwanda est depuis une trentaine d'années le théâtre de massacres interethniques entre Hutus (majoritaires) et Tutsis.

● **En novembre 1959,** la rivalité historique entre les deux principales ethnies éclate: les paysans hutus se révoltent contre leurs anciens seigneurs féodaux tutsis, dont plusieurs milliers sont massacrés.

● **Fin 1963,** un an et demi après l'indépendance et l'accession au pouvoir des Hutus, des Tutsis commencent une guérilla. La répression fera entre 10 et 20 000 morts chez les Tutsis. Plus de 100 000 fuiront au Burundi.

● **En octobre 1990,** 1 500 rebelles tutsis du Front patriotique rwandais (FPR) passent à l'offensive. C'est le début de la guerre civile. Des milliers de Tutsis seront massacrés de façon systématique par l'armée.

● **Le 4 août 1993,** accord d'Arusha (Tanzanie) entre le gouvernement et le FPR qui prévoit la mise en place d'un gouvernement transitoire et le déploiement d'une force internationale.

● **Le 6 avril 1994,** les présidents rwandais et burundais périssent à bord d'un Mystère-Falcon 50, apparemment touché à l'atterrissage à Kigali par une ou plusieurs roquettes. Un gouvernement intérimaire est formé de ministres opposés à un partage du pouvoir avec les Tutsis. Mécontent, le FPR fait marcher ses troupes sur la capitale.

● **Le 7 avril,** les massacres commencent dans la capitale. Le Premier ministre tutsi, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, est assassiné. Les dix Casques bleus belges, qui assuraient sa protection, sont tués.

● **Le 9 avril,** arrivée de 191 parachutistes français, ainsi que plusieurs centaines de parachutistes belges.

soir dans son quartier. Le corps de mon voisin et de sa femme sont là dans le caniveau. Devant la maison. Les Hutus sont venus une fois ici et m'ont dit qu'ils reviendraient ce soir. Nous attendons notre exécution. Nous sommes perdus.» Les petits groupes qui parviennent à se cacher attendent avec terreur leur tour n'espérant plus qu'une entrée dans la ville des rebelles du FPR, le Front patriotique rwandais, à majorité tutsi.

Epouse d'un ex-ministre de Habyarimana, une jeune femme accompagnée de ses cinq filles s'est réfugiée à l'hôtel des Mille Collines. «Je suis moi-même hutu, mais ils n'ont pas voulu me croire. Même lorsque mon fils a montré une photo de lui en compagnie du Président, ils ont prétendu que j'étais tutsi. Nous avons trouvé refuge ailleurs, mais ils sont revenus et ont tué les deux familles qui étaient avec nous. Ils ont tiré trois balles dans le cœur des bébés.»

Soupçonnés d'être soit trop proches de l'opposition, soit trop proches des Tutsis, beaucoup de Hutus du Sud sont liquidés par leurs voisins du Nord.

L'ampleur du massacre est impossible à chiffrer avec exactitude. A l'hôpital central de Kigali, où pourrissent depuis trois jours près de 400 cadavres, il a fallu entasser les corps mutilés dans la cour. Dimanche matin, une mère nous a désigné son fils, encore vivant, enseveli par erreur et dans la panique sous la pile de cadavres. Difficile extraction pour réussir enfin à l'amener au bloc opératoire. Hier matin toujours, l'armée est entrée dans l'hôpital et a sorti des blessés, à coups de crosses. Sept d'entre eux ont été exécutés sur-le-champ. Les médecins européens, exténués, tentent d'évacuer l'hôpital central et de le déplacer. Au regard de ces exactions, la peur des Européens, qui ont pour la plupart évacué la ville hier (lire ci-contre), semble un peu dérisoire. Mais les scènes d'adieu sont déchirantes, particulièrement chez les Belges. Avec des amis de longue date, tutsis pour la plupart, qu'il est impossible d'emmener avec soi.

Les maisons des expatriés sont aujourd'hui désertes, encore pleine d'un futur butin, meubles, vêtements, électronique, laissés sur place. Les 2 500 soldats de l'ONU sont invisibles, terrés dans leur quartier. Dimanche après-midi, un long convoi d'une centaine de voitures, bourrées de Canadiens, d'Allemands, d'Américains, s'est ébranlé sous escorte vers Bujumbura, capitale du Burundi. Le matin et l'après-midi, les Français ont été évacués par avion. Quelques minutes après, les bombardements d'artillerie lourde et les rafales ont repris aux portes de la ville, sans qu'il soit possible de savoir si les rebelles du FPR arrivent en force pour prendre la ville ou s'il ne s'agit que de combats avec les forces rebelles ayant évacué la capitale. Les contacts radio avec l'extérieur donnent à penser qu'ils sont à quinze kilomètres de la capitale. Mais avant qu'ils ne s'emparent de la ville, pour autant qu'ils le puissent, le génocide des Tutsis de Kigali aura probablement eu lieu. Le CICR, dans ses estimations les plus prudentes, affirme que le nombre des victimes dépasserait à ce jour 10 000 morts dans la capitale.

Jean-Philippe CEPPI

● Le ministère des Affaires étrangères, qui a mis en place «une cellule de contact avec les familles» françaises au Rwanda, communique un nouveau numéro de téléphone pour la joindre. Il s'agit du 16 (1) 45.50.34.60 qui s'ajoute aux numéros suivants: 40.63.31.31, 40.63.31.57, 40.63.31.64.

April 11, 1994
I-94/16533

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY/COVER BRIEF

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

THROUGH: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs

FROM: Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East
Africa
Prepared by: LtCol Harvin:MEA:x78824

SUBJECT: Talking Points On Rwanda/Burundi (U)

PURPOSE: INFORMATION--Talking points for your dinner
tonight with Mr. Kissinger.

DISCUSSION: (U) Action Officers in H&RA, PK/PE, and MEA
collaborated on the attached talking points.

COORDINATION

ASD/SOLIC _____

ASD/SR&R _____

Atch: a/s

RWANDA/BURUNDI

- **What is State doing now?**
Just beginning to look at next steps (DCM Leader will brief at State tomorrow).
Expect little beyond diplomatic statements.
- **What next in Rwanda?**
Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) will maintain 48-hour cease-fire to allow ex-pats to depart.
UN will likely withdraw all UN forces.
Following the 48-hour cease fire period, RPF forces will attempt to take Kigali and will come into open warfare with any remaining French, Belgian, or UN forces.
Civilians will increasingly be drawn into the conflict and fighting will likely spread to Burundi.
AmEmbassy Bujumbura is under "Ordered Departure" and is drawing down from its 46 official/31 dependents to essential personnel only (planning on 22, could drop lower).
Unofficial U.S. personnel normally number between 100-150, but many may have already departed.
- **Will Burundi's newly democratic, Hutu-led Government fall?**
Probably. Given the close tribal ties to the parties in Rwanda, it is highly likely that inter-tribal killings will spread.
A NEO should not be necessary given the prior warning foreign citizens are getting.
- **Is the USG willing to get involved?**
Not inside Rwanda or Burundi until peace is restored.
We played an important role in brokering the Arusha Accords.
As the only "honest broker" left on the field (given the intense hatred of Belgium by the Rwandan Hutus and of France by the Tutsis) we could (and should) play a critical diplomatic role in urging the parties to adhere to the Arusha peace agreement.
We would want to restart our security assistance program once the peace process is back on track.
- **What is happening at the U.N.?**
Security Council is meeting today to discuss future of UNAMIR, probably will take no action--everyone waiting for UNAMIR Commander's recommendations. USUN has not been given guidance.
There is some support in the USG for leaving the Commander and a small support staff in Kigali. He seems to be the only person who can talk to both sides.
- **What are the humanitarian issues, and what can DoD do?**
Since last Wednesday, 5,000 refugees have fled Rwanda to Zaire, 5,000 Burundi have fled to Tanzania in anticipation of more violence, and UNHCR in Tanzania is expecting 100-250,000 more.
UNHCR has refugee support food in Zaire for 10 days. DoD may be asked to airlift relief supplies. If State requests, H&RA can provide MREs, Humanitarian Daily Rations, consumable medical and other supplies for disaster relief.

RWANDA

DoD POLICY OPTIONS

- Because of the fluidity of the situation and the obvious requirement to focus on the NEO, State has not yet begun to look at its next steps re: U.S. Policy toward Rwanda and will not do so for a few days. DCM Joyce Leader will brief at State tomorrow. AMB Rawson will remain in Burundi for a few day. The Burundi Government wants the additional US Marines in Bujumbura to depart as soon as all AmCits are out of Rwanda--we support that request. (State Rwanda TF)
- State will likely shut down its Rwanda Task Force NLT Wednesday morning. (State Rwanda TF)
- We believe State will initially limit itself to diplomatic statements in support of the UN, the French, the Belgians, and the necessity for both sides to resume the peace process. Of note: this crisis will likely raise questions at the UN about the wisdom of including lightly armed troops in a Chapter VI PKO instead of only unarmed observers (who would probably have been well-treated like most other un-armed ex-pats).
- Unless both sides can be convinced to return to the peace process, a massive (hundreds of thousands of deaths) bloodbath will ensue that would likely spill over into Burundi. In addition, millions of refugees will flee into neighboring Uganda, Tanzania, and Zaire, far exceeding the absorptive capacity of those nations. Since neither the French nor the Belgians have the trust of both sides in the conflict, they are unlikely to be able to convince the parties to return to the peace process--thus there will be role to play for the U.S. as the "honest broker."
- One of the primary U.S. representatives at the last round of peace negotiations was an ISA alum, LTC Tony Marley, who is assigned to the Africa Regional Affairs office at State. He is known and trusted by both sides and will likely be called upon to play a significant role once more if the peace process can be put in motion.
- When the peace process is back on track, we should resume our security assistance program:

Recent Security Assistance Summary (\$ in Millions):

	<u>FY91</u>	<u>FY92</u>	<u>FY93</u>	<u>FY94</u>	<u>FY95</u> (PROPOSED)
FMF	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
CIVIC ACTION	.135	.150	0.0	0.0	0.0
BIODIVERSITY	.525	N/A	.525	N/A	N/A
IMET/DIRECT TRNG.	.060	.070	.127	.075	.150
IMET Students	3	3	5	4	8

Prepared by LtCol Harvin, 11 April 94, X78824

CLASSIFIED BY: DIR, AFR REGION
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF:
OSD
DATE: 18 Nov 1998
CASE #: 95-F-0894

YKF 635

UNAMIR

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MOST IMMEDIATE

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

TO : BOOH-BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK


DATE : 12 APRIL 1994

Attached, for your information, is a press release issued
this morning in New York by the Secretary-General.

Regards.



FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS
RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



12 April 1994

PRESS RELEASE

The Rwandese Patriotic Front forces have now entered the Rwandan Capital, Kigali, and are engaging elements of Rwandan government forces, which we hope to neutralize very soon.

The so called Interim government, composed of Criminals who have masterminded the massacre of opposition politicians, human rights activists, United Nations peacekeepers and thousands of innocent Rwandan Civilians, particularly those of Tutsi ethnic origin, has now fled the Capital.

The evacuation of foreign nationals is almost complete and all foreign troops are expected to leave Rwanda within 24 hours.

Despite the fact that a systematic genocide of Tutsi and Hutu opposition politicians has been carried out by a gang of extremist Hutu elements, the media has unfairly treated this crisis as tribal conflict. We wish to make it clear that this is a political conflict and not a tribal conflict. The Rwandese Patriotic Front is not a Tutsi rebel group, but a national organisation that advocates national Unity, democracy and security for people and their property.

Our immediate objective is to stop the senseless killing of innocent people and to restore law and order in Rwanda. We call upon both the national and International Community to support this noble objective.

Claude Dusaidi
Rwandese Patriotic Representative
at the United Nations

<p>RELEASED IN FULL</p>

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PAGE 01 NAIROB 06551 121419Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00 C-01 OASY-00 DODE-00 DOEE-00 EUR-01
HA-09 H-01 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-16 L-01 ADS-00
NSAE-00 NSCE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-00 PRS-01
P-01 SNP-00 SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00
PMB-00 /036W

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P 121414Z APR 94
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8323
INFO AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//ECJ-4// PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL NAIROBI 06551

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PINS, PINR, RW
SUBJECT: COLONEL BLAMES RIGHT WING MILITARY FOR
- KIGALI'S NIGHTMARE

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. IN TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH DCM LEADER
CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 NAIROB 06551 121419Z
4/10, A WELL-PLACED RWANDAN ARMY COLONEL CREDITED A
SECRET MILITARY/CIVILIAN ORGANIZATION WITH ORDERING THE
KIGALI ATROCITIES. HE PLEADED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY TO CONDEMN THE KILLINGS, INTERVENE TO END THE
FIGHTING, AND HELP MILITARY/CIVILIAN MODERATES
REESTABLISH DIALOGUE WITH THE RPF. END SUMMARY.

3. COLONEL RUSATIRA, DIRECTOR OF THE MILITARY TRAINING
ACADEMY IN KIGALI SINCE MID-1992 AND SECRETARY GENERAL
OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE FOR NEARLY TWO DECADES BEFORE
THAT, ARGUED TO DCM IN TELEPHONE CONVERSATION 7/10 THAT
THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD HAD ACTED ON THE ORDERS OF A
SECRET MILITARY/CIVILIAN ORGANIZATION IN COMMITTING THE
KIGALI ATROCITIES. HE SAID THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, WITH
THE HELP OF COMMUNAL POLICE, WAS ACTING ON ORDERS OF
AMASASU, A SECRET ORGANIZATION THAT OCCASIONALLY ISSUES
PRO-HABYARIMANA COMMUNIQUES ON POLITICAL AND MILITARY

<p>REVIEW AUTHORITY: Charles Daris, Senior Reviewer</p>

ISSUES. HE SAID THE PRESIDENT'S DEATH WAS THE PROVOCATION NEEDED TO PUT A LONG-STANDING PLAN INTO EFFECT.

5. RUSATIRA SAID SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS MET THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE AFTERNOON OF 4/9 AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY. SEVERAL TOLD THE MINISTER HE MUST DENOUNCE THE ATROCITIES AND DISMANTLE THE GROUP COMMITTING THEM. HE SAID OFFICERS TOLD THE MINISTER THEY KNEW THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD HAD RECEIVED ORDERS TO KILL SOUTHERN HUTUS, OPPOSITION PARTY MEMBERS AND TUTSIS. RUSATIRA NAMED HIMSELF, COL. GATSINZI (NEWLY NAMED CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY), AND COL. RWABALINDA (LIAISON OFFICER WITH THE UN FORCES) AMONG OTHERS DEMANDING THAT THE MINISTER

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 NAIROB 06551 121419Z
TAKE STEPS TO END THE MASSACRES.

6. RUSATIRA PLEADED WITH DCM FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO CONDEMN THE ATROCITIES WITHOUT WAITING FOR AN INVESTIGATION. HE LAMENTED THAT THE KILLING SURPASSED ALL IMAGINATION, WITH WHOLE FAMILIES BEING DECIMATED. HE CITED THE EXAMPLE OF TUTSI MINISTER AND PEACE NEGOTIATOR LANDOALD NDASINGWA WHO, HE SAID, HAD BEEN KILLED ALONG WITH HIS WIFE AND CHILDREN.

7. THE COLONEL URGED THAT THE US ENCOURAGE FRENCH OR BELGIAN INTERVENTION TO STOP THE ESCALATION OF FIGHTING AND TO PROTECT RWANDANS. HE ARGUED THAT THERE IS NO LARGE FORCE ON THE GROUND IN RWANDA AS IN SOMALIA AND THAT IT WOULD NOT BE DIFFICULT FOR FRENCH AND BELGIAN TROOPS TO GAIN CONTROL OF THE SITUATION.

8. FINALLY, HE URGED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WORK WITH "PEOPLE OF GOOD WILL" TO REESTABLISH THE DIALOGUE WITH THE RPF AND RENEW THE ARUSHA PEACE PROCESS. "WE DON'T HAVE THE STRENGTH TO DO IT BY OURSELVES," HE SAID. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST UNDERSTAND, HE SAID, THAT THESE HORRIBLE ACTS ARE NOT THE WILL OF THE ENTIRE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN RWANDA.

9. COMMENT. IN RUSATIRA'S VOICE WAS A DESPARATE PLEA FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO HELP MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MODERATES WHO WANT TO REESTABLISH ORDER AND SANITY IN RWANDA. ACCORDING TO A GENDARME CONTACT MET BY CHANCE OUTSIDE EMBASSY NAIROBI LATER 4/10, RUSATIRA WAS REPORTEDLY ONE OF SEVERAL SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 NAIROB 06551 121419Z
WORKING HARD SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF THE KILLINGS TO
REESTABLISH ARMY DISCIPLINE. THE GENDARME, ACTIVE IN
PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, SAID HE
WAS IN DANGER FROM THE MILITARY AND WAS EVACUATING HIS
FAMILY TO THE SOUTH.

10. BUJUMBURA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
BRAZEAL

CONFIDENTIAL

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K0236130

Communiqué issued by the Command of the *Forces Armées Rwandaises*

Following the tragic events of 6 April 1994, which have plunged the country into mourning, caused numerous innocent victims and led to great distress for the Rwandan people as a whole, and following the hideous murder of ten UNAMIR soldiers and other foreign nationals, the Command of the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* considers that it is more than high time to put an end to this tragedy.

To this effect, it would be highly desirable for the Command of the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* to meet immediately with the RPF Command so as to examine together how to pacify the country with no further delay, contribute to the rapid establishment of the Broad Based Transitional Institutions, and avoid any further pointless bloodshed.

The Command of the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* recognises UNAMIR's unflagging efforts, sometimes foiled, for the total implementation of the Arusha Accords and requests it serve as a go-between for the above-mentioned meetings.


In order to facilitate dialogue and stop the wave of panic that has swept through the population, it is desirable that the fighting be suspended. To achieve this goal, the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* wish to propose a truce to RPF forces that would begin on 13 April 1994 at 12 o'clock.

K0236131

On behalf of the Command of the *Forces Armées Rwandaises*, the field officers who attended the meeting:

- Colonel Léonidas Rusatira [Signed]
- Colonel BEM Marcel Gatsinzi [Signed]
- Colonel BEMS Félicien Muberuka [Signed]
- Colonel BEMSG Aloys Ntiwiragabo [Signed]
- Colonel André Kanyamanza [Signed]
- Colonel Joseph Murasampongo [Signed]
- Colonel Edouard Hakizimana [Signed]
- Lieutenant Colonel BEM Ephrem Rwabalinda [Signed]
- Lieutenant Colonel BEMS Augustin Rwamanywa [Signed]
- Lieutenant Colonel Emmanuel Kanyandekwe [Signed]


Kigali 12 April 1994



CNP 088 22/3

2-14

FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS
RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT



(1)

New York, 13 April 1994

H.E. Ambassador Colin Keating
President of The UN Security Council
United Nations
New York

Mr. President,

A crime of genocide has been committed against the Rwandese people, in the presence of a United Nations International force, and the International Community has stood by and only watched.

Efforts have been mobilized to rescue foreign nationals from the horrifying events in Rwanda, but there has been no concrete action on the part of the International Community to protect innocent Rwandese children, women and men who have been crying for help.

In the absence of International action to save innocent Rwandan people, the Rwandese Patriotic Front is obliged and has a moral responsibility to protect Rwandese people from barbaric and savage criminals. It is the intention of the Rwandese Patriotic Front to neutralize elements of the Rwandese army that are responsible for these massacres, bring an end to the senseless killing of innocent Rwandans, opposition politicians as well as UN peacekeepers, and restore law and order. The International Community should mobilize all its efforts to support this noble task, instead of calling for ceasefires that would only allow the criminals in Rwanda to continue committing atrocities.

We wish to request the International Community, through you Mr. President, to immediately set up a UN war crimes tribunal, apprehend those who have committed crimes against humanity in Rwanda and bring them to justice. Mr. President, the perpetrators of these atrocities in Rwanda are known and with UN assistance they can be brought to justice. By doing this, Mr. President, the UN will have rendered a noble service to the Rwandan people, who deserve it as members of this world community.

©

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-2-

Mr. President, the Rwandese Patriotic Front wishes to confirm to members of the Security Council its commitment to the Arusha Peace Agreement and as soon as the situation in Rwanda is stabilized, the Rwandese Patriotic Front will cooperate with UNAMIR, to set up broad-based institutions in the spirit of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

Please accept Mr. President, my highest regards.

Yours sincerely,

Claude Dusaidi
Director for External Relations and,
RPF Representative at the UN



RELEASED IN FULL

PAGE 01 BUJUMB 01299 01 OF 05 160220Z
ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	COR-01	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	EUR-01
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	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-00
	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-00	SP-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	RPE-01	PMB-00	/040W			

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P 150830Z APR 94
FM AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3355
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
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AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY
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USDAO YAOUNDE CM PRIORITY
DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//ECJ-4// PRIORITY
JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BUJUMBURA 01299

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (SUBJECT LINE)
E.O. 12356: OADR:DECL.
TAGS: PINS, PINR, PGOV, MOPS, RW
SUBJECT: NED FROM KIGALI AND AN ANALYSIS OF WHAT HAPPENED
FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S DEATH AND WHY

REF: NAIROBI 6551

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1. THIS IS A JOINT STATE/DIA CABLE THAT ATTEMPTS TO PROVIDE A CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNTING OF EVENTS FROM THE TIME OF PRESIDENT HABYARIMANA'S DEATH AT ABOUT 21:30 P.M. ON 6 APRIL UNTIL THE DEPARTURE OF THE LAST U.S. CONVOY OUT OF KIGALI AT 13:00 P.M. ON 10 APRIL. THE RECOUNTING OF EVENTS COMES FROM A LOG MAINTAINED BY ECONOFF WITH INPUT FROM OTHER EMBOFFS AND DISCUSSIONS WITH VARIOUS THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS. THIS REPORT DOES NOT PRETEND TO BE 100 PERCENT ACCURATE BUT ONLY PROVIDES THE EMBASSY TEAMS' UNDERSTANDING OF EVENTS THAT TRANSPIRED IN A CONFUSING AND DANGEROUS ENVIRONMENT.

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2. WE WILL ALSO ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN WHY CERTAIN EVENTS TOOK PLACE AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE MILITARY AND PROVIDE AN ASSESSMENT AS TO WHERE THE COUNTRY IS HEADED NOW.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS:

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6

9:00 P.M. FIRST EXPLOSION HEARD, UNAMIR REPORTS IT IS HEADING TOWARD THE AIRPORT TO INVESTIGATE.

9:30 P.M. RADIO RTLM REPORTS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PLANE IS SHOT DOWN.

9:35 P.M. GENDARME DETACHMENT AT KANOMBE
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AIRPORT REPORT THAT THEY WERE IN COMMUNICATION WITH THE PRESIDENT'S PLANE JUST BEFORE IT CRASHED. COMMUNICATION WAS CUT WHEN THE ELECTRICITY WENT OUT FOR SEVERAL MINUTES AT THE AIRPORT.

10:45 P.M. RPF SAYS ITS FORCES IN THE CND COMPOUND ARE ON ALERT.

11:30 P.M. COL MARCHAL (UNAMIR KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER) TELLS ECONOFF THAT PRESIDENT IS CONFIRMED DEAD.

12:00 P.M. CONTACTED RSO IN BUJUMBURA TO ADVISE THAT SECURITY SITUATION IN KIGALI WAS DETERIORATING RAPIDLY.

THURSDAY, APRIL 7

5:00 A.M. HEAVY MORTAR FIRE HEARD, FOLLOWED BY AUTOMATIC WEAPONS FIRE

PRESIDENTIAL GUARD UNITS BEGIN ENTERING HOMES, LOOKING FOR OPPOSITION MINISTERS. TACTICS USED: PRESIDENTIAL GUARD THROWS GRENADES INTO HOMES, FORCING OCCUPANTS OUT; SOLDIERS THEN SHOOT FLEEING

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OCCUPANTS.
FIRST REPORTS THAT GOR FORCES HAVE
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CONTROL OF THE AIRPORT.

6:00 A.M. PRIVATE AND OFFICIAL AMERICAN
WARDEN SYSTEM ACTIVATED

9:45 A.M. FIRE FIGHT BEGINS ON KIMIHURURA
BETWEEN PRESIDENTIAL GUARD AND
UNIDENTIFIED GOR FORCES. (RPF STILL
HAS NOT FIRED ON ANY GOR FORCES).

10:00 A.M. DCM LEADER'S HOUSE OCCUPIED BY
SEVERAL PRESIDENTIAL GUARD SOLDIERS
WHO ARE LOOKING FOR THE ACTING
PRIME MINISTER.

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INFO	LOG-00	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	EUR-01	HA-09	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-00	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-00
	SP-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	RPE-01	PMB-00

/037W

-----3C93CF 152244Z /38

P 150830Z APR 94
FM AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3356
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
USDAO YAOUNDE CM PRIORITY
DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ-4// PRIORITY
JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 05 BUJUMBURA 01299

C O R R E C T E D COPY (ADDING SUBJECT LINE - PLEASE
CORRECT ALL SECTIONS)

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E.O. 12356: OADR:DECL.

TAGS: PINS, PINR, PGOV, MOPS, RW

SUBJECT: NEO FROM KIGALI AND AN ANALYSIS OF WHAT HAPPENED
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PAGE 02 BUJUMB 01299 02 OF 05 152233Z
FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S DEATH AND WHY

11:00 A.M. SOLDIERS LEAVE DCM'S HOUSE,
THREATENING HER AGAINST USE OF HER
TELEPHONE.

11:05 A.M. WILLARD MUNGER OF MUDENDE
UNIVERSITY REPORTS THAT CIVILIANS
HAVE ENTERED UNIVERSITY COMPOUND
AND BEGUN KILLING TUTSI STUDENTS,
INCLUDING THE SON OF THE MINISTER
OF AGRICULTURE. ECONOFF CONTACTS
GISENYI GENDARMES ASKING FOR
ASSISTANCE.

11:10 A.M. GAKONI ORPHANAGE REPORTS ETHNICALLY
MOTIVATE KILLINGS ON ITS COMPOUND;
28 INITIALLY REPORTED DEAD. ECONOFF
CONTACTS UNAMIR DMZ COMMANDER, COL
YAATSE, ASKING IF A UN PATROL CAN
BE SENT IMMEDIATELY TO ASSIST
AMCITS AT THE ORPHANAGE.

12:00 P.M. EMBOFFS BEGIN RECEIVING REPORTS
THAT MINISTER OF INFORMATION, LABOR
AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, AND AGRICULTURE
ARE DEAD.

12:20 P.M. EMBOFFS BEGINNING HEARING REPORTS
FROM VARIOUS CONTACTS THAT MINISTER
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OF LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND
ACTING PRIME MINISTER ARE BOTH
DEAD; UNAMIR GUARDS PROTECTING THEM
HAVE ALSO BEEN KILLED; 7 OF THE 10
BELGIAN SOLDIERS PROTECTING ACTING
PRIME MINISTER REPORTEDLY CUT UP
INTO PIECES RATHER THAN BEING SHOT.

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13:15 P.M. MEMBERS OF ASIAN BUSINESS ASSOCIATION REPORT STORES IN DOWN TOWN KIGALI BEING LOOTED.

14:00 P.M. ROZ CARR REPORTS ETHNIC KILLINGS IN MUTURA

14:30 P.M. HEAVY FIGHTING REPORTED NEAR PRIME MINISTER DESIGNATE'S HOUSE, AIRPORT RUNWAY REPORTED BLOCKED WITH TRUCKS AND EQUIPMENT.

14:35 P.M. REPORTS THAT FRENCH MILITARY ON ALERT IN BANGUI

14:45 P.M. CONTACT RSO BUJUMBURA TO GIVE SITUATION REPORT.

15:00 P.M. REPORTS FROM GIKONDO AREA RESIDENTS THAT BOTH GOR FORCES AND CIVILIANS (BELIEVED TO BE INTERHAMWE) ARE ENTERING HOUSES AND KILLING TUTSI OCCUPANTS.

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UNAMIR NO LONGER ANSWERING TELEPHONE AT FORCE HEADQUARTERS OF KIGALI SECTOR COMMAND; LATER REPORTS THAT FORCE HEADQUARTERS HIT BY MORTAR.

RPF ISSUES ULTIMATUM THROUGH UNAMIR TO THE GOR FORCES THAT THEY WILL BE FORCED TO ATTACK IF THE GOR DOES NOT STOP THE KILLING IN KIGALI WITHIN 12 HOURS.

16:00 P.M.

REFUGEES STREAM INTO EMR CLAIMING RPF WILL SHOOT THEM IF THEY SEEK REFUGUE IN NEARBY CHURCHES ACROSS THE ROAD.

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INFO	LOG-00	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	EUR-01	HA-09	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-00	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-00
	SP-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	RPE-01	PMB-00

/037W

-----3C9427 152250Z /38

P 150830Z APR 94
 FM AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3357
 INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY
 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
 USDAO YAOUNDE CM PRIORITY
 DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
 USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//ECJ-4// PRIORITY
 JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 05 BUJUMBURA 01299

C O R R E C T E D COPY (ADDING SUBJ LINE - PLS CORR ALL SECTIONS)

E.O. 12356: OADR:DECL.
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18:00 P.M. FIGHTING DIMINISHES SIGNIFICANTLY;
 ONLY KIMIHURURA AND GIKONDO REPORT
 SPORADIC GUNFIRE; EMBASSY PROVIDES
 RADIO WARDEN MESSAGE WHICH IS
 TRANSMITTED VIA TELEPHONE TO
 PRIVATE AMCITS.

19:30 P.M. DATT, ECONOFF AND RSO DISCUSS
 POSSIBILITY OF OVERLAND EVACUATION.
 AMBASSADOR ASKS THAT DATT AND
 ECONOFF BEGIN PLANNING OF
 EVACUATION.

20:00 P.M. SPORADIC GUNFIRE AND GRENADE BLASTS
 HEARD THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT

FRIDAY, APRIL 8

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1:00 A.M. TWO OFFICIAL AMCIT HOUSES TAKE HITS DURING THE NIGHT; HEAVY FIGHTING REPORTED IN KIMIHURURA.

8:00 A.M. WARDEN MESSAGE TO ALL AMCITS

9:00 A.M. ALL HOUSES IN KIMIHURURA AND KACIKIRU LOOSE ELECTRICITY AND TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS

10:00 A.M. OFFICIAL AMERICANS ADVISED TO TURN OFF THEIR RADIOS AND ONLY TURN THEM ON EVERY HOUR ON THE HOUR FOR FIVE
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MINUTES FOR SECURITY UPDATES.

11:00 A.M. DATT, PC ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER, ECONOFF AND GSO ASSISTANT ESCORTED TO EMBASSY BY GENDARMES.

13:00 P.M. DATT AND ECONOFF MEET WITH GENERAL DALLAIRE AT MINISTRY OF DEFENSE TO ADVISE HIM THAT WE ARE PLANNING AN OVERLAND EVACUATION; GENERAL DALLAIRE SAYS HE IS NEGOTIATING

16:00 P.M. IN FIRE FIGHT BEHIND EMR, FAR SHOOTS INTO EMR COMPOUND, KILLING ONE CHILD AND WOUNDING TWO ADULTS. WITH MGEN NDINDILYIMANA TO ESTABLISH THE TERMS OF A CEASE FIRE

AT THIS POINT, ECONOFF COULD NO LONGER CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN A LOG AS PLANNING FOR EVACUATION WAS BEGUN REQUIRING CONTINUOUS CONTACT WITH BOTH PRIVATE AND OFFICIAL AMCITS.

TEAM WITHIN THE EMBASSY ESTABLISHED OPEN LINE WITH STATE OPS CENTER AND EUCOM. THROUGHOUT THE DAY, CONTACTS WERE MADE WITH THE FRENCH AND FAR MILITARY FOR SECURITY UPDATES. DATT BEGAN NEGOTIATING WITH FAR AND ECONOFF WITH THE RPF THROUGH UNAMIR LIAISON FOR GUARANTEE OF SAFE PASSAGE FOR AMCIT CONVOYS. INITIAL PLANS MADE FOR GROUND EVACUATION FROM THREE ASSEMBLY POINTS: AMERICAN CLUB, AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE, AND
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 KIGALI INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL. AS PART OF THE PLANNING,
 GSO (FROM HER RESIDENCE), ECONOFF AND GSO ASSISTANT
 BEGAN CONTACTING AMERICANS VIA RADIO AND/OR TELEPHONE
 PROVIDING INSTRUCTIONS AND FINDING OUT IF AMCITS CAN
 REACH DESIGNATED ASSEMBLY POINTS. ECONOFF ALSO TRIES
 COORDINATING WITH UNAMIR TO ASSIST AMCITS OUTSIDE
 KIGALI.

SATURDAY, APRIL 9

AT 3:00 A.M, EMBOFFS HEAR PLANE LANDING; REPORTS
 LATER THAT FRENCH MILITARY LANDED AND SECURED
 AIRFIELD. EUCOM NOTIFIES EMBASSY OF AVAILABILITY OF
 AIRCRAFT FOR AIR EVACUATION, BUT ALSO LEAVE OPTION
 OPEN FOR GROUND EVACUATION. AT APPROXIMATELY 08:00

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 ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	EUR-01	HA-09	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-00	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-00
	SP-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00	RPE-01	PMB-00

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-----3C94AE 152259Z /38

P 150830Z APR 94
 FM AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3358
 INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY
 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
 USDAO YAOUNDE CM PRIORITY
 DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
 USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//ECJ-4// PRIORITY
 JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 05 BUJUMBURA 01299

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 A.M., AMBASSADOR IN CONSULTATION WITH EMBOFFS DECIDES
 ON THE GROUND EVACUATION OPTION FROM KIGALI, THROUGH
 BUTARE, TO BUJUMBURA. EMBOFFS UNDER THE IMPRESSION
 THAT TEMPORARY CEASEFIRE NEGOTIATED THE DAY BEFORE
 HAD GONE INTO EFFECT AT 6:00 A.M.

DATT ARRANGES FOR GENDARME ESCORTS FOR THREE CONVOYS
 SENT OUT AT 12:30, 13:10 AND 14:00 P.M. MOST
 AMERICANS LEAVE IN THE FIRST OF THESE THREE CONVOYS.
 FIRST CONVOY CROSSES THE BORDER BEFORE 18:00 P.M. THE
 OTHER TWO CONVOYS ARRIVE AFTER BORDER CLOSED. WITH
 ASSISTANCE FROM RSO BUJUMBURA, REMAINING TWO CONVOYS
 CROSS BOARDER AT 3:00 A.M.
 SUNDAY, APRIL 10

EMBOFFS RECEIVE REPORTS THAT CEASEFIRE NOT HOLDING
 AND THAT RPF IS ADVANCING ON KIGALI. DECISION MADE TO
 EVACUATE ALL REMAINING AMERICANS INCLUDING SKELETON
 EMBASSY CREW PRIOR TO 12:00 P.M. AGAIN UNAMIR AND FAR
 CONTACTED FOR SAFE PASSAGE GUARANTEES FOR AMERICAN
 CONVOYS. TWO CONVOYS LEFT KIGALI, AFTER HEROIC
 EFFORTS ARE MADE BY EMBOFF WALT MEYERS AND PRIVATE
 CANADIAN CITIZEN VERNON DEMILLE TO GET REMAINING
 AMERICANS TRAPPED IN GIKONODO AND KACIKIRU TO
 ASSEMBLY POINTS. ONE CONVOY DEPARTS AT 11:00 A.M.;
 THE SECOND CONVOY DEPARTS AT 13:30 P.M. WITH 108
 VEHICLES AND 600 PEOPLE (ONLY 9 OF WHICH ARE
 AMERICANS). THE SECOND CONVOY SWELLED IN SIZE AS
 GERMANS, INDIANS, CANADIANS AND OTHER EXPATRIATES
 DECIDE TO JOIN THE AMERICAN CONVOY TO ESCAPE THE
 FIGHTING IN THE CITY. THIS LAST CONVOY ARRIVES IN
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 BUJUMBURA AT 23:30 P.M.

ASSESSMENT:

2. WAS THE PRESIDENT ASSASSINATED; AND IF SO, TO WHAT
 END?

BECAUSE NO FORMAL INVESTIGATION OF THE DOWNED
 AIRCRAFT WAS CONDUCTED, IT IS PURE SPECULATION

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WHETHER THE PLAN WAS SHOT DOWN BY HOSTILE FIRE OR ACCIDENTALLY CRASHED. ACCORDING TO DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN FRENCH MILITARY AND DATT, UNAMIR WAS INTENDING TO CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION OF THE DOWNED AIRCRAFT AND SPECIFICALLY TO RETRIEVE THE BLACK BOX IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE CRASH. TO OUR KNOWLEDGE THAT HAS NOT YET BEEN DONE.

IF IN FACT THE PRESIDENT WAS ASSASSINATED, AMONG MANY POSSIBLE SCENARIOS, THREE SEEM MOST LIKELY. SCENARIO ONE: RPF ASSASSINATES PRESIDENT BECAUSE HABYARIMANA IS SEEN AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT. WITHIN THIS SCENARIO IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE RPF PLANNED THE DEATH OF THE PRESIDENT KNOWING THE REACTION IT WOULD CAUSE THEREBY ALLOWING THEM THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXIT THE CND COMPOUND WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF TAKING ALL OR PART OF THE CITY OF KIGALI. THIS IS SOMETHING THEY WERE NEVER ABLE TO DO DURING THE THREE YEAR CIVIL WAR AND WOULD GIVE THEM AT A MINIMUM, GREAT BARGAINING ADVANTAGE IN THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT.

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SCENARIO TWO: ASSASSINATION BY SOUTHERN HUTUS ALSO DISSATISFIED BY PRESIDENTIAL INTRANSIGENCE AND FEAR THAT THIS INTRANSIGENCE WAS A SIGN THAT HABYARIMANA AND HIS INNER CIRCLE WERE IMPLEMENTING PLANS TO ELIMINATE SOUTHERN HUTUS AND OPPOSITION LEADERS BEGINNING WITH THE KILLING OF GAPIYSI AND LATER MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS GATABAZI.

SCENARIO THREE: NORTHERN HUTU HARDLINERS KILL THE PRESIDENT IN ORDER TO USE HIS DEATH AS AN EXCUSE TO ELIMINATE THE RPF AND SYMPATHETIC HUTU LEADERSHIP, EFFECTING STOPPING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA PEACE ACCORDS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TRANSITION INSTITUTIONS.

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ACTION AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	EUR-01	HA-09	H-01
	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-16	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00
	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-01	PM-00	PRS-01	P-01	SNP-00

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SP-00 SS-00 TRSE-00 T-00 USIE-00 RPE-01 PMB-00
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-----3C9514 152303Z /38

P 150830Z APR 94
 FM AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3359
 INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY KAMPALA PRIORITY
 AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY
 USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
 USDAO YAOUNDE CM PRIORITY
 DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
 USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//ECJ-4// PRIORITY
 JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 05 BUJUMBURA 01299

C O R R E C T E D COPY (ADDING SUBJECT LINE - PLEASE
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3. WAS THE EXECUTION OF OPPOSITION MINISTERS
 FOLLOWING THE DEATH OF THE PRESIDENT PLANNED AND/OR
 SANCTIONED BY THE MILITARY HIERARCHY OR WAS IT A
 SPONTANEOUS REACTION BY A LOYAL GRIEF STRICKEN
 PRESIDENTIAL GUARD LOOKING FOR REVENGE ?

DCM WAS TOLD BY THE COMMANDANT OF THE MILITARY
 TRAINING SCHOOL THAT A PLAN WAS IN PLACE TO KILL
 OPPOSITION MINISTERS SHOULD THE PRESIDENT BE
 ASSASSINATED (SEE REFTEL). SINCE THERE WERE NO
 REPORTS FOLLOWING THE PRESIDENT'S DEATH OF FAR FORCES
 ATTEMPTING TO PREVENT THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARDS KILLING
 SPREE, IT CAN ONLY BE ASSUMED THAT EITHER THE
 MILITARY FELT POWERLESS TO STOP IT OR CONDONE IT BY
 THEIR INACTION. (COMMENT: THE ARMY AND GENDARMES
 COMBINED SHOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ACT TO CONTAIN AN
 APPROXIMATELY 500 MAN PRESIDENTIAL GUARD. HOWEVER,
 THERE ARE REPORTS THAT SOME SOLDIERS AND GENDARMES
 PARTICIPATE WITH GENDARMES IN ATTACKING CIVILIANS,
 LOOTING HOMES AND STORES AND KILLING /ANKING
 GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. THEREFORE, DEPENDING ON THEIR

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NUMBER, IT MAY IN FACT HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE ARMED FORCES TO EFFECTIVELY INTERVENE. END COMMENT.)

4. DID THE NORTHERN VERSUS SOUTHERN HUTU RIVALRY IN THE MILITARY RESULT IN FIGHTING WITHIN THE FAR'S RANKS AFTER THE PRESIDENT'S DEATH?

ALTHOUGH TENSIONS ALWAYS EXISTED IN THE MILITARY BETWEEN THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN HUTUS, DURING

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RWANDA'S THREE YEAR CIVIL WAR, THIS TENSION NEVER RESULTED IN FIGHTING BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS WITH THE FAR RANKS. ALTHOUGH THERE WERE RUMORS THAT THERE WERE FIGHTING BETWEEN THESE TWO FACTIONS, NONE HAVE EVER BEEN SUBSTANTIATED IN NUMEROUS DISCUSSIONS WITH FAR OFFICERS AND THIRD COUNTRY MILITARY OFFICIALS. THEREFORE IF THESE TENSIONS FLARED INTO ACTUAL FIGHTING BETWEEN NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN SOLDIERS, SUCH FIGHTING WAS CONTAINED TO A VERY LOW LEVEL.

5. WILL CURRENT FIGHTING RESULT IN A MILITARY STANDOFF OR WILL BOTH SIDES AGREE TO A QUICK CEASEFIRE FOLLOWED BY ATTEMPTS AT REINSTITUTING THE ARUSHA ACCORDS?

IN ALL LIKELIHOOD, THE ARUSHA ACCORDS WERE SIGNED BY BOTH SIDES BECAUSE THEY WERE EXHAUSTED AFTER THREE YEARS OF CIVIL WAR WHICH RESULTED IN NO SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE FOR EITHER SIDE. EMBOFFS STILL BELIEVE THAT BOTH SIDES ARE WAR WEARY AND DO NOT WANT A PROLONGED CONFLICT. THE MOST LIKELY SCENARIO NOW IS FOR THE RPF TO GAIN QUICK MILITARY ADVANTAGE BY TAKING ALL OR PART OF KIGALI AND THEN SUEING FOR PEACE, RECOGNIZING THAT THEY MAY BE ABLE TO HOLD KIGALI MILITARILY BUT THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO RULE UNILATERALLY WITHOUT VIOLENT REPRISALS AGAINST FELLOW TUTSIS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. THE RPF, HOWEVER, IS UNLIKELY TO SUE FOR PEACE UNTIL MOST ELEMENTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD ARE ELIMINATED IN KIGALI.

EMBOFFS DO NOT SEE RPF'S ATTACK AS HAVING THE OBJECTIVE OF TOTALLY DEFEATING THE FAR. INSTEAD,

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CAPTURING ALL OR PART OF KIGALI IS AIMED AT SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASING THEIR BARGAINING POSITION IN

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A FUTURE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT BASED ON THE
RESURRECTIONS OF THE ARUSHA ACCORDS PRINCIPLES.
LANGE

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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RW/DIVERS/940422A
MINISTERE
DES
AFFAIRES ETRANGERES

R E P U B L I Q U E F R A N C A I S E

Paris, le 25 avril 1994

L'AMBASSADEUR DE FRANCE
AU RWANDA

6.E.1. Note du ministère des Affaires étrangères,
25 avril 1994, Attentat du 6 avril 1994

A/S : RWANDA.

Déclassifié

L'attentat qui a coûté la vie au Président HABYARIMANA et qui est la cause immédiate des événements que connaît aujourd'hui le Rwanda est probablement l'oeuvre du FPR. L'avenir de ce pays et de la sous-région dépend de l'équilibre qui s'instaurera, sur la base duquel devra être négocié un accord politique.

*
* *

La destruction de l'avion du Président HABYARIMANA, le 6 avril dernier, a été selon toutes probabilités provoquée par un attentat. Trois témoignages directs (directeur de cabinet et fille du chef de l'Etat, commandant de la garde présidentielle de Kanombe) font état de tirs. Ces témoignages sont corroborés par d'autres, qui ne sont pas toujours issus de milieux favorables au Président HABYARIMANA.

Aucun élément matériel ne permet à l'heure actuelle de déterminer la responsabilité de cet attentat. Le FPR nie en être l'auteur et l'attribue à des éléments hostiles aux accords d'Arusha, notamment de la garde présidentielle.

Certes, aucune hypothèse ne peut être définitivement écartée. La thèse d'une responsabilité de proches du Président HABYARIMANA est cependant d'une très grande fragilité. Elle repose sur le fait que les tirs provenaient de Kanombe, où se trouve un camp de la garde présidentielle. Mais rien ne prouve qu'ils venaient de l'intérieur de ce camp. Le désarroi des autorités rwandaises au lendemain de l'attentat et leurs premières décisions (désignation d'un chef de l'Etat et d'un gouvernement intérimaires, appel au dialogue avec le FPR) ne cadrent pas avec l'idée d'un coup monté par elles. Enfin, la mort dans un même attentat du Président de la République, du Chef de la Sécurité et du Chef d'Etat-Major de l'Armée a affaibli gravement l'armée rwandaise, qui aurait pu trouver le moyen de saboter les accords à un moindre coût pour elle.

.../...

La responsabilité du FPR, sans être prouvée, est beaucoup plus vraisemblable. Les indices matériels sont peu nombreux : rumeurs persistantes selon lesquelles le Front disposait à Kigali de missiles Sam, départ pour Mulindi de la quasi-totalité des responsables du FPR dans les jours précédant l'attentat.

Surtout, il semble bien que le FPR ait pris conscience au cours de ces derniers mois du fait que la transition prévue à Arusha ne débouchait pas pour lui sur une prise du pouvoir. Les accords semblaient à priori très favorables au Front. Sa stratégie reposait, semble-t-il, sur les éléments suivants :

- s'allier aux partis d'opposition de l'intérieur pour obtenir une majorité systématique des 2/3 à l'Assemblée et au gouvernement,
- remplacer totalement l'administration locale avant l'issue de la transition,
- déconsidérer le Président HABYARIMANA et son entourage par des procès touchant aux Droits de l'Homme et à des affaires de corruption, avec l'issue possible d'une destitution (selon le mécanisme prévu à Arusha),

Or, il apparaissait de plus en plus clairement au fil des semaines que le succès de cette stratégie n'était pas assuré :

- les partis d'opposition de l'intérieur, alliés au FPR lors des négociations d'Arusha pour enlever ses pouvoirs au chef de l'Etat, ont eu tendance après avoir atteint ce résultat à reprendre leurs distances vis-à-vis du FPR pour qu'il n'en soit pas le seul bénéficiaire. Cette évolution se faisait, soit par recentrage progressif de l'ensemble du parti (cas du PSD, sous l'influence de M. GATABAZI jusqu'à son assassinat), soit par éclatement des partis en tendances (cas du PL, divisé en deux factions nettement marquées en faveur du FPR et du Président ; cas du MDR, où le futur Premier Ministre, indulgent à l'égard du FPR, n'était pas soutenu par la majorité de son parti se réclamant de la révolution anti-tutsi de 1959 et du Parmehutu),
- l'assassinat du Président NDADAYE du Burundi, en octobre 1993, a recomposé le paysage politique en fonction des clivages ethniques, qui se sont brutalement aggravés. Dès lors, le langage du FPR -récusant les différences ethniques et se présentant comme un mouvement politique- était en décalage par rapport à l'opinion rwandaise. Le fossé ne séparait plus les camps du "changement" (FPR + opposition) et du conservatisme (le parti présidentiel), mais les "républicains" (héritiers de la révolution de 1959 qui a porté les hutu au pouvoir) et les partisans du FPR,
- Enfin, l'opinion internationale, qui depuis le début de la guerre en octobre 1990 s'était généralement montrée ouverte aux thèses du FPR, évoluait dans un sens qui n'était pas toujours favorable au Front, comme en a témoigné la

déclaration conjointe des pays observateurs et du représentant spécial du secrétaire général des Nations Unies, publiée à Kigali et donnant tort au FPR sur la question spécifique de l'entrée de la CDR dans les institutions.

Le FPR se trouvait donc dans une situation inconfortable : l'arithmétique parlementaire et gouvernementale ne lui donnait plus le contrôle des institutions, les obstacles à la mise en place de ces dernières se multipliaient, des problèmes logistiques sérieux (notamment d'approvisionnement) commençaient à se poser dans la zone qu'il contrôlait.

Il semble qu'une réédition du scénario de janvier-février 1993 l'ait alors tenté : pousser les FAR à la faute pour avoir le prétexte d'une reprise des combats. Plusieurs incidents en zone démilitarisée et assassinats n'ont cependant pas suffi à susciter une réaction des autorités rwandaises, qui craignaient effectivement un piège de ce type.

La mort du Président et des principaux responsables de l'armée et de la sécurité, en déclenchant le cycle de représailles meurtrières exercées par une partie de la garde présidentielle à l'encontre de l'opposition et des tutsi, a donné un prétexte à l'intervention militaire du FPR.

*
* *

L'avenir du Rwanda se joue aujourd'hui d'abord sur le terrain. Le FPR a remporté des succès militaires, mais la résistance des FAR ne lui a pas permis pour l'instant de prendre un avantage décisif. La nomination du Colonel BIZIMUNGU, commandant du secteur opérationnel de Ruhengeri, témoigne de la détermination de l'armée rwandaise.

Le problème des renforts dont pourra disposer le FPR, en provenance des troupes ougandaises en cours de démobilisation, et de l'approvisionnement des deux parties en munitions, revêtira une importance cruciale.

Le rapport de forces qui s'établira devra ensuite se traduire en termes politiques. A cet égard, chaque partie a ses problèmes. Pour les autorités rwandaises, il s'agit de trouver un dirigeant qui puisse se poser en successeur du Président HABYARIMANA et en fédérateur des hutu. Il ne semble pas à l'heure actuelle se dégager des rangs du MRND (parti présidentiel), dont les principaux responsables sont plutôt réputés pour leur longue fidélité à l'ancien Président que pour leurs capacités de meneurs d'hommes. Peut-être le MDR, héritier de 1959, du Parmehutu et de la première République, dont les bastions sont au sud du pays, recèle-t-il un tel homme en son sein, mais celui-ci devra alors se faire accepter par l'armée (majoritairement issue du nord).

Du côté du FPR, le problème essentiel est celui de la transformation politique d'une éventuelle victoire militaire. Le FPR, seul, réduit à sa dimension tutsi (malgré la présence de quelques responsables hutu), peut difficilement

.../...

espérer tenir le pays. Il doit donc, comme il l'avait prévu initialement dans le cadre de la mise en oeuvre des accords d'Arusha, trouver des alliés. Il est confronté pour ce faire à une triple difficulté : sa propre rigidité intellectuelle, qui le conduit à écarter tout accord avec le MRND alors qu'il admettait lui-même encore récemment que le parti présidentiel représente une véritable force politique dans le pays ; la mort de la plupart des responsables d'opposition qui auraient pu jouer un rôle de force d'appoint tout en ayant une réelle implantation dans le pays ; la réticence probable de personnalités rwandaises à l'idée de s'allier à un parti qui est perçu comme l'expression des seuls tutsi.

Dans ce contexte, les efforts de notre pays devraient porter sur les points suivants :

- le maintien d'une certaine présence internationale au Rwanda. La MINUAR reste utile, parce qu'elle peut permettre aux belligérants de se rencontrer en terrain neutre au moment où ils seront prêts à rouvrir des discussions et parce qu'elle sera le garant international d'un éventuel accord. La disparition de la MINUAR ne nous permettrait sans doute plus d'obtenir du Conseil de Sécurité, le moment venu, une nouvelle résolution la ressuscitant.

De même, la MONUOR (mission d'observateurs à la frontière ougando-rwandaise) devrait être maintenue et même renforcée, pour être en mesure d'exercer effectivement son mandat. Non seulement elle n'est rattachée à la MINUAR que de façon administrative (à la demande expresse de l'Ouganda), mais son personnel, déployé du seul côté ougandais, ne court aucun risque.

Le risque d'être surpris par la communauté internationale en flagrant délit d'assistance au FPR est de nature à jouer un rôle modérateur sur le Président MUSEVENI.

La clef du problème rwandais est en effet pour une part entre les mains ougandaises. Le soutien du FPR en hommes (démobilisés), en matériel et en munitions dépend essentiellement de Kampala. Nous avons les moyens de peser sur les décisions ougandaises, en soulignant le risque pour l'Ouganda d'une pérennisation de l'instabilité au Rwanda (très probable dans l'hypothèse d'une victoire militaire du FPR), en replaçant cette question dans le cadre de notre dialogue politique global avec l'Ouganda et en usant aussi des arguments financiers, bilatéraux (don du Trésor) et multilatéraux (Banque Mondiale).

- la communauté internationale devrait continuer d'être mobilisée en faveur d'une solution aux problèmes rwandais. En particulier, les appels au cessez-le-feu pourraient être plus pressants. C'est le FPR qui refuse un cessez-le-feu, comme l'avait fait l'UNITA en Angola. L'argument selon lequel il ne cessera les combats que lorsque les exactions et les massacres s'interrompront renverse la chaîne des causalités. S'il est exact qu'à l'annonce de la mort du Président les exactions ont tout de suite commencé et donné un fondement à l'intervention armée du FPR, aujourd'hui la situation est plutôt inverse : les Hutu,

tant qu'ils auront le sentiment que le FPR essaie de prendre le pouvoir, réagiront par des massacres ethniques. Seul un arrêt des combats pourrait permettre une reprise progressive de la situation en mains. / *HA (Maaland)*.

RW/VARIOUS/940422A
MINISTRY
OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

REPUBLIC OF FRANCE

Paris, April 25, 1994

—
FRENCH AMBASSADOR
IN RWANDA

**6.E.I. Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
April 25, 1994, Attack of April 6, 1994**

A/S: RWANDA.

Declassified

The attack, which cost the life of President HABYARIMANA, and which was the immediate cause of the calamities Rwanda is going through now, is probably the responsibility of the RPF. The future of the country and of the sub-region depends on the balance that will be established, the basis of which should be negotiated in a political agreement.

*
* *

The destruction of President HABYARIMANA's airplane, on April 6, was, in all probability, the result of an attack. Three direct testimonies (the Chief of Staff, the daughter of the Head of State, the commander of the Presidential Guard of Kanombe) report gunfire. These testimonies are corroborated by others, which do not always come from circles favorable to President HABYARIMANA.

No material evidence presently exists to determine the origin of the attack. The RPF denies responsibility and attributes it to elements hostile to the Arusha Accords, notably the Presidential Guard.

Certainly, no hypothesis can be definitively rejected. The thesis of responsibility of those close to President HABYARIMANA is, however, very fragile. It rests on the fact that the shots came from Kanombe, where a camp of the Presidential Guard is located. But there is no proof that they came from inside the camp. The disarray of the Rwandan authorities the day after the attack and their first decisions (designation of an interim Head of State and an interim government, call to dialogue with the RPF) do not correspond with the idea of a coup mounted by them. Finally, the death, in the same attack, of the President of the Republic, the Chief of

Security, and the Chief of the Defense Staff, has gravely weakened the Rwandan army, which could have found a way to sabotage the accords with little cost to itself.

.../...

The responsibility of the RPF, though not proved, is much more likely. Solid indications are few: persistent rumors that the Front has SAM missiles in Kigali, the departure for Mulindi of most of the leaders of the RPF in the days before the attack.

Above all, it seems that the RPF has become aware, in the past few months, of the fact that the transition, planned at Arusha, would not result in it taking power. The accords seemed a priori very favorable to the Front. It seems that its strategy rested on the following elements:

- to ally itself with interior opposition parties to obtain a systematic majority of 2/3 in the Assembly and in the government,
- to totally replace local administration before the completion of the transition,
- to discredit President HABYARIMANA and his entourage through trials involving human rights and corruption affairs, with the probable result of his removal (following the mechanism planned at Arusha),

And yet, it became clearer and clearer, over the course of weeks, that this strategy's success was not assured:

- the interior opposition parties, allied with the RPF during the negotiations of Arusha to take the Head of State's power away, had the tendency, after having achieved this result, to once again distance themselves from the RPF, so that it would not be the only beneficiary thereof. This evolution took place either by the progressive refocusing of the whole party (as in the case of the PSD, under the influence of Mr. GATABAZI until his assassination) or by the break-up of parties into factions (as in the case of the PL, divided into two factions neatly marked by favor for the RPF or the president; in the case of the MDR, where the future Prime Minister, indulgent with respect to the RPF, was not supported by the majority of his party, which harkened back to the anti-Tutsi revolution of 1959 and to the Parmehutu),
- the assassination of President NDADAYE of Burundi, in October 1993, recomposed the political landscape along ethnic lines, which have clashed sharply. Since then, the language of the RPF—rejecting ethnic differences and presenting itself as a political movement—was lagging with respect to Rwandan public opinion. A deep divide no longer separated the "change" camps (RPF & opposition) from conservatives (the presidential party), but the "republicans" (inheritors of the 1959 revolution which brought the Hutus to power) from the RPF partisans,

- Finally, the international operation, which, since the start of the war in October 1990, had generally shown itself open to RPF ideas, evolved in a direction not always favorable to the Front, as testified to in the joint declaration of the observer countries and the Special Representative of the General Secretary of the United Nations which said that the RPF was in the wrong on the specific question of the entry of the CDR into the institutions of government.

The RPF thus found itself in an uncomfortable situation: the parliamentary arithmetic no longer gave it control of the government, obstacles to the implementation of the aforementioned strategies multiplied, and serious logistical problems (notably supply) started to appear in the zone it did control.

It seems that a repeat of the January-February 1993 situation was therefore attempted: push the FAR into the wrong to have a pretext to take back up arms. Several incidents in the demilitarized zone and assassinations did not, however, suffice to arouse a reaction from the Rwandan authorities, who, indeed, feared a trap of this kind.

The death of the President and of the leaders of the army and of the security forces, in triggering the cycle of murderous reprisals exercised by part of the Presidential Guard against the opposition and the Tutsis, has given a pretext for the military intervention of the RPF.

*
* *

The future of Rwanda is at stake today on the field. The RPF has won military successes, but FAR resistance has prevented them, for the time being, from taking a decisive advantage. The nomination of Colonel BIZIMUNGU, commandant of the operational sector of Ruhengeri, testifies to the determination of the Rwandan army.

The RPF may have a problem with reinforcements resulting from the demobilization of Ugandan troops. This, along with the supply of both parties with ammunition, will be crucial.

The balance of power which will be established should then be translated into political terms. In this regard, each party has its problems. For the Rwandan authorities, the problem is to find a leader who can succeed President HABYARIMANA and unify the Hutus. It does not seem, at the current time, that there is such a man in the ranks of the MRND (the presidential party), whose principal leaders are held in esteem for their long loyalty to the former president rather than for their capability as leaders. Perhaps the MDR, inheritor of 1959, of Parmehutu, and of the First Republic, whose strongholds are in the south of the country, harbors such a man, but he would then have to be accepted by the army (a majority of whose members come from the north).

On the side of the RPF, the essential problem is that of the political transformation of an eventual military victory. The RPF, alone, reduced to its Tutsi component (despite the presence of a few Hutu leaders), can hardly hope to hold the country. It must therefore, as it had initially planned as part of the implementation of the Arusha Accords, find allies. In this, it must confront a triple difficulty: its own intellectual rigidity, which leads it to preclude any agreement with the MRND despite the RPF's own recent admission that the presidential party represents a veritable political force in the country; the death of the majority of the opposition leaders who could have played a powerful role as backup, having real ability to get things done in the country; and the probable reticence of Rwandan figures to the idea of allying themselves with a party that is perceived as the expression of only Tutsis.

In this context, our country's efforts should address the following points:

- the maintenance of a certain international presence in Rwanda. UNAMIR remains useful, because it can permit the belligerents to meet on neutral ground when they are ready to reopen discussions, and because it will be the international guarantor of an eventual agreement. The disappearance of UNAMIR would no doubt prevent us from obtaining, once the moment arrives, a new resolution from the Security Council to resuscitate it.

Also, UNOMUR (an observation mission on the Ugandan-Rwandan border) should be maintained and even reinforced in order to be able to effectively exercise its mandate. Not only is it only attached to UNAMIR in an administrative fashion (at the express request of Uganda), but its personnel, deployed only on the Ugandan side, are not in any risk of danger.

The risk of being surprised by the international community in flagrante delicto of helping the RPF is likely to play a moderating role on President MUSEVENI.

The key to the Rwandan problem is, in fact, partly in the hands of the Ugandans. Support for the RPF in men (demobilized), in material, and in munitions, comes from Kampala, and the Front depends on this support. We have the means to put pressure on Ugandan decisions, by underlining the risk for Uganda of the perpetuation of instability in Rwanda (very probable in the case of a military victory for the RPF), by placing this question back into our global political dialogue with Uganda, and by also using financial arguments, both bilateral (donations from the Treasury) and multilateral (World Bank).

- the international community should continue to mobilize in favor of a solution to the Rwandan problems. In particular, the appeals for a cease-fire could be more insistent. It is the RPF that refuses a cease-fire, like UNITA did in Angola. Its argument, that it will not cease fighting until the atrocities and massacres stop, reverses the chain of causality. If it is true that at the announcement of the President's death, the atrocities commenced at once and gave grounds for the armed intervention of the RPF, today the situation is quite reversed: the Hutus, as they feel that the RPF is trying to take power, will react with ethnic massacres. Only a stoppage of fighting would permit a progressive recovery of the situation./.

This is the first time that I am meeting with ICTR investigators. I am able to go to Arusha and testify only if the ICTR assures me of my personal security, and that of my three children.

I married my late husband TURATSINZE Jean Pierre Aboubakar in 1990 in Shyorongi and we were later blessed with three children. When I married my husband, he was working as a driver at Kibuye Prefecture. He was actually driving the Prefect of Kibuye who was called HAKIZIMANA Donat, who had just been transferred from the office of the President in Kigali. The Prefect of Kibuye was later, I think in 1991 transferred to Kigali to go and work in the Office of the President as an intelligence officer. This was the time that my husband was also transferred to Kigali. Whilst in Kigali, my husband was working as a driver in the Office of the President, intelligence unit. I am not sure whether my husband continued driving HAKIZIMANA Donat or not, although they were in the same unit.

Whilst in Kigali, my late husband got involved in politics, particularly the MRND party, although I am not exactly sure in which year this was. As days went by, my late husband told me that there were divisions within the MRND and that the party was going to break up into two that is one group from the North (BAKIGA) and the other group from NDUGA. My late husband did not come from any of the two warring parties, and according to what he told me, the party was planning to commit some massacres of people. He further told me that if he remained within the MRND, it would mean that he would start by killing me, and his mother. Because I am Tutsi, and his mother was Tutsi, I understood this to mean that the massacres were going to be against the Tutsi population. As a result of this, my husband wrote a letter of resignation from the party. I think that this was either at the end of 1993 or the beginning of 1994.

In early 1994, my husband went to Tanzania to go and prepare where we would go and stay and started some business. We were however getting in touch. In February 1994, he sent a message that I should go with the children and join him. So, I left and went to join him in Tanzania. He actually met us at the Rusumo border crossing on the Tanzanian side. My late husband had family members in Tanzania and some of them were RPF members. These are the ones who convinced my late husband to join the RPF. My late husband told me about his intentions to join the RPF and left about two weeks before president HABYARIMANA Juvenal died. He actually went with our SUZUKI motor vehicle.


One month later, some of my late husband's relatives who had joined the RPF came back, but they distanced themselves from me. When I tried to inquire about my husband, they used to tell me that he was well and that he was in very good books with senior members of RPF at MULINDI, Byumba.

I came back to Rwanda in September 1994. In a month I cannot exactly recall, but towards the end of the year, my late mother in law, NGUTEGURE Hadija told me that she had been told, by Minister Abdoul KARIM that my husband had been killed in battle. If and whether he is surely dead, I did not bury him and I do not know how he died and where.


The pictures that I have given to ICTR investigators are showing my husband. On one picture, where I also appear, it was the occasion of giving names to our twin children in January 1994, whilst the other one that looks like a passport photo, where he is alone, I got it from his bankbook. The third photograph, which is a portrait in black and white, is also that of my husband. I think it was taken in Tanzania.

Finally, I would appreciate any information regarding the death of my husband and possibly where he could have been buried.

DATE: 12/08/04/2008
Signature of witness



Signature(s) of Interviewer(s)



Session 3

“Inside the United Nations Security Council: April – July 1994”

Documents List

Page No.	Date	Author	Title	Source	Notes
3-1	4/11/1994	Bushnell	NSC requested IO to draft resolution to pull UNAMIR	Bushnell Personal Archive	
3-6	4/12/1994	US Geneva	ICRC Update on Activities in Rwanda	Freedom of Information Act	
3-10	4/12/1994	Albright	Future UNAMIR and French Roles in Rwanda	Freedom of Information Act	
3-12	4/12/1994	IO	Approach to UN secretariat on UNAMIR	Freedom of Information Act	
3-15	4/12/1994	USUN	Security Council Informals on Rwanda	Freedom of Information Act	
3-16	4/14/1994	Dallaire	Summary of Contingency Options in the Even to Unilateral Withdraw of the Belgian Contingent from UNAMIR	ICTR evidence	
3-20	4/15/1994	Secstate	USUN talking points for UNAMIR withdrawal	Freedom of Information Act	
3-24	4/17/1994	Dallaire	The Military Assessment of the Situation as of 17 April 1994	ICTR evidence	
3-31	4/19/1994	Dallaire	Military Assessment of the Situation	ICTR evidence	
3-35	4/21/1994	Mujawamariya	Letter to President Clinton from Monique Mujawamariya	Freedom of Information Act	
3-37	4/24/1994	Médecins sans Frontières	MSF Report on Butare	Médecins sans Frontières	
3-38	4/25/1994	Médecins sans Frontières	MSF report to Reuters - Article	Reuters news	
3-39	4/26/1994	Shattuck	Meeting with Rwandan Human Rights Activist Monique Mujawamariya	Freedom of Information Act	
3-42	4/28/1994		Presidential Statement on Rwanda Proposed by Czech Delegation to the UNSC	Genocide Studies and Prevention (Journal)	
3-43	4/29/1994	Bushnell	DAS Bushnell tells Col. Bagasora to Stop the Killings	Freedom of Information Act	
3-46	5/4/1994	Dallaire	UNAMIR - Future Force Structure	ICTR evidence	
3-59	5/13/1994	Tarnoff	Rwanda Security Council Discussions	Freedom of Information Act	
3-64	5/16/1994	Harvin/DoD	Deputies Committe Meeting on Rwanda	Freedom of Information Act	
3-70	5/16/1994	Grossman	Discussion paper for deputies committee meeting on peacekeeping options in Rwanda	Freedom of Information Act	

4/11

Today's Issues

419-7

12:45

3391 - Mac

9438 - Burleigh

- Military
 - Pull out
 - re staging
- Germans

• UN Resolution re UNAMIR

- ~~Mouquet~~

- Stragglers

Noon

- Ramagana

Military

Bill → What have we told French / Belg

Bill → Do they have transport or are we the only ones.

Arlene Monique - 6:45 Sun - am -

Force was going to try to follow-up w
ICRC

-> Check w. Laura re Monique status

-> Break Kevin out of group

What is thinking of Belg & French

-> What is AF's position on UNAMID fallout

-> Military Entebbe, Nairobi, Mombasa, Mwanza

- Monique is out - ^{heard} through UN

David

- Evacuation - complete

military mission is over

- Germans - left message to

get foreign ministry

- looking for instructions -

Who (plural) do we say thank you

- Admin. setting up system to

get guard contract. Will

try to get in touch w. FSNs - get paid
Query = do our needs for further info.
Thurs. Sabena.

think there will be stalemate - Govt wants
to negotiate - intentions & role of
Museveni . Tanzania joining
disaster

Sec. wants Rwanda night note for
Pres.

Pres. Clinton - GEM, me, Arlene . 7:10
7:40

- ~ CA task force part Turn papers
- ~ See ^{Bill H.} GEM re Fance's replacement
- ~ R Pardon - didn't clear w. Andy Sims
Egypt ^{quotes} → With & Sec.

Military

- Marines out of Buj
- Germans still stuck
- APCs in Somalia

UN

Support Belge request at UN

- Call Leonard
- ~~UN. Calls~~
- NSC requested ID to draft resolution to pull UNAMIR.
- See Arlene re Kagame & what we say
- Burundi
 - what ways to reinforce calm & stability
- Call Steinberg re PK w/ g
Have instructions on 1st half on withdrawn
Decision = mandate.

GW: Ned W. concerned re

- Boutros will withdraw & suspend
- ~~block transfer~~ letters aren't there to terminate. Ned thinks we may have to wait til June to terminate.

Fear = NAM will come up.

- GW's point of view = ~~terminate~~ ^{don't} suspend.
- Sec. will talk to Boutros

2 Americans left
 small # affiliated w. int'l orgs
 (about 10)

Kigali - calm - 48 hr truce

Burundi - 207 - Americans - about 34 employees

- ~~267~~ ^{low} 205 will be left

- 34 by

UNCLASSIFIED

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ACTION IO-16

RELEASED IN FULL

INFO	LOG-00	AF-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	DS-00	EUR-01	OIGO-01	HA-09	H-01	TEDE-00
	INR-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-06
	OIC-02	OMB-01	PA-02	PM-00	PRS-01	P-01	RP-10
	SNP-00	SP-00	SR-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	USIE-00
	FMP-00	PMB-00	/057W				

-----3ADCOF 121444Z /38

O 121441Z APR 94
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7473
INFO AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 03437

ROME FOR FODAG

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PINS, AEMR, CASC, PREL, RAID, PEF, RW
SUBJ: TFRWOL: ICRC UPDATE ON ACTIVITIES IN RWANDA
UNCLASSIFIED

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PAGE 02 GENEVA 03437 01 OF 02 121443Z
- (AS OF APRIL 11)

1. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS
(ICRC) ISSUED THE FOLLOWING UPDATE ON APRIL 11 REGARDING
ITS ACTIVITIES IN RWANDA.

2. BEGIN TEXT --

- HEAVY FIGHTING IN KIGALI - ICRC WORKING AMID THE
- CHAOS
- -----

- COMPLETE MAYHEM HAS HIT THE STREETS OF KIGALI, LEAVING A HEAVY DEATH TOLL AND LARGE NUMBERS OF WOUNDED. ARMED ELEMENTS ARE ON THE RAMPAGE, GOING FROM HOUSE TO HOUSE KILLING AND DESTROYING. THE VIOLENCE WAS SPARKED OFF BY THE DEATH OF THE PRESIDENT OF RWANDA, THE PRESIDENT OF BURUNDI AND A NUMBER OF DIGNITARIES OF BOTH GOVERNMENTS, WHO WERE ALL KILLED AS THEIR PLANE CAME IN TO LAND AT KIGALI LAST THURSDAY EVENING. SINCE THEN THE BLOODSHED IN THE CITY HAS STEADILY GROWN IN INTENSITY. TODAY THE FIGHTING IS STILL FIERCE, AND THE CITY IS GRIPPED BY GENERALIZED LOOTING AND LAWLESSNESS. ICRC DELEGATES IN KIGALI HAVE DESCRIBED SCENES OF EXTREME VIOLENCE, STATING THAT THERE ARE THOUSANDS OF CASUALTIES LYING IN THE STREETS.

- IN THE MEANTIME FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS ARE EVACUATING THEIR EXPATRIATES FROM KIGALI.

- AIMED THE CHAOS, THE ICRC'S 26 DELEGATES IN RWANDA
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PAGE 03 GENEVA 03437 01 OF 02 121443Z
HAVE BEEN WORKING WITH THE RWANDESE RED CROSS FIRST-AIDERS, EVACUATING THE WOUNDED TO THE MAIN HOSPITAL IN KIGALI. THEY HAVE ALSO BEEN PROVIDING THE HOSPITAL WITH URGENTLY NEEDED MEDICAL SUPPLIES. IN ADDITION, THE INSTITUTION IS SUPPLYING THE FUEL REQUIRED FOR THE VEHICLES OF THE NATIONAL SOCIETY AND THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES, WHICH ARE BEING USED TO CLEAR AWAY THE DEAD BODIES FROM THE STREETS.

- ICRC STEPS UP INTERVENTION TODAY

- THE ICRC HAS BEEN IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH THE COUNTRY'S AUTHORITIES SINCE THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES. THIS MORNING THE ICRC'S HEAD OF DELEGATION IN RWANDA MET THE REPUBLIC'S NEWLY APPOINTED PRESIDENT, IN ORDER TO REQUEST A MAJOR EFFORT FROM THE GOVERNMENT TO ENSURE THAT CIVILIANS ARE RESPECTED, THAT SECURITY IS RE-ESTABLISHED AND THAT THE RED CROSS EMBLEM IS RESPECTED.

- IN ADDITION TO EVACUATING THE WOUNDED TO HOSPITAL, THE ICRC PLANS TO EVACUATE ABOUT 100 PATIENTS LATER TODAY FROM THE MAIN HOSPITAL IN KIGALI TO KABGAYI, 40 KM SOUTH OF THE CAPITAL.

- THIS AFTERNOON A PLANE CHARTERED BY THE BELGIAN RED CROSS WILL BE LEAVING FOR BUJUMBURA. ON BOARD ARE 15 TONS OF MEDICAL MATERIAL DONATED BY THE BELGIAN RED CROSS AND 2 TONS PROVIDED BY THE ICRC, AND AN ADDITIONAL ICRC SURGICAL TEAM, COMPOSED OF ONE SURGEON, ONE THEATRE NURSE, TWO SURGICAL WARD NURSES AND AN ANAESTHETIST

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PAGE 04 GENEVA 03437 01 OF 02 121443Z NURSE. THE TEAM INCLUDES STAFF SECONDED BY THE NATIONAL RED CROSS SOCIETIES OF THE NETHERLANDS AND THE UNITED KINGDOM. ONCE IN BUJUMBURA THE ICRC WILL TRANSPORT THE SURGICAL TEAM AND THE MEDICAL SUPPLIES OVERLAND TO KIGALI TOMORROW. ALSO TOMORROW A FURTHER THREE SURGICAL WARD NURSES SECONDED BY THE DANISH, FINNISH AND NORWEGIAN NATIONAL SOCIETIES WILL LEAVE GENEVA FOR RWANDA.

- VIOLENCE REPORTEDLY SPREADING TO SOUTHERN RWANDA

- FOLLOWING RUMORS FROM A NUMBER OF SOURCES THAT MASSACRES AND DESTRUCTION ARE GOING ON IN THE SOUTH OF

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 03437 02 OF 02 121443Z ACTION IO-16

INFO	LOG-00	AF-01	CA-02	CIAE-00	C-01	OASY-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	DS-00	EUR-01	OIGO-01	HA-09	H-01	TEDE-00
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O 121441Z APR 94
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7474
INFO AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA IMMEDIATE
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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 03437

ROME FOR FODAG

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: PINS, AEMR, CASC, PREL, RAID, PREF, RW
SUBJ: TFRWOL: ICRC UPDATE ON ACTIVITIES IN RWANDA
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PAGE 02 GENEVA 03437 02 OF 02 121443Z
THE COUNTRY, THE ICRC PLANS TO SEND A TEAM OF DELEGATES
FROM ITS BASE IN BURUNDI AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, IN
ORDER TO INVESTIGATE THE SITUATION.

- AT THE MOMENT THE ICRC HAS NO PLANS TO SET UP A
FIELD HOSPITAL. END TEXT.

3. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SPIEGEL

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RELEASED IN PART B1,1.4(D)

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REVIEW AUTHORITY: Archie Bolster, Senior Reviewer

PAGE 01 USUN N 01503 121743Z
ACTION IO-16

INFO LOG-00 AF-01 AID-01 ARA-01 CCO-00 CIAE-00 C-01
OASY-00 DOEE-00 EAP-01 EB-01 EUR-01 HA-09 H-01
TEDE-00 INR-00 L-01 ADS-00 NEA-01 NSAE-00 OIC-02
OIG-04 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-00 PRS-01 P-01 SNP-00
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JOINT STAFF WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
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UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
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AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

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PAGE 02 USUN N 01503 121743Z
JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3;
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, MARR, PGOV, KDEM, RW, UNSC, CG


SUBJECT: TFRWOL: FUTURE UNAMIR AND FRENCH ROLES IN RWANDA

REFTEL: PARIS 9724

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. USUN FORESEES TWO ISSUES THAT DEMAND WASHINGTON'S IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION. FIRST, THERE ARE RUMORS THAT THE FRENCH ARE CONSIDERING STAYING IN RWANDA AFTER THEY COMPLETE THE HUMANITARIAN MISSION OF EVACUATING FOREIGN

3-11

NATIONALS (REFTEL)



B1
1.4(D)

3. THE OTHER IMMEDIATE ISSUE IS UNAMIR'S FUTURE. AT
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PAGE 03 USUN N 01503 121743Z
PRESENT THE AIRPORT IS STILL OPEN AND UNDER
FRENCH-BELGIAN CONTROL. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO SIGNAL
THAT THE UN IS NEARING A DECISION BECAUSE RELATIVE CALM
HAS DESCENDED ON KIGALI AND UNAMIR TROOPS ARE NOT
PRESENTLY THE TARGET OF HOSTILITIES. YET THIS MIGHT BE
A WINDOW OF RELATIVE OPPORTUNITY TO EVACUATE UNAMIR
FORCES; THERE IS A REAL POSSIBILITY THAT IT MIGHT BECOME
MORE DIFFICULT TO EVACUATE UNAMIR ONCE THE FRENCH AND
BELGIANS LEAVE. IN THIS RESPECT, IT IS WORTH
CONSIDERING TAKING THE LEAD IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO
AUTHORIZE THE EVACUATION OF THE BULK OF UNAMIR, WHILE
LEAVING BEHIND A SKELETAL STAFF THAT MIGHT BE ABLE TO
FACILITATE A CEASE-FIRE AND ANY FUTURE POLITICAL
NEGOTIATIONS.

4. BUJUMBURA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

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EXCISE

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Immediate usun new york, brussels immediate
Immediate paris, bujumbura immediate, dar es salaam immediate
nairobi immediate, kampala immediate, un se immediate+

E.O. 12356: decl: oadr

TAGS: prel, mops, rw, be, fr, by, un

SUBJECT: tfrwol: approach to UN secretariat on UNAMIR

ref: a] brussels 4084 [notal], b] usun 1491; c] paris 9724

1. confidential - entire text.
2. this is an action cable - see below.
3. department shares government of belgium concerns that the greatly changed circumstances in rwanda have rendered untenable the continued presence of UNAMIR forces in the country. we support a rapid but orderly withdrawal of unamir forces and other un personnel as required, provided the security situation of rwandan nationals currently under direct unamir protection is successfully resolved.

4. we believe it is the un secretary general's [syg] prerogative to recommend withdrawal [it is appropriate that the syg should take the lead in recommending unamir's withdrawal. at the same time, we believe that it is important that other UN elements, including but not necessarily limited to unhcr and the

B1

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syg's special representative, stand ready to provide their good offices and perform their negotiating role, provided that security conditions permit them to do so. in the event that these un representatives are compelled by security considerations to temporarily withdraw from rwanda, we would hope that improved conditions would permit their early return.

action requested

5. for usun: mission should approach senior secretariat officials urgently, drawing on the following:

-- the united states is prepared to support a recommendation by the syg for the rapid and orderly withdrawal of unamir forces from rwanda. we believe that such a recommendation is the most appropriate means of meeting the urgent humanitarian need to preserve the safety of unamir personnel while not exacerbating tensions in rwanda.

-- we support such a withdrawal, but only after the security of rwandan nationals currently under direct unamir protection is successfully resolved.

-- we are prepared to support offers by governments with national forces available to facilitate the withdrawal.

-- we hope that other un elements, including the syg's special representative booh-booh, may be able to continue their activities in rwanda. however, we understand that the security situation may compel them to temporarily withdraw. we believe that these agencies and the syg's representative may be able to play an important stabilizing and humanitarian role and hope that, if they must be evacuated now, they will be prepared to resume their missions as soon as security conditions permit.

-- the withdrawal of unamir forces is necessitated by current circumstances. the usg feels that the un should remain politically engaged in rwanda if security permits, in order to facilitate the peace process.

6. for brussels: embassy is authorized to inform the government of belgium of instructions that are being carried out by usun in new york. you should urge the gob to make a similar approach to the syg or his senior

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representatives.

7. for paris: embassy should inform the french government of our position and seek support. \\

joint staff was hdc priority

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3-15
UN FIELD MISS. RWANDA
(UNAMIR)
3

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April 12, 1994

MEMORANDUM

TO: Ambassador Walker
FROM: POL - Robert T. Greig
SUBJECT: Security Council informals on Rwanda, 3:30, Tuesday, April 12

BACKGROUND

Today's Security Council informals will continue the discussion on UNAMIR's future. Early reports are that while A/SYG Riza views UNAMIR's future as "very bleak," the Secretariat is not yet ready to offer concrete options or recommendations at today's meeting. Meanwhile, other states, notably Belgium, have expressed strong interest in withdrawing their contingents while the airport is still secure and before Rwanda (potentially) returns to chaos.

Washington has decided to support a Security Council decision to authorize the withdrawal of UNAMIR, and the hope is that the Secretariat will request the Security Council to authorize the withdrawal of UNAMIR. The following talking points originated in Washington.

If possible, you should inform the Secretariat by phone of our position prior to the consultations (see separate e-mailed instructions).

drafted: Polmil: MBarnett
cleared: POL: lshestak, jboardman
Wang #898 POLMIL
distribution: EXEC (5) POL (3), REF, MB chron
L: RRosenstock, PRESS: JRubin

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UNAMIR

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: DALLAIRE, FC, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA

DATE: 14 APRIL 1994

NUMBER: MIR-757

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF CONTINGENCY OPTIONS IN THE EVENT OF A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE BELGIAN CONTINGENT FROM UNAMIR

APR 15 11:09

1. ON 12 APRIL 1994, THE FC OF UNAMIR WAS INFORMED THAT THE BELGIAN BATTALION IN UNAMIR MIGHT UNILATERALLY WITHDRAW.

2. MY STAFF CONDUCTED A DAY LONG ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPING OPTIONS ON HOW THIS WITHDRAWAL WOULD AFFECT UNAMIR. THIS ANALYSIS INCLUDED MEETINGS WITH CONTINGENT SENIORS, COMMANDERS AND STAFFS TO SOLICIT THEIR VIEW OF THE SITUATION.

3. THERE ARE TWO POSSIBLE SCENARIOS:

- A. SCENARIO 1. THE PRESENT SITUATION CONTINUES AND PROGRESSIVELY DETERIORATES.
- B. SCENARIO 2. THE SITUATION STABILIZES AND PROGRESSIVELY IMPROVES.

4. SCENARIO 1. GIVEN THAT THIS MISSION HAS BARELY BEEN ABLE TO FUNCTION DURING THE LAST WEEK OF WAR IN RWANDA DUE TO LOGISTICS SHORTAGES IN STOCKS, VEHICLES, COMMUNICATIONS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE BELGIAN BATTALION, WHICH IS THE BEST OPERATIONALLY EQUIPPED AND LOGISTICALLY SUPPORTED UNIT IN UNAMIR, WOULD BE A TERRIBLE BLOW TO THE MISSION. THE MISSION COULD ONLY CONTINUE TO FUNCTION IF THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS WERE MET:

- A. THE UNIT WAS IMMEDIATELY REPLACED WITH AN EQUALLY TRAINED, EQUIPPED, MOTIVATED AND SUPPORTED CONTINGENT AND IN ADDITION THE LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT SHORTFALLS OF THE FORCE WERE SATISFIED IN AN URGENT MANNER.
- B. IF THE ABOVE CONDITION CANNOT BE MET THE FORCE IS WITHDRAWN.

5. SCENARIO 2. IF THE SITUATION STABILIZES AND PROGRESSIVELY IMPROVES THE BELGIAN BATTALION NEED NOT BE

REPLACED AND THE ENTIRE STRUCTURE OF THE FORCE SHOULD BE REEVALUATED TO REDUCE ITS SIZE. THE MINIMUM VIABLE OPTION OF THE TECHNICAL REPORT ON RWANDA DATED 11 SEPTEMBER 1993 SHOULD BE REVIEWED. IF THE LOGISTICS CAPABILITY AND SUSTAINMENT OF ONE OF THE OTHER BATTALIONS IN THE MISSION ARE ENHANCED TO THE SCALE AND CAPABILITY OUTLINED IN THE MILITARY GUIDELINES TO TROOP CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES THEN THE MISSION CAN CONTINUE WITHIN THIS SCENARIO. THE ECONOMIES IN MANPOWER SAVINGS ARE USED TO OFFSET EQUIPMENT AND LOGISTICS PROVISION.

6. THE PRESENT CONFLICT IN RWANDA MAY HAVE PEAKED BUT WILL NOT STABILIZE AND IMPROVE FOR AT LEAST 4-6 DAYS AS THE RPF ADVANCE SEEMS TO BE CONDUCTED IN A MOST DELIBERATE FASHION IN KIGALI. SOME RGF UNITS HAVE NOT BEEN COMMITTED AT THIS TIME. IT WAS THE GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT THE MISSION SHOULD BE CONTINUED. THE SOLDIERS ON THE GROUND FEEL THEY ARE MAKING A DIFFERENCE IN RWANDA AND STILL HAVE A VALUABLE ROLE TO PLAY IN THE PEACE PROCESS IN RWANDA.

7. BOTH PARTIES HAVE STATED THEY ABSOLUTELY WANT A UNAMIR PRESENCE TO ASSIST IN THE PEACE PROCESS AND ASSIST IN SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN DUTIES. SHOULD THE FORCE BE TOTALLY WITHDRAWN THERE IS A VERY REAL THREAT THAT REFUGEES OR AT WORST ONE OR BOTH OF THE PARTIES WILL REVENGE THEMSELVES UPON UNAMIR. IF WITHDRAWAL IS CONTEMPLATED IT WILL HAVE TO BE ASSISTED BY AN INTIMIDATING AND THREATENING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. BOTH PARTIES MUST REALIZE THAT AN ATTACK UPON THE FORCE WILL NOT BE TOLERATED AND WILL HAVE DIRE ECONOMIC, HUMANITARIAN AND POSSIBLE MILITARY CONSEQUENCES. UNAMIR HAS LOST ENOUGH MEN AND SHOULD NOT LOSE ANYMORE ESPECIALLY DURING A WITHDRAWAL TO THEIR HOMELANDS. THE SECURITY AND SAFETY OF UNAMIR DURING A WITHDRAWAL MUST BE GUARANTEED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE PRESENCE OF THE BELGIUM BATTALION (+) MUST STAY FOR AIRFIELD DEFENCE IN PARTICULAR.

8. AT PRESENT UNAMIR IS SUFFERING FROM PERSONNEL FATIGUE AND SOME STRESS. ITS EQUIPMENT IS BEING WORN OUT WITHOUT THE LOGISTICS BASE TO MAINTAIN IT. ITS OPERATIONAL STOCKS ARE MINIMAL AND ARE ONLY BEING MAINTAINED BY AN EMERGENCY AIRLIFT. HEALTH AND HYGIENE PROBLEMS WILL CULMINATE IN SICKNESS WITHIN DAYS (NO WATER IN CITY WITH THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES). LASTLY, THE POSSIBLE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A UNILATERAL BELGIAN WITHDRAWAL WILL HAVE AN ADVERSE AFFECT ON MORALE AS THIS WILL BE SEEN AS DESERTION IN THE FACE OF A THREAT.

9. GIVEN A WITHDRAWAL IS ORDERED IT MUST BE NOTED THAT A UN PRESENCE IN RWANDA, ALBEIT REDUCED, IS REQUIRED TO ASSIST AND SECURE THE MAJOR HUMANITARIAN EFFORT WHICH WILL BE REQUIRED IN THE POST WAR PERIOD. JUST AS IMPORTANT THERE WILL ALSO BE AN REQUIREMENT FOR A NEUTRAL CONDUIT IN NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN THE PRE AND POST-CEASEFIRE PERIOD.

10. IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT THE MINIMUM VIABLE OPTION PRESENTED IN THE TECHNICAL REPORT OF 11 SEPTEMBER 1993 BE ASSESSED GIVEN THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

- A. THE 800 MAN INFANTRY BATTALION (GHANA) MUST BE PROVIDED WITH THE MEANS TO MAKE IT SELF-SUFFICIENT TO SECOND LINE. WE MUST ABSOLUTELY AVOID THE CURRENT 2X BATTALION (-) TO EQUAL 1 BN CONCEPT OF COMMAND AND CONTROL. WE HAVE WASTED TO MANY ASSETS IN SUCH ORGANIZATIONS. REDISTRIBUTION OF EXISTING EQUIPMENT WILL HELP BUT SOME MAJOR SECOND LINE EQUIPMENTS WILL NEED TO BE PROVIDED. THIS UNIT WOULD PROVIDE SECURITY AT THE AIRPORT FOR OBVIOUS REASONS BUT WOULD ALSO BE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING THE PHYSICAL SECURITY FOR THE MISSION EQUIPMENT AND MATERIEL THAT COULD NOT BE READILY EVACUATED DURING THE WITHDRAWAL, PROVIDE A FORCE RESERVE TO REINFORCE UNMO TEAMS THROUGHOUT RWANDA, PROVIDE ARMED ESCORTS FOR THE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORT, PROVIDE SECURITY OF UN AND OTHER VITAL POINTS AND ASSIST IN THE MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY FOR THE INSTALLATION OF THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS.
- B. A MILOB GROUP WOULD TAKE OVER MONITORING TASKS THROUGHOUT RWANDA. IT COULD BE REINFORCED BY THE QUICK REACTION FORCE FROM KIGALI. IT SHOULD CONSIST OF NO MORE THAN 100 UNMOs.
- C. A 5 MAN MOVE CONTROL SECTION AND A 5 MAN MILITARY POLICE SECTION (BOTH FROM BANGLADESH) WOULD PROVIDE SPECIALIST SUPPORT TO THE FORCE.
- D. A 50 MAN FIELD HOSPITAL (BANGLADESH).
- E. A FORCE HEADQUARTERS OF 46 PERSONNEL WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL DIRECTLY FROM KIGALI.
- F. THE FORCE MUST BE SUPPORTED BY A REDUCED DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT AND A CONTRACTED HELICOPTER UNIT CONSISTING OF 2 BELL 212 IN KIGALI.
- G. IN ADDITION UNOMUR SHOULD REMAIN IN PLACE AS IS.
- H. A SRSG OFFICE AND POLITICAL OFFICE, ALONG WITH A CIVPOL ORGANIZATION ARE REQUIRED.

11. BOTH PARTIES MUST SEE THAT THE FORCE HAS BEEN DRASTICALLY REDUCED TO A MINIMUM VIABLE LEVEL AS A WARNING THAT FURTHER NON-COMPLIANCE WITH DEADLINES OR VIOLATIONS OF AGREEMENTS WILL RESULT IN A TOTAL UN WITHDRAWAL FROM RWANDA. BOTH PARTIES FEAR SUCH A WITHDRAWAL AND MUST BE INTIMIDATED TO COMPLY WITH THE AGREEMENTS THEY MAKE. THEY MUST BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR THE MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF HUMANITARIAN AND ECONOMIC AID THEY RECEIVE AND SO DESPERATELY NEED.

12. RWANDA AND THE PEACE PROCESS IN THE COUNTRY HAVE SUFFERED A SERIOUS SETBACK WITH THIS WAR. HOWEVER, THE PEOPLE OF RWANDA DESPERATELY WANT PEACE. WITH A POSSIBLE RPF VICTORY,

CRN-115

4/4

ESPECIALLY IN KIGALI, OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS, BOTH PARTIES SHOULD BE MORE WILLING TO COMPLY WITH THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT. THIS IS A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY THAT THE UN SHOULD NOT MISS.

13. THE SOLDIERS OF THIS COMMAND, ESPECIALLY THE BELGIAN CONTINGENT, HAVE SUFFERED GREATLY OVER THE PAST WEEK TO BRING PEACE AND FREEDOM TO RWANDA. THEY ARE STILL PREPARED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO AN EFFORT TO BRING PEACE TO RWANDA. RESOLVE IS NEEDED TO ENSURE THE PEACE PROCESS CAN CONTINUE IN RWANDA.

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PAGE 02 STATE 099440 150430Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 099440

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, UN,
SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS ON UNAMIR WITHDRAWAL

A) USUN 1553, B) USUN 1533, C) TELCON IO/UNP-USUN 4/14

- 1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
- 2. THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE - SEE BELOW.
- 3. DEPARTMENT HAS GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION (REF A) AND TO THE VIEWS OF OTHER

SECURITY COUNCIL (UNSC) MEMBERS REGARDING THE STATUS AND FUTURE OF THE CURRENT UN PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN RWANDA. THE POLITICAL AND HUMANITARIAN REASONS PUT FORTH FOR RETENTION OF UNAMIR ELEMENTS IN RWANDA HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT FULLY IN OUR DETERMINATION OF THE APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO DEVELOPMENTS IN RWANDA SINCE PASSAGE OF UNSC RESOLUTION 909 ON APRIL 5.

4. DEPARTMENT HAS CONSIDERED THE PROSPECT OF ADDITIONAL WIDESCALE CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE IN RWANDA, AND THE THREAT THAT THE RELATIVE IMMUNITY AFFORDED TO REMAINING FOREIGN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL WILL END ON APRIL 15.

TAKING THESE FACTORS INTO ACCOUNT DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THAT THERE IS INSUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION TO RETAIN A UN PEACEKEEPING PRESENCE IN RWANDA AND THAT THE INTERNATIONAL
CONFIDENTIAL

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COMMUNITY MUST GIVE HIGHEST PRIORITY TO FULL, ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL OF ALL UNAMIR PERSONNEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

5. COGNIZANT THAT FULL WITHDRAWAL MAY NOT BE ABLE TO BE IMPLEMENTED PRIOR TO THE END OF THE CURRENT DEADLINE SET BY THE RPF, WE BELIEVE THAT UN NEGOTIATORS SHOULD FOCUS THEIR EFFORTS ON ENSURING THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL IS NOT IMPEDED AND THAT THE WARRING RWANDAN PARTIES REFRAIN FROM ATTACKING OR THREATENING THESE PERSONNEL. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT UNAMIR SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF RWANDAN CIVILIANS UNDER ITS PROTECTION, CONSISTENT WITH ITS MANDATE AND PROVIDED THAT THE SAFETY OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL IS NOT JEOPARDIZED.

ACTION REQUESTED

6. DRAWING ON THE FOREGOING, USUN IS INSTRUCTED TO INFORM NSC COLLEAGUES THAT THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE FIRST PRIORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS TO INSTRUCT THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO IMPLEMENT AN ORDERLY WITHDRAWAL OF ALL/ALL UNAMIR FORCES FROM RWANDA, TAKING THE NECESSARY STEPS TO ENSURE THAT THE WARRING PARTIES IN RWANDA RESPECT THE SAFETY OF UNAMIR AND OTHER FOREIGN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PERSONNEL UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THEIR EVACUATION HAS BEEN COMPLETED. MISSION IS ALSO INSTRUCTED TO MAKE CLEAR TO OTHER UNSC MEMBERS THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION IS NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THIS WITHDRAWAL (THE SYG HAS AUTHORITY TO ORDER THIS WITHDRAWAL UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES)' AND THAT WE

WILL OPPOSE ANY EFFORT AT THIS TIME TO PRESERVE A UNAMIR
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PRESENCE IN RWANDA.

7. MISSION MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN PRESENTING
THE U.S. POSITION:

-- THE UNITED STATES SHARES THE SHOCK AND OUTRAGE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OVER THE EVENTS IN RWANDA IN
RECENT DAYS.

-- WE CONDEMN UNEQUIVOCALLY THE RENEWED FIGHTING AND
WIDESPREAD VIOLENCE, AND THE ATTACKS ON INTERNATIONAL
PEACEKEEPERS, FOREIGN CIVILIANS, AND INNOCENT RWANDAN
CITIZENS.

-- THE RWANDAN ARMED PARTIES MUST BEAR FULL
RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TRAGIC SITUATION, AND CONTINUED
VIOLENCE AND INSTABILITY, IN THEIR COUNTRY.

-- IN THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT IN RWANDA, THERE IS NO ROLE
FOR A UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

-- THOSE NATIONS THAT CONTRIBUTED TROOPS TO UNAMIR HAVE
ACTED RESPONSIBLY AND TO THEIR UTMOST ABILITY, AND HAVE
EXERTED COMMENDABLE EFFORTS TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN
PROTECTION TO FOREIGN, AS WELL AS RWANDAN, CIVILIANS.

-- THOSE FORCES THAT PARTICIPATED IN UNAMIR ARE TO BE
COMMENDED FOR THEIR EFFORTS IN A HOSTILE AND THREATENING
ENVIRONMENT.

-- WE ENDORSE THE DECISION OF UNAMIR CONTRIBUTORS TO
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WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM RWANDA FOR THEIR SAFETY, HOPING
THAT SUCH WITHDRAWAL WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN AN ORDERLY
MANNER AND THAT MEASURES WILL BE TAKEN TO OBTAIN
COMMITMENTS FROM THE RWANDAN PARTIES TO RESPECT THE SAFETY
OF RWANDAN AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS AFTER THE UN PERSONNEL
HAVE WITHDRAWN.

-- WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE WARRING PARTIES IN RWANDA
ARE LIKELY TO RESPECT UNAMIR'S MANDATE NOR, IN THE PRESENT
ENVIRONMENT, ARE THEY CAPABLE OF ADEQUATELY ENSURING THE

SAFETY OF UN PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL IN RWANDA.

-- THERE MAY BE A ROLE FOR THE UN TO PLAY IN FACILITATING NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE WARRING PARTIES BUT THAT IS A ROLE FOR A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, NOT FOR UNAMIR. WE ARE WILLING TO SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGE A POLITICAL INITIATIVE BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO PROMOTE RECONCILIATION AMONG THE PARTIES.

--- EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS THAT ANY SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE PARTIES WILL TAKE PLACE OUTSIDE RWANDA; THEREFORE, UN SECURITY FORCES WILL NOT BE REQUIRED.

-- OUR OPPOSITION TO RETAINING A UNAMIR PRESENCE IN RWANDA IS FIRM. IT IS BASED ON OUR CONVICTION THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS AN OBLIGATION TO ENSURE THAT PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS ARE VIABLE, THAT THEY ARE CAPABLE OF FULFILLING THEIR MANDATES, AND THAT UN PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL ARE NOT PLACED OR RETAINED, KNOWINGLY, IN AN INTENABLE SITUATION.

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-- THE UNITED STATES HOPES THAT THE PARTIES IN RWANDA, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF MEDIATORS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AS APPROPRIATE, WILL BE ABLE TO END THE VIOLENCE IN THEIR COUNTRY, MOVE TOWARD RECONCILIATION, AND BEGIN A PROCESS THAT WILL LEAD TO A DURABLE PEACE.

-- WHEN THE PARTIES DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY ARE WILLING AND ABLE TO WORK IN THE INTERESTS OF THE RWANDAN PEOPLE TOWARD A LASTING RESOLUTION OF THEIR CONFLICT, WE WILL BE WILLING TO RECONSIDER WHETHER A RENEWED ROLE FOR UN PEACEKEEPING CAN FACILITATE AND BUILD A LASTING PEACE IN THEIR COUNTRY.

-- UNTIL THAT TIME, HOWEVER, PRIORITY MUST BE GIVEN TO ENSURING THE SAFE WITHDRAWAL OF UN PEACEKEEPERS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL PERSONNEL AND CIVILIANS IN DANGER IN RWANDA. TO ATTEMPT TO SUSTAIN A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN THE PRESENT ENVIRONMENT WOULD ONLY UNDERMINE THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESPONSIBILITIES FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING. CHRISTOPHER

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MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK (ONLY)
 FROM: DALLAYRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
 DATE: 17 APRIL 1994
 NUMBER: MIR-782

SUBJECT: THE MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AS OF 17 APRIL 1994

1. GENERAL. TWO DAYS AGO WE SUCCEEDED IN BRINGING BOTH PARTIES TO AN INITIAL MEETING CHAIRED BY THE SRSG DURING WHICH EXCHANGES OF GENERAL POSITIONS ON THE CURRENT CONFLICT WERE EXPRESSED BY ALL SIDES AND THE DESIRE FOR PEACE WAS RENEWED. THE GOVERNMENT WAS REPRESENTED BY THE INTERIM CHIEF OF STAFF (WHO WAS REPLACED BY A HARDLINER ON THE EVENING OF 16 APRIL 1994) OF THE ARMY AND FOUR SENIOR OFFICERS, ALL OF WHOM ARE CONSIDERED MODERATE AND REASONABLE MEN. THE RPF WAS REPRESENTED BY TWO RELATIVELY JUNIOR OFFICERS (ONE WAS THE BN COMD OF THE CND AND THE OTHER WAS THE UNAMIR\RPF LIAISON OFFICER). IT WAS ONLY THROUGH THE PERSONAL INTERVENTION AND INSISTENCE BY THE FC AT THE CND, THAT THE RPF FINALLY DECIDED TO COME. THEY HAD TACITLY AGREED EARLIER BUT WANTED THEIR MILITARY TO REVIEW THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THEY THEN EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE ON-GOING FIRING IN THE AREA AND SO OPTED FOR A MILITARY DELEGATION ONLY, AND IN THE END (THAT IS UNTIL FC WENT TO THEM PERSONALLY), THEY WERE NOT GOING TO ATTEND BECAUSE OF THESE SECURITY\FIRING CONCERNS. THIS LAST MINUTE RETICENCE BY THE RPF TO ATTEND, EVEN THOUGH THE MEETING SITE IS IN THEIR AREA OF GENERAL CONTROL, COUPLED WITH THE LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION AT THE MEETING, HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED EITHER THE PARTICULARLY STRONG DESIRE ON THE RPF PART TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS. ALTHOUGH THE DELEGATION DOES SEEM JUNIOR, THE BN COMD HAS BEEN HERE SINCE THE MOVE TO KIGALI IN DEC AND ENJOYS THE TRUST OF THE RPF MOVEMENT. THEY ALSO BROUGHT THE OFFICIAL POSITIONS OF THE POLITICAL WING WITH THEM IN WRITING.

3. AS FAR AS THE RGF SIDE, THEY CHANGED THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THEIR REPRESENTATION GROUP OF OFFICERS AND NOMINATED THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE GENDARMERIE (A SENIOR OFFICER WHO HAS HAD OUR GENERAL RESPECT THROUGHOUT EVEN THOUGH ONE OF HIS HOUSES WAS RENTED BY THE MRND AS THEIR HQ AND THAT THERE WERE WEAPONS IN THIS HOUSE BELONGING TO THE INTERHAMWE) DUE TO HIS SENIORITY. ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT SIGNED THE UNCONDITIONAL CEASEFIRE REQUEST, AS HE WAS OUT OF TOWN, THEY ALL SAID HE IMMEDIATELY SUPPORTED THE PROPOSAL. THE SENIOR ARMY OFFICERS WHO MET WITH MR KANE AND THE FC EARLIER IN THE DAY BEFORE THE MEETING, EXPRESSED THE DESIRE

THAT SOMETHING TANGIBLE BE SHOWN AS A RESULT OF THE MEETING AS THEY WERE MODERATES AND THEY NEEDED SUPPORT IN THEIR CAUSE. THE COS OF THE GENDARMERIE DID NOT ATTEND AS IT WAS FELT BY THEM THAT IT WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE FOR HIM TO ATTEND LATER FOR HIGHER LEVEL MILITARY MEETINGS. THE POSITION OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN ALL THIS IS NOT CLEAR EXCEPT FOR THE FACT THAT HE IS WELL AWARE OF THESE OVERTURES AND HE KNOWS THE RPF WILL NOT RECOGNISE THE NEW GOVERNMENT SO HE CANNOT NEGOTIATE AT ALL. ON THE EVENING OF 16 APRIL IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE COS OF THE ARMY HAD BEEN CHANGED TO A HARDLINER. THIS SIGNIFICANT EVENT MAY IN FACT REPRESENT THE VICTORY OF THE HARDLINERS OVER THE MODERATES IN THE RGF HIGH COMMAND. WE MAY BE WITNESSING THE END OF THE DESIRE OF THE RGF FOR A CEASEFIRE AND A STIFFENING OF THEIR POSITION.

4. THE MEETING. ALTHOUGH THERE WAS SPORADIC GUNFIRE AROUND, THE 1 1/2 HOUR MEETING DID PERMIT BOTH SIDES TO EXPRESS THEIR IDEAS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THEIR DESIRE FOR PEACE. A SHORT RESUME IS ATTACHED. THE RPF PRESENTED A DOCUMENT (ALSO ATTACHED) THAT LAID OUT FOUR PRE-CONDITIONS TO ANY CEASE-FIRE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS LIST IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME THAT THE FC FACED WHEN NEGOTIATING FOR THE SECURITY MEASURES FOR THE EXPATRIATE WITHDRAWAL, WHICH ENDED UP AFTER THREE DAYS OF DISCUSSIONS WITH ONLY BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS. ALTHOUGH THESE ARE SOME ASPECTS OF THE "MOYENS DE VERIFICATION" THAT COULD BE IMPLEMENTED WITH THE SUPPORT OF BOTH SIDES, POSSIBLY EVEN WITH THE FIRING STILL GOING ON. IT WOULD SEEM DIFFICULT FOR OTHERS TO BE SORTED OUT IN A REASONABLY SHORT TIME SHOULD THE RPF INSIST ON THEIR TOTAL COMPLIANCE. THESE PRECONDITIONS REPRESENT A HARDLINE APPROACH THAT DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE FLEXIBLE AT THIS TIME.

5. IT IS EVIDENT FROM THE PRE-MEETING BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS, AND THE ORIENTATION OF THE DISCUSSIONS AT THE MEETING, THE RGF NEED/WANT URGENTLY A CEASEFIRE OR AT LEAST A STOP TO THE SHOOTING. HOWEVER THE RPF STATE THAT TO STOP THE SHOOTING IS A SIMPLE MILITARY MEASURE, BUT WHAT THEY SEE AS AN URGENT REQUIREMENT IS THE STOPPING OF THE MASSACRES BEHIND THE LINES BY PEOPLE OR GROUPS (EVEN SOME IN UNIFORM) ARMED WITH MACHETES AND OTHER TRADITIONAL WEAPONS. THESE KILLINGS ARE THE WORK OF SOME SOLDIERS/GENDARMES, OF GROUPS OR MILITIAS WHO ARE MORE AND MORE SEEMINGLY ORGANIZING THEMSELVES AND IN FACT CONTROLLING SOME PORTIONS OF THE CITY (EVEN PREVENTING RGF TO ENTER).

6. THERE IS A DIVERGENCE ON BOTH SIDES AS TO WHAT SHOULD BE DONE FIRST. RGF WANT A CEASE-FIRE THEN THEY WILL SORT OUT ALL THESE MURDERERS ETC AS THESE PEOPLE ARE ALL COMMITTED TO FIGHTING THE RPF. THE RPF STATE THAT THE GOVERNMENT FORCES ARE TO SORT OUT THEIR MILITIAS, PRESIDENTIAL GUARD ETC. BEFORE ANY CEASE-FIRE IS TO BE ENTERTAINED. THIS IS A CHICKEN AND EGG SITUATION THAT IS NOT READILY SOLVABLE. THE STOPPING OF THE MASSACRES MAY BECOME MORE AND MORE DIFFICULT AS THE LOCAL GROUPS/MILITIAS ARE BECOMING SEEMINGLY BOLDER (MASSACRES ARE NOT STOPPING AND APPARENTLY ARE SPREADING AS STATED BY THE INTERIM COS OF THE ARMY). AS OF AM 16 APRIL THE RGF OFFICERS HAD STATED THAT THEY NEEDED AT LEAST UNTIL NOON TO ANALYZE THE RPF PAPER SO THEY DID

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NOT SEE THE POSSIBILITY TO HAVE ANOTHER MEETING UNTIL THE PM. THE RPF WAS TO BE APPROACHED ONCE THE RGF WAS READY FOR THE MEETING. THE RPF REFUSED TO ATTEND ANY MORE MEETINGS AS THEY STATED THEIR PRECONDITIONS ARE KNOWN AND THE RGF NEED ONLY COMPLY. THE RGF DID NOT ATTEND THE MEETING EITHER.

7. IN ADDITION, THE CHANGE OF CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY FROM A MODERATE TO A HARDLINER (RUHENGERI SECTOR COMMANDER FOR THE PAST 3 YEARS) MAY INDICATE THAT THE MODERATES HAVE BEEN PUSHED ASIDE BY THE HARDLINERS. FC ORGANIZED A MEETING WITH NEW COS TO FEEL HIM OUT BUT HE WAS STILL IN THE NORTH OF THE COUNTRY AND WAS THEREFORE UNAVAILABLE FOR A MEETING.

8. MILITARY SITUATION. OVER THE PAST 24-48 HRS, UNAMIR HAS HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE AND ANALYZE THE BATTLE IN KIGALI. THIS ASSESSMENT OF THE CONFLICT IS BASED ON THAT ANALYSIS AND IS SUBMITTED FOR YOUR REFERENCE AND CONSIDERATION. MEETINGS WERE HELD TODAY WITH THE INTERIM CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY (STILL ON DUTY AND WILL REMAIN THE PRINCIPAL LINK WITH THE RGF AND THE PEACE PROCESS) AND THE COS OF THE GENDARMERIE IN ORDER TO RECEIVE AND REVIEW THE RGF COMMENTS/RESPONSES TO THE RPF FOUR POINT CEASE-FIRE PRECONDITIONS. THEIR POINTS SEEMS TO BE A VERY REASONABLE ATTEMPT TO COMPLY WITH THE RPF DEMANDS BUT THE PROOF WILL BE IN THE RPF'S RESPONSES TOMORROW. THERE STILL SEEMS TO BE A WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF THE RGF TO GIVE INTO THE RPF EVEN WITH THE CHANGE OF LEADERSHIP. ALSO TODAY, THE RPF WHOM FC MET SEPARATELY SHOWED THEMSELVES TO BE MORE AT EASE YET VIGILANT ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE NEW ARMY HIGH COMMAND AS MANY OF THESE NEWLY PROMOTED OFFICERS HAD NOT SIGNED THE RGF CEASEFIRE DOCUMENT. FC DID NOT MEET MGEN KAGAME TODAY ALTHOUGH HE WAS TOLD THIS WOULD BE ARRANGED. FC IS SERIOUSLY WONDERING ABOUT THE LATTERS WHEREABOUTS.

9. JUST PRIOR TO THE CONFLICT THE FC HAD A CONVERSATION WITH MGEN KAGAME, WITH TWO UNAMIR OFFICERS IN ATTENDANCE, WHICH NOW IN HINDSIGHT WERE VERY PROFOUND IN PREDICTING THE TYPE OF CONFLICT WE ARE NOW WITNESSING.

10. MGEN KAGAME WAS LAMENTING THE ETHNIC KILLINGS WHICH WERE TAKING PLACE AND STATED IF THEY DIDN'T STOP THE RPF MAY " BE FORCED TO SORT IT (RWANDA SITUATION) OUT ONCE AND FOR ALL". IN ADDITION HE STATED "IF IT (THE WAR) STARTED NO ONE MAY BE ABLE TO CONTROL IT THIS TIME".

11. OVER THE PAST 24-48 HOURS IT HAS BECOME APPARENT THE FOLLOWING ARE TAKING PLACE:

- A. THE RPF OFFENSIVE, WHICH STARTED IN BLITZKRIEG FASHION, IS SLOWING DOWN, EITHER DELIBERATELY OR DUE TO RESISTANCE OF THE OPPOSING FORCES.
- B. THE ETHNIC KILLINGS ARE CONTINUING AND IN FACT UNCONFIRMED REPORTS INDICATE IT IS EVEN INCREASING IN SCALE AND SCOPE IN THE AREAS JUST AHEAD OF THE RPF ADVANCE.

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C. THE RPF DO NOT DESIRE A CEASEFIRE UNTIL THEIR PRECONDITIONS ARE MET.

D. THE GOVERNMENT SIDE APPEARS TO BE FRAGMENTING INTO AT LEAST TWO DISTINCT GROUPS WITH THE HARDLINERS APPARENTLY IN THE ASCENDANCY.

12. UNAMIR HAS LOST ITS EYES AND EARS OUTSIDE OF KIGALI WITH THE CONCENTRATION OR WITHDRAWAL OF ITS UNMOS, THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE DMZ AND ITS INABILITY, DUE TO SECURITY TASKS IN KIGALI, TO CONDUCT PATROLLING OUTSIDE OF THE KIGALI AREA. WHEREAS IN THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF THE CONFLICT WE HAD A CLEAR PICTURE OF THE SITUATION THROUGHOUT RWANDA, WE NOW ARE LIMITED TO KNOWLEDGE OF THE KIGALI AREA AND RPF ZONE. WE ARE RAPIDLY ENTERING A PHASE WHERE UN NEW YORK MAY VERY WELL KNOW MORE ABOUT WHAT IS GOING ON THAN UNAMIR WITH INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION (SATELLITE, EW ETC) FROM ITS MEMBERS OF THE SITUATION OUTSIDE KIGALI. THEREFORE THIS ASSESSMENT IS VERY MUCH KIGALI CENTRED.

13. THE RPF OFFENSIVE APPEARS TO HAVE SLOWED, ESPECIALLY IN THE KIGALI AREA. THE RPF TACTICS APPEAR TO BE INFILTRATION FROM THE NORTH IN LARGE (100) OR SMALL (4) GROUPS, ATTACK UPON A GOVERNMENT POSITION LIKE KACYIRU GENDARMERIE CAMP, VILLAGE OJUGWIRO, PRESIDENTIAL GUARD CAMP OR CAMP KANOMBE BY FIRE, FLANKING MOVEMENTS TO ENVELOP AND ISOLATE THE POSITION FROM ITS LOGISTICS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL, HARASSMENT FOR A PERIOD OF TIME AND A FINAL ASSAULT TO MOP UP (YET TO BE CONDUCTED IN THE FOUR EXAMPLES OUTLINED ABOVE). WHILE THESE ACTIONS ARE WELL PLANNED, EFFECTIVE AND CONDUCTED, THEY ARE SLOW AND BASED ON INFILTRATION AND STRANGULATION. THE QUESTION BEGS WHY ARE THE RPF SLOWING DOWN WHEN IT APPEARED LESS THAN THREE DAYS AGO THEY COULD OVERRUN KIGALI IN A MATTER OF HOURS IF NOT DAYS. SPECULATION IS THAT THE RPF, AS HAS LONG BEEN SUSPECTED, IS LOGISTICALLY SHORT OF SUPPLIES (THIS IS CONFIRMED IN THE AREA OF MEDICAL SUPPLIES FOR WHICH THEY HAVE REQUESTED OF UNAMIR AND ENTERED OUR HOSPITAL ON 16 AND 17 APRIL TO TAKE) AND IS HUSBANDING ITS PRESENT RESOURCES FOR A LONGER CONFLICT. IT HAS THEREFORE DEVELOPED AND EMPLOYED TACTICS TO ENSURE ECONOMY. THE SECOND REASON MAY BE THEIR RELUCTANCE TO TAKE CASUALTIES. THEY MAY IN FACT HAVE WHAT THEY BELIEVE IS EVERY POSSIBLE RECRUIT IN UNIFORM AND MAY BE PROTECTING THEIR MANPOWER FOR WHAT THEY BELIEVE WILL BE A LONG CONFLICT. REPORTS SUGGEST THE SAME SCENARIO IS BEING PLAYED OUT IN BYUMBA. THE RPF SEEM TO PREFER MANOEUVRE AROUND THE ENEMY TO DIRECT ATTACKS UPON ENEMY POSITIONS. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY IS THAT THE RGF RESISTANCE MAY BE STIFFENING AS THIS TURNS FROM A POLITICAL TO AN ETHNIC WAR. WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF DESERTIONS, THEY ARE NOT ON A MASS SCALE AND THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTED CASES OF MASS SURRENDERS OR DEFECTIONS. WITH THEIR ABILITY TO DRAW FROM 85% OF THE POPULATION THE RGF IS NOT AND WILL NOT BE SHORT OF MANPOWER FOR A PROLONGED CONFLICT. THEIR LEAST PRECIOUS RESOURCE IS MANPOWER, UNLIKE THE RPF WHO TREAT MANPOWER AS THEIR MOST PRECIOUS RESOURCE. IN ADDITION, THERE APPEARS TO BE A MOBILIZATION OF THE MASSES AGAINST THE RPF. IN RGF AREAS CIVILIANS ARE ARMED AND OUT IN FORCE, SUPPOSEDLY TO DEFEND THEIR HOMES FROM THE RPF. EVEN IN A VICTORY SCENARIO (IF THIS BECOMES

OR IF IT ALWAYS WAS AN ETHNIC CONFLICT) THE RGF CAN FIGHT IT OUT FOR YEARS. OUR ASSESSMENT IS THAT THIS MAY BECOME A LONG CONFLICT WITH TACTICAL VICTORIES FOR THE RPF BUT AN OPERATIONAL STALEMATE.

14. THE ETHNIC CLEANSING CONTINUES AND MAY IN FACT BE ACCELERATING. BEHIND RGF LINES MASSACRES OF TUTSIS AND MODERATE HUTUS AND SYMPATHIZERS WITH OPPOSITION PARTIES IS TAKING PLACE. BODIES LITTER THE STREETS AND POSE A SIGNIFICANT HEALTH HAZARD. RTLM RADIO BROADCASTS INFLAMMATORY SPEECHES AND SONGS EXHORTING THE POPULATION TO DESTROY ALL TUTSIS (RTLM RADIO WAS DAMAGED BY RPF MORTAR FIRE ON 17 APRIL). EVEN THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE, A KNOWN HARDLINER, HAS CONDEMNED THIS PROPAGANDA, BUT HAS NOT CLOSED DOWN THE STATION. IT APPEARS NOW THAT THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD INITIATED THE ETHNIC ATTACKS AND THEN HANDED THIS TASK OVER TO THE MILITIAS LIKE THE INTERHAMWE AND THE POWER AND THEN WITHDREW TO BUTARE AND GITARAMA. IN KIGALI, FREQUENT ROADBLOCKS ARE ESTABLISHED, ID CARDS CHECKED AND TUTSIS EXECUTED ON THE SPOT. IF THE RGF OR GENDARMERIE ARE PRESENT THEY DO NOT INTERFERE. IN FACT IN SOME AREAS THEY ARE PROHIBITED TRANSIT BY THE MILITIAS. THESE MASSACRES HAVE BEEN WITNESSED FROM A DISTANCE BY UN TROOPS. THIS ETHNIC CLEANSING INFURIATES THE RPF WHO HAVE STATED THERE WILL BE NO CEASEFIRE UNTIL THE MASSACRES STOP. THE MAJOR PRESENT QUESTION IS CAN THE GOVERNMENT STOP THE ATTACKS OR HAS THIS PROGRAMME GONE SO FAR OUT OF CONTROL (AS MGEN KAGAME STATED) THAT IT CANNOT BE STOPPED.

15. THE RPF CLEARLY STATE THEY DO NOT WANT A CEASEFIRE UNTIL THE MURDERS STOP. TACTICALLY, THEY MAY NOT WANT A CEASEFIRE UNTIL THEY HAVE SEIZED THE TERRAIN THEY WANT TO CONTROL (IE BYUMBA-KIGALI CORRIDOR, KIGALI OR A MAJOR PART OF IT, AND EASTERN RWANDA (THE ONLY OPEN GROUND LEFT THAT CAN ACCOMMODATE THEIR EXPATRIATE REFUGEES). UNLESS THE GOVERNMENT TAKES DRASTIC ACTION TO STOP THE MASSACRES AND ESTABLISH LAW AND ORDER IN THEIR AREA AND UNTIL THE RPF GAIN THE GROUND THEY NEED, THE CHANCES OF A CEASEFIRE SEEM REMOTE.

16. UNAMIR MILITARY SITUATION. UNAMIR FORCES ARE INCREASINGLY BEING FORCED INTO SELF-PROTECTION TASKS, DEFENCE OF THE AIRPORT, AND RESUPPLY AND SUSTAINMENT ACTIVITIES UNDER ARMED ESCORT. UNMO ACTIVITIES ARE CONCENTRATED IN SAFE AREAS OR ARE CONDUCTED AT CONSIDERABLE RISK. IN ADDITION, THE MORAL DILEMMA OVER WHAT TO DO ABOUT THE THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES WHO HAVE TAKEN SHELTER IN RGF MILITIA CONTROLLED AREAS AND ARE THREATENED WITH MASSACRE POSES THE DILEMMA OVER HOW TO EXTRACT THEM. THE MILITIAS HAVE DISPLAYED DRUNKENNESS, DRUG ABUSE AND SADISTIC BRUTALITY. THEY DO NOT RESPECT THE UN FLAG, THE RED CROSS OR ANY OTHER HUMAN SYMBOL. THEY WILL NOT HESITATE TO STOP ANY CONVOY AND ATTACK ITS RWANDESE PASSENGERS OR EVEN THE UN GUARDS. WITHIN OUR PRESENT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT WE ARE CONFRONTED WITH THE DILEMMA OF ENFORCING THE SECURITY OF PERSONS UNDER OUR PROTECTION. WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO "SMUGGLE" OUT SMALL NUMBERS AND HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL TO DATE BUT IT IS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME UNTIL A CONFRONTATION OCCURS. INCREASINGLY WE ARE BEING PRESSURED BY UNNY, NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ETC TO CONDUCT THESE OPERATIONS TO RESCUE SELECTED INDIVIDUALS. NOW HOWEVER, THESE INDIVIDUALS ARE

IN LOCATIONS WITH HUNDREDS OR THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE. ANY ATTEMPT TO RESCUE LET ALONE EVEN IDENTIFY THE INDIVIDUAL WILL LEAD TO A MOB ATTACK. MOST OF THE LARGE CONCENTRATIONS OF THESE REFUGEES ARE IN MILITIA CONTROLLED AREAS. THE RISK MUST BE ASSESSED. DOES UNAMIR RISK AN ARMED CONFRONTATION, FOR WHICH WE ARE NOT EQUIPPED, PROTECTED OR MANDATED; AT CONSIDERABLE RISK TO THE SAFETY OF OUR OWN TROOPS, TO ATTEMPT TO SAVE THESE PEOPLE. OR DO WE LEAVE THEM FOR POSSIBLE EXTERMINATION? RAPIDLY UNAMIR IS BEING DRAGGED INTO A PEACE ENFORCEMENT SCENARIO FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS. NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN FRUITLESS IN THIS AREA BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT\RGF WILL NOT OR CANNOT CONTROL THIS SITUATION OR THE MILITIAS. IT MUST ALSO BE RECOGNIZED THAT IF THESE OPERATIONS ARE CONDUCTED AND END IN THE INEVITABLE ARMED CONFRONTATION THE THREAT TO UNAMIR WILL SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE. OUR ABILITY TO ESCORT FUTURE HUMANITARIAN OR REFUGEE CONVOYS WILL BE ENDANGERED AND OUR POSSIBLE FUTURE EXTRACTION WILL BE DONE UNDER HOSTILE CONDITIONS. IF THIS MISSION IS TO BE CHANGED INTO A PEACE ENFORCEMENT SCENARIO TO STOP THE MASSACRES AND RESCUE THREATENED CIVILIANS THAN A CHANGE IN MANDATE WILL BE REQUIRED AND THE MISSION MUST BE REINFORCED WITH MEN, WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT.

17. ON 16 APRIL INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED THAT THE MILITIAS WERE PLANNING TO MASSACRE THE REFUGEES WHO HAD TAKEN REFUGE AT THE HOTEL MILLES COLLINES. A SECTION OF THIS CONTINGENT WITH TWO UNMO TEAMS WAS DISPATCHED TO PROVIDE A PRESENCE AND HOPEFULLY DETER A MASSACRE UNTIL THE SITUATION COULD BE NEGOTIATED BY THE FC. WITHIN HOURS THE CONTINGENT COMMANDER, IN WRITING TO THE FC, STRONGLY REQUESTED THE WITHDRAWAL OF HIS SECTION AS AN UNACCEPTABLE RISK TO THE LIVES OF HIS MEN IN DEFENCE OF LOCAL PEOPLES. THIS CONTINGENT COMMANDER HAS CONSISTENTLY STATED HE IS UNDER NATIONAL ORDERS NOT TO ENDANGER HIS SOLDIERS BY EVACUATING RWANDESE. THEY WILL EVACUATE EXPATRIATES BUT NOT LOCAL PEOPLE. HIS JUNIOR OFFICERS HAVE CLEARLY STATED THAT IF THEY ARE STOPPED AT A ROADBLOCK WITH LOCAL PEOPLE IN THE CONVOY THEY WILL HAND OVER THESE LOCAL PEOPLE FOR INEVITABLE KILLING RATHER THAN USE THEIR WEAPONS IN AN ATTEMPT TO SAVE LOCAL PEOPLE. THIS RETICENCE TO ENGAGE IN DANGEROUS OPERATIONS AND THEIR STATED RELUCTANCE TO USE THEIR WEAPONS IN SELF-DEFENCE OR IN DEFENCE OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY HAS LED TO WIDESPREAD MISTRUST OF THIS CONTINGENT AMONG ITS PEERS IN OTHER UNITS AND AMONGST STAFF OFFICERS\UNMOs AT THE HEADQUARTERS WHEN THEY ARE TASKED TO GO WITH THESE MEN ON DANGEROUS MISSIONS.

18. ON 17 APRIL THE EXTRACTION OF OUR BELGIAN CONTINGENT COMMENCED. THESE MEN WERE OUR BEST TRAINED, EXPERIENCED, EQUIPPED AND MOTIVATED PERSONNEL. EVEN THOUGH THEY SUFFERED HEAVILY WITH THE LOSS OF THEIR COMRADES, THEY CONDUCTED THE EVACUATION IN A DETERMINED AND PROFESSIONAL MANNER. THE REMAINING STAFF HAS BEEN CONSOLIDATED IN ORDER TO FILL MOST OF THE EMPTIED POSITIONS BUT SUCH A RADICAL CHANGE OF KEY STAFF AT SUCH A CRITICAL MOMENT IS MOST DISTRESSING AND MAY CAUSE US SOME SERIOUS DEGRADATION OF CONTROL IN THE FORCE.

19. THE SUMMARY OF THESE EVENTS IS THAT UNAMIR MUST BE PREPARED TO DEFEND THE AIRPORT WITH ONE BATTALION AS IT IS OUR AND THE

HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES LIFELINE. THIS LEAVES ONLY 1\2 BATTALION FOR ESCORT DUTIES. THIS 1\2 BATTALIONS RELUCTANCE TO ENGAGE IN THESE OPERATIONS CONCLUDES THAT UNAMIR MAY NOT BE ABLE TO CONDUCT HUMANITARIAN RESCUE MISSIONS OR EVEN HUMANITARIAN ESCORT MISSIONS WITHOUT A MAJOR CHANGE IN OUR RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, REINFORCEMENT WITH A CONTINGENT THAT IS PREPARED TO USE FORCE AND HAS THE CAPABILITY TO USE FORCE WITHIN LIMITS AND A NEW MANDATE WHICH WILL DETERMINE THE NEW TASKS AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR THE FORCE. THE FORCE TODAY WAS THE TARGET OF DIRECT FIRE BY SMALL ARMS ON A 4X4 (ONE INJURED) BY THE RPF AND BY AN ASSAULT ON ONE OF OUR APCs BY A MOB AT A ROADBLOCK WHO OPENED FIRE WITH SMGs. THE APC EXTRACTED ITSELF BY FIRING WARNING SHOTS. ONE OF OUR CITY GARRISON POSTS WAS CAUGHT IN AN INTENSE CROSS-FIRE BETWEEN BOTH FORCES BUT LITTLE DAMAGE WAS CAUSED. IT IS BECOMING MORE AND MORE DIFFICULT TO MOVE ABOUT THE CITY DUE TO THE MILITIAS AND SELF DEFENCE GROUPS CONTROLLING IMPORTANT ARTERIES AND AREAS OF THE CITY. THIS IS A THIRD FORCE THAT WAS ALWAYS THERE BUT HAS OVER THE LAST 3 DAYS COME MUCH BOLDER\AGGRESSIVE\BRAZEN EVEN IN THE CITY. THEY HAVE NO PARTICULAR RESPECT FOR ANYBODY AND ESSENTIALLY WORK TO THEIR OWN UNRULY\DRUNK\DRUGGED TUNE. THEY ARE A VERY LARGE DANGEROUS AND TOTALLY IRRATIONAL GROUP OF PEOPLE. FC CONSIDERS THEM TO BE THE MOST DANGEROUS THREAT TO UNAMIR.

20. CONCLUSION. THE PRESENT ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION CONCLUDES:

- A. THE RPF OFFENSIVE HAS SLOWED DOWN TO A METHODOICAL ADVANCE.
- B. ETHNIC CLEANSING IS CONTINUING AND MAY BE ACCELERATING.
- C. THE GOVERNMENT SIDE HAS FRAGMENTED INTO AT LEAST TWO CAMPS, EXTREMIST AND MODERATE, AND IT APPEARS THE HARDLINERS HAVE CONTROL. THEREFORE, THE POSSIBILITY OF A CEASE-FIRE WILL BE DETERMINED BY THIS GROUP AND THEIR ACTION ON THE MASSACRES.
- D. THE RPF WILL NOT ACCEPT A CEASEFIRE UNTIL THEY HAVE TAKEN THE TERRAIN THEY NEED AND THE MASSACRES HAVE BEEN STOPPED.

21. UNAMIR ACTIVITIES. WITHIN THE PRESENT SITUATION UNAMIR OPERATIONS MUST FOCUS ON:

- A. MAINTAINING A PRESENCE IN KIGALI.
- B. SECURING THE AIRPORT FOR SELF-SUPPORT, POSSIBLE EXTRACTION ROUTE AND HUMANITARIAN AID DELIVERY.
- C. PROTECTION OF UN PROPERTY AND PERSONNEL WITHIN OUR PRESENT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT.
- D. CONTINUATION OF SPONSORING AND SECURING JOINT MEETINGS IN ATTEMPTING TO GET A CEASE-FIRE. PROVISION OF

UNAMIR
194 APR 19 13 53

U N A M I R

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNAMIR, NEW YORK
 FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI
 DATE: 19 APRIL 1994
 NUMBER: MIR-791

SUBJECT: MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

REFERENCE: UNAMIR 1173 DATED 18 APRIL 1994

1. THIS MORNING FC UNAMIR RECEIVED AN OFFICIAL LETTER OF RESPONSE FROM THE RGF IN REFERENCE TO MAKING THE AIRPORT NEUTRAL GROUND (ATTACHED). THE RGF REFUSED THE INTENT OF UNAMIR TO MAKE THE AIRPORT NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL GROUND OPERATED AND SECURED BY UNAMIR ONLY.

2. INSTEAD THE RGF PROPOSED CO-CONTROL OF THE AIRPORT IN RELATION TO FUNCTIONING AND SECURITY. A PHOTOCOPY OF THEIR LETTER IS ATTACHED. THE RGF STATED THAT SECURITY OF UNAMIR, HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AND HUMANITARIAN EVACUATION WERE THE PRIORITIES. NEUTRALITY OF THE AIRPORT WAS NOT AS GREAT A CONCERN TO THE RGF AS "CONGESTION". IN ADDITION THE RGF REQUESTED A CEASEFIRE PERMITTING RETURN TO THE KWSA AGREEMENT. PENDING A CEASEFIRE THE RGF "APPROVED" THE RELIEF IN PLACE OF KIBAT (BELGIUM) WITH BYUBAT (GHANA) WHICH WOULD THEN CO-HABITATE WITH RGF UNITS. THE RGF PROPOSED A JOINT COMMISSION TO OPERATE AND DEFEND THE AIRPORT. THIS COMMISSION WOULD ENSURE THE INTEREST OF BOTH THE RGF AND UNAMIR. THEY ALSO STATED THERE WAS NO REASON TO INVOLVE THE RPF IN THIS AGREEMENT.

3. OUR ANALYSIS OF THIS LETTER IS THAT THE POWER STRUGGLE BETWEEN HARDLINER AND MODERATE RGF OFFICERS SEEMS TO HAVE SWUNG IN FAVOR OF THE HARDLINERS. ONLY YESTERDAY THE RGF AGREED TO DETAILED DISCUSSIONS AND POSSIBLE HANDOVER OF THE AIRPORT AS NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL AREA CONTROLLED ESSENTIALLY BY UNAMIR. THIS CHANGE IN POSITION IS TOTALLY CONTRARY TO ANY ACCEPTABLE OPTION. THE RPF WILL NEVER ACCEPT BEING EXCLUDED FROM AN AIRPORT AGREEMENT OR TO JOINT RGF\UNAMIR CONTROL OF THE AIRPORT. IT COULD APPEAR THE RGF MAY BE ATTEMPTING TO "BLACKMAIL" UNAMIR AND USE THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL AS A BARGAINING CHIP FOR THE PURPOSE OF GETTING UNAMIR PRESSURE ON THE RPF FOR A CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT ON LESS THAN THE RPF FOUR PRE-CONDITIONS. THE FC DISCUSSIONS WITH THE NEW RGF ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF THIS MORNING DID NOT REVEAL ANY

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- 2 -

ANIMOSITY NOR DESIRE TO QUESTION UNAMIR'S STATUS. HIS CONCERNS OVER THE AIRPORT WERE TACTICAL IN NATURE ONLY AND AS SUCH SHOWED NO HINT OF ANY ULTERIOR MOTIVE.

4. THE AIRPORT COULD BECOME THE SCENE OF A BATTLE AS EACH PARTY MAY VIE FOR SOLE CONTROL OF THE AIRPORT AND ITS ENVIRONS. THIS WOULD SERIOUSLY ENDANGER A POSSIBLE UNAMIR WITHDRAWAL AND THE RESUPPLY, SAFETY AND SECURITY OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL.

5. INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS WITH RGF BATTALION COMMANDERS ON 18 AND 19 APRIL REVEALED A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE FROM SEEKING PEACE TO A RELUCTANCE TO ENTER INTO A CEASEFIRE WITH THE RPF AND A DESIRE TO "SORT THINGS OUT ONCE AND FOR ALL"; SIMILAR STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE BY RPF FIELD COMMANDERS. THIS SIGNIFICANT SHIFT IN THE POSITION OF THE RGF IN THE LAST 18 HOURS, COUPLED WITH THE REFUSAL OF THE RPF TO ENTER INTO CEASEFIRE NEGOTIATIONS UNLESS THERE IS UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR FOUR PRE-CONDITIONS CONCLUDES THAT THEIR IS NOT MUCH HOPE OF A CEASEFIRE IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. BOTH PARTIES NOW SEEM TO BE READY TO SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES ON THE BATTLEFIELD IF THIS CEASEFIRE SITUATION DOES NOT CLEAR UP RAPIDLY.

6. IN ADDITION IN THE EARLY AM OF 19 APRIL THE RGF FIRED MORTAR ROUNDS INTO THE AMAHORO STADIUM (A KNOWN JOINT UNAMIR AND REFUGEE LOCATION) KILLING 6 REFUGEES AND WOUNDING 46 OTHER REFUGEES. UNAMIR PERSONNEL WERE UNHURT BUT SUBJECTED TO SEVERE DANGER. ADDITIONAL MORTAR SHELLS LANDED IN THE AREA ADJACENT TO THE STADIUM KILLING AND WOUNDING AN UNKNOWN NUMBER OF CIVILIANS. THE FORCE HEADQUARTERS WAS ALSO HIT BY A MORTAR BOMB THAT DID NOT EXPLODE. THIS MORTAR ATTACK FURTHER ENDANGERED THE LIVES OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL WHEN THEY ATTEMPTED TO EVACUATE CASUALTIES WITH RED CROSS AMBULANCES AND SIRENS.

7. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS NOT VIABLE TO LEAVE A RESIDUAL FORCE AS FC OPTION C (IE ABOUT 1300 PERSONNEL) IN RWANDA. THERE IS NOW NO REASONABLY GUARANTEED SAFETY VALUE FOR THE RESUPPLY AND POSSIBLE EXTRACTION OF A VERY LARGE CONTINGENT OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL IN RWANDA SHOULD THINGS GET WORSE.

8. UNAMIR SHOULD HOWEVER GO TO A FORCE OF OPTION B (IE 250 PERSONNEL) IN ORDER TO KEEP A UN SECURE PRESENCE FOR HUMANITARIAN AND PEACE BROKERING PURPOSES. JUST AS IMPORTANT IF NOT MORE, THIS OPTION IS CONSIDERED AN ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL MINIMUM STEP OF UNAMIR PRESENCE IN RWANDA BECAUSE BOTH PARTIES HAVE CONTINUOUSLY STATED THEY FIRMLY WISH TO SEE UNAMIR STAY. A WHOLESAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE MISSION WOULD MOST CERTAINLY BE INTERPRETED AS LEAVING THE SCENE IF NOT EVEN DESERTING THE SINKING SHIP. IN VIEW OF THE SERIOUS STATE OF AFFAIRS ONE SHOULD ANTICIPATE ENORMOUS DANGEROUS REACTIONS AGAINST OUR TROOPS AND AS SUCH PREJUDICE AND ENDANGER THE WHOLE WITHDRAWAL PROCESS. FOR SECURITY REASONS IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO GO TO OPTION B AND THEN LET THE SITUATION SETTLE FOR A SHORT WHILE (AFTER POSSIBLY THE TANZANIAN MEETING) BEFORE REVIEWING

THE MISSION. FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS, IT WOULD BE UNETHICAL TO LEAVE THIS TERRIBLE SCENE WITHOUT AT LEAST GIVING A LAST HARD AND DETERMINED CHANCE FOR A CEASE FIRE AND AN EMBRYO OF A RELIEF ORGANIZATION IN COUNTRY. THE MISSION WOULD BE BASED IN OUR CURRENT HQ AND STADIUM COMPLEX AS IT IS STILL A REASONABLY SAFE PLACE AND IT IS VERY EASILY ACCESSIBLE TO CITY AND AIRPORT.

9. SHOULD OPTION B BE ORDERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND/OR IF THE AIRPORT IS CLOSED DUE TO FIGHTING IN ITS ENVIRONS, THEN A ROAD MOVE WILL HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED. THE PREFERRED ROUTE OF KIGALI-BYUMBA-MULINDI-GATUNA-KABALE-KAMPALA MAY NOT BE FEASIBLE WITH FIGHTING STILL ON-GOING IN THE NORTH. IN ADDITION THE ROUTE KIGALI-DAR-ES-SALEM MAY BE INSECURE IN SOME OF THE RGF\MILITIA CONTROLLED TERRITORY. UNAMIR DOES NOT POSSESS HEAVY WEAPON SYSTEMS OR THE AMMUNITION TO FORCE ITS WAY OUT. OPTIONS LIKE AN INTERNATIONALLY IMPOSED CEASEFIRE OR GUARANTEES OF AN INTERNATIONALLY MILITARY SUPPORTED EXTRACTION MAY HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IF UNAMIR IS TO SUCCESSFULLY WITHDRAW ITS PERSONNEL WITH SAFETY FROM RWANDA.

10. THE CONSEQUENCES OF A WITHDRAWAL BY UNAMIR WILL DEFINITELY HAVE AN ADVERSE AFFECT ON THE MORALE OF THE CIVIL POPULATION, ESPECIALLY THE REFUGEES, WHO WILL FEEL WE ARE DESERTING THEM. HOWEVER IN ACTUAL FACT THERE IS LITTLE THAT WE ARE DOING AT THE PRESENT TIME EXCEPT PROVIDING SECURITY, SOME FOOD AND MEDICINE AND A PRESENCE. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE HAS NOT REALLY COMMENCED. THE REFUGEES IN THE AMAHORO STADIUM, THE KING FAISEL HOSPITAL AND THE MERIDIEN HOTEL ARE IN SECURE RPF TERRITORY AND THEY WILL BE WELL TREATED (WITHIN THEIR MEANS) BY THE RPF SHOULD THEY CONTINUE TO HOLD THAT GROUND. THE ONLY THREAT WILL BE INDIRECT FIRE ATTACKS BY THE RGF WHO ARE CAPABLE OF SUCH ACTION AS WAS DEMONSTRATED ON 19 APRIL. HOWEVER, THEY WOULD SEEM TO BE INCLINED TO CONDUCT SUCH ATTACKS IF UNAMIR WAS HERE OR NOT AS WITNESSED TODAY AND AS INDICATED BY THE NEW CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE RGF ARMY WHO STATED HE MAY HAVE TO USE ALL THE TOOLS HE HAS TO WIN IF THE RPF INSIST ON CONTINUING THE FIGHT.

11. THE REFUGEES AT LOCATIONS LIKE HOTEL MILLES COLLINES, THE RED CROSS, ST MICHELS CATHEDRAL ETC IN RGF TERRITORY ARE IN DANGER OF MASSACRE, BUT HAVE BEEN IN THIS DANGER WITHOUT RESULT SO FAR FOR THE LAST WEEK EVEN WITH UNAMIR ON THE GROUND. BOTH PARTIES ARE BEING INFORMED THAT WE HAVE NOMINAL ROLLS OF THE PERSONS IN THE MERIDIEN AND MILLES COLLINES AND AN ACCURATE HEAD COUNT OF THE REFUGEES IN THE OTHER LOCATIONS. THIS WAS MADE AS A WARNING THAT THEY WOULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF REFUGEES UNDER THEIR CONTROL. LETTERS AND MEETINGS WILL BE HELD WITH EACH PARTY TO EMPHASIZE THAT THESE PERSONS MUST BE TREATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH BASIC HUMANITARIAN PRINCIPLES AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF SUPPLIES WILL NOT BE FORWARDED TO RWANDA UNTIL THERE IS A STABLE AND DURABLE CEASEFIRE TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF THE PERSONNEL AND SUPPLIES.

12. THE FIRST INFORMAL MEETING BETWEEN UNAMIR AND THE ICRC HEAD WAS HELD AT FORCE HQ IN ORDER TO POSSIBLY CONVINCE BOTH

PARTIES TO MEET ONLY TO DISCUSS HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. THE TEAM WENT TO THE RPF IN ORDER TO FEEL THEM OUT ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A QUADRIPARTITE MEETING (UNAMIR, ICRC, RPF, RGF) TO DISCUSS IMMEDIATE HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS LIKE BURYING THE DEAD, FOOD DELIVERY ETC. THE RESULTS WERE RATHER DISAPPOINTING AS THEY EMPHASIZED ONCE AGAIN THEIR VERY STRONG CASE REGARDING THE CONTINUING MASSACRES AROUND THE COUNTRY THAT ARE NOT SEEMINGLY BEING ABATED.

13. IN CONCLUSION THE PREFERRED OPTION IS TO REDUCE THE MISSION TO THE OPTION B LEVEL OF APPROXIMATELY 250 MILITARY/CIVILIAN PERSONNEL TO MAINTAIN A UN PRESENCE IN RWANDA, TO ASSIST IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS, TO PROVIDE A FORUM FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE DISCUSSIONS OF A CEASEFIRE AND TO ENSURE THE SAFE WITHDRAWAL OF THE REST OF THE FORCE. THE SAFETY OF OUR WITHDRAWAL IS DIRECTLY RELATED TO OUR KEEPING A FOOT ON THE GROUND IN RWANDA FOR AT LEAST THE NEXT SHORT WHILE. FC CANNOT STRESS THIS POINT EMPHATICALLY ENOUGH. WE AWAIT YOUR DECISION ON THIS MATTER.

*Raw
P. 10/02*

RELEASED IN FULL

April 21, 1994.

A4

President Clinton
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

My country and I have suffered grievously since last December when you spoke so many kind words about me at the White House. I am sure that you know that tens of thousands of Rwandans have been summarily executed over the last two weeks, since a plane bearing President Habyarimana was shot down in Kigali, the capital city. These killings have been carried out by the Presidential Guard and by the militia trained by the president's political party and its allies in government. I myself barely escaped from Rwanda with my life, wearing only a single cloth tied around my body.

Although the situation in Rwanda now seems like anarchy, it is only a small group of extremists around the late President Habyarimana who have planned and intensified the massacres. They have been able to cause a catastrophe of this magnitude because they were carefully organized and very well armed, and because they were attacking people who had neither organization nor arms. This slaughter of the defenseless - which continues even today - accompanies but is different from the fighting that has been going on for some years between the mainly Hutu Rwandan army and the RPF, the mostly Tutsi rebel movement. Although most of the victims of the latest massacres are Tutsis, many are children, women and the elderly, who have never taken up arms against the government or joined any opposition movement. Among the 1,150 people killed in a church at Musha, 650 were children, according to the pastor.

The forces of the UN that came to Rwanda to supervise a ceasefire between the government and the RPF (UNAMIR) are protecting thousands of Rwandans from a similar fate. They are guarding 25,000 to 30,000 people in a stadium, a hospital and other sites in Kigali. These people deliberately sought the protection of the UN forces, yet the Security Council of the UN has already withdrawn some soldiers, and is considering withdrawing those troops who remain in Rwanda. To do so would deliver these 25,000-30,000 people into the hands of the killers.

I understand concerns about the safety of the UNAMIR troops. However, there have been no fatalities among them since the first day of the violence, when ten Belgian soldiers were killed while defending the Prime Minister. The RPF has specifically stated that it hopes the UNAMIR will stay and that it would not intentionally fire on them. While attacks by Rwandan army troops can not be excluded, such an attack is only a possibility; this

Box: 970241 (5 of 8)
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FILE: PHUM-01 RWANDA/HUMAN RIGHTS JAN-APR 1994

possibility must be weighed against the near certainty that the tens of thousands of Rwandans now in their care will be slaughtered if they leave.


Withdrawal or reduction of UN forces in Rwanda would also seriously weaken any effort by the international community to persuade those who are carrying out these massacres that their strategy for taking power will fail.

The extremists from President Habyarimana's circle know they must depend upon international assistance in the future if they are to survive as a government. All international donors must therefore forcefully and unanimously convince them that any hope for such aid is futile. But these declarations will not be credible if at the same time the UN withdraws or reduces its troops. Such a withdrawal or reduction will only show that the international community is willing to turn its back on these horrendous crimes against humanity and will suggest to the killers that at some time in the future the killers will be accepted into that community.

If the UN lacks the will or the courage to maintain its concrete resistance against these killers, what is to stop them from destroying every single person who has ever opposed them and every single Tutsi in the country. Their campaign is genocide against the Tutsis. The US, like many other countries, has a moral and legal treaty obligation to "suppress and prevent" genocide.

Mr President, I appeal to you to act immediately to ensure a continued and effective peacekeeping force in Rwanda

Sincerely,



Monique Mujawamariya

NEDERLAND

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Postbus 10014
1001 EA Amsterdam

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ARTSEN ZONDER GRENZEN
MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES

P R E S S R E L E A S E

M A S S A C R E S I N R W A N D A

Amsterdam, 24 April 1994. In the South Rwandese town of Butare an orgy of violence is taking place. Thousands of people have been arrested and taken away to the outskirts of the town where they have been killed. In the university hospital where Médecins sans Frontières is working, 170 male patients were rounded up by military and taken away. MSF is extremely concerned for their safety. The patients were Tutsi's and Hutu's.

As the civil authorities have lost total control over the situation and as the military obstruct the treatment of civil patients, Médecins sans Frontières has to put off her activities.

According to the civil authorities in Butare there are 2 million displaced people in the south of Rwanda from the north and east of the country. These people are in need of immediate help and food. A serious famine is feared for. MSF-teams state that hundreds of people have been massacred near the border with Burundi. In the river between Rwanda and Burundi as well as along the road between Butare and the Burundese capital Bujumbura they saw corpses.

Médecins sans Frontières protested a few days ago against the nearly complete withdrawal of UN-troops from Rwanda. The organization has asked the Security Council again to reconsider her decision.

**For further information: MSF-Holland, Malou Nozeman,
Tel. 020 - 5208700.**

Newsday
New York, NY
April 25, 1994

Slaughter At Hospital In Rwanda

*Gunmen slay 170 in
unremitting chaos*

REUTER

Nairobi, Kenya — Government troops and gunmen killed about 170 patients, nurses and drivers at a hospital in southern Rwanda because they were members of the minority Tutsi tribe, witnesses said today.

Dr. Rony Zacharias of the medical charity Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders) said the killings took place over three days at the central hospital in the southern city of Butare, 25 miles from the border with Burundi.

"We saw the bodies of two Rwandese MSF drivers who were killed and a nurse who was beaten to death . . . Everything is out of control in Rwanda. It is a complete state of anarchy," he said by phone from the Burundian capital of Bujumbura.

"The killings at the hospital took place over the past three days, . . . carried out by people in military uniform and armed civilians."

Other members of his team corroborated Zacharias' account of what he described as a systematic "ethnic cleansing" of Tutsi civilians, apparently by members of Rwanda's Hutu majority.

Zacharias said that on the road to the border with Burundi after leaving Butare yesterday "the whole landscape was littered with bodies," and in the space

of five minutes he counted 30 corpses of men, women and children floating down the river on the border.

He urged the international community, especially the United Nations, to provide a minimum level of security so international aid agencies could operate in the chaotic central African country. Thursday, the UN Security Council ordered the 2,500-member UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda to cut its forces to a bare minimum of 270 peacekeepers.

Aid agencies said that as a result they feared tens of thousands of civilians would be left unprotected.

Yesterday, reporters in rebel-controlled territory just south of the Rwandan capital of Kigali came across a pile of 100 rotting corpses in Nyanza district and more bodies spilling out of mud huts.

Survivors said most of the dead were Tutsis, killed by militiamen who threw grenades into a crowd rounded up by troops as they tried to reach the UN-protected national stadium in Kigali.

Combat between military units continued in Kigali, where government forces and Rwanda Patriotic Front rebels battled with artillery and rockets overnight until late in the morning in one of their fiercest exchanges in days. UN peacekeepers evacuated 300 people from a hotel in Rwanda's shell-blasted capital after a fierce bombardment of rebel headquarters.

As efforts to halt the carnage continued, a Rwandan government delegation in neighboring Zaire said it had signed a ceasefire agreement brokered by Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko, but the Rwandan Patriotic Front failed to attend the ceremony.

In neighboring Tanzania, front negotiators walked out of talks, saying the government delegation failed to turn up. Tanzanian officials said a Rwandan government delegation to the peace talks, called by Tanzania and originally supposed to start Saturday, never arrived in Arusha and had vanished.

The confusion was compounded by members of the Rwandan government delegation in the Zairean capital, saying the accord, signed Saturday in Mobutu's palace in Gbadolite, had previously been approved by the rebels. But the front failed to make an appearance.

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APPROVED BY: A:JSHATTUCK

AF/C:RFENDRICK

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HA/BA:ECLARK

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 110049

FOR AMB. SPIEGEL FROM JOHN SHATTUCK

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: RW, EAID, AEMR, PREL, PHUM

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH RWANDAN HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST

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PAGE 02 STATE 110049 261740Z
MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIYA

REF: GENEVA 3795

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT. ACTION REQUEST IS AT
PARAGRAPH 5.

2. SUMMARY: MONIQUE MUJAWAMARIYA, A HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST
FROM RWANDA, AND TWO REPRESENTATIVES FROM HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH MET WITH HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS A/S

JOHN SHATTUCK ON FRIDAY. APRIL 22. MS. MUJAMARIYA EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE DEPARTURE OF U.N. FORCES FROM RWANDA. SHE SOUGHT U.S. SUPPORT IN URGING THE U.N. TO MAKE A DETERMINATION THAT THE ACTIONS TAKING PLACE IN RWANDA CONSTITUTE GENOCIDE AND EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO HAVE JACQUES-ROGER BOOH-BOOH REPLACED AS MEDIATOR OF THE CONFLICT. THE GROUP MADE A NUMBER OF SUGGESTIONS ON WAYS TO STOP THE FIGHTING IN RWANDA, INCLUDING REQUESTING U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, JOSE AYALA LASSO, TO PUBLICLY HIGHLIGHT EVENTS TAKING PLACE THERE. AMB. SPIEGEL IS REQUESTED TO RAISE WITH AYALA LASSO THE

POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA. END SUMMARY

3. DURING THE MEETING WITH A/S SHATTUCK, MS. MUJAWAMARIYA EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE DEPARTURE OF U.N. FORCES. SHE BELIEVES THAT THERE WILL BE EVEN MORE KILLING SHOULD THAT APPEN. GIVEN THE NUMBER OF CIVILIANS WHO HAVE ALREADY DIED IN THE FIGHTING, THE GROUP ASKED A/S SHATTUCK WHAT THE CHANCES MIGHT BE OF GETTING THE U.N. TO LABEL THE
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EVENTS IN RWANDA AS GENOCIDE SO THAT THERE MIGHT BE A GREATER CALL TO ACCOUNTING FOR THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE. A/S SHATTUCK WAS NOT HOPEFUL THAT THIS WOULD OCCUR.

4. ANOTHER CONCERN RAISED BY THE GROUP WAS THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.N. MEDIATOR, JACQUES-ROGER BOOH-BOOH. THEY BELIEVE BOOH-BOOH SHOULD BE REPLACED, AS HE HAS COMPROMISED HIS POSITION AND IS TOO CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH THE GOVERNMENT TROOPS WITH WHOM HE HAS BEEN OPENLY FRATERNIZING. HOWEVER, AFTER THE HASTY DEPARTURE OF THE MEDIATION TEAM THAT HAD INITIALLY TRAVELED TO RWANDA TO TRY AND WORK OUT AN AGREEMENT, FINDING A SUITABLE REPLACEMENT FOR BOOH-BOOH MIGHT BE DIFFICULT.

5. A NUMBER OF SUGGESTIONS WERE OFFERED DURING THE MEETING ON WAYS TO STOP THE KILLING IN RWANDA INCLUDING CONVENING A SPECIAL SESSION OF THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (UNHRC) AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JOSE AYALA LASSO, THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, PUBLICLY HIGHLIGHTING THE EVENTS TAKING PLACE IN RWANDA IN AN EFFORT TO EXERT SOME INFLUENCE ON THE WARRING PARTIES

6. COMMENT: THE UNHRC IS NOT LIKELY TO AFFECT THE COURSE OF THE FIGHTING IN RWANDA AT THIS POINT, HOWEVER, IN LIGHT OF AYALA LASSO'S INTEREST IN BECOMING DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN MAJOR HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, INCLUDING THOSE IN RWANDA (SEE REFTTEL), IT WOULD BE WORTH PURSUING THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS SPEAKING OUT PUBLICLY ON THE NEED TO END THE KILLINGS AND NEGOTIATE A PEACEFUL TRANSITION TOWARD ESTABLISHING A NEW GOVERNMENT. END COMMENT

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7. ACTION REQUEST: AMB. SPIEGEL IS REQUESTED, AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY, TO URGE HIGH COMMISSIONER AYALA LASSO TO SPEAK OUT ON THE SITUATION IN RWANDA. TALBOTT

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Appendix: Draft Presidential Statement on Rwanda, Proposed by the Czech Delegation to the UNSC on 28 April 1994

The Security Council is absolutely appalled and horrified over continuing reports of indiscriminate slaughter of innocent civilians in Kigali and various other localities in Rwanda. It notes that according to reliable reports, transmitted to the Council by the Secretary-General in his Special Report (S/1994/470), the current wave of killings was started by unruly members of the Presidential Guard, joined by elements of the Rwandese Government Forces (RGF), over which the interim Government, established on April 8, had failed to establish its authority. Unruly RGF soldiers were also responsible for the brutal murders of Mrs. Agathe Uwilingiyimana, Prime Minister, and several other ministers, of the provisional Government that stemmed from the initial implementation of the Arusha Accords, as well as for the deaths of 10 members of the Belgian contingent serving with UNAMIR.

In addition to information available from the Secretary-General, the Security Council has considered information available from well-respected NGOs. All this information points to one thing: the horrors of Rwanda's killing fields have few precedents in the recent history of the world. The Security Council reaffirms that the systematic killing of any ethnic group, with intent to destroy it in whole or in part constitutes an act of genocide as defined by relevant provisions of international law.

The Security Council points out that genocide cannot be condoned or tolerated, let alone justified, under any circumstances: not by civil war, not by the death of a leader, whatever suspicions surround it, not by past history. The Council further points out that an important body of international law exists that deals with perpetrators of genocide.

The Security Council warns the interim Government of Rwanda of the responsibility it bears for immediately reining in and disciplining all elements of the RGF and of the Presidential Guards responsible for the brutalities. The Council calls upon the interim Government of Rwanda to assure that any group, organization, movement, militia or individual under its control should cease and desist from all acts of genocide against any part of the population of Rwanda. The Council also calls upon the interim Government of Rwanda to investigate all acts of genocide and to severely punish those responsible for their commission. The Council furthermore expresses its hope that forces that are currently engaging the RGF and the Presidential Guard will not resort to comparable countermeasures.

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 APPROVED BY: AF/C: RJFENDRICK

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TAGS: MOPS PREL PHUM RW US

SUBJECT: DAS BUSHNELL TELLS COL. BAGASORA TO STOP THE KILLINGS

1. SUMMARY. AF DAS BUSHNELL TELEPHONED RWANDAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE CABINET DIRECTOR COL. BAGASORA ON APRIL 28 TO URGE AN END TO THE KILLINGS. BAGASORA RESPONDED THAT THE RPF OFFENSIVE IS TRIGGERING THE MASSACRES AND THAT A CEASE-FIRE IS NEEDED FIRST. DAS BUSHNELL CONFRONTED HIM WITH EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF RWANDAN ARMY COMPLICITY IN

THE KILLINGS, AND SAID THE WORLD DID NOT BELIEVE THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT/RWANDAN MILITARY'S PARTY LINE. THIS SOBERED HIM UP, AND HE PROMISED TO PASS THE MESSAGE TO THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP TO SEE IF A COMPROMISE WAS POSSIBLE, AND TO CALL BACK THE FOLLOWING DAY WITH AN ANSWER. END SUMMARY

2. BAGASORA TOLD DAS BUSHNELL THAT THE FIGHTING BETWEEN GOR AND RPF FORCES WAS CONTINUING, BUT WAS LESS INTENSE. HE CLAIMED THAT NO MORE MASSACRES WERE OCCURRING IN KIGALI AND THAT MOST AREAS WERE CALM, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF BUTARE AND GITARAMA. HE SAID THE PRESIDENT HAD TRAVELED TO BUTARE THE PREVIOUS DAY IN AN ATTEMPT TO CALM THE POPULATION. BAGASORA SAID BUYUMBA AND OTHER TOWNS TAKEN BY THE RPF WERE "EMPTY".

3. CONSISTENT WITH THE LINE TAKEN BY OTHERS IN THE GOR AND RWANDAN ARMY, BAGASORA SAID THE RPF'S OFFENSIVE IS TRIGGERING THE MASSACRES AND THAT A CEASE-FIRE WAS NEEDED BEFORE THE KILLINGS WOULD STOP. HE CHARACTERIZED THE
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KILLINGS AS A SPONTANEOUS REACTION BY THE POPULATION TO THE RPF OFFENSIVE. BAGASORA OBVIOUSLY OBJECTED TO THE RPF'S CHALLENGE TO THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT'S LEGITIMACY AND SAID HE OPPOSED THE RPF'S DEMAND THAT THE GOR DELEGATION TO PEACE TALKS INCLUDE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RWANDAN MILITARY.

4. DAS BUSHNELL TOLD BAGASORA THAT THE WORLD DOES NOT BUY THE GOR'S STORY ON THE KILLINGS AND THAT CREDIBLE EYEWITNESSES AND RESPECTED ORGANIZATIONS REPORTED RWANDAN MILITARY COMPLICITY IN THE KILLINGS. SHE SAID THAT, IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD, THE RWANDAN MILITARY ENGAGED IN CRIMINALS ACTS, AIDING AND ABETTING CIVILIAN MASSACRES. SHE REMINDED BAGASORA OF THE GOVERNMENT'S REPEATED EARLIER STATEMENTS THAT THEY WOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO IMPLEMENT THE PEACE ACCORDS, BUT THAT THIS APPARENTLY WAS NOT TRUE SINCE THEY WEREN'T EVEN WILLING TO COMPROMISE ON THE ISSUE OF MILITARY REPRESENTATION IN THE GOVERNMENT DELEGATION TO THE PEACE TALKS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, DAS BUSHNELL TOLD BAGASORA THAT IT WOULD BEHOVE THE GOR MILITARY TO SHOW SOME RESPONSIBLE LEADERSHIP AND A WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE. SHE EMPHASIZED THAT WE WERE LOOKING TO HIM PERSONNALLY TO DO THE RIGHT THING.

5. DAS BUSHNELL'S REMARKS SEEMED TO TAKE BAGASORA BY SURPRISE AND SOBERED HIM. HE PROMISED TO TALK TO GOR ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF BIZIMUNGU TO SEE IF THEY COULD COME UP WITH A COMPROMISE. HE SAID HE WOULD CALL DAS BUSHNELL BACK TOMORROW. HE ALSO ASKED THAT WE TALK TO THE RPF. DAS BUSHNELL SIMPLY REPLIED THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE WORKING WITH GENERAL DALLAIRE ON GETTING A CEASE-FIRE IN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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PLACE AND TALKS RESUMED.

6. BUJUMBURA - MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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TO: BARIL (ONLY), UNATIONS, NEW YORK (NO DISTRIBUTION)

FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI *[Signature]*

DATE: 4 MAY 1994 *For FC*

NUMBER: MIR-899

SUBJECT: UNAMIR - FUTURE FORCE STRUCTURE

1. AS DISCUSSED, FIND ENCLOSED A DRAFT DOCUMENT ON THE UNAMIR FUTURE FORCE STRUCTURE.
2. FOR YOUR REVIEW AND NECESSARY COMMENTS PLEASE.
3. REGARDS

ATTACHMENTS: 12 PAGES

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DRAFTUNAMIR
FORCE HQ

May 94

3000.1 (COO)

SUBJECT: UNAMIR - FUTURE FORCE STRUCTUREGeneral

1. One month has passed since fighting broke out in Rwanda. RPF has unilaterally declared cease-fire on 252400 Apr 94. RGF is also ready to accept cease-fire with some conditions. It is revealed that some RGF hard liners have soften quite a bit and approached their moderates to pursue for peace. Others, not yet fully identified are dying through ruthless means. The intensity of fighting has stabilized considerably in the city but continues in the North East, North to North West.
2. RPF has surrounded Kigali city from north, east and west and closing in on RGF fortified positions. In some places RGF has launched counter offensive which hardly brought any success, rather they have taken casualties and withdrawn to their original positions. Bulk of RGF forces seem tired of the fighting. Some young officers of RGF in statements of desperation are in a mood of conducting massacres in refugee camps before any cease-fire take place or before they are pushed out of Kigali.
3. There is however a third force that has come out of hiding and mixing in with the general population. It has its base in the political militias, youth wings and self defense groups. These groups are fanatical, ruthless and quite often under influence of booze and drugs. They are committing maximum atrocities and destruction. Each individual is a leader by himself and does not seem to obey or to take orders from anyone. They are mostly armed and have enough (mostly looted) money to sustain their action for some time. They incite the locals to join them. Even if a cease-fire is brought into effect, it may be difficult to control these militias. If UNAMIR supports the massive humanitarian projects (even without cease-fire), it will require a sizable force for escorting food convoys, protection of food distribution points. Other tasks will be the recovery of arms from these militias, cordon and search ops, investigation of crimes/violations, detevence of local protection groups that are harassing/torturing/killing innocent civilians. Experiences show that Militias would loot food convoys if such convoys are not

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protected. UNAMIR will require special mandate and re-inforced teeth to tackle them; however it has to be done in collaboration with both the forces.

UNAMIR - Present Force Structure

4. Strength. During the thick of the battle, it was decided to thinout UNAMIR forces to a workable strength. Total strength of UNAMIR is at present 449. Present combat strength is two and half companies.

5. Tasks. Our current force structure is based on a very limited self defence capability of UN installations, an armed presence at the airfields, monitoring refugee camps, liaison and humanitarian monitoring/assistance tasks. Major tasks are:

- a. Provide security to all UN installations.
- b. Escort duties.
- c. Provide security to all the refugees in UN installations.
- d. Monitor activities in refugee camps not held by UNAMIR.
- e. Provide limited humanitarian assistance to the neeties.
- f. Coordinate all humanitarian efforts with other organizations.
- g. Continue to pursue for peace.
- i. Continue monitoring activities by UNMOs.

6. Limitation of UNAMIR. UNAMIR, under its current structure and mandate, is not capable of countering the civil defence/militia actions. UNAMIR cannot take actions that have a confrontational nature. Furthermore, it does not have the force to do it and at the same time protect itself from the consequences. Should both the forces agree for a cease-fire, it will be difficult to maintain the BLUE LINE (no man's land) with the present structure. UNAMIR needs to show its presence even under present scenario. It also needs to prepare itself for cease-fire phase so that no time is wasted once cease-fire is accepted by both the parties.

Present Rwanda and Its Need

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7. Political Scenario. The whole world is looking forward for a cease-fire, so is UNAMIR. With the cease-fire we would move into a new scenario in Rwanda. Although the ARUSHA ACCORD is still in the background, its validity in future Rwandese peace process is in jeopardy. RPF has brought north and north - eastern part of Rwanda under their control. The capital is also divided into two. It is quite likely that RPF is not going to give away their military gains. Fact is; the country is so far militarily divided into two. North and north - east is held by RPF and south by RGF. In the RGF held territory, civil defence militias are unruly and un-managable (already described). The government and its armed forces have no control over them and they have hardly any intention to bring these militias under their grip. If at all a cease-fire can be brought to effect, it is anticipated that negotiations will continue for a permanent solution. It may take a long and arduous task to bring about settlement to the political problem which could lead to anarchy especially in the areas that could be under the control of RGF. It would then create security problems and breakdown of essential services. Under this circumstances extensive humanitarian activities and the presence of UN troops will be needed throughout Rwanda.

8. MILITARY SITUATION. The failure of several attempts to reach a ceasefire implies that both factions will continue to prosecute the war which may lead to one of the following actions:

- a. RGF counter offensive.
- b. RPF capture of the whole country.
- c. RPF halting along identifiable line.
- d. RPF capturing the whole country and then withdrawing to an identifiable line during negotiations in order to give the impression of having made some concession.

In the first two cases, UN could find itself doing more of humanitarian activities and monitoring of the situation than peacekeeping. In the last two cases, a foreseeable BLUE LINE will be drawn between the forces, through which place it will pass through, will be difficult to predict now. This will necessitate monitoring not only the ceasefire line, but also selected points along the borders with the neighbouring countries to check inflow of military hardware. It will also call for a creation of a Buffer Zone to separate the forces of both parties. The UN would require the presence of a sizeable force to meet this requirement. This option may be against the spirit of the Arusha Peace Agreement, but in reality it may be difficult to have a unified country after bitter fighting as manifested in the Cyprus case. In a situation where the country is partitioned as a result

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of the war, a number of issues arise that require to be addressed, mass migration, revenge killings, continued hostilities between the factions, political stalemate and a continuous decline in economic activities.

9. MASS MIGRATION. As a result of the war, there has been a mass movement of displaced persons to safe areas. This is likely to continue leading to the creation of more refugee centres. Their security and upkeep requires a significant involvement by the UN and NGOs (Non-Government Organizations). Beside the movement of the displaced persons, others may return to their former places of residence where they may be having their immovable properties as soon as there is a ceasefire. This may require the presence of UN troops in the various important towns and cities to assist in the maintenance of law and order.

10. REVENGE KILLINGS. Revenge killings for atrocities committed by one party or the other, could occur during the ceasefire period. The presence of the militias and elements of the Presidential Guard also pose significant threats to peace and security. Even though, in the long term, this would abate with a political settlement, in the interim, it is imperative to operate a UN-base security measure to prevent such action. Hence, the presence of UN troops is required for this purpose. Arms that have gone into the wrong hands or irresponsible members of the public must be retrieved under UN arrangement. This could be achieved by the establishment of check points, road blocks and urban/town patrollings.

11. CONTINUED HOSTILITIES. Continuation of hostilities could be seen in the form of sabotage activities and small scale military operations. This would require the monitoring of the military as well as policing of important towns and cities along the ceasefire line. It would therefore necessitate the establishment of a Buffer Zone around the ceasefire line. During the ceasefire period, it is anticipated that negotiations will continue on the basis of the Arusha Peace Agreement or a variation of it. It may take a long and arduous road to bring about settlement to the political problem which could lead to anarchy especially in the areas that would be under the control of RGF. It would then create enormous security problems and even a breakdown of essential services. This would require extensive humanitarian activities and the presence of UN troops to assist in maintaining security and order.

12. ECONOMIC DECLINE. Obviously, the battered country would

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have started a decline in the economy due to the breakdown of its infrastructure, which is generally built on regional interdependence, in the country. A UN presence, however, could improve the situation and encourage normal economic activities including the transfer of goods and services from one region to another. In particular, the airport which provides external link and therefore an asset for economic activities, must be secured and should be considered as a neutral ground and out of the hands of both parties. Hence, it would be under the control of the UN troops to facilitate resupply of troops and inflow of humanitarian goods, an view of the enormous humanitarian assistance tasks that lie ahead.

UNAMIR - FUTURE FORCE STRUCTURE

13. Concept of Operation

a. A cease-fire may not be agreed by both the parties in near futures but Rawandese basic need to survive will require massive humanitarian assistance. To perform humanitarian tasks, the force structure should be designed in such a way that it has the following operational capabilities:

(1) A force structure for humanitarian tasks, security and supports.

(2) Combat power to face Militias or local resistance forces and conduct deterrent operations such as arms seizure and recovery.

(3) Adequate logistic support.

b. This concept proposes to divide the entire country into seven Zones based on the following factors:

(1) Prefecture administrative boundries.

(2) Displaced people and refugees camps.

(3) Builtup areas.

(4) Lines of communication.

Each zone will primarily be manned by an Infantry Battalions. The battalion could divide the zone in sub-zones and the number of sub-zones would depend on the factors already discussed.

c. Border Control. Presently Uganda border activities are monitored by UNOMUR located at Kabale. To monitor border areas of ZAIRE, BURUNDI and TANZANIA similar UNMOS

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organizations will be needed. UNMOs would monitor and report of any arms and military movements to Rwanda.

d. CIVPOL. To investigate war and civil crimes and to restore law and order situations in Rwanda, at least 90 Civil Police are needed. They would operate jointly with RPF/RGF (Gendarmerie). It is imperative that the CIVPOL be placed directly under command of the Force Commander. Details are in Annexes A and B.

Force Requirement

14. To ensure smooth humanitarian efforts and to maintain law and order situation, UNAMIR needs a reasonably large force self sufficient, highly mobile in all respects to operate efficiently throughout its large operational area. In order to get a grip of the situation UNAMIR needs a Full and Effective Force. If that is not possible, it should have Minimum Viable Force. Details are explained in following paragraphs:

15. Full and Effective Force. The composition of this force should of 8 Infantry Battalions out of which 4 would be mechanized. If UNAMIR gets 8 bns, the country would be operationally divided into seven zones:

a. Zone 1. Comprises of CYANGUGU, GIKONGORO and BUTARE prefectures. Zone HQ will be located at BUTARE. The area is presently under the control of RGF. BUTARE will also be used for Logistic Base. The area can be used for dumping of relief material coming from BURUNDI.

b. Zone 2. Comprises of KIBUYE and GITARAMA prefectures. Zone HQ will be located at GITARAMA. Bulk of the area is presently the control of RGF.

c. Zone 3. Comprises of GISENYI and RUHENGARI prefectures. Zone HQ would be located at RUHENGARI. Bulk of the area is held by RGF but fighting is still going on in RUHENGARI area where RPF launched an offensive to capture RUHENGARI.

d. Zone 4. Comprises of BYUMBA prefecture. Zone HQ to be located at BYUMBA. One of the sub-zone HQ would be located at GABIRO which has an airfield and it is located on the main road between Uganda and Rwanda. GABIRO would also be one of the Logistic Base. The logistic base to control all humanitarian aids coming from Rwanda. The area is presently under the control of RPF. Tutsis from the south have migrated to this area and taken shelters under the umbrella of RPF. Thousands of displaced persons are now presently staying here.

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e. Zone 5. Comprises of KIGALI prefecture. Bn HQ would be located at BUGESERA. This area is mostly dominated by RPF. Maj atrocities have taken place in this area where both the parties participated in the massacre.

f. Zone 6. It is the KIGALI CITY area. One mech and one motorised battalion will be deployed in the area. Mech bn will carryout escort duties and also be the force reserve. The city is surrounded by RPF and they have taken over some parts of city. Rest are held by RGF.

g. Zone 7. Comprises of KIBUNGO prefecture. Zone HQ will be located of RPF. About two hundred thousand displaced persons have concentrated in this area (mostly Hutus) to cross over to TANZANIA.

h. Force Support Bn. To maintain the above force a Force Supprt Bn will be needed. Engineer Coy should be capable of undertaking following tasks:

- (1) De-mining.
- (2) Bomb disposal.
- (3) Road Repair.
- (4) Bridge Repair.
- (5) Infrastructure Enlargement.

Total requirement of Full and Effective Force is four mechanised bns, four motorised bns and a Force Support Bn. details are at Anx A.

i. Helicopter Support Wing. It will consist of two sqns. These are:

- (1) Heli Lift Sqn (Min 1/2 coy lift at a time)
- 8 x UTTH (Bell 212 type).
- (2) Recce/Armed Sqn - 8 x Light helicopters with armed capability.

j. In addition to the bns, an observer group of about 300 officers will be required to monitor and to provide liaison and escort duties.

k. A Force HQ to be built around the nucleus of the

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present HQ, should continue to operate in KIGALI to exercise command over the new force. The proposed organization of Full and Effective Force is at Anx A.

16. Minimum Viable Force. To perform the tasks, UNAMIR needs minimum 5 Infantry Battalions out of which 3 should be mechanised. The distribution of units are as under:

a. Sector 1. Comprises of CYANGUGU, GIKONGO and BUTARE prefectures. Sector HQ will be located at BUTARE. BUTARE will also be used for Logistic Base. Materials coming from BURUNDI can be dumped here. A motorised bn will be needed for this sector. The area is presently under the control of RGF.

b. Sector 2. Comprises of GISENYI, KIBUYE and GITARAMA prefectures. Sector HQ will be located at GITARAMA. One mechanised bn will be needed for this sector. The area is under the control of RGF.

c. Sector 3. Comprises of RUHENGARI and BYUMBA prefectures. Sector HQ will be at BYUMBA. One motorised bn will be responsible for this Sector. Except a portion of RUHENGARI, rest of the area is under the control of RPF. GABIRO will be one of the logistic base.

d. Sector 4. Comprises of KIGALI and KIBUNGO prefectures. Sector HQ will be at RWAMAGANA. One mechanised bn will be needed for this Sector. Most of the area is controlled of RPF.

e. Sector 5. It is the KIGALI CITY area. Minimum one mechanised battalion will be deployed in the area. Mech bn will carryout escort duties, protect UN Installations and also be the force reserve.

f. Force Support Bn. To maintain the above force, a Force Support Bn will be needed.

Total requirement of Minimum Viable Force is three mechanised bns, two motorised bns and a Force Support Bn. Details are at Anx B.

17. Plan for Deployment of Minimum Viable force. The deployment of Forces should be conducted in three phases:

a. Phase 1. Ghana Bn is brought to its full strength (800) and equipped with M113 APCs for communality, ease of maintenance, driver training, spare parts and reliability. They will ensure the protection of Kigali International Airport so that re-inforement can be brought in without

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hinderence.

b. Phase 2. Inducting two mechanised bns into operational area within 7-14 days from D Day (Decision Day of Secy Gen).

c. Phase 3. Inducting Force Support Bn and two motorised Bn. Bns should be in Rwanda within one month from D Day.

18. Probable Tasks. Likely tasks of UNAMIR Force can be divided into three. These are:

a. Humanitarian Assistance Tasks.

- (1) Estalish refugee camps.
- (2) Provide safe areas for persons in danger.
- (3) Surveillance and monitoring of aid distributions.
- (4) Arrangement for exchange of refugees and provide vehicles, escorts and liaison for this task.
- (5) Collect data of refugees/displaced persons and affected areas.
- (6) Dispose un-exploded bombs and breech mine fields.
- (7) Take up repair works within capability.
- (8) Provide medical support to the people.

b. Security Tasks

- (1) Convoy escorts.
- (2) Dis-arming population with local authorities.
- (3) Secure displaced persons camp and Refugee Camps.
- (4) Secure transfer of people between warring areas/zones.
- (5) Control measures (road blocks, cordon and search, investigations etc).
- (6) Violation investigation.
- (7) Deterrent/offensive operations against extremist groups.

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(8) Assist RPF/RGF in maintaining law and order within their respective areas.

c. Peace Effort

- (1) Continue to mediate between two factions.
- (2) Pursue for a peace agreement.

CONCLUSION

19. The new draft mandate for UNAMIR when passed, will serve as a basis for continued presence of UNAMIR in Rwanda. Presently the military situation seems to suggest a partition of the country as a most likely outcome of the war. The future concept of the operation may therefore be viewed in three phases involving continuous humanitarian assistance, security tasks and implementation of ceasefire and political settlement.


20. Effective participation of UNAMIR would call for an enlargement of the force with the current structure forming the nucleus of the enlargement force. The presence of the enlarged force with combat power would definitely serve as a deterrent to the warring factions.

R.A. DALLAIRE
Maj Gen
Force Commander

12/13

PROPOSED UNAMIR HUMANITARIAN SECURITY FORCE
FULL AND EFFECTIVE FORCE STR-8120

ANNEX A




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PROPOSED UNAMIR HUMANITARIAN SECURITY FORCE

MINIMUM VIABLE FORCE STR-5513

ANNEX B



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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: MARR, PINS, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, PGOV, RW, UNSC
 SUBJECT: RWANDA: SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSIONS

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PAGE 02 STATE 127262 130541Z
 REF: A) PRETORIA 6682, B) USUN 2015

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. THE FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED AS GUIDANCE TO USUN DURING DISCUSSIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL THIS WEEK ON THE CONTINUING HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN RWANDA. END SUMMARY.
3. WE HAVE SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT THE UN'S NON-PAPER ON RWANDA WHICH ASKS FOR AN EXPANDED UNAMIR FORCE OF AT LEAST

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7,500 TROOPS BASED IN KIGALI WITH A MANDATE TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR DISPLACED PERSONS IN VARIOUS PARTS OF RWANDA AND TO ASSIST IN THE PROVISION OF HUMANITARIAN SERVICES TO THEM. VICE PRESIDENT GORE HAS ALREADY EXPLAINED TO BOUTROS-GHALI SOME OF OUR SPECIFIC CONCERNS ABOUT BASING A HUMANITARIAN OPERATION IN KIGALI WHILE A CIVIL WAR AND HEAVY FIGHTING ARE RAGING IN AND AROUND THAT CITY AND ITS AIRPORT (REF A). A KIGALI-BASED OPERATION IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD REQUIRE A CHAPTER VII MANDATE, GIVEN

THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT'S LACK OF COMMAND AND CONTROL OVER RENEGADE ARMY UNITS AND EXTREMIST MILITIAS. IT MAY BE DIFFICULT TO LOCATE ADEQUATE NUMBERS OF TROOPS WILLING TO SERVE UNDER THESE CONDITIONS. MOREOVER, THE LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS OF AIRLIFTING IN THE QUANTITY OF TROOPS AND HEAVY EQUIPMENT REQUIRED TO MOUNT A KIGALI-BASED OPERATION ARE DAUNTING. THE U.S. IS NOT PREPARED AT THIS POINT TO LIFT HEAVY EQUIPMENT AND TROOPS INTO KIGALI.

4. IN ADDITION TO OUR CONCERNS ABOUT A KIGALI-BASED
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MISSION, WE PERCEIVE SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS IN THE SECRETARIAT'S PROPOSED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. IN PARTICULAR, WE SEE AN INHERENT CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE SECRETARIAT'S ASSUMPTIONS THAT THERE WILL BE NO CEASEFIRE AND THE EXPECTATION THAT THIS WILL NOT BE A PEACE ENFORCEMENT MISSION. SIMILARLY, THAT THE MISSION WOULD HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO "ENSURE" SAFETY FOR DISPLACED PERSONS BUT, AS GENERAL DALLAIRE OPINED, OPERATE WITH #MINIMUM USE OF FORCE". FINALLY, THE MANDATE DESCRIBED BY THE SECRETARIAT AND CONTAINED IN REF B SEEMS OVERLYROAD AND WOULD BE MORE MANAGEABLE IF LIMITED TO CREATING A PROTECTIVE ZONE, PROVIDING SECURITY TO HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORTS, LIAISON, AND PROMOTING RESTORATION OF A CEASEFIRE AND RETURN TO THE ARUSHA FEACE PROCESS.

5. AS VICE PRESIDENT GORE HAS INDICATED, WE ARE INTERESTED IN EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF USING AN EXPANDED FORCE TO CREATE ONE OR MORE SECURE ZONES IN RWANDA ALONG THE BORDER FOR THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN MOST IMMEDIATE DANGER AND FOR THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF TO THEM. SUCH A MISSION COULD NOT ONLY PROVIDE SECURITY FOR SUCH SAFE ZONES AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE BUT COULD ALSO PROVIDE AN ENVIRONMENT CONDUCIVE TO REFUGEE REPATRIATION

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AND COULD SERVE IN A PREVENTIVE CAPACITY TO DETER THE SPREAD OF VIOLENCE TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES.

6. UNDER THIS OPTION, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WOULD BE STORED IN THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AND TRANSPORTED INTO THE SECURE ZONES. THE MISSION WOULD PROTECT THE ZONES' PERIMETERS AGAINST INCURSIONS AND, WITHIN THE ZONES,

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ENFORCE SECURITY, INCLUDING SECURITY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE SHIPMENTS AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF EFFORTS. THE OPERATION WOULD REQUIRE SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND ROBUST RULES OF ENGAGEMENT TO ENSURE PROTECTION FOR THESE ZONES.

7. BASED ON KNOWN FLOWS OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS AND THE LOCATION OF PERSONS MOST AT RISK, THE ZONE OR ZONES SHOULD BE SET UP AT LEAST INITIALLY ON THE RWANDA BORDER WITH BURUNDI AND, IF REQUIRED, POSSIBLY TANZANIA. ESSENTIAL TO THIS CONCEPT WOULD BE THE FULL CONCURRENCE OF THE NEIGHBORING GOVERNMENTS AND THE ASSENT OF THE RWANDAN PARTIES. OTHER AREAS COULD BE CONSIDERED LATER IF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE AND RESOURCES PERMIT.

8. THE MANDATE OF THIS EXPANDED UNAMIR FORCE WOULD BE TO ESTABLISH SAFE ZONES ALONG THE RWANDAN BORDER FOR REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS AND TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR THE PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE BY HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES TO THOSE PERSONS AND SECURITY FOR THE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE EFFORTS. THE NUMBER AND SIZE OF THE ZONES CREATED SHOULD CORRESPOND WITH THE SIZE AND MANDATE OF THE FORCE. DEPLOYMENT COULD BEGIN AS SOON AS THE TROOPS, EQUIPMENT, AND TRANSPORT ARE READY, WHETHER OR NOT A MILITARY CEASEFIRE IS IN PLACE.

9. IN THE CUMULATIVE, MILITARY ANALYSIS INDICATES THAT THIS MISSION MAY REPRESENT A REAL DANGER TO THE TROOPS INVOLVED. EVEN WITH THE TACIT APPROVAL OF THE WARRING PARTIES, ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURE ZONE IN SOUTHERN RWANDA

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HAS THE POSSIBILITY OF PROVOKING CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD, MILITIAS AND ROVING GANGS. TO DATE, THE GOVERNMENT SIDE HAS BEEN UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO CONTROL THESE FORCES. THEREFORE, TROOP CONTRIBUTING NATIONS' FORCES MUST BE EQUIPPED, CAPABLE AND HAVE THE CLEAR AUTHORITY FOR CONDUCTING WHAT COULD LIKELY BE AN ACTIVE PROTECTION OPERATION REQUIRING THE USE OF LETHAL FORCE. MOREOVER, IF THE RPF CARRIES OUT ITS PREVIOUS THREAT TO PUNISH WHAT IT CONSIDERS ROGUE FORCES IN SOUTHERN RWANDA, THOSE FORCES MIGHT ATTEMPT TO ENTER THE DISPLACED PERSON CAMPS IN THE SECURE ZONE, OR TO PASS THROUGH UN LINES. WITH THE RPF PURSUING THESE FORCES, THE UN FORCE WOULD FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN A NEUTRAL HUMANITARIAN ROLE. UN SHOULD BE AWARE OF THIS ANALYSIS AS IT CONSIDERS THE MANDATE, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, AND WHICH FORCES TO ACCEPT AND HOW THEY ARE EQUIPPED. IN OUR VIEW, TROOP CONTRIBUTORS WOULD NEED TO COME EQUIPPED AND PREPARED TO COUNTER POTENTIAL HOSTILITIES AND MEET THE CHALLENGES DESCRIBED ABOVE.

10. THIS OPTION DOES NOT ADDRESS THE FATE OF THE SEVERAL THOUSAND RWANDANS WHO ARE ALREADY UNDER UN PROTECTION IN KIGALI. WE RECOMMEND THAT THESE AD HOC PROTECTIVE EFFORTS SHOULD CONTINUE UNTIL A SUITABLE ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENT CAN BE ENSURED.

11. WE RECOGNIZE THAT OUR PROPOSAL CONTAINS MANY UNANSWERED QUESTIONS -- SUCH AS, WHERE WILL THE NEEDED FORCES COME FROM; HOW WILL THEY BE TRANSPORTED TO THE RWANDAN BORDER AREA; WHAT IS THE PRECISE ROLE OF THE UN

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AND NGO AGENCIES, THEIR REQUIREMENTS, AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH UN FORCES; WHERE PRECISELY SHOULD THESE SAFE ZONES BE CREATED; COULD THESE ZONES BE RELOCATED TO RESPOND TO CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES; WOULD UN FORCES BE AUTHORIZED TO MOVE OUT OF THE ZONES TO ASSIST AFFECTED POPULATIONS NOT IN THE ZONES; CAN WE OBTAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES TO ESTABLISH THESE ZONES NEAR THEIR BORDER; WILL THE FIGHTING PARTIES IN RWANDA AGREE TO THIS ARRANGMENT; WHAT MECHANISMS WILL BE ESTABLISHED TO COORDINATE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES WITHIN MILITARY OPERATIONS; WHAT CONDITIONS WOULD NEED TO OBTAIN FOR THE OPERATION TO END SUCCESSFULLY? WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH YOU AND OTHERS TO FIND ANSWERS TO THESE

QUESTIONS.

12. WE WOULD URGE THE UN TO EXPLORE AND REFINE THIS ALTERNATIVE AND PRESENT THE COUNCIL WITH A MENU OF AT LEAST TWO OPTIONS IN A FORMAL REPORT FROM THE SYG ALONG WITH COST ESTIMATES BEFORE THE SECURITY COUNCIL VOTES ON CHANGING UNAMIR'S MANDATE. TALBOTT

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2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400



16 May 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: DIRECTOR, RWANDA TASK FORCE *UK*
Prepared by: LTC Harvin: ISA/MEA: x78826

SUBJECT: Deputies Committee Meeting on Rwanda (U)

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BY AFRA
DATE 4 Dec 01

(U) Purpose: To provide background and talking points for the 16 May Deputies Committee on Rwanda (maps at Tab A).

~~(S)~~ Background: The interagency has been meeting daily for three weeks on Rwanda. As the situation on the ground remains deplorable (Tab B), there is a consensus on the desirability of doing "something" that will help to stop the killing, provide security for civilians at the most risk, and provide humanitarian assistance. There is very little consensus on how to accomplish this, in large part because there are strong downsides to each of the three options that are being considered. (See Tab C for additional details including initial DoD objections.)

(U) Option 1. The UNSYG proposes a Chapter VI 5,500-man African force based in Kigali to pacify the country and provide humanitarian relief (Tab D). This is the option the VP told the UNSYG we do not favor. It is highly unlikely that possible troop contributors would agree to send people into Rwanda unless a cease-fire is implemented. No cease-fire is presently envisioned, but according to PDD-25, a cease-fire is required for a Chapter VI operation. Although Ghana, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and Nigeria have expressed willingness to contribute troops, Ghana and Zimbabwe have ruled out peace enforcement missions. These African forces would be unable to support such a force logistically; it would require a First World military. If this option is chosen, we will be under immense pressure to deploy forces into Rwanda to get the PKO up and running and to keep it afloat. Further, JCS thinks that it would take a significantly larger force to do this mission. This is the type of operation that took 25-30,000-men for a similar area and population in Somalia. If this option is selected, the UN would then be on a slippery slope, faced with the alternatives of admitting failure or significantly increasing the size of the force and the concomitant logistical burden (Intelligence Assessments at Tab E).

~~(S)~~ Other views:

- NAM: Wants an even larger Chapter VII operation
- OAU: Main concern is that UN maintain lead, whatever is decided.

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- Senators Simon & Jeffords: Love it. See their letter to the President (Tab F) requesting immediate increase in UNAMIR forces; lending support to "protecting civilians throughout the country"; and offering up DoD assets as well as funding (no mention of where these funds are to be found).

- Interagency largely agrees that this option is not feasible.

~~(C)~~ Option 2. The U.S. proposed that the UN consider other options such as a "Border Safe Havens" Option that would leave only the present small force in Kigali and use Burundi as a base from which to establish a safe area for humanitarian relief in southern Rwanda. It is important to note that the U.S. has never committed to support this option, but only offered it up as a possible alternative to the UN's. This option was presented in general terms by U.S./UN to the Security Council Sunday and briefed in detail by State and OSD/Joint Staff this morning (Tab G). It hinges on use of Burundi as a staging area, a doubtful proposition, but one which has not yet been presented to the GOB.

~~(S)~~ Other views:

- UNSYG: Hates it, unless included as an adjunct to its plan.
- NAM: Hates it, not large enough effort, not aggressive enough.
- UNSC: Unknown; being briefed this morning.
- OSD/Joint Staff: We have serious concerns about this option, which emerged from State and NSC as an alternative to Option 1. State and NSC considered it politically unacceptable to pursue only a humanitarian effort as described in Option 3. Joint Staff support of the concept has been limited to providing the data requested by State to flesh out the option. JCS and OSD share very strong concerns that, in addition to not meeting the requirements set forth in PDD-25, this option might not be possible logistically without U.S. ground force presence. Moreover, finding the quality troops will be very difficult, especially if the UN will accept only Africans and in particular, if "protection" means the use of force. We are also concerned that the likely inability of the UN to accomplish this mission will somehow become a problem (of enormous financial and material significance) for the United States to solve, since we are the ones offering it up. The problems the Joint Staff foresees in logistically supporting this operation far exceed those that were encountered in Somalia. The price for gaining support for option 2 might be a U.S. logistic commitment of about 1,000 in Burundi. Conceptually, there are other problems with this option (e.g. who gets to enter the safe have; are they disarmed; what if 100,000 more displaced persons flood to the area - will the UN increase troops and size accordingly, etc.?)

~~(C)~~ Option 3. Do not expand UNAMIR. Continue humanitarian support and engage in aggressive diplomatic efforts to end crisis.

~~(S)~~ Other views:

- OSD/Joint Staff: Of the three, this is the proposal we dislike least. Although this does nothing dramatic to "stop the killings", we believe that Option 1 is not "do-able" and that Option 2 will not stop the killing of civilians in areas under Interim Government control, except in the very small border area made safe. We also do not believe that this is a "do nothing" option. The DoD airlift of humanitarian relief to Tanzania continues. There were 19 flights scheduled (which

includes three support flights) into Tanzania: there have been 13 flights so far, six more to follow this week. In addition, DoD will begin a humanitarian airlift similar to the Tanzanian lift (around 20 C-141 missions) to haul plastic sheeting, food, and heating oil into Bujumbura for refugee support, the first delivery date will be NLT 22 May. However, we recognize that political pressure at the UN will make it impossible to avoid a larger peacekeeping mission.

- State: Fears that public and Hill opinion would be very negative.
- NSC: Has to be convinced that this is proactive.

(C) All of the proposed options would include arms embargo language which we support.

(C) We anticipate a vote in the UN this evening. If U.S./UN is unable to convince the UN to modify its plan along the lines of alternative "border safe haven" proposal, OSD and JCS recommend a U.S. veto. State and NSC would oppose this.

(C) If we do convince the UN to modify its plans, we should seek to have the new concept of operations formalized in a new UNSYG report and clarify among ourselves the degree of USG support we are willing to provide.

RWANDA TALKING POINTS:

- DoD supports doing "something" in Rwanda, but we are leery about the possibility of success for either option one or two. Our preferred option is three. This is a situation where we should choose diplomacy and humanitarian relief over an ill-fated resort to force.
- We oppose the resolution as it is currently drafted. While it does not appear controversial, it does not address the question of where the operation is centered. If it is centered in Kigali, the operation would necessarily involve securing the area around the airport and operating amidst the center of an ongoing civil war. If it was centered in the south, the operation could use the airport at Bujumbura, where there is not the problem of protecting the airport.
- Before the USG can vote on a resolution, we need to have a clear understanding of the concept of operations and a commitment that it will be reflected in a new document presented by the UNSYG.
- If we opt to support a PKO, we would prefer Option 2.
- Regardless of mandate (Chapter VI or Chapter VII), if we are not up front with troop-contributing nations about the potential dangers to their forces and the lethality of the role we expect them to fulfill, we risk setting up another operation to fail.
- We recognize that there are additional issues surrounding Option 2 that require discussion (e.g., will we replicate "safe havens" in other areas of Rwanda, and expand the southern one as necessary?).
- Under no circumstance do we wish to have U.S. ground forces involved in a Rwanda PKO. We fear that we will be sucked into a heavy logistical burden under either option but particularly under option 2 which will so become known as "The American option." The Deputies need to discuss and decide whether U.S. ground force participation, even in a neighboring country, is acceptable since it could determine the viability of the concept or of the operation.
- (If asked) The DoD has already provided a great deal of assistance. This includes C-141 flights flying in 400,000 lbs of plastic sheeting and blankets. In addition, DoD has plans to provide an additional 300 metric tons, including additional plastic sheeting and blankets, trucks, medicine, and cooking oil.

COORDINATION:

S&R -----
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Support the RPF

(S) There is a fourth option which has yet to be considered interagency-- abandoning our neutral position and supporting a Tutsi-Moderate Hutu coalition government. Such an entity does not formally exist at this instant. However, we believe one could be brought to being quickly in northern Rwanda, under the umbrella of the Arusha Peace Accords signed last August in Tanzania between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Government of Rwanda. Some members of that Government escaped assassination by the Hutu extremists and are now in northern Rwanda under the protection of the RPF.

- (C) The present mind-set of the world is that this crisis is a battle between a majority-led legitimate government and a rebel force that represents only a small minority of the population. However, OSD does not believe this to be the case. It is becoming clearer by the day that this crisis is actually a battle between an illegitimate Interim Government force (responsible for hundreds of thousands of deaths of its own citizens of both tribes and representing only a small minority of the population, the extremist Hutu faction), and a Tutsi/Moderate Hutu coalition whose military arm is the predominately Tutsi-led RPF.

- (C) We believe a military victory by this coalition would provide a solution to all of the problems listed above: it would stop the killings of civilians-- there have been no massacres of Hutu civilians in areas under RPF control; it would provide security for civilians at the most risk--NGOs report they are able to move freely in the areas under RPF control; it would allow the provision of humanitarian assistance without destabilizing Burundi to the point civil war breaks out there--the Burundi (Tutsi-led) Military and (Moderate-Hutu) Government would both be reassured by a coalition of moderate Hutus and Tutsis. An unstable "forced" agreement between the RPF and the Interim Government would be more likely to destabilize Burundi in the long run in our opinion.

- (S) Steps to accomplish this option are:

- a. Call for formal UN recognition of the RPF/Hutu coalition as the legitimate government of Rwanda, and a return to implementation of a legitimate transition government under the terms of the Arusha accord

- b. Call for Member Nations to expel representatives of the extremist-Hutu "Interim Government" We have already made strong statements to the "Interim Government" (Tab I).

- c. Continue with actions to install an arms embargo on the forces of the "Interim Government".

- d. Provide non-lethal security assistance support to the RPF/Hutu coalition transition government as it finishes up establishing control over the nation. The DIO for Africa believes that it would take very little aid (logistics primarily) to tip the military balance in the RPF's favor.

• ~~(C)~~ There are problems that must be overcome for this proposal to succeed:

a. The French (who were closely aligned with the Hutu government before the crisis and have been a supporter of the "Interim Government") will hate it at first sight, but we believe they could be brought on board if sufficient moderate Hutu public support for the concept can be generated and if adherence to the Arusha Accords is kept a prominent goal. The French might also agree to be brought on board as a balance to (likely) Belgium support (the Belgians have long been linked to the RPF--solo participation by either would be viewed with suspicion).

b. Other African Nations must be convinced as to the illegitimacy of the "Interim Government" before they will agree to the concept of UN support to a non-elected faction in the act of assuming control of a country.

c. Currently regional neighbors have a personal stake in this crisis--Uganda is supporting the RPF and Zaire is supporting the "Interim Government." This should not pose a problem to this option, but sensitivities to this fact must be considered.

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Washington, D.C. 20520 9411350

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MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: Discussion Paper for the Deputies Committee on
Peacekeeping Options in Rwanda

PDD-25 requires Deputies Committee-level approval of all U.S. votes in the United Nations Security Council to establish new peacekeeping operations. The Peacekeeping Core Group is to provide an analysis of the options to aid the Deputies in their decision.

The proposed expansion of the size and mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) changes the operation significantly enough to qualify in effect as a "new" mission. The attached discussion paper analyzes three proposals now before the Security Council in relation to the decision factors set out in PDD-25.

Your assistance in distributing the attached paper to all members of the Deputies Committee is appreciated.

Marc Grossman
Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachment: Discussion Paper on Rwanda

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RWANDA OPTIONS PAPER

This paper considers three options for bringing humanitarian assistance to the victims of the conflict in Rwanda. After describing the options, the paper assesses whether they meet or do not meet the guidelines in PDD 25, and then sets forth the resources available from the U.S. Note: In a letter to UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, OAU Secretary General Salim Salim said that his organization would not take the lead in providing forces for a peace operation in Rwanda.

Briefly, the options are:

1. A UN-proposed military operation based out of Kigali to assure the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Rwanda.
2. A cross-border military operation to secure zones in Rwanda to protect and care for those at risk.
3. A humanitarian operation, without the use of force, to assist Rwandan refugees in the border areas outside Rwanda.

I. The Kigali based option

The UN is proposing a UN peacekeeping operation based out of Kigali. UNAMIR Commander Dallaire is asking for a force of 5,500 troops, with a mandate to use force as necessary to assure delivery of humanitarian assistance and to protect persons in threatened enclaves, by, for example, breaking through roadblocks manned by hoodlums and disarming roving gangs. Dallaire believes this can be done under Chapter VI authority. He has requested 150 M-113 armored personnel carriers to protect his troops. He estimates the costs for the first six months of such an operation at \$115 million.

II. The cross border option with force

The second option would be a military operation to

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establish secure zones in Rwanda for the protection of persons at risk and for the delivery of humanitarian relief. Humanitarian assistance would be stored in neighboring countries and transported into the secure zones. The mission would defend the zones' perimeters against incursions and, within the zones, enforce security, disarm civilians and escort humanitarian assistance shipments. At the very least this would be a Chapter VI-Plus operation. Even if the Interim Government of Rwanda and the Rwanda Patriotic Front agree to the mission, the existence of renegade military units and civilian militia outside the control of Government authorities makes Rwanda a semi-permissive environment.

Based on known flows of refugees and displaced persons and the location of persons at risk, the zones should be set up on the Rwanda border with Burundi. The UN force would establish a secure zone inside Rwanda along the border with Burundi to ~~protect refugees/displaced persons in most immediate danger and~~ provide security for the delivery of humanitarian relief to those personnel. The force would deploy to Burundi, establish a base of operations in Burundi near the Rwandan border, conduct cross-border operations to secure and establish displaced persons camps within Rwanda, and provide continuous security for the operation of those camps. The force would establish security for UNHCR-run camps but not transport displaced persons to the camps. The force would also secure ~~lines of communication and relief convoys in the zone.~~

Rules of engagement would clearly spell out the authority of the UN force commander to defend the humanitarian mission, to include UN forces, camps and displaced persons being protected.

The concept relies on the following assumptions:

- [a] the current UNAMIR force would remain in Kigali to help negotiate a political settlement and provide the overall force commander;
- [b] well trained, disciplined troops will be available for the mission;
- [c] the UN has RPF/RGF permission to establish the zone in Rwanda, and Burundi permission to establish base operations in, and allow logistic support of secure zone through, Burundi;
- [d] UNHCR would run the camps, and the UN force would only provide security; and

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[e] the UN and the NGOs would be responsible for transportation and distribution of humanitarian supplies into Rwanda, while the UN force would provide its own logistic support.

The UN force would debark in Burundi, establish a forward support base near the Rwandan border, and conduct operations to establish a secure zone for the displaced persons camps. About 6,000-6,500 UN force personnel per 100,000 refugees/displaced persons would be required.

This option does not address the fate of those in enclaves elsewhere in Rwanda. UNAMIR forces in Kigali would continue their responsibility for the safety of persons currently under their protection.

III. The operation without force

In the third option, the UN and various NGOs would facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Rwandan refugees in neighboring countries and ensure that they have safe havens outside Rwanda. This would not involve the use of troops. The U.S. would probably provide airlift outside Rwanda on a reimbursable basis, as well as substantial funding.

The international community would see this option as nothing different from what is already being done. Support for this option would probably leave the U.S. isolated on the Security Council. This option, like option 2, also would not address the problem how to rescue those within Rwanda, including the people in the Kigali stadium and other enclaves.

Analysis of guidelines for U.S. decision to support

1. Whether UN involvement advances U.S. interests, and an international community of interest exists for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis.

- For option 1, YES. The U.S. has a general interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in the region and a strong humanitarian interest. Both the UN Security Council and the OAU are exploring peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance options. Neighboring states, led by Tanzania and supported by the U.S., are pressing for a resumption of the Arusha peace talks.

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-- For option 2, the same.

-- For option 3, the same.

OSD agrees with State's assessment. However, we believe sending in 5,000-15,000 troops represents a commitment which may exceed the U.S.' "general interest in the maintenance of peace and stability in the region."

2. Whether there is a threat to or breach of international peace and security, often of a regional character, defined as one or a combination of the following: (a) international aggression; (b) urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence; or (c) sudden interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with violence, or threat of violence.

-- For option 1, YES. The killing of over 100,000 people over the past month, with many more continuing to be at risk, and the need for humanitarian assistance for up to 500,000 refugees and displaced persons, constitute a humanitarian disaster coupled with violence. The death of the Rwandan President and subsequent assassination of much of Rwanda's political opposition constituted a sudden and unexpected interruption of the democratic process. The wholesale slaughter of civilians constituted a gross violation of human rights coupled with violence and the threat thereof.

-- For option 2, the same.

-- For option 3, the same.

3. Whether there are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

-- For option 1, NOT YET. We have not seen a clearly developed concept. Those who have developed the idea believe that it could be a Chapter VI operation, but it is hard to see how it could remain that way in a civil war. A Kigali-based operation would likely require a Chapter VII mandate unless the warring sides were to acquiesce in the UN mission. Even then it would require a robust Chapter VI mandate, given the

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Interim Government's lack of command and control over renegade army units and extremist militias.

- For option 2, NOT YET. This is a possible U.S. proposed alternative to option 1, and, therefore, if we believe it preferable, we ourselves would need to develop the mission statement further, and define where on the peace operations spectrum it should fit. Since this force is designed to operate outside the area of maximum confrontation between the government and rebel forces, it would be less likely to provoke major confrontation with either side than option 1, and would be more likely, therefore, to operate within a Chapter VI mandate, albeit at the rougher end of the peacekeeping part of this spectrum.

Joint Staff believes that the establishment of a protective zone would be very likely to provoke major confrontation with the Presidential Guard, militias and roving gangs intent on continued slaughter of moderate Hutus and Tutsis. Therefore, Chapter VII rules of engagement and mandate would likely be required.

- For option 3, NO. This would be neither peacekeeping nor peace enforcement. How the mission could operate without any force component is also unclear.

OSD believes that both options 1 and 2 would be Chapter VII operations undertaken by African forces with robust rules of engagement, and that option 3 is not going to stop the killings.

4. Whether, if UNAMIR is to remain a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation, a cease-fire is in place; or, if it is to become a Chapter VII peace enforcement operation, the threat to international peace and security is considered significant.

- For option 1, NO on Chapter VI. No cease-fire is in place, and, given the lack of command and control exercised by the Interim Government over renegade military forces and Hutu militia, it is debatable how effective a cease-fire would be.

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- For option 1, YES on Chapter VII. A significant threat does exist to international peace and security. The refugee flows threaten to overwhelm resources in neighboring states. The violence in Rwanda also threatens to spill over into neighboring Burundi.
- For option 2, NO on Chapter VI. No cease-fire is in place. Option 2 is designed to put forces in areas of minimum confrontation between the warring parties. The issue whether Chapter VI is applicable devolves, therefore, on whether each of the parties is prepared to accept a UN presence.

Joint Staff believes that agreement of Rwandan government to cease-fire proposal could not necessarily be considered to constitute assent by Presidential Guard, hard-line Hutu militias, and roving gangs behind government lines, all of whom have been implicated in slaughter. To date, Government forces unable to control mass killings of Tutsis and moderate Hutu. Joint Staff position underscores Option 2 as probable Chapter VII operation, especially on Rwanda-Burundi border, where possibility of confrontation with Hutu extremists likely to be greatest.

- For option 2, YES on international significance.
- For option 3, NO on the cease-fire.

5. Whether the means to accomplish the mission are available, including the forces, financing and a mandate appropriate to the mission.

- For option 1, UNCLEAR. The availability of adequate numbers and quality of troops for this mission is questionable. Nigeria has offered a battalion, and Zimbabwean and Ghanaian battalions are said to be available. The UN and OAU are optimistic that sufficient forces can be found. Experience in Somalia suggests, however, that a Chapter VII operation would require a U.S. or Western European combat capability, which appears unlikely in Rwanda. Sufficient financing for a Chapter VII mission also is doubtful.

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It may be available for a Chapter VI mission. The UN Secretariat estimates a cost for the first six months of \$115 million for this option. A hybrid of a voluntary fund and assessed contributions is possible in order to access money authorized for the existing assessment for UNAMIR. The U.S. theoretically could provide up to \$173.3 million in DoD drawdown, PKO and CIPA assistance. We also have up to \$60 million in reallocation authority, although this will mean reducing or eliminating other programs.

-- For option 2, MORE LIKELY. While this option may require at least as many forces as option 1, the military character is different and the quality of forces need not be so high.

Joint Staff believes just the opposite. Forces will be in peace-enforcement role protecting displaced Tutsis and moderate Hutus from roving gang, militias, and Presidential Guard; will require clearing secure zones, searching and disarming (if necessary) displaced Rwandans allowed into camps, and then protecting those camps. Questions about how displaced Rwandans get to camps have yet to be answered. Any intent to have UN/OAU forces go out and bring back displaced Rwandans to camps will require operations in territory controlled by Rwandan government troops and possible direct confrontation with gangs, militias and Presidential Guard forces.

Moreover, assuming RPF remains true to stated intent of continuing Southward movement to punish "rogues" who have committed slaughter, expect Presidential Guard, militias and gangs to retreat in face of advance and attempt to seek refuge in UN-held camps. Significant possibility exists for PKO forces to conflict with either extremist Hutus, or with RPF should RPF believe extremists are seeking safe haven in camps.

Need to remain neutral under above situations will continuously challenge Option 2 forces. Therefore, quality and capability of troops performing mission must be as high as, if not higher than, those posited for Option 1.

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OSD disagrees with State's analysis for options 1 and 2. We believe "NO" is the correct answer for both. While option 1 is almost a repeat of the Somalia experience and is therefore unlikely to generate much support, State presents a faulty argument for option 2 that may be misleading. State asserts that option 2 may require at least as many forces as option 1, but that the military character is different and the quality of forces need not be so high. We strongly disagree that forces charged with protection of displaced persons in only a "semi-permissive" environment (facing uncontrolled gangs, the Presidential Guard, and militias) do not need the training, equipment, or support that a force operating in a non-permissive environment requires. **Furthermore, there is no evidence outside of Boutros-Ghali's optimism, that support, forces and equipment, can be marshaled for any large operation in Rwanda.**

-- For option 3, N/A.

6. Whether the political, economic and humanitarian consequences of inaction by the international community have been weighed and are considered unacceptable.

-- For option 1, **YES**. The international community clearly views what is happening in Rwanda as a humanitarian disaster of the highest magnitude and considers inaction to be unacceptable.

-- For option 2, the same.

-- For option 3, the same. But option 3 may be viewed as inaction.

OSD agrees that inaction is unacceptable, however, we do not believe that our present activities (or option 3) are "inaction."

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7. Whether the operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic guidelines for ending the operation.

- For option 1, NO. The duration of each is tied to a restoration of sufficient order in Rwanda to allow return of refugees and the absence of serious threat to humanitarian efforts. While criteria are clear enough, the time by which to meet them would be indeterminate.
- For option 2, the same.
- For option 3, the same.

PDD guidelines for U.S. participation

On the assumption that U.S. participation is highly unlikely, this paper does not consider the PDD guidelines for U.S. participation.

Resources available from the U.S.

The U.S. has the following resources available:

- \$75,000,000 FAA Sec. 506(a)(1) DoD drawdown
- \$75,000,000 FAA Sec. 506(a)(2) DoD drawdown
- \$10,000,000 Unspent UNAMIR CIPA
- \$13,000,000 Unspent Sec. 551 Haiti PKO account
- \$ 700,000 Unspent Sec. 552(c)(2) DoD drawdown

- \$173,700,000 Funds/Drawdown Authority Available

- \$15,000,000 Sec. 552(c)(1) reallocation authority
- \$45,000,000 Sec. 451(a)(1) reallocation authority

- \$60,000,000 Total reallocation authorized

- \$233,000,000 Total Funds/Drawdown/Reallocation

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Session 4

“Lessons from Rwanda”

Documents List

Page No.	Date	Author	Title	Source	Notes
4-1	4/29/1994	Quesnot	Quesnot Situation in Rwanda FRENCH	Mitterand Archive	French language (original)
4-4	4/29/1994	Quesnot	Quesnot Situation in Rwanda ENGLISH	Mitterand Archive	English language (translation)
4-6	5/5/1994	Pin	The Situation in Rwanda FRENCH	Mitterand Archive	French language (original)
4-11	5/5/1994	Pin	The Situation in Rwanda ENGLISH	Mitterand Archive	English language (translation)
4-14	5/24/1994	Quesnot	Correspondence of Dr. Théodore SINDIKUBWABO, Interim President of Rwanda FRENCH	Mitterand Archive	French language (original)
4-15	5/24/1994	Quesnot	Correspondence of Dr. Théodore SINDIKUBWABO, Interim President of Rwanda ENGLISH	Mitterand Archive	English language (translation)
4-16	6/1/1994	NGA	Satellite photo of Butare roadblocks	US District Court New Hampshire evidence	
4-17	6/1/1994	NGA	Closeup of logs on road	US District Court New Hampshire evidence	

Entretien avec Françoise Carle

Situation au Rwanda.

Bruno Delaye :

"On n'a pas encore reçu beaucoup d'images, mais les télévisions vont maintenant au Rwanda, et les images qui vont arriver pendant le week-end vont gâcher la soirée du dimanche : ce n'est pas beau à voir.

La communauté internationale ne fait rien. Les Nations Unies proposent un embargo sur les armes ! Mais cela n'empêchera pas l'armée rwandaise d'avoir des machettes, et le FPR a des armes lourdes.

Les pays de la région essaient d'imposer un cessez le feu, chacun avec ses arrière-pensées.

La grosse difficulté, c'est une certaine apathie française. J'ai eu un mal fou à convaincre Matignon d'envoyer une aide humanitaire. Ils devraient se rendre compte, aussi, que devant les télévisions les Rwandais vont appeler au secours. Ce sont des gens d'expression française, ils ne diront pas "Help !", ils diront "au secours", et l'opinion les entendra. Quand on dit au secours en anglais, en somalien ou en éthiopien, tout le monde s'en fout, mais en français ça aura un certain effet... Matignon a fini par envoyer 48 tonnes de secours, mais sans accompagnement. Ce sont les ONG qui devront les distribuer . C'est à dire qu'il n'y a rien de fait.

Le silence français est assourdissant.

L'organisation tutsie est excellente, elle a su sensibiliser en faveur des tutsis, et faire considérer les autres comme une bande d'assassins choyés, équipés par la France. Cette idée-là est la tendance dominante partout.

Les collègues diplomates disent : il faut attendre le rapport du secrétaire général de l'ONU, attendre les résultats de la mission de l'ONU... Mais il

ne sortira rien de l'ONU ! La décision d'instaurer un embargo est parfaitement hypocrite. On aura peut-être un cessez le feu, et le démembrement de l'état rwandais ; les hutus iront s'entasser au sud - le pays est très, très peuplé - et ils vivront de l'aide internationale.

Au Burundi, chaque jour passé sans crise est un miracle. Le Zaïre est déjà fragile : l'armée n'est pas payée, elle pille en compensation. On va arriver à un démembrement complet. Les Belges sont lamentables sur toute la ligne - d'ailleurs, chez eux, Flamands et Wallons, c'est comme hutu et tutsi. Ils sont incapables de mener une politique africaine. Et on nous dit qu'il faut agir avec la Belgique, la communauté internationale... Cela ne veut rien dire pour le Rwanda.

Au Conseil restreint mercredi, j'espère qu'il y aura des propositions. Il en faut, sur le plan humanitaire, et pour stabiliser le Burundi. Et il faudrait traiter le Zaïre de façon différente. Je vais horrifier par mes propos, mais on a besoin de Mobutu : il faut le sortir de son relatif isolement.

Le véritable problème est cette espèce d'atonie générale.

Christian Quesnot :

Je connais le Rwanda. Ce qui se passe est abominable. Des gens m'ont dit : ce sont des Noirs, pas des Blancs, ils peuvent crever ! Au Burundi cela ne va pas tenir, au Zaïre non plus, et cela gagnera la Tanzanie. Nous sommes aussi coupables, car les accords d'Arusha auxquels nous avons activement contribué sont trop déséquilibrés. On a poussé les Hutus à signer, surtout l'accord Arusha 4 donnant un avantage exorbitant au FPR dans l'encadrement de la future armée rwandaise. On a fait pression sur les Hutus pour qu'ils signent des conditions intenable.

Le FPR est le parti le plus fasciste que j'aie rencontré en Afrique. Il peut être assimilé à des "khmers noirs". Il a une complicité belge. On a dit : les Hutus ont abattu l'avion d'Habyarimana. Mais c'est faux. Ce sont des mercenaires, recrutés par le FPR ou issus de lui, qui ont abattu l'avion. Et alors, la garde présidentielle, dont le chef avait été tué avec le Président et qui n'est pas composée d'enfants de chœur, s'est mise à massacrer : on avait tué leur Président. C'était exactement ce que

Par de
revenir

voulait le FPR, car le président Habyariamana constituait le seul véritable obstacle à sa prise de pouvoir.

Derrière tout cela il y a aussi Museweni (le président ougandais), qui veut créer un Tutsiland avec la complicité objective des anglo-saxons, qui estiment que Museweni doit devenir le leader régional et assurer la stabilité dans la zone des Grands Lacs. Ils se trompent, car une ethnie majoritaire à 90 % n'acceptera pas la domination d'une ethnie minoritaire tutsie (10 %)

Tant que nous avons eu sur place environ une compagnie de parachutistes qui formaient les militaires rwandais, il n'y a pas eu de massacres. Notre présence militaire a empêché le FPR de s'emparer du pouvoir par la force, et a permis d'amener les deux parties à une table de négociations et à signer les accords d'Arusha. Notre présence militaire aurait arrêté les massacres. A Kigali, 2500 soldats de l'ONU ont été incapables d'arrêter quoi que ce soit. L'introduction du multilatéralisme en Afrique est criminelle. Nous devrions tous avoir honte."

Bruno Delaye, Christian Quesnot**April 29, 1994**

Interview with François Carle.

Situation in Rwanda.**Bruno Delaye:**

"We have not yet received many images, but the television crews are going to Rwanda now, and the images that are going to arrive over the weekend will spoil Sunday evening: it is not a pretty sight.

The international community does nothing. The United Nations proposes an arms embargo! But that will not prevent the Rwandan army from having machetes, or the RPF from having heavy arms.

The countries in the region are trying to impose a cease-fire, each one with its own ulterior motives.

The main difficulty is the French apathy. I had a devil of a time to convince Matignon to send humanitarian aid. They must realize, as well, that the Rwandans will call for rescue in front of the television cameras. These are French speakers; they will not say, "Help!" but "au secours," and public opinion will hear them. When one calls for help in English, in Somali, or in Ethiopian, no one gives a damn, but in French it will have a certain effect...Matignon eventually sent 48 tons of aid, but without accompaniment. The NGOs will have to distribute it. That is to say, nothing has been done.

The French silence is deafening.

The Tutsi organization is excellent; it knew how to raise awareness in favor of the Tutsis, and to have the others considered a band of pampered assassins, equipped by France. This idea is dominant everywhere.

The diplomatic colleagues say: we must wait for the UN General Secretary's report, wait for the results of the UN mission...but nothing will come from the UN! The decision to establish an embargo is perfectly hypocritical. We could perhaps have a cease-fire, and the dismemberment of the Rwandan state; the Hutus will crowd into the south—the country is very, very highly populated—and they will live off of international assistance.

In Burundi, each day that passes without crisis is a miracle. Zaire is already fragile: the army has not been paid, and it pillages for compensation. We are going to see a complete breaking-up. The

Belgians are totally pathetic—and in fact, the Flemings and Walloons there are like Hutus and Tutsis. They are incapable of having an African policy. And we are told that we must act with Belgium, with the international community...this means nothing for Rwanda.

I hope that there will be propositions at the Restricted Council on Wednesday. They are needed, for humanitarian reasons, and to stabilize Burundi. And we must treat Zaire differently. I will horrify with my proposal, but we need Mobutu: we must bring him out of his relative isolation.

The real problem is this kind of general sluggishness.

Christian Quesnot:

I know Rwanda. What is going on is abominable. People have told me: these are blacks, not whites; they can die! In Burundi this will not stand, neither in Zaire, and this will win over Tanzania. We are also guilty, because the Arusha Accords, to which we actively contributed, and too imbalanced. We pushed the Hutus to sign, especially the Arusha Accord 4, which gave the RPF an outrageous advantage in the formation of the future Rwandan army. We pressured the Hutus to agree to intolerable conditions.

The RPF is the most fascist party I have encountered in Africa. They are like the "black khmers." Belgium is their accomplice. We said that the Hutus attacked Habyarimana's airplane. But that is wrong. It was mercenaries, recruited by the RPF or from it, who attacked the airplane. And so, the Presidential Guard, whose head had been killed along with the president and which is not composed of choirboys, began to massacre: their President had been killed. That is exactly what the RPF wanted, because President Habyarimana was the only real obstacle to their taking power.

Behind all this, there is also Museweni (the Ugandan president), who wants to create a Tutsiland with the objective complicity of the Anglo-Saxons, who believe that Museweni is going to become the regional leader and ensure stability in the Great Lakes region. They are wrong, because an ethnic majority of 90% will not accept domination of a Tutsi ethnic minority (10%).

As long as we had about a company of parachutists on the ground to train the Rwandan soldiers, there were no massacres. Our military presence prevented the RPF from seizing power by force and allowed the two parties to come to the negotiation table and sign the Arusha Accords. Our military presence would have stopped the massacres. In Kigali, 2,500 UN soldiers have been incapable of stopping anything at all. The introduction of multilateralism to Africa is criminal. We should all be ashamed."

le 5 mai 1994

Dominique Pin

(entretien avec Françoise Carle)

Non relu par D. Pin

La situation au Rwanda :

Le Rwanda était un petit Etat où on vivait à peu près bien, qui se gouvernait bien. Depuis 1973 le président était Habyarimana, Hutu du Nord, et il tenait un régime "fort", mais qui n'avait rien à voir avec de la corruption.

Le Rwanda s'est trouvé confronté à un double problème :

1. l'ouverture démocratique nécessaire, avec l'émergence d'une opposition intérieure développée par les Hutus du Sud ;

2. Surtout : le retour de force des réfugiés Tutsis partis en Ouganda en 1959, lorsque les Belges, appuyés sur la majorité hutu, ont essayé de déclencher une prise de pouvoir par les hutus. Les Tutsis se sont alors réfugiés en Ouganda (où on en a fait des militaires, des mercenaires, dit Bruno Delaye). Ils ont cherché à en revenir dans les années 70, mais le Rwanda est un pays très peuplé. Ils n'ont pas eu alors d'autre choix que de s'engager auprès de Museweni, et de l'aider à prendre le pouvoir.

Puis il y a eu en Ouganda une réaction contre le fait que les Rwandais prenaient une place importante dans l'armée, la haute administration. Museweni a renvoyé l'ascenseur en 1990, lorsque le FPR est entré par force au Rwanda. Ils sont arrivés armés, ont continué d'avoir des relations avec l'Ouganda, et ont engagé une guerre face à l'armée rwandaise pas très organisée.

Nous avons aidé l'armée rwandaise, sous couvert d'envoi de troupes pour protéger les ressortissants français.

Le FPR est arrivé à 5 km seulement de Kigali, en poussant devant lui un million de personnes réfugiées. Il pouvait l'emporter. Mais il a craint les

Français. Donc, nous avons réussi à geler la situation, pas pour sauver Habyarimana - qui n'a rien d'un féroce dictateur, il était plutôt un type sympathique, simple - mais pour qu'il puisse commencer à ouvrir son régime.

Nous disions : il n'y a pas de solution militaire, il faut négocier. Nous ne pouvons pas accepter qu'une opposition, armée par un pays voisin, revienne prendre le pouvoir par la force : sinon, on fout en l'air toute l'Afrique !

Museweni, de son côté, se débarrassait de ses réfugiés anglophones.

Il y a eu des négociations à Arusha, en Tanzanie, pour construire la transition démocratique. Là, quelques Hutus partisans de l'opposition à Habyarimana ont semé le trouble : ils ont pensé venir dans les valises du FPR, mais étant majoritaires par rapport à celui-ci, lors des élections ils pourraient mettre le FPR de côté. L'opposition hutu sentait que Habyarimana était déstabilisé, et voulait une revanche des hutus du Sud contre les hutus du Nord. Le pouvoir paraissait à prendre, et elle espérait le prendre à terme. Ce qu'elle oubliait, c'était que le FPR c'était 20 000 hommes en armes, qui voulaient bien d'un gouvernement-croupion, mais pas plus.

Les accords d'Arusha ont été signés, le gouvernement de transition a été mis en place. Chaque parti avait un quota de ministres et de députés au gouvernement, au Parlement, et Habyarimana était reconduit comme Président. Il y avait aussi, prévus dans les accords d'Arusha, des quotas dans l'armée, inacceptables mais qui ont été acceptés : 40 % des postes militaires pour le FPR...

De plus le FPR exigeait, pour sa protection, de ne participer à la transition que s'il conservait un bataillon de 600 hommes pour sa sécurité et à condition que les forces françaises s'en aillent.

Nous avons essayé de convaincre les Nations Unies de ce que la crise venait de l'extérieur, pas de l'intérieur, et qu'une force devait être déployée, l'une à l'intérieur du pays, l'autre à la frontière avec l'Ouganda. Nous avons obtenu un déploiement d'observateurs à la

frontière, et 2500 hommes de la MINUAR, dont beaucoup de Belges. Il a fallu plus d'un an pour cela : les Etats-Unis y étaient opposés pour des raisons financières, les Russes ne voulaient pas, la Grande Bretagne n'y était pas favorable... Mais enfin on a pu l'imposer.

Pendant ce temps le blocage politique s'accroissait, et le pouvoir du Président était contesté. A Arusha, le FPR a refusé qu'on parle des problèmes de justice, d'amnistie. Une procédure de destitution du Président a été mise en place ; elle pouvait être contrée si Habyarimana avait une minorité de blocage, à la fois au Parlement et au gouvernement.

Nous disions : il faut jouer la démocratie, vous avez votre place dans le pays. Ils refusaient. Dans le processus de désignation des représentants de chaque partis, chacun travaillait les siens. Le FPR disait : Habyarimana bloque tout. Habyarimana répondait : non, mais je ne veux pas que le FPR ait tout.

Dans la dernière période, Habyarimana semblait l'emporter : le FPR avait trop d'exigences. Il avait obtenu un accord en février, qui lui donnait une minorité de blocage. Mais le FPR a refusé, il y a eu blocage à nouveau. Une réunion a eu lieu en Tanzanie pour essayer de débloquer. C'est au retour qu'a eu lieu l'attentat.

L'entourage du Président aurait accusé les Belges. On ne sait pas, mais cela a déclenché ce qu'on redoutait.

J'ai immédiatement dit : il va y avoir des massacres des hutus modérés. L'opposition participait au gouvernement, le Premier ministre était issu de l'opposition modérée, assez sympathisante du FPR et qui essayait d'arriver dans ses valises. Les Hutus du Nord, partisans du président assassiné, ont fait la peau des hutus modérés puis se sont retournés contre les tutsis.

Au FPR tout était prêt. Une offensive a été lancée pour faire la jonction entre les 600 hommes dans la capitale, et les forces à l'extérieur.

Alors il y a eu des massacres effroyables. On ne peut même pas dire que c'était bestial : les animaux ne font pas ça. On a vu un exode sans précédent vers les pays voisins. L'Est du pays est plus ou moins contrôlé par le FPR. Il y a entre 300 000 et 600 000 personnes qui ont fui le FPR.

Nous nous sommes tenus prêts à intervenir rapidement pour sauver nos ressortissants, on en a sauvé beaucoup d'autres aussi. Cela était prévu en deux étapes : d'abord l'envoi de militaires, pour établir une plateforme de sécurité sur l'aéroport, puis peut-être pouvait-on essayer de calmer les choses.

On a négocié cela avec l'armée rwandaise, et cela s'est bien passé. Mais les Belges ont lancé l'évacuation tout de suite, les Etats-Unis ont évacué les leurs par la route. Nous étions sur place, nous pouvions faire quelque chose ; Roussin, ministre de la coopération, est intervenu pour dire : nous sommes là pour les Français seuls. C'est à dire : on emmène nos ressortissants et on se tire.

Les Belges étaient partis pour le Rwanda avec plusieurs avions, mais les rwandais ne voulaient pas les laisser atterrir, les jugeant complices de la mort du président. Le contingent belge a été nul dans cette affaire, ils se sont laissés désarmer par la garde présidentielle, puis massacrer.

Donc on évacue ; ensuite l'ONU décide qu'il doit y avoir un retrait total des forces de l'ONU, en ne laissant qu'un maintien symbolique : ils passent de 2500 hommes à 270 hommes.

On en est là. Le monde entier assiste au massacre, avec de bonnes paroles. Les Etats-Unis pressés par CNN décident de dire : il faut aider les Africains à se financer leur propre force.

Or, nous ne réussirons pas plus cela qu'on ne l'a réussi au Libéria. Mais ainsi les Etats-Unis calent leur opinion, elle est en phase : pas un GI ne sera envoyé, on fait de l'aide humanitaire et on décide un embargo sur les armes. Mais les armes sont surtout des machettes, et les Ougandais ne sont pas contrôlables. Le FPR ne pourra pas gouverner; sauf par une dictature militaire avec des collaborateurs hutus. Cela ne durera pas, il y

aura une longue guérilla. Les Etats-Unis calment leur opinion pour des raisons de politique intérieure.

Le gouvernement français a fait montre d'une apathie coupable. Le discours était : on se replie sur l'hexagone. Et ainsi, on donne l'impression de lâcher nos amis. Si les Français et les Belges étaient restés un mois de plus sur place, on n'aurait pas eu les massacres.

Nous passons notre temps à bousculer le gouvernement et à chercher à obtenir de l'aide humanitaire. On a réussi à renvoyer notre ambassadeur à Kigali (il était rentré en France) pour une mission d'information.

Il faudrait agir à la fois sur Museweni et sur Mobutu. Des négociations peuvent intervenir, et on passe notre temps à nous cacher derrière le multilatéralisme, l'action multinationale. Une résolution du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies ne va pas arrêter les coupe-coupe.

Si on a pu évacuer rapidement Kigali, c'est parce que François Mitterrand avait demandé, à Joxe, qu'on soit prêts à cela. On est obligés de tenir compte de la position du gouvernement, nous sommes en situation de cohabitation. Je suis convaincu personnellement que s'il n'y avait pas eu la cohabitation, on aurait agi autrement et évité les massacres.

Dominique Pin

Notes taken by
Françoise Carle
On
May 5, 1994

The situation in Rwanda:

Rwanda was a small country where one lived fairly well, which was governed well. Since 1973, the president has been Habyarimana, a Hutu from the north, and his regime was “strong,” but had nothing to do with corruption.

The Rwanda has been confronted by a double problem:

1. the emergence of an interior opposition developed by the Hutus of the south necessitates democratic opening;
2. Above all: the Tutsi refugees who went to Uganda in 1959, when the Belgians, supporting the Hutu majority, tried to instigate a Hutu takeover, have come back in force. In 1959, the Tutsis became refugees in Uganda (where they were turned into soldiers and mercenaries, says Bruno Delaye). They have tried to come back since the seventies, but the Rwanda is a very densely populated country. Therefore, they had no choice but to get involved with Museweni, and to help him take power.

Then, there was a reaction in Uganda against the fact that the Rwandans had an important position in the army and the high administration. Museweni returned the favor they had done him in 1990, when the RPF entered Rwanda by force. They arrived armed, have continued their relationship with Uganda, and have engaged in war against the unorganized Rwandan army.

We have helped the Rwandan army under the guise of sending troops to protect French nationals.

The RPF is within 5 kilometers of Kigali, pushing a million refugees before it. But it fears the French. Therefore, we have succeeded in slowing the situation down, not to save Habyarimana—who was nothing like a ferocious dictator, he was a pretty nice, simple guy—but to allow him to begin opening up his regime.

We said: there is no military solution, you must negotiate. We cannot accept that the opposition, armed by a neighboring country, has come back to take power by force: otherwise, we are screwing all of Africa over!

Museweni, for his part, has gotten rid of his English-speaking refugees.

There were negotiations in Arusha, in Tanzania, to build a democratic transition. Some Hutu representatives among the opposition to Habyarimana caused confusion there: they had thought to hide among the RPF, but, being in the majority, they realized they could get rid of the RPF when the elections came around. The Hutu opposition, from the south, thought that Habyarimana was destabilized, and wanted to contrast themselves with the northern Hutus. The power seemed to be up for grabs, and they wanted, ultimately, to take it. What they forgot was that the RPF was 20,000 armed men, who wanted a rump government, but nothing more.

The Arusha Accords were signed, the transitional government was put in place. Each party had a quota of ministers and deputies in the government and in Parliament, and Habyarimana was recognized as president. There were also, as planned in the Arusha Accords, quotas in the army, which were unacceptable but nevertheless accepted: 40% of the military posts would go to the RPF.

Furthermore the RPF insisted, for its own protection, that it would participate in the transition only if it could keep a battalion of 600 men for its security and on the condition that the French forces left.

We have tried to convince the United Nations that the crisis came from the outside, not the inside, and that two forces must be deployed, one in the interior of the country, and one along the Ugandan border. We have obtained a deployment of observers on the border, and 2500 men from UNAMIR, including many Belgians. This required more than a year: the United States was opposed for financial reasons, the Russians didn't want it, Great Britain was not supportive...but at last, we were able to pass it.

During this time, the political blockage became accentuated, and the President's power was contested. In Arusha, the RPF had refused to talk about problems of justice and amnesty. Impeachment proceedings for the president were put in place; these could be countered if Habyarimana had a blocking minority, both in Parliament and in the government.

We said: democracy must exist, you have your place in the country. They refused. In the process for designating representatives from each party, each worked for their own aims. The RPF said, Habyarimana is blocking everything. Habyarimana responded, No, but I don't want the RPF to have everything.

In the final negotiation period, Habyarimana seemed to have won: the RPF had too many requirements. He had obtained an agreement in February which gave him a blocking minority. But the RPF refused, and there was a new blockage. There was a meeting in Tanzania to try to remove the blockage. It was on the return from this meeting that the attack occurred.

The president's entourage accused the Belgians. We don't know what happened for sure, but this declaration set off what we feared it would.

I immediately said: there will be massacres of Hutu moderates. The opposition was part of the government, the Prime Minister was from the moderate opposition, sympathetic enough to the RPF and trying to negotiate with them. The northern Hutus, supporters of the assassinated President, killed the moderate Hutus and then turned against the Tutsis.

Within the RPF, everything was ready. An offensive was launched to bridge the gap between the 600 men in the capital and the forces outside it.

So, there were terrible massacres. We cannot even say that it was bestial: animals don't do things like this. We saw an unprecedented exodus towards the neighboring countries. The eastern part of the country is more or less controlled by the RPF. There are between 300,000 and 600,000 people who have fled the RPF.

We were ready to intervene quickly to rescue our nationals and saved many others as well. This was planned in two steps: first, to send soldiers to establish a security platform at the airport, then, maybe to try to calm things down.

We negotiated this with the Rwandan army and it went well. But the Belgians started their evacuation right away, and the United States evacuated their nationals by road. We were there, we could have done something; Roussin, Minister of Cooperation, said: we are only here for the French. That is to say: we're taking our nationals and clearing out.

The Belgians had left for Rwanda with several airplanes, but the Rwandans did not want to let them land, thinking them accomplices in the death of the president. The Belgian contingent was nothing in that affaire, they let the Presidential Guard disarm and massacre them.

So, we evacuate; then the UN decides that there must be a total withdrawal of UN forces, leaving nothing but a symbolic remainder: they go from 2500 to 270 men.

That's where we are now. The whole world is watching the massacre, with fine words. The United States, pressured by CNN, decide to say: the Africans must be helped to finance their own force.

Now, this won't work any better than it did in Liberia. But, in this way, the United States can stall their action and toe the line: not one GI will be sent, we will do humanitarian aid and we decide on an arms embargo. But the weapons being used are machetes, and the Ugandans cannot be controlled. The RPF will not be able to govern except by a military dictatorship with Hutu collaboration. That will not last, there will be a long guerrilla war. The United States is pacifying their opinion because of internal political reasons.

The French government has been culpably apathetic. The speeches were: we retreat back home. And so, we give the impression of letting go of our friends. If the French and the Belgians had stayed in Rwanda one month longer, there would not have been any massacres.

We pass our time by pushing the government around and trying to get humanitarian aid. We have succeeded in sending our ambassador to Kigali (he had returned to France) for an informational mission.

We must deal with Museweni and Mobutu at the same time. We could get involved with negotiations, but we pass our time hiding behind multilateralism, multinational action. A United Nations Security Council resolution will not stop the machetes.

We were only able to evacuate from Kigali quickly because François Mitterand asked Joxe to be ready for such a step. We are obliged to consider the government's position, we are in a cohabitation situation. I am personally convinced that if there had been no cohabitation, we would have acted otherwise and avoided the massacres.

PRÉSIDENCE
DE LA
RÉPUBLIQUE

Le 24 mai 1994



Le Général
Chef de l'Etat-Major Particulier

- N O T E -

à l'attention de Monsieur le Président de la République

OoO

Le Général
1/11

O B J E T : Correspondance du docteur Théodore SINDIKUBWABO
Président par intérim du RWANDA.

Suite à l'appel téléphonique du Président du Rwanda dimanche 22 mai dont je vous ai rendu compte ce matin à 11 heures 30, l'attaché de Défense Rwandais à PARIS m'a fait parvenir à votre intention la lettre jointe adressée par fax.

Sur le terrain le rapport de forces, y compris à Kigali, est de plus en plus favorable au FPR avec l'aide matérielle, militaire et diplomatique de l'OUGANDA et la complicité implicite de toutes les autres puissances.

Le sommet régional n'aura pas lieu et il n'y aura pas de véritable cessez le feu avant la conquête totale du pouvoir par le FPR. L'arrivée au pouvoir dans la région d'une minorité dont les buts et l'organisation ne sont pas sans analogie avec le système des Khmers rouges est un gage d'instabilité régionale dont les conséquences n'ont pas été anticipées par ceux, y compris en France, dont la complicité et la complaisance sont patentées.

Le Gouvernement, suite à la mission de Monsieur Douste Blasy, veut rendre encore plus visible notre contribution humanitaire au Burundi et en Tanzanie. Monsieur Juppé, sans illusion excessive, se dit prêt à faire une nouvelle démarche diplomatique auprès de Monsieur Museveni afin qu'il fasse pression sur le FPR pour l'amener à respecter un cessez le feu. L'arrivée de 5500 hommes de l'ONU en renforcement de la MINUAR reste problématique compte-tenu du peu d'enthousiasme des états africains et de l'inertie américaine.

Quesnot

Général QUESNOT

PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC

May 24, 1994

*The General
President's Chief of Staff*

- N O T E -

to the attention of the President of the Republic

0o0

S U B J E C T: Correspondence of Dr. Théodore SINDIKUBWABO, Interim President of RWANDA.

After the Rwandan President's telephone call on May 22, which I told you about this morning at 11:30, the Rwandan defense attaché in Paris faxed over the attached letter, which I am bringing to your attention.

On the ground the balance of power, including in Kigali, is more and more in the favor of the RPF, which has UGANDA's material, military, and diplomatic aid and the implicit complicity of all the other powers.

The regional summit is not going to take place and there will not be any real cease-fire before the RPF takes complete control. This minority, whose goals and organization are not without comparison to the Khmer Rouge, seizing power is a guarantee of regional instability, and the consequences have not yet been anticipated by those, including France, who are complicit and complacent.

The government, following Mr. Douste Blasy's mission, wants to make our humanitarian contribution in Burundi and Tanzania more visible. Mr. Juppé, without undue delusion, says he is ready to make a new diplomatic approach to Mr. Museveni, to have him put pressure on the RPF to respect a cease-fire. The arrival of 5,500 men from the UN to reinforce UNAMIR is still problematic, taking into account the lack of enthusiasm from the African states and the American inertia.

General QUESNOT

05 JUNE 1994

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 OBSTRUCTIONS

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01 JUNE 1994


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
PEOPLE



OBSTRUCTIONS



VEHICLES



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